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TORT LAW

LICENSE

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0.
Under this CC BY-NC license, you’re free to:
•
•

Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material

As licensor, I can’t revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms:
•

•

Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests
I endorse you or your use.
NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.

Notices:
•

•

You don’t have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public domain or
where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation.
No warranties are given. The license may not give you all of the permissions necessary for your
intended use. For example, other rights such as publicity, privacy, or moral rights may limit how
you use the material.

This non-commercial work also contains some copyrighted materials, the use of which I believe
constitutes fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. I’ve included these materials because
they provide valuable insights to students, scholars, and researchers, without profit to anyone involved.
The materials serve educational and research purposes, especially by shedding light on historical realities
behind particular legal decisions and helping people whose learning improves with visual aids.
The copyright status for each image in this work is noted on the page where the image appears, unless
an image is in the public domain. While I’ve included images for educational and research purposes, some
images might be subject to different rights restrictions if used for other purposes. If you wish to use
copyrighted material for your own purposes, you’re responsible for determining and satisfying any rights
restrictions, including obtaining any necessary permissions from the copyright owner. If you believe I’ve
included material that infringes your copyright, please contact me at tek@uga.edu.

For Natália, Popover, and Paçoca,
who woke me up early so I could
work on this book before class.
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TORT LAW

INTRODUCTION
A tort is a wrong. In a tort suit, the plaintiff demands a remedy by alleging that the defendant wronged
them. Tort law determines what counts as a tort, how plaintiffs may establish their claims, when
defendants may avoid liability, and which remedies plaintiffs may seek. Simply put, tort law is about civil
legal protection of bodily autonomy, emotional integrity, property rights, and dignitary interests.
This casebook explores tort law’s practice, structure, and theory by examining a range of torts. The
cases range from mundane and amusing disputes to serious and shocking situations. I expect you’ll find
that some outcomes make sense as a matter of justice, some make sense as a matter of policy, some make
sense as a matter of history or politics, and some make no sense at all. The best way to learn torts, I think,
is to study a broad set of cases, thinking critically about nuanced and controversial concepts like harm,
duty, consent, and causation. Tort law isn’t static—in many areas, the doctrine’s past and present are both
connected and divergent. Shifting social norms, new technologies, and changes in other legal regimes can
all shape and be shaped by tort law. I love this class, and I hope you’ll enjoy it too.
THE CASEBOOK

Torts is a mandatory class in every law school that I know. It’s taught all around the country, year
after year, usually with substantial similarity in the topics—and even the cases—that professors cover.
This makes a good deal of sense. After all, tort law is a key part of every bar exam and one of the building
blocks of American legal education, so it’s unsurprising that Torts syllabi don’t budge much over time.
Pedagogical consistency can be a virtue.
But despite the stability of the classic Torts curriculum, students must usually buy extortionate
casebooks. I say this from a position of personal experience and culpability: my professors made me buy
pricey books for my doctrinal classes as a student, and I demanded the same of my students when teaching
for the first time last year. This ancient law-school tradition creates huge financial burdens during a time
when many students are already shouldering colossal debt to pay for tuition and living expenses.
A few hundred bucks for a Torts casebook might seem paltry compared to the overall costs of a legal
education, but the expense can still pose significant financial hardships for individual students. And when
the costs are aggregated, the numbers are staggering. The book I used last year costs $298, meaning my
students would collectively spend nearly $20,000 on Torts alone (used copies, oddly, cost $320 at the
moment). Multiply that by six to cover the standard first-year doctrinal curriculum, and that’s over
$110,000 for the sixty-five 1Ls I teach. Expand it to the entire 1L class, and it’s closer to $350,000. That’s
over $1 million across the three years of students currently enrolled at my school. All that for mandatory
first-year casebooks that look remarkably similar to the tomes I bought as a 1L nearly a decade ago.
It’s true that some students recoup a bit by reselling books. But this partial remedy again produces
inequities. The need to find willing buyers creates uncertainty in how students can use their casebook,
limiting their ability to highlight, annotate, or engage with the material in ways they find educationally
beneficial. Only students privileged enough to keep their old books can do as they please. Renting books
presents similar constraints, as does relying on the free library copies that some students feel compelled
to use. And to cap it all off, the resale market is regularly disrupted by the publication of new editions.
I don’t mean to be naïve or one-sidedly critical of traditional casebooks (and that’s not just because
they’re used—and even authored—by many of the people who’ll judge my tenure file in a few years!). As
I’ve found, making a casebook is taxing and time-consuming work. Not everyone has the support or
interest to make their own materials. It’s tempting, and indeed understandable, to rely on the expertise
and work of generations of professors who’ve created resources of great value. But if there’s a path to
making legal education less daunting and more inclusive, I believe we as teachers should pursue it.
My goal in creating this casebook is to do my part to make legal education more affordable, accessible,
and adaptable. That’s why I’m making the book available to all for free. By using a CC BY-NC license,
I’m also inviting others to adapt these materials for their own use, so long as they adhere to the noncommerciality and attribution terms. (Anyone interested in “remixing” this book for their own purposes
should feel free to contact me at tek@uga.edu, including if you’d like a more adaptable non-PDF version.)
You’re welcome to print any part of this casebook if you want a hard copy to accompany the digital
version. If you do print it, I ask that you please be environmentally conscious by using double-sided pages.
Because the digital version can be easily searched, it contains no index or other finding aids that are
conventional for printed books. You should also be able to enhance your experience with the digital
version by highlighting text, adding comments, and annotating it in other ways you find helpful.
To see the syllabus accompanying this casebook, please visit www.thomaskadri.com/torts.
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GIVING BACK

If you use this casebook, I hope you’ll consider donating some of the money you’ll save to one of the
following causes (or another cause of your choosing):
•

Project Safe, which works in and around the Athens community to tackle domestic
violence. Project Safe’s executive director is also a Georgia Law alum!

•

Project South, which seeks to combat racial and economic injustice by cultivating social
movements in the South. The organization has deep ties in South Atlanta, where it’s
empowering communities to respond to COVID-19 and structural racism.

•

Tem Gente com Fome, which distributes food, personal hygiene items, and cleaning
products to families in Brazil who face hunger, poverty, and human-rights violations,
especially during the pandemic. The campaign reflects a simple mantra: “If there are
hungry people, give them something to eat.”

•

Union of Concerned Scientists, which relies on science to solve our planet’s pressing
problems. The group of nearly 250 scientists and experts is combatting climate change
and developing sustainable ways to feed, power, and transport ourselves.
EDITING

Throughout this casebook, I’ve prioritized readability over strict loyalty to the original texts. For
example, I liberally removed or amended some citations, quotation marks, headings, ellipses, brackets,
and footnotes. While I used ellipses to indicate my own substantive omissions, I didn’t always mark other
edits. The casebook is designed as a pedagogical resource; if you wish to engage with the materials for
other purposes, I’d recommend consulting the original sources.
I’ve tried to include content warnings throughout this casebook, recognizing that certain topics are
especially likely to induce trauma or distress. While I’ve done my best to flag these particularly unsettling
materials, tort law regularly challenges us to confront difficult and disturbing issues in ways I can’t always
predict in advance. If you ever feel that a content warning would’ve been valuable to you but was lacking,
I welcome that feedback. Indeed, I welcome any reactions to this casebook, so please reach out if you
think important perspectives are missing or if you find errors or typos. I surely have blind spots in the
way I present some topics, plus I lack a professional editor to catch my linguistic blunders. You can
contact me at tek@uga.edu with any constructive criticism.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I created this casebook with support from a University of Georgia Provost’s Affordable Course Materials
Grant. I owe huge debts of gratitude to Sarah Burns, Courtney Hogan, and Noah Nix—their work has
been invaluable, and I thank them for their care and brilliance. I truly couldn’t have published this edition
without them. For licensing advice and assistance in gathering source materials, I thank Stephen Wolfson
and Tiffany Au at the Alexander Campbell King Law Library. Enrique Armijo offered generous tips in
selecting defamation and privacy cases, while Margo Schlanger graciously let me adapt her materials on
the “reasonable woman” standard. My thanks also to James Grimmelmann, whose own affordable
casebook, Internet Law: Cases and Problems, was inspirational to me.
My approach to teaching tort law is also shaped by the casebook I used as a student—Tort Law:
Responsibilities and Redress, now co-authored by John Goldberg, Leslie Kendrick, Anthony Sebok, and
Benjamin Zipursky, whose approaches to torts pedagogy and scholarship I greatly admire. When I taught
this course for the first time, I also greatly benefited from the advice and materials I received from
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Rebecca Crootof, Woodrow Hartzog, Claudia Haupt, Don Herzog, Douglas
Kysar, Andrew Selbst, Jed Shugerman, Elizabeth Weeks, Mike Wells, and John Fabian Witt.
Lastly, I’m immensely grateful to Scott Hershovitz, who made me love Torts as my professor in 2012
and then guided me as I taught it for the first time.
Thomas Kadri
October 2021
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CHAPTER

1:

INTENTIONAL TORTS

A. Battery
ALCORN v. MITCHELL
Supreme Court of Illinois (1872)
Sheldon, Justice:

ã

The ground mainly relied on for the reversal of the
judgment in this case is, that the damages are excessive,
being $1,000.
The case presented is this: There was a trial of an
action of trespass between the parties, wherein the
appellee [Andy Mitchell] was defendant, in the circuit
court of Jasper county. At the close of the trial the court
adjourned, and, immediately upon the adjournment, in
the court room, in the presence of a large number of
persons, the appellant [William Alcorn] deliberately spat in the face of the appellee.
So long as damages are allowable in any civil case, by way of punishment or for the sake of
example, the present, of all cases, would seem to be a most fit one for the award of such damages.
The act in question was one of the greatest indignity, highly provocative of retaliation by force,
and the law, as far as it may, should afford substantial protection against such outrages, in the way
of liberal damages, that the public tranquillity may be preserved by saving the necessity of resort to
personal violence as the only means of redress.
Suitors, in the assertion of their rights, should be allowed approach to the temple of justice
without incurring there exposure to such disgraceful indignities, in the very presence of its ministers.
It is customary to instruct juries that they may give vindictive damages where there are
circumstances of malice, wilfulness, wantonness, outrage and indignity attending the wrong
complained of. The act in question was wholly made up of such qualities. It was one of pure
malignity, done for the mere purpose of insult and indignity.
An exasperated suitor has indulged the gratification of his malignant feelings in this despicable
mode. The act was the very refinement of malice. [Alcorn] appears to be a man of wealth; we can
not say that he has been made to pay too dearly for the indulgence.
We have carefully looked into the instructions given and refused, and do not perceive any
substantial error in respect to them…. Judgment affirmed.
1.

QUESTIONS
Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: Should Alcorn have to pay Mitchell $1,000?
Why or why not?

2.

Angry Alcorn: The court mentions that Alcorn spat “deliberately” and with “malice.”
Do his intent and motivation really matter? Should they?

3.

Spit for Tat: What do we accomplish by making Alcorn pay Mitchell?

ã

Woodley Wonder Works, No Spitting, No Smoking (CC BY 2.0).
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LEICHTMAN v. WLW JACOR COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
Court of Appeals of Ohio (1994)
Per Curiam:

ã

The plaintiff-appellant, Ahron Leichtman,
appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his
complaint against the defendants-appellees, WLW
Jacor Communications (“WLW”), William
Cunningham and Andy Furman, for battery,
invasion of privacy, and a violation of Cincinnati
Bd. of Health Reg. No. 00083. In his single
assignment of error, Leichtman contends that his
complaint was sufficient to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted and, therefore, the
trial court was in error when it granted the defendants’ Civil Rule 12(B)(6) motion. We agree in part.
In his complaint, Leichtman claims to be “a nationally known” antismoking advocate.
Leichtman alleges that, on the date of the Great American Smokeout, he was invited to appear on
the WLW Bill Cunningham radio talk show to discuss the harmful effects of smoking and breathing
secondary smoke. He also alleges that, while he was in the studio, Furman, another WLW talk-show
host, lit a cigar and repeatedly blew smoke in Leichtman’s face “for the purpose of causing physical
discomfort, humiliation and distress.”
Under the rules of notice pleading, Civil Rule 8(A)(1) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” When construing a complaint for failure
to state a claim, under Rule 12(B)(6), the court assumes that the factual allegations on the face of the
complaint are true. For the court to grant a motion to dismiss, it must appear beyond doubt from
the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery. A court cannot
dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(B)(6) merely because it doubts the plaintiff will prevail….
Leichtman contends that Furman’s intentional act constituted a battery. The Restatement of the
Law 2d, Torts (1965), states:
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the
other…, and
(b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results[; or]
[c] an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.
In determining if a person is liable for a battery, the Supreme Court has adopted the rule that
contact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is offensive contact. It has defined
“offensive” to mean “disagreeable or nauseating or painful because of outrage to taste and
sensibilities or affronting insultingness.” State v. Phipps, 389 N.E.2d 1128 (Ohio 1979). Furthermore,
tobacco smoke, as “particulate matter,” has the physical properties capable of making contact.
As alleged in Leichtman’s complaint, when Furman intentionally blew cigar smoke in
Leichtman’s face,… he committed a battery. No matter how trivial the incident, a battery is
actionable, even if damages are only one dollar. The rationale is explained by Roscoe Pound in his
essay “Liability” [1922]: “In civilized society men must be able to assume that others will do them
no intentional injury—that others will commit no intentioned aggressions upon them.”
Other jurisdictions also have concluded that a person can commit a battery by intentionally
directing tobacco smoke at another. We do not, however, adopt or lend credence to the theory of a
“smoker’s battery,” which imposes liability if there is substantial certainty that exhaled smoke will
predictably contact a nonsmoker. Also, whether the “substantial certainty” prong of intent from the
Restatement of Torts translates to liability for secondary smoke via the intentional tort doctrine in
employment cases as defined by the Supreme Court in Fyffe v. Jeno’s, Inc., 570 N.E.2d 1108 (Ohio
1991), need not be decided here because Leichtman’s claim for battery is based exclusively on
ã

Mendhak, Why Have You Abandoned Us? (CC BY-SA 2.0).
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Furman’s commission of a deliberate act. Finally, because Leichtman alleges that Furman
deliberately blew smoke into his face, we find it unnecessary to address offensive contact from
passive or secondary smoke under the “glass cage” defense of McCracken v. Sloan, 252 S.E.2d 250
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979), relied on by the defendants.
Neither Cunningham nor WLW is entitled to judgment on the battery claim under Rule 12(B)(6).
Concerning Cunningham, at common law, one who is present and encourages or incites commission
of a battery by words can be equally liable as a principal. Leichtman’s complaint states, “At Defendant
Cunningham’s urging, Defendant Furman repeatedly blew cigar smoke in Plaintiff’s face.”
With regard to WLW, an employer is not legally responsible for the intentional torts of its
employees that do not facilitate or promote its business. However, whether an employer is liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior because its employee is acting within the scope of
employment is ordinarily a question of fact. Accordingly, Leichtman’s claim for battery with the
allegations against the three defendants in the second count of the complaint is sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(6).
By contrast, the first and third counts of Leichtman’s complaint do not state claims upon which
relief can be granted.… In his first count, Leichtman alleged a tortious invasion of his privacy. A
claim for invasion of privacy may involve any one of four distinct torts. The tort that is relevant here
requires some substantial intrusion into a plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion, habitation, or affairs that
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Leichtman acknowledges that he willingly entered
the WLW radio studio to make a public radio appearance with Cunningham, who is known for his
blowtorch rhetoric. Therefore, Leichtman’s allegations do not support his assertion that Furman,
Cunningham, or WLW intruded into his privacy.
In his third count, Leichtman attempts to create a private right of action for violation of
Cincinnati Bd. of Health Reg. No. 00083, which makes it illegal to smoke in designated public places.
Even if we are to assume, for argument, that a municipal regulation is tantamount to public policy
established by a statute enacted by the General Assembly, the regulation has created rights for
nonsmokers that did not exist at common law. Therefore, because sanctions also are provided to
enforce the regulation, there is no implied private remedy for its violation.
Arguably, trivial cases are responsible for an avalanche of lawsuits in the courts. They delay cases
that are important to individuals and corporations and that involve important social issues. The
result is justice denied to litigants and their counsel who must wait for their day in court. However,
absent circumstances that warrant sanctions for frivolous appeals under Appellate Rule 23, we refuse
to limit one’s right to sue. Section 16, Article I, Ohio Constitution states, “All courts shall be open,
and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”
This case emphasizes the need for some form of alternative dispute resolution operating totally
outside the court system as a means to provide an attentive ear to the parties and a resolution of
disputes in a nominal case. Some need a forum in which they can express corrosive contempt for
another without dragging their antagonist through the expense inherent in a lawsuit. Until such an
alternative forum is created, Leichtman’s battery claim, previously knocked out by the trial judge in
the first round, now survives round two to advance again through the courts into round three.…
1.

QUESTIONS
Bad Timing: Does it matter that this happened during the Great American Smokeout?

2.

Who’s to Blame? Furman blew the smoke, so why did Leichtman sue Cunningham and
WLW?

3.

What’s to Gain? Why do you think Leichtman brought this lawsuit? For publicity?
Because he genuinely felt humiliated?
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CECARELLI v. MAHER
Court of Common Pleas New Haven County (1943)
Cullinan, Judge:

ã

A willful, apparently unprovoked, and thoroughly
unjustifiable assault represents the background of this
litigation. The plaintiff, a personable, well-spoken
and well-groomed young man, 25 years of age, alleges
that the defendant George Maher, in concert with
John Heinz and an unknown assailant, beat and
assaulted him with intense ferocity to produce most
serious physical consequences.
On the evening of August 1, 1943, the plaintiff
attended a public dance at Sea Cliff, New Haven, at
the conclusion of which three young ladies requested
him to drive them to their homes. His willingness to meet this request appears to have provoked the
anger and wrath of the defendant and his two companions, who, at a secluded and lonely spot
adjacent to the dance hall, set upon him to administer a severe, and painful beating. Fists and
dangerous instruments constituted the implements of aggressive warfare.
In consequence, the plaintiff’s upper right central and upper right lateral teeth and roots were
severed from their sockets; his upper left central, lower right central, and lower right lateral teeth
were so destroyed as to necessitate ultimate removal; his upper lip was severely lacerated, requiring
sutures and resulting in an involvement of the nasal septum; his nose and left eye were abrased and
contused; and his right arm, right shoulder, and right side became exceedingly sore and tender as a
result of a vicious kicking process. Thereafter, the plaintiff required emergency hospital treatment
and a complete restoration of the dental structures with the replacement of five teeth. In addition,
the plaintiff was forced to absent himself from his employment for a complete week, experiencing
acute pain for an extended period after his return to work.
The terrifying and violent episode had its basis in the ungovernable tempers of these young men,
who, after having had their attentions spurned by three young women, struck fiercely, suddenly, and
stealthily at the innocent plaintiff. Both the defendant Maher and his companion Heinz were
subsequently arrested and offered guilty pleas to assault charges before the City Court of New
Haven. The third assailant is unknown to the plaintiff and his identity has never been disclosed by
his colleagues in violence.
This action originally joined both Maher and Heinz as codefendants. Subsequently, the action
was withdrawn as to Heinz, and a default judgment has been entered against Maher by reason of his
failure to appear. Thus, damages are now to be assessed against Maher alone.
By way of special damage, the plaintiff has lost in wages and has become obligated to expend for
dental and medical treatment approximately $315. To this sum may be added $2,000, representing
fair and reasonable compensation for his pain, suffering, and permanent injury. Judgment may enter
for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant $2,315, together with taxable costs.
1.
2.

ã

QUESTIONS
Tort-Crim I: What’s the tort in this case? (Hint: the word doesn’t appear in the opinion.)
Tort-Crim II: Maher and Heinz pled guilty to criminal charges, so what’s the point of
having a tort suit?

State Library Victoria Collections, Swiss Polka Dancing (CC BY-NC 2.0).
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PAUL v. HOLBROOK
Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida (1997)
Orfinger, Judge:

ã

Meredith A. Paul (“Paul”) appeals an order of the trial court granting
summary judgment in favor of Professional Medical Products, Inc.
(“PMP”) and Paul Holbrook (“Holbrook”) on Paul’s claims against
Holbrook and PMP for assault, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and
negligent hiring and retention. We affirm the entry of summary
judgment in all respects except as to the battery claim against Holbrook.
On that single claim, we reverse.
Paul and Holbrook are former employees of PMP. Paul testified that
Holbrook was her co-worker and not her supervisor. On various
occasions, Paul worked alone with Holbrook. During some of these
times, Paul alleges that Holbrook harassed her by asking that she wear
revealing clothing and suggesting that they engage in sexual relations.
Paul claims that on two occasions, Holbrook came up behind her while she was working and tried
to massage her shoulders. On both occasions, Paul immediately pulled away and told Holbrook to
leave, which he did. After Paul complained to PMP’s management, she and Holbrook never again
worked the same shifts and his improper behavior toward her ended.
While Paul takes issue with the trial court’s judgment in its entirety, we find merit only in Paul’s
contention that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment on her battery claim against
Holbrook, finding that Holbrook’s contact with Paul amounted to no more than a “casual touching”
and concluding that Paul failed to produce evidence establishing intent.
A battery consists of the infliction of a harmful or offensive contact upon another with the intent
to cause such contact or the apprehension that such contact is imminent. Professor Prosser’s treatise
explains that the tort of battery exists to protect the integrity of the person. As Prosser & Keeton
wrote in [W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 9 (5th ed.1984)]:
Proof of the technical invasion of the integrity of the plaintiff’s person by even an
entirely harmless, but offensive contact entitles the plaintiff to vindication of the
legal right by an award of nominal damages, and the establishment of the tort
cause of action entitles the plaintiff also to compensation for the resulting mental
disturbance, such as fright, revulsion or humiliation.
Once a contact has been established, its character becomes the focus:
The element of personal indignity involved always has been given considerable
weight. Consequently, the defendant is liable not only for contact which do actual
harm, but also for those relatively trivial ones which are merely offensive and
insulting…. The time and place, and the circumstances under which the act is
done, will necessarily affect its unpermitted character, and so will the relations
between the parties. A stranger is not to be expected to tolerate liberties which
would be allowed by an intimate friend. But unless the defendant has special
reason to believe that more or less will be permitted by the individual plaintiff, the
test is what would be offensive to an ordinary person not unduly sensitive to
personal dignity.
Id. Offensiveness is an essential element of the tort. The trial court, relying on Gatto v. Publix
Supermarket, Inc., 387 So.2d 377 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), concluded that, as a matter of law,
Holbrook’s actions were not offensive. The plaintiff in Gatto testified that a store employee, in
attempting to retrieve allegedly stolen items from the plaintiff’s hands, “came into contact with
either part of [his] palm or [his] wrist or [his] arms.” The third district concluded that this was not
ã

Brittanie Shey, Backrub (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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evidence of an offensive contact. But, the act of approaching a co-worker from behind while on the
job and attempting to massage her shoulders is, in the circumstances of this case, not capable of such
summary treatment. On these facts, offensiveness is a question for the trier of fact to decide.
The trial court also found that Paul failed to produce evidence establishing Holbrook’s intent to
commit a battery. Proof of intent to commit battery is rarely subject to direct proof, but must be
established based on surrounding circumstances. Based on the record before this court, a jury could
reasonably infer that Holbrook intended to touch Paul in a matter that would constitute a battery.
No evidence of an intention to cause harm is necessary.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment against Paul in all respects except with
regard to the battery claim against Holbrook. On that claim, we reverse. In all other respects, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
1.

QUESTIONS
Procedural Precision: Did the appeals court actually conclude that Holbrook’s actions
constituted battery?

2.

It’s All Circumstantial: Was Holbrook’s attempt to massage Paul offensive? What if he
did the same thing on a date instead of at work?

3.

Alcorn Revisited: What would the justices in Alcorn have thought of this case in 1872?
How do you think they would have decided it?
TECH BRO PROBLEM

Janice worked as a salesperson at Tesla in Alpharetta for fifteen years. The environment at Tesla
was very laid back. Foul language, sexual innuendo, and dirty jokes were often in the airways. Janice
was also known to give massages, back scratches, and hugs to her coworkers during work hours, and
she often received the same in return. Leon—Janice’s boss—often poked fun at Janice and
propositioned her for sex. Beyond these verbal encounters, Leon’s hands once lingered on Janice’s
rear as he hugged her. Janice has now sued Leon for battery.
(a) Was Leon’s contact with Janice offensive for purposes of battery liability?
(b) Is the environment at Tesla a relevant part of this inquiry?
(c) Are Janice’s own actions toward her coworkers relevant? What if she had been tactile
with Leon in the past?
(d) Does the outcome you reached sit well with you? Why or why not?
COLE v. HIBBERD
Court of Appeals of Ohio (1994)
Young, Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant, Debbie L. Cole, appeals the
judgment of the Warren County Common Pleas Court
granting summary judgment in favor of defendantappellee, Sheri L. Hibberd.
Cole filed a personal injury complaint against
Hibberd on June 11, 1993, based on an incident that
occurred on June 15, 1991. She set forth the operative
facts of this action in paragraph two of her complaint:
“At said time and place, defendant negligently struck
said plaintiff in the lower lumbar area, which negligence directly caused injuries and damages
hereinafter set forth.” Cole described Hibberd’s actions more completely in her deposition taken on
August 12, 1993. At the deposition, Cole described the incident as follows:
The Hibberds had been drinking and Sheri was acting a little rambunctious. While
I was standing there leaning over, I had ahold of my daughter with one hand and
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my niece with the other, I was holding them by the hand, I leaned over to look at
her children in her stroller, and she hauled off and kicked me.
Hibberd’s attorney asked Cole to describe the incident in more detail, and she responded:
Well, she kicked me. And I stood up and said, damn it, Sheri, that hurt. She started
laughing. And… [Hibberd’s husband] Gary called me something foul and started
laughing and thought it was funny. And I told my husband, I said, come on. I was,
I was extremely hot about it. She hurt me.
When asked whether she believed Hibberd’s action was intentional or accidental, Cole stated:
I’d say she didn’t, she meant to kick me. I mean, she didn’t mean to hurt me, she
was just horsing around. I guess she thought it wouldn’t hurt me…. No, she meant
to kick me playingly, but I don’t think she meant to hurt me like she did. She
basically thought it was funny. I mean, that’s how, how she was, really.
R.C. 2305.111 establishes a one-year statute of limitations for claims involving assault and
battery. On the other hand, R.C. 2305.10 requires that an action for bodily injury must be brought
within two years after the cause arises. Cole filed her complaint more than one year, but less than
two years after June 15, 1991, the date Hibberd kicked her.
Hibberd filed a motion for summary judgment contending that her alleged actions constituted
a battery which was no longer actionable under R.C. 2305.111 since the complaint was not filed
within one year of the incident. The trial court granted Hibberd’s motion for summary judgment by
entry filed January 14, 1994.
In a single assignment of error, Cole contends that the court erred in concluding that her claim
amounted to an action in assault and battery instead of negligence. Basically, Cole argues that a
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Hibberd made intentional, offensive contact with
Cole…. In determining which limitation period will apply, courts must look to the actual nature or
subject matter of the case, rather than to the form in which the action is pleaded. The grounds for
bringing the action are the determinative factors, the form is immaterial.
In Love v. Port Clinton, 524 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio 1988), the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “where
the essential character of an alleged tort is an intentional, offensive touching, the statute of
limitations for assault and battery governs even if the touching is pleaded as an act of negligence. To
hold otherwise would defeat the assault and battery statute of limitations.”
An individual is liable for battery when he or she acts intending to cause offensive or harmful
contact, and such contact results. “Offensive contact” is contact that would be offensive to a
reasonable sense of personal dignity.
Cole insists that Hibberd did not act with an intention to cause harm. However, it is the
intentional nature of the contact with the plaintiff that controls the definition, not the intent to cause
actual harm or injury.
Construing the facts most strongly in favor of Cole, this court concludes that the essential
character of her complaint is grounded in the intentional tort of assault and battery. From the
evidence presented, reasonable minds can only conclude that Hibberd intended to kick Cole. We
also conclude that Hibberd’s contact, as testified to by Cole in her deposition, would be considered
offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity. It is irrelevant to this determination whether or
not Hibberd intended to cause injury.
In this case, the statute of limitations for assault and battery applies over the statute of limitations
for bodily injury. Accordingly, Cole had only one year from the time of the incident, or until June
15, 1991, to file this lawsuit. The filing of this suit on June 11, 1993, was therefore untimely.
Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled. Judgment affirmed.
Jones, Judge, dissenting:
Summary judgment was simply inappropriate. A factual question existed with respect to
Hibberd’s intentions. A jury could, would, and should find that Hibberd’s playful “kick in the rear”
was not intended to cause offensive or harmful conduct. Hibberd wasn’t assaulting her friend Cole
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any more than one would “assault” a friend by slapping him on the back. Hibberd’s “kick” was
simply misdirected, striking the coccyx, and a jury could certainly conclude that such was merely
negligence. The two-year statute of limitations [for negligence should apply, rather than the oneyear limit for assault and battery].
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
Cruel Intentions: Did Hibberd intend to harm or offend Cole? Is that the intent that
matters?
Time Is of the Essence: Notice something seemingly odd about this case: Hibberd is
trying to convince the court that she committed battery. Why is she doing that?
VOSBURG v. PUTNEY
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1891)

Lyon, Justice:

ã

The action was brought to recover damages for an
assault and battery, alleged to have been committed
by the defendant upon the plaintiff on February 20,
1889…. At the date of the alleged assault the plaintiff
was a little more than fourteen years of age, and the
defendant a little less than twelve years of age.
The injury complained of was caused by a kick
inflicted by defendant upon the leg of the plaintiff, a
little below the knee. The transaction occurred in a
school-room in Waukesha, during school hours,
both parties being pupils in the school. A former trial
of the cause resulted in a verdict and judgment for the
plaintiff for $2,800. The defendant appealed from
such judgment to this court, and the same was
reversed for error, and a new trial awarded.
The case has been again tried in the circuit court, and the trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff
for $2,500.… On the last trial the jury found a special verdict, as follows:
“(1) Had the plaintiff during the month of January, 1889, received an injury just
above the knee, which became inflamed, and produced pus? Answer. Yes. (2) Had
such injury on the 20th day of February, 1889, nearly healed at the point of the
injury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plaintiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as the
result of such injury? A. No. (4) Had the tibia in the plaintiff’s right leg become
inflamed or diseased to some extent before he received the blow or kick from the
defendant? A. No. (5) What was the exciting cause of the injury to the plaintiff’s
leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, intend
to do him any harm? A. No. (7) At what sum do you assess the damages of the
plaintiff? A. $ 2,500.”…
Thereupon judgment for plaintiff for $2,500 damages and costs of suit was duly entered. The
defendant appeals from the judgment….
The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, did not intend
to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff has no cause of action…. In
support of this proposition counsel quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule that “the intention to do
harm is of the essence of an assault.” Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for mere
assaults. But this is an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery. In such case the
rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show either
ã

Their History, Grazed Knee (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault. If the intended act is unlawful, the
intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful. Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of
the plaintiff by the defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also
unlawful.
Had the parties been upon the play-grounds of the school, engaged in the usual boyish sports,
the defendant being free from malice, wantonness, or negligence, and intending no harm to plaintiff
in what he did, we should hesitate to hold the act of the defendant unlawful, or that he could be held
liable in this action. Some consideration is due to the implied license of the play-grounds. But it
appears that the injury was inflicted in the school, after it had been called to order by the teacher,
and after the regular exercises of the school had commenced. Under these circumstances, no implied
license to do the act complained of existed, and such act was a violation of the order and decorum
of the school, and necessarily unlawful. Hence we are of the opinion that, under the evidence and
verdict, the action may be sustained.
The plaintiff testified, as a witness in his own behalf, as to the circumstances of the alleged injury
inflicted upon him by the defendant, and also in regard to the wound he received in January, near
the same knee, mentioned in the special verdict. The defendant claimed that such wound was the
proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff’s leg, in that it produced a diseased condition of the bone,
which disease was in active progress when he received the kick, and that such kick did nothing more
than to change the location, and perhaps somewhat hasten the progress, of the disease.… The
following question was then propounded to Dr. Philler[, the plaintiff’s witness]: “After hearing [the
teacher’s] testimony, and what you know of the case of the boy, seeing it on the 8th day of March,
what, in your opinion, was the exciting cause that produced the inflammation that you saw in that
boy’s leg on that day?” An objection to this question was overruled, and the witness answered: “The
exciting cause was the injury received at that day by the kick on the shin-bone.”
It will be observed that the above question to Dr. Philler calls for his opinion as a medical expert,
based in part upon the testimony of the plaintiff, as to what was the proximate cause of the injury to
plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff testified to two wounds upon his leg, either of which might have been
such proximate cause. Without taking both of these wounds into consideration, the expert could
give no intelligent or reliable opinion as to which of them caused the injury complained of; yet, in
the hypothetical question propounded to him, one of these probable causes was excluded from the
consideration of the witness, and he was required to give his opinion upon an imperfect and
insufficient hypothesis—one which excluded from his consideration a material fact essential to an
intelligent opinion. A consideration by the witness of the wound received by the plaintiff in January
being thus prevented, the witness had but one fact upon which to base his opinion, to wit, the fact
that defendant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone. Based, as it necessarily was, on that fact alone, the
opinion of Dr. Philler that the kick caused the injury was inevitable, when, had the proper hypothesis
been submitted to him, his opinion might have been different. The answer of Dr. Philler to the
hypothetical question put to him may have had, probably did have, a controlling influence with the
jury, for they found by their verdict that his opinion was correct.
Surely there can be no rule of evidence which will tolerate a hypothetical question to an expert,
calling for his opinion in a matter vital to the case, which excludes from his consideration facts
already proved by a witness upon whose testimony such hypothetical question is based, when a
consideration of such facts by the expert is absolutely essential to enable him to form an intelligent
opinion concerning such matter. The objection to the question put to Dr. Philler should have been
sustained. The error in permitting the witness to answer the question is material, and necessarily
fatal to the judgment.
Certain questions were proposed on behalf of defendant to be submitted to the jury, founded
upon the theory that only such damages could be recovered as the defendant might reasonably be
supposed to have contemplated as likely to result from his kicking the plaintiff. The court refused to
submit such questions to the jury. The ruling was correct. The rule of damages in actions for torts
was held in Brown v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. to be that the wrong-doer is liable for all injuries resulting
directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him….
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for a new trial.
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1.

QUESTIONS
Accidentally on Purpose: Putney argues that he’s not liable because the jury found that
he didn’t intend to hurt Vosburg. Is that a good defense?

2.

Karate Kids: What if the kick had been on the playground? Same result?

3.

Eggshell Skull: You’ll hear a lot about reasonable foreseeability in due course—it’s
critically important when we cover the tort of negligence. But here the court says it’s
legally irrelevant whether Putney could have foreseen that his kick would do so much
harm to Vosburg. Is that fair? Does the rule make any sense?

ã

ã

Wela Quan, Vosburg v. Putney, NY Bar Picture Book (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
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GARRATT v. DAILEY
Supreme Court of Washington (1955)
Hill, Justice:

ã

…Brian Dailey (age five years, nine months) was visiting with Naomi
Garratt, an adult and a sister of the plaintiff, Ruth Garratt, likewise an adult,
in the backyard of the plaintiff’s home, on July 16, 1951. It is plaintiff’s
contention that she came out into the backyard to talk with Naomi and
that, as she started to sit down in a wood and canvas lawn chair, Brian
deliberately pulled it out from under her. The only one of the three persons
present so testifying was Naomi Garratt. (Ruth Garratt, the plaintiff, did
not testify as to how or why she fell.) The trial court, unwilling to accept
this testimony, adopted instead Brian Dailey’s version of what happened,
and made the following findings:
…[W]hile Naomi Garratt and Brian Dailey were in the back yard the plaintiff,
Ruth Garratt, came out of her house into the back yard. Some time subsequent
thereto defendant, Brian Dailey, picked up a lightly built wood and canvas lawn
chair which was then and there located in the back yard…moved it sideways a few
feet and seated himself therein, at which time he discovered the plaintiff, Ruth
Garratt, about to sit down at the place where the lawn chair had formerly been, at
which time he hurriedly got up from the chair and attempted to move it toward
Ruth Garratt to aid her in sitting down in the chair; that due to the defendant’s
small size and lack of dexterity he was unable to get the lawn chair under the
plaintiff in time to prevent her from falling to the ground. That plaintiff fell to the
ground and sustained a fracture of her hip, and other injuries and damages as
hereinafter set forth.… [T]he preponderance of the evidence in this case
establishes that when the defendant, Brian Dailey, moved the chair in question he
did not have any willful or unlawful purpose in doing so; that he did not have any
intent to injure the plaintiff, or any intent to bring about any unauthorized or
offensive contact with her person or any objects appurtenant thereto; that the
circumstances which immediately preceded the fall of the plaintiff established that
the defendant, Brian Dailey, did not have purpose, intent or design to perform a
prank or to effect an assault and battery upon the person of the plaintiff.
It is conceded that Ruth Garratt’s fall resulted in a fractured hip and other painful and serious
injuries. To obviate the necessity of a retrial in the event this court determines that she was entitled
to a judgment against Brian Dailey, the amount of her damage was found to be eleven thousand
dollars. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the action and asks for the entry of a judgment
in that amount or a new trial….
It is urged that Brian’s action in moving the chair constituted a battery. A definition (not allinclusive but sufficient for our purpose) of a battery is the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily
contact upon another. The rule that determines liability for battery is given in 1 Restatement, Torts,
29, § 13, as:
An act which, directly or indirectly, is the legal cause of a harmful contact with
another’s person makes the actor liable to the other, if
(a) the act is done with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive
contact or an apprehension thereof to the other or a third person, and
(b) the contact is not consented to by the other or the other’s consent thereto is
procured by fraud or duress, and
(c) the contact is not otherwise privileged.

ã
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We have in this case no question of consent or privilege. We therefore proceed to an immediate
consideration of intent and its place in the law of battery. In the comment on clause (a), the
Restatement says:
Character of actor’s intention. In order that an act may be done with the intention
of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension thereof to a
particular person, either the other or a third person, the act must be done for the
purpose of causing the contact or apprehension or with knowledge on the part of
the actor that such contact or apprehension is substantially certain to be produced.
We have here the conceded volitional act of Brian, i.e., the moving of a chair. Had the plaintiff
proved to the satisfaction of the trial court that Brian moved the chair while she was in the act of
sitting down, Brian’s action would patently have been for the purpose or with the intent of causing
the plaintiff’s bodily contact with the ground, and she would be entitled to a judgment against him
for the resulting damages. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403. (Wis. 1891).
The plaintiff based her case on that theory, and the trial court held that she failed in her proof
and accepted Brian’s version of the facts rather than that given by the eyewitness who testified for
the plaintiff. After the trial court determined that the plaintiff had not established her theory of a
battery (i.e., that Brian had pulled the chair out from under the plaintiff while she was in the act of
sitting down), it then became concerned with whether a battery was established under the facts as it
found them to be.
In this connection, we quote another portion of the comment on the “Character of actor’s
intention,” relating to clause (a) of the rule from the Restatement heretofore set forth:
It is not enough that the act itself is intentionally done and this, even though the
actor realizes or should realize that it contains a very grave risk of bringing about
the contact or apprehension. Such realization may make the actor’s conduct
negligent or even reckless but unless he realizes that to a substantial certainty, the
contact or apprehension will result, the actor has not that intention which is
necessary to make him liable under the rule stated in this Section.
A battery would be established if, in addition to plaintiff’s fall, it was proved that, when Brian
moved the chair, he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down
where the chair had been. If Brian had any of the intents which the trial court found, in the italicized
portions of the findings of fact quoted above, that he did not have, he would of course have had the
knowledge to which we have referred. The mere absence of any intent to injure the plaintiff or to
play a prank on her or to embarrass her, or to commit an assault and battery on her would not
absolve him from liability if in fact he had such knowledge. Without such knowledge, there would
be nothing wrongful about Brian’s act in moving the chair, and, there being no wrongful act, there
would be no liability.
While a finding that Brian had no such knowledge can be inferred from the findings made, we
believe that before the plaintiff’s action in such a case should be dismissed there should be no
question but that the trial court had passed upon that issue; hence, the case should be remanded for
clarification of the findings to specifically cover the question of Brian’s knowledge, because intent
could be inferred therefrom. If the court finds that he had such knowledge, the necessary intent will
be established and the plaintiff will be entitled to recover, even though there was no purpose to injure
or embarrass the plaintiff. If Brian did not have such knowledge, there was no wrongful act by him,
and the basic premise of liability on the theory of a battery was not established…. The cause is
remanded for clarification, with instructions to make definite findings on the issue of whether Brian
Dailey knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair
which he moved had been, and to change the judgment if the findings warrant it….
1.

QUESTIONS
Just Enough Knowledge to Be Dangerous: Does the legal standard discussed in Garratt
modify the longstanding rule that battery requires the defendant to intentionally make
contact with the plaintiff?
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2.

Access to Justice: Ruth Garratt ultimately won a judgment of $11,000—over $100,000
in today’s money. How on earth would little Brian Dailey pay? Consider the following
background from Jennifer Wriggins:
Access to liability insurance equals access to the tort system. When plaintiffs in the
tort system receive money for damages, the money generally comes out of a defendant’s
liability insurance policy, rather than out of the defendant’s pocket. Liability insurance
also pays the bills for defense and plaintiff lawyers—either directly (defense lawyers) or
indirectly (plaintiffs’ lawyers). Torts casebooks…generally leave out how unequally
liability insurance has been distributed. It has been unequally distributed by race—as a
result at least in part of deliberate racism by institutions, individuals, and governments—
in several different ways. One way is that after World War II, the GI bill gave valuable
benefits and low-cost home loans to returning white GIs while in practice denying
benefits and home loans to African-American returning GIs. Homes purchased with the
help of the GI bill had to have liability insurance. Thus, as housing was unequally
distributed by race, so was liability insurance. A second way is that insurance companies
refused to issue policies in urban neighborhoods with large populations of AfricanAmericans; this practice, known as ‘redlining,’ contributed to neighborhoods’ decline.
Garratt v. Dailey, a classic torts case, looks a bit different with this background. Ruth
Garratt sued a five-year-old boy, Brian Dailey, for injuries she received when he pulled
a chair out from under her as she was starting to sit down. Generations of law students
ponder the intent Brian did or did not have. Ruth Garratt won $11,000 (about $105,474
in today’s dollars) for a fractured hip and serious injuries. Brian, of course, did not have
the money to pay $11,000 for the injuries he caused. But as a resident of his parents’
home, he was an ‘insured’ under their homeowners policy, one casebook tells us. Thus,
Ruth Garratt got the $11,000 compensation for her injuries from Brian’s parents’
homeowners policy.
But let’s not stop there. Consider for a moment the same facts and injury if Brian’s
parents did not own their house. If they rented rather than owned, it is very unlikely they
would have had renters’ insurance that would cover Brian and the injuries he caused by
his chair-pulling. And with no liability insurance covering Brian, Ruth Garratt would
not have been able to find a lawyer, there would have been no lawsuit, and her injury
would have gone uncompensated. The same outcome—no lawsuit—would result if his
parents owned a house but had no insurance. The parents would probably not be liable
for Brian’s actions. And even if they were, it would have been difficult or impossible for
Ruth Garratt to find a lawyer to pursue the case unless Brian’s parents were very wealthy
and had collectible assets. Liability insurance has a central place in torts regardless of the
race of the participants, but distribution of liability insurance—and the extent to which
plaintiffs are compensated—has been influenced by race and racism.*

* Jennifer Wriggins, Teaching Torts with a Focus on Race and Racism (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://mainelaw.maine.edu/faculty/teaching-torts-with-a-focus-on-race-and-racism; see also KENNETH ABRAHAM, THE
LIABILITY CENTURY 177 (2008); Jennifer Wriggins, In Deep: Dilemmas of Federal Flood Insurance Reform, 6 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 1443, 1457–58 (2015); Erin Blakemore, How the GI Bill’s Promise Was Denied to a Million Black WWII Veterans, HISTORY
(Apr. 20, 2021), www.history.com/news/gi-bill-black-wwii-veterans-benefits.
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The following case and questions involve racism and slavery.
FISHER v. CARROUSEL MOTOR HOTEL, INC.
Supreme Court of Texas (1967)
Greenhill, Justice:
This is a suit for actual and exemplary
damages growing out of an alleged assault and
battery. The plaintiff Fisher was a
mathematician with the Data Processing
Division of the Manned Spacecraft Center, an
agency of the National Aeronautics and Space
Agency, commonly called NASA, near
Houston. The defendants were the Carrousel
Motor Hotel, Inc., located in Houston, the Brass
Ring Club, which is located in the Carrousel,
and Robert W. Flynn, who as an employee of
the Carrousel was the manager of the Brass Ring Club….
The plaintiff Fisher had been invited by Ampex Corporation and Defense Electronics to a one
day’s meeting regarding telemetry equipment at the Carrousel. The invitation included a luncheon.
The guests were asked to reply by telephone whether they could attend the luncheon, and Fisher
called in his acceptance. After the morning session, the group of 25 or 30 guests adjourned to the
Brass Ring Club for lunch. The luncheon was buffet style, and Fisher stood in line with others and
just ahead of a graduate student of Rice University who testified at the trial. As Fisher was about to
be served, he was approached by Flynn, who snatched the plate from Fisher’s hand and shouted that
he, a Negro, could not be served in the club. Fisher testified that he was not actually touched, and
did not testify that he suffered fear or apprehension of physical injury; but he did testify that he was
highly embarrassed and hurt by Flynn’s conduct in the presence of his associates.
The jury found that Flynn “forceably dispossessed plaintiff of his dinner plate” and “shouted in
a loud and offensive manner” that Fisher could not be served there, thus subjecting Fisher to
humiliation and indignity. It was stipulated that Flynn was an employee of the Carrousel Hotel and,
as such, managed the Brass Ring Club. The jury also found that Flynn acted maliciously and awarded
Fisher $400 actual damages for his humiliation and indignity and $500 exemplary damages for
Flynn’s malicious conduct.
The Court of Civil Appeals held that there was no assault because there was no physical contact
and no evidence of fear or apprehension of physical contact. However, it has long been settled that
there can be a battery without an assault, and that actual physical contact is not necessary to
constitute a battery, so long as there is contact with clothing or an object closely identified with the
body. In Prosser, Law of Torts 32 (3d Ed. 1964), it is said:
The interest in freedom from intentional and unpermitted contacts with the
plaintiff’s person is protected by an action for the tort commonly called battery.
The protection extends to any part of the body, or to anything which is attached
to it and practically identified with it. Thus contact with the plaintiff’s clothing, or
with a cane, a paper, or any other object held in his hand will be sufficient;… The
plaintiff’s interest in the integrity of his person includes all those things which are
in contact or connected with it.
Under the facts of this case, we have no difficulty in holding that the intentional grabbing of
plaintiff’s plate constituted a battery. The intentional snatching of an object from one’s hand is as
clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an actual contact with the body. To constitute
an assault and battery, it is not necessary to touch the plaintiff’s body or even his clothing; knocking
or snatching anything from plaintiff’s hand or touching anything connected with his person, when
done in an offensive manner, is sufficient.… In S. H. Kress & Co. v. Brashier, 50 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.
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Civ. App. 1932), the defendant was held to have committed “an assault or trespass upon the person”
by snatching a book from the plaintiff’s hand. The jury findings in that case were that the defendant
“dispossessed plaintiff of the book” and caused her to suffer “humiliation and indignity.”
The rationale for holding an offensive contact with such an object to be a battery is explained in
1 Restatement of Torts 2d § 18 as follows: “Since the essence of the plaintiff’s grievance consists in
the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability
of his person and not in any physical harm done to his body, it is not necessary that the plaintiff’s
actual body be disturbed. Unpermitted and intentional contacts with anything so connected with
the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the other’s person and therefore as partaking of its
inviolability is actionable as an offensive contact with his person. There are some things such as
clothing or a cane or, indeed, anything directly grasped by the hand which are so intimately
connected with one’s body as to be universally regarded as part of the person.” We hold, therefore,
that the forceful dispossession of plaintiff Fisher’s plate in an offensive manner was sufficient to
constitute a battery, and the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the issue of actual damages.
In Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 254 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. 1953), this Court refused to adopt the “new
tort” of intentional interference with peace of mind which permits recovery for mental suffering in
the absence of resulting physical injury or an assault and battery. This cause of action has long been
advocated by respectable writers and legal scholars. However, it is not necessary to adopt such a
cause of action in order to sustain the verdict of the jury in this case. The Harned case recognized
the well established rule that mental suffering is compensable in suits for willful torts “which are
recognized as torts and actionable independently and separately from mental suffering or other
injury.” Damages for mental suffering are recoverable without the necessity for showing actual
physical injury in a case of willful battery because the basis of that action is the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s person and not the actual harm done to the plaintiff’s body.
Personal indignity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently the defendant is liable
not only for contacts which do actual physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and
insulting. We hold, therefore, that plaintiff was entitled to actual damages for mental suffering due
to the willful battery, even in the absence of any physical injury.… The judgments of the courts
below are reversed, and judgment is here rendered for the plaintiff for $900 with interest from the
date of the trial court’s judgment, and for costs of this suit.
1.

QUESTIONS
Pen Pals: If your friend reaches over during class and grabs your pen from your hand, is
that battery under Fisher?

2.

What’s Tort Law Up To? How are the goals of tort law served by a decision like Fisher?

3.

Personality Extended, but to Whom? Fisher presents a famous example of the doctrine
of “extended personality,” under which battery may occur through “intentional contacts
with anything so connected with the body as to be customarily regarded as part of the
other’s person.” Here, it was contact with a plate snatched from the hands of a Black
man. But consider the case of State v. Davis, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 46 (S.C. App. L. & Eq.
1833), a criminal assault case in which an enslaved person was attached by a rope to a
deputy sheriff to prevent escape. A third man, Davis, cut the rope and took the enslaved
person away. The court explained that Davis’s act constituted assault on the deputy
sheriff because “[t]he rope was as much identified with his person, as the hat or coat
which he wore, or the stick which he held in his hand,” or even “the horse on which he
rides.” The court said nothing, however, about the interests of the enslaved person who
was also attached to the rope.

EICHENWALD v. RIVELLO
United States District Court for the District of Maryland (2018)
Bredar, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Kurt Eichenwald brought this
action against Defendant John Rivello over a
year ago, on April 24, 2017. Defendant is facing
criminal charges related to the same incident
underlying this civil case….
Plaintiff is a journalist and author currently
living in Texas. Plaintiff’s work is well known.
He writes for Newsweek and Vanity Fair. He
worked for years at the New York Times, has
authored four books, and has won several
awards including the George Polk Award
(twice). He is an active Twitter user, having
posted over 50,000 tweets.
Plaintiff also has epilepsy. He was diagnosed
at age 18, and suffered from frequent seizures as
a young adult. Medication has helped reduce
the number of seizures, but he continues to
experience them. Plaintiff has been public about
his condition in the past and in 2016 wrote an
article, published in Newsweek, titled “Sean
Hannity: Apologize to Those with Epilepsy, or
Burn in Hell.”
During the 2016 election, Plaintiff was often critical of then-candidate Donald J. Trump, and
expressed those views in his writing and on his Twitter account. Plaintiff received numerous threats
and messages over the Internet as a result of his public criticism, and wrote about the online abuse
for Newsweek in October 2016. In that article, Plaintiff wrote about one instance of online
harassment in particular. Plaintiff received a tweet from someone with the twitter handle “Mike’s
Deplorable AF.” In that tweet Mike made mention of [Plaintiff’s] seizures and included a small
video…. The video was some sort of strobe light, with flashing circles and images…flying toward
the screen. The video was “epileptogenic,” meaning it triggers seizures. Plaintiff did not suffer a
seizure upon opening this video, however, because he quickly dropped the device.
Two months later, on December 15, 2016, a Twitter user with the handle @jew_goldstein, replied
to one of Plaintiff’s tweets. (When Plaintiff clicked on the notification button on twitter, the replies
to his tweet immediately loaded, including the reply from @jew_goldstein. The tweet included (and
immediately displayed) a Graphic Interchange Format (“GIF”) that contained an animated strobe
image flashing at a rapid speed. In addition to the flashing images, the GIF contained the message
“YOU DESERVE A SEIZURE FOR YOUR POSTS.” Upon seeing the rapidly flashing GIF, Plaintiff
suffered a severe seizure.
For reasons that will become clear, it is necessary to briefly discuss the physical reactions that led
to Plaintiff’s seizure. Light comes in rays, or waves, comprised in part by photons. These waves
sometimes reflect off objects and strike a person’s cornea, which focuses the light wave. The eye
focuses the wave onto its retina, which through a process of visual phototransduction, converts the
light wave into electrical impulses. That is, photons hit the retina and are converted into electrical
signals. These electrical signals are then transmitted by the optic nerve to the visual cortex. Such
electrical signals from strobing images can trigger seizures in certain individuals with epilepsy. So,
Defendant intentionally caused photons to hit Plaintiff’s retina, causing Plaintiff to suffer a seizure.
Plaintiff’s wife witnessed the seizure and, after caring for Plaintiff, called the police. According
to information obtained as a result of the criminal investigation, Defendant, who lives in Maryland,
operated the @jew_goldstein account. Defendant discussed with others his intent to harm Plaintiff
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by causing a seizure. Defendant was arrested on March 17, 2017, and three days later a grand jury
indicted him for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
Plaintiff continued to suffer as a result of the December 15 seizure. He experienced another
seizure in his sleep, and he had to take increased medication, which left him sedated and disabled
during the holidays. He required assistance from his family to perform routine tasks, and was
embarrassed, humiliated, and deeply upset as a result of this incident.
With the criminal case against Defendant still pending, Plaintiff filed a civil case against
Defendant in this Court on April 24, 2017. Plaintiff brought four claims: (I) battery, (II) assault,
(III) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (IV) “purposeful infliction of bodily
harm/prima facie tort under Texas law.”… [Under the rule of lex loci delicti,] the substantive tort
law of the state where the wrong occurs governs. Plaintiff has alleged that he was harmed in Texas,
and therefore the Court will apply the substantive tort law of Texas in analyzing Plaintiff’s claims….
Defendant has moved to dismiss Counts I and IV of Plaintiff’s complaint, and presents three
arguments in support of that request. First, Defendant contends that Texas courts do not recognize
a claim of civil battery, and instead only recognize a claim for assault. Second, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff’s claim of battery fails because he has not alleged any physical contact. Third, Defendant
asserts that the “wrong” claimed in Count IV has not yet been recognized as a tort in Texas and
therefore it must be dismissed with prejudice….
a. Assault and Battery
Defendant requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s first count of battery because, he argues,
Texas does not recognize the tort of battery. Defendant is incorrect….
Texas courts’ reliance on the Texas penal code in civil cases, and the Texas penal code’s
combination of common law assault (threatening another with imminent bodily injury) and
common law battery (harmful or offensive touching), has resulted in a number of civil courts mixing
them together under the term “assault.” Still, although the two torts are related, they are conceptually
distinct. Assault is redress for threatened, but non-consummated, harmful touchings; battery is
redress for actual harmful, or offensive, touchings. Texas courts have recognized private causes of
action for both assault and battery for well over a century.
So, the law is clear (even if the semantics are not). Whatever the label given to the cause of action,
under Texas law a plaintiff can assert a cause of action for common law battery, i.e. for
“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury or intentionally or knowingly causing
physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other
will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (3). Insofar
as Defendant’s argument is that Plaintiff cannot bring a battery claim at all under Texas law,
Defendant is incorrect.
Another reading of Defendant’s argument, however, is that Plaintiff cannot bring both an
assault and a battery claim under Texas law. According to this argument, both causes of action are
now melded into a single cause of action, “assault,” and although a plaintiff can recover for an
intentional harmful or offensive touching, he cannot recover for both an intentional harmful or
offensive touching and the threat of such a touching. Insofar as this is a proper reading of
Defendant’s argument, it still fails. As Plaintiff’s complaint stands, he alleges that Defendant’s
intentional tortious conduct a) caused him to suffer physical harm and b) put him in fear of
immediate physical harm. Under Texas law, he can recover for both. If it turns out that he can
only prove physical harm, or only apprehension of immediate harm, that does not mean it is
improper to plead both torts in his complaint. Furthermore, at least at this early stage Plaintiff can
plead as many alternative, or even inconsistent, causes of action and legal theories as he
pleases. Ultimately, Texas recognizes both assault and battery and Plaintiff may plead both assault
and battery. The Court will not dismiss Count I on these grounds.
b. Battery by GIF
Defendant next argues that, whatever the label, Plaintiff’s allegations do not amount to a civil
battery under Texas law. The Court disagrees.
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As an initial matter, the Court notes that however one characterizes Plaintiff’s claim, the facts as
pled constitute some form of a tort. The fundamental purposes of our tort system are to deter
wrongful conduct, shift losses to responsible parties, and fairly compensate deserving victims. So far
as there is one central idea in tort law, it would seem that it is it that liability must be based upon
conduct which is socially unreasonable. The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of
unreasonable interference with the interests of others. The civil tort is a mechanism by which courts
aid in the maintenance of a civil society, and as such offensive contacts, or those which are contrary
to all good manners, need not be tolerated. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant sent Plaintiff an
image with the intent to cause Plaintiff to have a seizure. Whatever exact name a legal scholar may
put to it, that is a tort; it is conduct outside the bounds of a civil society, conduct that should be
punished so as to deter its repetition, and conduct that causes a compensable harm. And although
the exact contours of the tort lack perfect clarity, ultimately it qualifies as a battery. “The essence of
the plaintiff’s grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and
intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 cmt. c
(1965). It is alleged that Defendant purposely acted to violate the dignity and health of the Plaintiff
and did in fact so harm him. The novelty of the mechanism by which the harm was achieved does
not make those actions any less a tort.
Although the nation’s leading authority on tort law contends there may be “no necessity
whatever that a tort have a name,” W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 1 at 3 (5th
ed. 1988), in the first three counts of his complaint, Plaintiff has applied several to the tortious
conduct he perceives here: battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. And,
specifically, Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s “battery” claim. Therefore, it is through the
lens of an alleged “battery” that the Court shall assess the validity of Plaintiff’s pleading.
As explained above, Texas courts look to the statutory definition of criminal assault for the
definition of a civil battery. Thus, in Texas, a battery is the intentional, knowing, or reckless causing
of a bodily injury, or intentionally or knowingly causing “physical contact with another when the
person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or
provocative.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (3). Or, more simply, a battery is “the least touching
of another person willfully and in anger, by the use of any part of the body of the party committing
the offense.” Marshall v. AT & T, 117 F.3d 1417 (5th Cir. 1997).
A battery undoubtedly requires some physical contact…. It is similarly well-established that the
physical contact need not be with the physical body of the plaintiff, see, e.g., Fisher v. Carrousel Motor
Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) (grabbing a person’s plate in buffet line constituted a
battery), and it need not be direct physical contact, see Prosser § 9 n.16 (citing examples such as
“operating car so as to throw plaintiff from running board”). So, in order for a battery to occur, there
must be some physical contact between something and the plaintiff or something attached to the
plaintiff.
If a person intentionally (or knowingly, or recklessly) causes another to come into contact with
a harmful physical element, that is a battery under Texas law. In Hutchinson v. Brookshire Bros., for
example, the plaintiff alleged that a store owner had asked a police officer to force the plaintiff to
siphon gasoline from the plaintiff’s car (plaintiff had accidentally over-pumped). The Court found
that because a reasonable jury could conclude that the store owner knew the officer would force
plaintiff to siphon the gas, the plaintiff’s battery claim survived summary judgment. In U.S. v.
Villegas-Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit, discussing Texas law, stated that the injury caused in a battery
“could result from any number of acts such as making available to the victim a poisoned drink while
reassuring him the drink is safe, or telling the victim he can safely back his car out while knowing
an approaching car will hit the victim.”
Here, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant intentionally caused Plaintiff to come into
contact with a harmful physical element (i.e., the strobe GIF), and that is a battery under Texas law.
It is alleged that Defendant knew that Plaintiff would see the GIF, knew that its physical properties
would cause him a seizure, and knew that a seizure would be physically harmful, or at least offensive
or provocative. Not only did Defendant know these things, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant intended
the exact harmful result that occurred. Plaintiff has stated a claim for battery under Texas law.

24

TORT LAW

Defendant’s concern focuses on the medium of the contact, asserting that “there is no allegation
in the Corrected Complaint of any physical contact between Plaintiff and Defendant.” But there is.
Plaintiff has alleged that light waves emitted from the GIF touched Plaintiff’s retina, generated an
electric signal, and caused a seizure. Taking, as the Court must, Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
including his characterization of the science and Plaintiff’s physical condition, there was physical
contact.
Such contact can often be of an amorphous nature; it is not always accomplished by means of a
solid, graspable object. According to the Supreme Court, “‘physical force’ is simply ‘force exerted by
and through concrete bodies,’ as opposed to ‘intellectual force or emotional force.’” U.S. v.
Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014). For example, courts around the Country have found that secondhand smoke (i.e., causing a person to come into contact with harmful smoke) can constitute a
battery. In Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994), the court stated that “tobacco smoke, as particulate matter, has the physical properties
capable of making contact.” Even less tangible than smoke is sound. Yet, a court in Georgia found a
battery where the tortfeasor made a loud noise over the phone in order to harm the victim. This
Court has stated in a prior case, applying Maryland law, that it is not unreasonable to infer that
causing an electrical shock to someone may be regarded as a battery whether or not the tortfeasor
ever laid a hand on the victim.
Defendant here allegedly chose to use the electronic capabilities of a computer as a weapon—as
a means of causing physical harm. Defendant’s tweet, activating certain harmful capabilities of the
transmitting computer, converted the computer into a weapon to inflict physical injury. The
computer and the tweet were no longer merely a mode of communication. Something more, and
separate, from mere communication occurred[:] an offensive touching. And, conscious
interpretation of the “message” was irrelevant to the offensive touching.1 The physical element that
Defendant caused to come into contact with Plaintiff was something entirely outside either party’s
mind. It was not words or pictures that would require conscious interpretation (i.e. an internal
process) to cause an impact. The strobe GIF was a physical tool, one that would have the same impact
on any person with Plaintiff’s condition. It would not have mattered if the GIF had displayed hateful
words, words of kindness, certain colors or pictures, or only abstractions. What mattered was the
physical nature of the light emitted from the GIF. The light, and not the emotional or intellectual
impact of any accompanying message, caused a seizure, and it would not have caused a seizure if
viewed by a person without epilepsy, regardless of whether they interpreted the tweet as meanspirited, frightening, or friendly. Effectively, and under the law, the scenario alleged is no different
from that where a tortfeasor is alleged to have picked up a computer, thrown it at a Plaintiff
(including one with or without an eggshell skull), and caused an impact that injured the Plaintiff’s
brain. And, any message displayed on the computer’s screen at the instant of impact is irrelevant to
the analysis of whether “battery” occurred….
That no Texas case exists where a plaintiff was harmed by an epileptogenic GIF in a tweet is
neither troubling nor surprising. The broad sweep of Texas tort precedents provides firm ground
on which to find that this unique fact pattern, if proven, qualifies as “battery.”2
c. Purposeful Infliction of Bodily Harm
Finally, Defendant has moved to dismiss Count IV on the ground that it is a tort “not yet
recognized under Texas law.” Plaintiff concedes that the tort has not been recognized in Texas, and
asks the Court to dismiss the claim without prejudice. Defendant argues that because this tort has
not been recognized in Texas, Plaintiff can prove no set of facts upon which relief could be granted,
thus Count IV should be dismissed with prejudice. Again, the Court disagrees with Defendant.
1
To be clear, Plaintiff’s conscious interpretation of the tweet is irrelevant to the physical touching and harm that it
caused. How Plaintiff interpreted the message (i.e., “YOU DESERVE A SEIZURE FOR YOUR POSTS”) may be relevant to
other aspects of this case, such as whether Defendant is liable for a civil assault, or for determining intent.
2
Developments in the ongoing criminal case are instructive, even if they do not control. Defendant was charged with
aggravated assault, and a Grand Jury indicted him on that charge. Aggravated assault in Texas is the commission of an assault
with a deadly weapon.… The Grand Jury found that Defendant committed the harmful physical contact form of assault, and
did so with a deadly weapon….
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The mere fact that a claim is novel does not defeat it. Defendant seems to concede that this is a
developing area of the law, and not a foreclosed avenue for relief. He writes that the Texas courts
have “not yet recognized” the tort, and presents the Court with no Texas case law that would prevent
relief. So, as this is a developing area of the law, the Court will dismiss the count without prejudice.
It is not the place of a federal court, particularly one in Maryland, to interfere with a developing
body of state tort law in Texas. Therefore, with an eye alert to avoiding disregard of State law, the
Court will not prevent Plaintiff from trying his hand in a different court, or at a different time, if he
so chooses….
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Harmful Hypos: Would it be battery to shine a laser in someone’s eye? How about using
a sonic weapon to cause hearing loss? Can a beam of light or a sound wave really
constitute a harmful or offensive contact?
Leichtman Revisited: Is Eichenwald a clearer case of battery than Leichtman? Or is it
more debatable?

B. Assault
BEACH v. HANCOCK
Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire (1853)
Gilchrist, Justice:

ã

…[I]t appeared that the plaintiff and defendant, being engaged in
an angry altercation, the defendant stepped into his office, which was at
hand, and brought out a gun, which he aimed at the plaintiff in an
excited and threatening manner, the plaintiff being three or four rods
distant. The evidence tended to show that the defendant snapped the
gun twice at the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did not know whether
the gun was loaded or not, and that, in fact, the gun was not loaded.
The court ruled that the pointing of a gun, in an angry and
threatening manner, at a person three or four rods distant, who was
ignorant whether the gun was loaded or not, was an assault, though it
should appear that the gun was not loaded, and that it made no
difference whether the gun was snapped or not…. The jury…found a
verdict for the plaintiff, [and] the defendant moved for a new trial…
One of the most important objects to be attained by the enactment of laws and the institutions
of civilized society is, each of us shall feel secure against unlawful assaults. Without such security
society loses most of its value. Peace and order and domestic happiness, inexpressibly more precious
than mere forms of government, cannot be enjoyed without the sense of perfect security. We have a
right to live in society without being put in fear of personal harm. But it must be a reasonable fear
of which we complain. And it surely is not unreasonable for a person to entertain a fear of personal
injury, when a pistol is pointed at him in a threatening manner, when, for aught he knows, it may
be loaded, and may occasion his immediate death. The business of the world could not be carried
on with comfort, if such things could be done with impunity. We think the defendant guilty of an
assault….
1.
2.

ã

QUESTIONS
Ready, Aim, Fire! How far away was Hancock from Beach? Do you think it matters?
Fear and Loathing in New Hampshire: The tort of battery clearly protects interests in
bodily integrity. Can the same be said for assault?

Jiuck, Hands up! (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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3.

Comic Relief: An evil villain points a gun at three superheroes — Batman, who doesn’t
fear death; Superman, who can’t be hurt by bullets; and The Flash, who can easily get
out of the way. Which of them, if any, is likely to prevail on an assault claim?
BROOKER v. SILVERTHORNE
Supreme Court of South Carolina (1919)

Hydrick, Justice:

ã

Defendant appeals from judgment for plaintiff for $2,000
damages for mental anguish and nervous shock alleged to have been
caused by abusive and threatening language addressed to plaintiff by
defendant over the telephone.
Plaintiff alleges: That on October 27, 1916, she was night
operator at the telephone exchange at Barnwell. That defendant
called the exchange over the telephone and asked for a certain
connection, which she promptly tried to get for him, but, upon her
failing to do so, he cursed and threatened her in an outrageous
manner, saying to her: “You God damned woman! None of you
attend to your business.” That she tried to reason with him, telling
him that she had done all that she could to get the connection he
wanted, but he continued to abuse and threaten her, saying to her: “You are a God damned liar. If I
were there, I would break your God damned neck.” That the language and threat of defendant put
her in great fear that he would come to the exchange and further insult her, and that she was so
shocked and unnerved that she was made sick and unfit for duty, and had to take medicine to make
her sleep. That for weeks afterwards, when defendant’s number would call, she would become so
nervous that she could not answer the call. And that her nervous system was so shocked and wrecked
that she suffered and continues to suffer in health, mind, and body on account of the abusive and
threatening language addressed to her by defendant….
Although it cannot affect the decision, because the truth of the facts alleged is concluded by the
verdict, it is nevertheless due to the defendant to say that he denied emphatically using the language
attributed to him, and his denial was corroborated by the testimony of his wife and a lineman of the
telephone company. Defendant testified, also, that, on hearing that plaintiff was offended, he went
to her and told her that he did not intend to say anything to offend her, and did not remember
having done so, and asked her what he had said that offended her, and she replied that he had spoken
a little harshly to her; that he told her he did not remember having done so, but, if she thought so,
he was very sorry, and she seemed to be satisfied with this apology. This conversation was not denied
by plaintiff.
The question is whether plaintiff stated or proved a cause of action. That question was decided
in the negative in Rankin v. Railroad Co., 36 S.E. 997 (S.C. 1900). In that case, Mrs. Rankin alleged
that the railroad company’s agents trespassed upon her premises, and were about to cut down some
trees of great value and beauty, and when she approached them and requested them not to do so,
the foreman of the gang “cursed her and ordered her to get away from there, or he would put her in
the penitentiary, and threatened to strike her, she being an old woman, and otherwise maltreated
and abused her to her great damage.”… The Court considered the complaint as having attempted
to set forth two causes of action, one for trespass on the plaintiff’s property and the other for the
abusive and threatening language. After showing that no cause of action for trespass was stated, the
question whether an action would lie for the abusive and threatening language was considered, and
it was held that it would not. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment upon the reasoning of the
Circuit Court, and said: “No assault upon the plaintiff is alleged, and mere words, under the
circumstances stated, would not be civilly actionable.”
The Circuit Court rested its conclusions in part upon…quotations from Cooley on Torts:
ã

Stanford Medical History Center, Switchboard Operators (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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An act or omission may be wrong in morals, or it may be wrong in law. It is
scarcely necessary to say that the two things are not interchangeable. No
government has undertaken to give redress whenever an act was found to be
wrong, judged by the standard of strict morality; nor is it likely that any
government ever will. A threat to commit an injury is also sometimes made a
criminal offense, but it is not actionable private wrong. Many reasons may be
assigned for distinguishing between this case and that of an assault, one of them
being that the threat only promises a future injury, and usually gives ample
opportunity to provide against it, while an assault must be resisted on the instant.
But the principal reason, perhaps, is found in the reluctance of the law to give a
cause of action for mere words. Words never constitute an assault, is a timehonored maxim. Words may be thoughtlessly spoken; they may be
misunderstood; they may have indicated to the person threatened nothing but
momentary spleen or anger, though when afterwards reported by witnesses they
seem to express deliberate malice and purpose to injure. Even when defamation
is complained of, the law is very careful to require something more than
expressions of anger, reproach, or contempt, before it will interfere; justly
considering that it is safer to allow too much liberty than to interpose too much
restraint. And comparing assaults and threats, another important difference is to
be noted: In the case of threats, as has been stated, preventive remedies are
available; but against an assault there are usually none beyond what the party
assaulted has in his own power of physical resistance….
[W]hen it was said in the Rankin case that no action would lie for mere threats or abusive words
spoken, the Court was careful to qualify the statement by confining it to the circumstances
stated…[because] it is not absolutely true that no action will lie for threats. Blackstone says that
injury may be committed “by threats and menaces of bodily hurt, through fear of which a man’s
business is interrupted. A menace alone, without a consequent inconvenience, makes not the injury,
but to complete the wrong there must be both of them together….” 3 Blackstone Commentaries 120.
But the threat which causes the fear must be such as the law will recognize as adequate to produce
the result. There must be just and reasonable ground for the fear; hence a vain or idle threat is not
sufficient. It must be of such nature and made under such circumstances as to affect the mind of a
person of ordinary reason and firmness, so as to influence his conduct; or it must appear that the
person against whom it is made was peculiarly susceptible to fear, and that the person making the
threat knew and took advantage of the fact that he could not stand as much as an ordinary person.
If it should be conceded that the language of defendant contained a threat, it was not of such
nature or made under such circumstances as to put a person of ordinary reason and firmness in fear
of bodily hurt. And it is not alleged that plaintiff was not a person of ordinary reason and firmness
and that defendant knew it; and, in the absence of such allegation, it will not be presumed. A person
of ordinary reason and firmness should have known that the profane and vulgar language alleged to
have been used by defendant was the result of a momentary fit of passion, caused by his failure to
get the connection he asked for, and that he had no intention of doing or attempting to do plaintiff
any bodily hurt. But the words used did not amount to a threat. Defendant said: “If I were there, I
would break your…neck.” But he was not there, and plaintiff knew it; and there is nothing in what
he said expressive of an intention to go there and injure plaintiff. Webster defines a “threat” as “the
expression of an intention to inflict evil or injury on another.” The law dictionaries give practically
the same definition. A threat therefore looks to the future. As Judge Cooley says, in the passage above
quoted, “a threat only promises a future injury.” Here there was no expression of an intention to
injure in the future, and therefore no threat.
The language attributed to defendant—especially when used by a man to a woman—merits
severest condemnation and subjects the user to the scorn and contempt of his fellow men. But it is
not civilly actionable.… Judgment reversed.
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1.

QUESTIONS
Be Careful What You Wish For: Silverthorne allegedly said: “If I were there, I would
break your God damned neck.” The court said this wasn’t civilly actionable as assault.
Can you think of any conditional or future threats that might have led to different results?

2.

Out of the Ordinary: The court notes that Brooker never alleged that she “was not a
person of ordinary reason and firmness and that defendant knew it.” Would it have
mattered if she had? Why? Should it? And what if a defendant can demonstrate that a
plaintiff alleging assault is of “extraordinary” reason and firmness? Should such a
plaintiff be barred from seeking relief?

3.

Gender Trouble I: Are the parties’ genders playing a role here? If so, how?
VETTER v. MORGAN
Court of Appeals of Kansas (1995)

Briscoe, Judge:

ã

Laura Vetter appeals the summary judgment dismissal of her
[assault claim] against Chad Morgan for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident…. Vetter was injured when her van ran off
the road after an encounter with a car owned by Morgan’s father
and driven by Dana Gaither. Morgan and Jerrod Faulkner were
passengers in the car. Vetter was alone at 1:30 or 1:45 a.m. when
she stopped her van in the right-hand westbound lane of an
intersection at a stoplight. Morgan and Gaither drove up beside
Vetter. Morgan began screaming vile and threatening
obscenities at Vetter, shaking his fist, and making obscene gestures in a violent manner. According to
Vetter, Gaither revved the engine of the car and moved the car back and forth while Morgan was
threatening Vetter. Vetter testified that Morgan threatened to remove her from her van and spat on
her van door when the traffic light turned green. Vetter stated she was very frightened and thought
Morgan was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She was able to write down the license tag
number of the car. Morgan stated he did not intend to scare, upset, or harm Vetter, but “didn’t really
care” how she felt. He was trying to amuse his friends, who were laughing at his antics.
When the traffic light changed to green, both vehicles drove forward. According to Vetter, after
they had driven approximately 10 feet, the car driven by Gaither veered suddenly into her lane, and
she reacted by steering her van sharply to the right. Vetter’s van struck the curb, causing her head to
hit the steering wheel and snap back against the seat, after which she fell to the floor of the van.
Morgan and Gaither denied that the car veered into Vetter’s lane, stating they drove straight away
from the intersection and did not see Vetter’s collision with the curb.
Vetter filed this action against Morgan and Gaither…. [The trial court concluded Morgan’s
actions did not constitute assault.] Vetter argues the trial court erred in dismissing her assault claim
against Morgan. Assault is defined as “an intentional threat or attempt, coupled with apparent
ability, to do bodily harm to another, resulting in immediate apprehension of bodily harm. No
bodily contact is necessary.” Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1991).
The trial court concluded there was no evidence that Morgan threatened or attempted to harm
Vetter, that he had no apparent ability to harm her because her van was locked and the windows
were rolled up, and there was no claim of immediate apprehension of bodily harm. Vetter contends
all of these conclusions involved questions of fact that should have been resolved by a jury.
There was evidence of a threat. Vetter testified in her deposition that Morgan verbally threatened
to take her from her van. Ordinarily, words alone cannot be an assault. However, words can
constitute assault if together with other acts or circumstances they put the other in reasonable
apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact with his person.

ã

THE FAST AND THE FURIOUS: TOKYO DRIFT (2006).
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The record is sufficient to support an inference that Morgan’s threat and the acts and
circumstances surrounding it could reasonably put someone in Vetter’s position in apprehension of
imminent or immediate bodily harm. Morgan’s behavior was so extreme that Vetter could
reasonably have believed he would immediately try to carry out his threat. It is not necessary that
the victim be placed in apprehension of instantaneous harm. It is sufficient if it appears there will be
no significant delay.
The record also supports an inference that Morgan had the apparent ability to harm Vetter.
Although Vetter’s van was locked and the windows rolled up, the windows could be broken. The
two vehicles were only six feet apart, and Morgan was accompanied by two other males. It was late
at night, so witnesses and potential rescuers were unlikely. Although Vetter may have had the ability
to flee by turning right, backing up, or running the red light, her ability to prevent the threatened
harm by flight or self-defense does not preclude an assault. It is enough that Vetter believed that
Morgan was capable of immediately inflicting the contact unless prevented by self-defense, flight,
or intervention by others.
The trial court erred in concluding there was no evidence that Vetter was placed in apprehension
of bodily harm. Whether Morgan’s actions constituted an assault was a question of fact for the jury….
1.

QUESTIONS
Never Say Never: The court in Brooker says that words “never constitute an assault.” In
what way does Vetter challenge this “time-honored maxim”?

2.

Assault by Tweet: Kelly tags Taylor on Twitter—“I’m gonna break your God damned
neck, @TaylorK.” Drawing on Eichenwald, Brooker, and Vetter, could Kelly’s tweet be
an actionable assault? What are your best arguments for either side?

3.

Gender Trouble II: Is gender playing a role in Vetter? Is it the same role as in Brooker?
The following problem discusses lynching.
THURGOOD PROBLEM

Nolan was an extra on the set of a movie about Thurgood Marshall—a great civil-rights lawyer
(and later U.S. Supreme Court justice) who was often threatened as he took controversial cases in
the Deep South. Nolan’s big scene depicted a time when Marshall was nearly snatched by a lynch
mob. Nolan’s character was a painter who stood in a group of Black bystanders. Meanwhile, another
extra named Trevor, who was white, saw one of the set props laying on the ground. It was a noose.
During a break in filming, Trevor gleefully waived around the knotted rope and tossed it in Nolan’s
direction. Nolan froze as he saw the noose fly through the air, land on his shoulder, and fall onto his
foot, at which point he quickly kicked it away. Though Nolan wasn’t injured physically, he sued
Trevor for both assault and battery.
(a) Reacting to the assault claim, Trevor says “I mean, come on! I wasn’t going to lynch him,
for crying out loud, nor could I have!” Does that argument persuade you?
(b) Trevor also exclaims that he “didn’t mean to hit him!” How does this statement affect
the assault claim? How about the battery claim?
(c) Finally, Trevor bemoans that Nolan “didn’t even move to get out of the way, so it clearly
wasn’t that big of a deal.” Is that a good argument?
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In re WHITE
United States Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of Virginia (1982)
Shelley, Judge:
…On September 10, 1977 Walter Calvin White, Jr.
(White) shot Ralph Edward Davis (Davis) in the stomach
with a handgun. White was arrested for the shooting and on
November 29, 1978 the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond found him guilty of maiming Davis and
sentenced him to serve five years in the state penitentiary. On
February 26, 1980 Davis obtained a default judgment against
White in the amount of $50,000.00 in the Circuit Court for
the City of Richmond on the ground that White willfully and
maliciously wounded Davis. White subsequently filed his petition in bankruptcy and Davis now asks
this Court to declare White’s debt on account of that judgment nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
On the day of the shooting Davis and his brother, Marvin W. Davis, were washing cars in front
of their mother’s house on Fairmont Avenue in Richmond, Virginia. At the same time White, a
neighbor who lives less than one block away on the same street, was having a conversation with
William Tipton (Tipton). In that conversation White and Tipton continued an argument which had
begun approximately one week earlier. White had obtained a gun in anticipation of seeing Tipton.
White was carrying the pistol in a container on his motorcycle and pulled it out of the container
during the course of that argument.
When White pulled the gun Tipton mounted his motorcycle and sped away. White shot at
Tipton as Tipton passed within twenty-five feet of Davis. He missed Tipton and the bullet hit Davis
in the stomach. White fled the scene.
White testified at the trial that he obtained the gun with the intent of scaring Tipton. He said
that he drew the gun after Tipton insulted his mother but that he did not intentionally fire the gun.
He claimed the gun went off when he tripped over a rock in the street.
Davis and White did not know each other before the shooting incident. White said he pulled the
gun intending to scare Tipton and that it accidently fired. This Court believes that White’s testimony
that the gun accidently fired when he tripped over a rock is unworthy of belief. White testified that
he obtained the gun earlier that week with another meeting with Tipton in mind. Although Davis
was located almost a full block from White, the bullet hit him as Tipton passed within twenty-five
feet of him. White clearly intended to shoot Tipton; however, he missed and the bullet hit Davis
instead….
A debt incurred from an action based upon a willful and malicious injury by the debtor to
another person may be nondischargeable in bankruptcy.… The word “willful” means “deliberate or
intentional,” a deliberate and intentional act which necessarily leads to injury. Therefore, a wrongful
act done intentionally, which necessarily produces harm and is without just cause or excuse, may
constitute a willful and malicious injury.
White committed the wrongful act when he shot at Tipton. The act was intentional and it
produced an injury although not to the person White intended to injure. White’s actions cannot be
excused solely because he missed his intended victim and instead hit someone else. The injury is not
required to be directed against the victim, but includes any entity other than the intended victim.
Under the doctrine of transferred intent one who intends a battery is liable for that battery when
he unexpectedly hits a stranger instead of the intended victim. If one intentionally commits an
assault or battery at another and by mistake strikes a third person, he is guilty of an assault and
battery of the third person if defendant’s intention, in such a case, is to strike an unlawful blow, to
injure some person by his act, and it is not essential that the injury be to the one intended.
Virginia courts have adopted the doctrine of transferred intent reasoning that every person is
liable for the direct, natural and probable consequence of his acts, and that everyone doing an
unlawful act is responsible for all of the consequential results of that act. There need be no actual
intent to injure the particular person who is injured….
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The evidence here clearly shows that the shooting was a wrongful act intentionally done and that
Davis’s injuries resulted from that act. White deliberately, intentionally and maliciously fired the
gun and injured Davis and the debt resulting from that act is nondischargeable in bankruptcy….
1.

QUESTIONS
Stranger Danger: The court slips in the fact that Davis and White didn’t know each
other before the shooting. Why bother to mention that?

2.

Close Shave: Why might it matter that the bullet passed within twenty-five feet of Tipton?

3.

Mix and Match: Tort law recognizes two main kinds of transferred intent: between
people and between torts. Plaintiffs can also mix and match across people and torts. In
re White is an example of intent transferring between people—White intended battery
against Tipton but instead battered Davis (i.e., same tort, different victim). Can you
think of hypotheticals in which intent transfers between torts (i.e., same victim, different
tort)? How about between people and torts (i.e., different tort, different victim)?

C. Consent
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B
Consent Under Mistake, Misrepresentation or Duress (1965)
(1) … [C]onsent to conduct of another is effective for all
consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any
interests resulting from it.
ã

(2) If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by
[a] a substantial mistake concerning the
[i] nature of the invasion of his interests or
[ii] the extent of the harm to be expected from it
and
[b] the mistake is
[i] known to the other or
[ii] is induced by the other’s misrepresentation,
the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.
(3) Consent is not effective if it is given under duress.
1.

2.

ã

QUESTIONS
Invalidating Consent: Consent is a defense to battery and assault. If the plaintiff
consented to an otherwise harmful or offensive contact, the contact is no longer tortious.
But consent isn’t always valid. The Restatement envisions two distinct ways to invalidate
a person’s consent. What are they? Can you think of examples of both types?
Manipulation: Consent is ineffective if given under duress. But how are we to
differentiate between persuasion and coercion? According to the Restatement, the parties’
age, sex, mental capacity, and relationship may all be significant, as are any “antecedent
circumstances” and “[t]he type of conduct to which the other party consents.”

Khalid Albaih, I AGREE??? (CC BY 2.0) (adapted).
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KOFFMAN v. GARNETT
Supreme Court of Virginia (2003)
Lacy, Justice:

ã

In this case we consider whether the trial court
properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ second amended
motion for judgment for failure to state causes of action
for [assault and battery.]…
In the fall of 2000, Andrew W. Koffman, a 13-year old
middle school student at a public school in Botetourt
County, began participating on the school’s football team.
It was Andy’s first season playing organized football, and
he was positioned as a third-string defensive player.
James Garnett was employed by the Botetourt County
School Board as an assistant coach for the football team
and was responsible for the supervision, training, and instruction of the team’s defensive players.
The team lost its first game of the season. Garnett was upset by the defensive players’ inadequate
tackling in that game and became further displeased by what he perceived as inadequate tackling
during the first practice following the loss.
Garnett ordered Andy to hold a football and “stand upright and motionless” so that Garnett
could explain the proper tackling technique to the defensive players. Then Garnett, without further
warning, thrust his arms around Andy’s body, lifted him “off his feet by two feet or more,” and
“slammed” him to the ground. Andy weighed 144 pounds, while Garnett weighed approximately
260 pounds. The force of the tackle broke the humerus bone in Andy’s left arm. During prior
practices, no coach had used physical force to instruct players on rules or techniques of playing
football…. The disparity in size between Garnett and Andy was obvious to Garnett. Because of his
authority as a coach, Garnett must have anticipated that Andy would comply with his instructions
to stand in a non-defensive, upright, and motionless position. Under these circumstances, Garnett
proceeded to aggressively tackle the much smaller, inexperienced student football player, by lifting
him more than two feet from the ground and slamming him into the turf. According to the
Koffmans’ allegations, no coach had tackled any player previously so there was no reason for Andy
to expect to be tackled by Garnett, nor was Andy warned of the impending tackle or of the force
Garnett would use.
As the trial court observed, receiving an injury while participating in a tackling demonstration
may be part of the sport. The facts alleged in this case, however, go beyond the circumstances of
simply being tackled in the course of participating in organized football….
The trial court held that the second amended motion for judgment was insufficient as a matter
of law to establish causes of action for the torts of assault and battery. We begin by identifying the
elements of these two independent torts. The tort of assault consists of an act intended to cause
either harmful or offensive contact with another person or apprehension of such contact, and that
creates in that other person’s mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery. The tort of
battery is an unwanted touching which is neither consented to, excused, nor justified. Although
these two torts “go together like ham and eggs,” the difference between them is “that between
physical contact and the mere apprehension of it. One may exist without the other.” W. Page Keeton,
Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 10 at 46.
The Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment does not include an allegation that Andy
had any apprehension of an immediate battery. This allegation cannot be supplied by inference
because any inference of Andy’s apprehension is discredited by the affirmative allegations that Andy
had no warning of an imminent forceful tackle by Garnett. The Koffmans argue that a reasonable
inference of apprehension can be found “in the very short period of time that it took the coach to
lift Andy into the air and throw him violently to the ground.” At this point, however, the battery
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alleged by the Koffmans was in progress. Accordingly, we find that the pleadings were insufficient
as a matter of law to establish a cause of action for civil assault.
The second amended motion for judgment is sufficient, however, to establish a cause of action
for the tort of battery. The Koffmans pled that Andy consented to physical contact with players “of
like age and experience” and that neither Andy nor his parents expected or consented to his
“participation in aggressive contact tackling by the adult coaches.” Further, the Koffmans pled that,
in the past, coaches had not tackled players as a method of instruction. Garnett asserts that, by
consenting to play football, Andy consented to be tackled, by either other football players or by the
coaches.
Whether Andy consented to be tackled by Garnett in the manner alleged was a matter of fact.
Based on the allegations in the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment, reasonable persons
could disagree on whether Andy gave such consent. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in
holding that the Koffmans’ second amended motion for judgment was insufficient as a matter of
law to establish a claim for battery….
Kinser, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority opinion except with regard to the issue of consent as it pertains to the
intentional tort of battery…. Absent fraud, consent is generally a defense to an alleged battery. In
the context of this case, taking part in a game manifests a willingness to submit to such bodily
contacts or restrictions of liberty as are permitted by its rules or usages. However, participating in a
particular sport does not manifest consent to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the
game if such rules or usages are designed to protect the participants and not merely to secure the
better playing of the game as a test of skill.
The thrust of the plaintiffs’ allegations is that they did not consent to “Andy’s participation in
aggressive contact tackling by the adult coaches” but that they consented only to Andy’s engaging
“in a contact sport with other children of like age and experience.” They further alleged that the
coaches had not previously tackled the players when instructing them about the rules and techniques
of football.
It is notable, in my opinion, that the plaintiffs admitted in their pleading that Andy’s coach was
“responsible…for the supervision, training and instruction of the defensive players.” It cannot be
disputed that one responsibility of a football coach is to minimize the possibility that players will
sustain something more than slight injury while playing the sport. A football coach cannot be
expected to extract from the game the body clashes that cause bruises, jolts and hard falls. Instead, a
coach should ensure that players are able to withstand the shocks, blows and other rough treatment
with which they would meet in actual play by making certain that players are in sound physical
condition, are issued proper protective equipment, and are taught and shown how to handle
themselves while in play. The instruction on how to handle themselves during a game should
include demonstrations of proper tackling techniques. By voluntarily participating in football, Andy
and his parents necessarily consented to instruction by the coach on such techniques. The alleged
battery occurred during that instruction.
The plaintiffs alleged that they were not aware that Andy’s coach would use physical force to
instruct on the rules and techniques of football since neither he nor the other coaches had done so
in the past. Surely, the plaintiffs are not claiming that the scope of their consent changed from day
to day depending on the coaches’ instruction methods during prior practices. Moreover, they did
not allege that they were told that the coaches would not use physical demonstrations to instruct the
players.
Additionally, the plaintiffs did not allege that the tackle itself violated any rule or usage of the
sport of football. Nor did they plead that Andy could not have been tackled by a larger, physically
stronger, and more experienced player either during a game or practice. Tackling and instruction
on proper tackling techniques are aspects of the sport of football to which a player consents when
making a decision to participate in the sport.
In sum, I conclude that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead a claim for battery. We must
remember that acts that might give rise to a battery on a city street will not do so in the context of
the sport of football….
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1.

QUESTIONS
In the Blink of an Eye: The court concludes there was no assault, essentially because
Andy had no warning before the tackle. But wouldn’t Andy have seen Coach Garnett
coming toward him? Think carefully about why the court still felt that wasn’t enough, as
well as any counterarguments you could have raised to save Andy’s assault claim.

2.

Scoping Consent: Austin needs surgery in his right ear. His surgeon, Dr. Fabiana, puts
him under anesthesia and operates on his left ear. Has Dr. Fabiana committed battery?

3.

Hairdryer Treatment: The court mentions in passing that Andy’s team had lost its first
game of the season and that Coach Garnett was upset. Why bring that up? Can you see
how it could be legally relevant?
NEAL v. NEAL
Supreme Court of Idaho (1994)

Trout, Justice:

ã

This is an appeal from an order dismissing appellant’s
action for damages allegedly suffered as a result of an
adulterous relationship between her husband and his
mistress…. In January of 1990, defendant Thomas A. Neal filed
for divorce after his wife became aware that he was having an
extramarital affair. Mary Neal, his wife, counterclaimed for
divorce and also asserted tort claims against Thomas Neal and
Jill LaGasse. The gravamen of the claims against Thomas Neal
and Jill LaGasse center upon allegations of an adulterous
relationship between them. Respondents moved to dismiss
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The trial court
treated the motion as one for summary judgment [and granted
it]…. On appeal from an order granting summary judgment,
we review the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to
determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I. Recovery for Criminal Conversation
Mary Neal seeks to recover for the respondents’ adulterous conduct which she contends is
actionable under tort theories of criminal conversation, invasion of privacy, interference with
contract, violation of a statutory duty of fidelity and negligence. All of these causes of action are
based, factually, on the alleged adulterous affair between Thomas Neal and Jill LaGasse. In addition,
although Mary Neal alleged the various torts cited, the focus of her argument throughout this case
has been on her claim of criminal conversation. For these reasons, our discussion here centers on
the criminal conversation issue.
Mary Neal contends that criminal conversation remains a viable cause of action under Idaho
law, thereby allowing her to maintain an action for interference with her exclusive sexual
relationship with her husband. She further contends that this cause of action, based on her husband’s
adultery, is grounded in I.C. § 32–901, which provides that a spouse has a marital duty of mutual
respect, fidelity and support, and I.C. § 18–6001, which provides a criminal penalty for adultery. We
address these issues in turn.
Black’s Law Dictionary 373 (1990) defines “criminal conversation” as
Sexual intercourse of an outsider with husband or wife, or a breaking down of the
covenant of fidelity. Tort action based on adultery, considered in its aspect of a
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civil injury to the husband or wife entitling him or her to damages; the tort of
debauching or seducing of a wife or husband….
Criminal conversation was recognized in Idaho as a common law tort in Watkins v. Lord, 171 P.
1133 (Ida. 1918). It has its genesis in the proposition that a husband has a property right in his wife
and her services. This property interest in his wife could be “stolen” by a third party through
adultery. Since a wife was her husband’s property and servant, her consent to the adultery was no
defense to her husband’s suit against her paramour. Prosser comments on the basis of criminal
conversation from Holdsworth, History of English Law 430 (1937), and states that “it was considered
that she [the wife] was no more capable of giving a consent which would prejudice the husband’s
interest than would his horse.” W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 124 (1971). This Court, and the courts of
other states, have condemned this reasoning as archaic. O’Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Ida.
1986) (where this Court abolished the related cause of action of alienation of affections).
Not since Watkins v. Lord was decided in 1918 has there been a reported case in Idaho involving
criminal conversation. We believe that the change in societal views toward women which has
occurred since then may have much to do with this total absence of case law. Here we take the
opportunity presented us to hold that criminal conversation has been abolished as a cause of action
in Idaho.
The medieval rationale for the viability of the tort offers the very reason to abolish it. The notion
that a wife is the property of her husband offends the right of every woman to be treated as an equal
member of society. In abolishing criminal conversation we join a number of jurisdictions which
have already done so. See Irwin v. Coluccio, 648 P.2d 458 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (listing some
eighteen jurisdictions which have abolished, legislatively or judicially, criminal conversation)….
Finally, we reject Mary Neal’s contention that the adultery statute results in the codification of
criminal conversation as a tort and that this Court cannot abolish the tort of criminal conversation
absent legislative abolition of the crime of adultery. The existence of a criminal statute proscribing
adultery seeks recompense for a public wrong. A civil action arises from the violation of a private
right. The existence of the former does not prevent the elimination of the latter. In addition, the tort
of criminal conversation has its origins in common law and this Court may modify such law.
While this Court does not condone adultery and continues to hold marriage in the highest
esteem, we are persuaded, for the reasons given, that the action pursued by Mary Neal does not serve
to protect the institution of marriage…. [O]nce such cause of action is brought, it can only serve to
add more tension to the family relationship.
There are other reasons to abolish the tort of criminal conversation. Revenge, which may be a
motive for bringing the cause of action, has no place in determining the legal rights between two
parties. Further, this type of suit may expose the defendant to the extortionate schemes of the
plaintiff, since it could ruin the defendant’s reputation. Deterrence is not achieved; the nature of the
activities underlying criminal conversation, that is sexual activity, are not such that the risk of
damages would likely be a deterrent. Finally, since the injuries suffered are intangible, damage
awards are not governed by any true standards, making it more likely that they could result from
passion or prejudice. These negative aspects, combined with the archaic basis for the tort, convince
us that the ill effects of a suit for criminal conversation outweigh any benefit it may have….
II. Recovery for Battery
Finally, Mary Neal contends that she has alleged a prima facie case of battery against Thomas
Neal. Her battery claim is founded on her assertion that although she consented to sexual
intercourse with her husband during the time of his affair, had she known of his sexual involvement
with another woman, she would not have consented, as sexual relations under those circumstances
would have been offensive to her. Therefore, she contends that his failure to disclose the fact of the
affair rendered her consent ineffective and subjects him to liability for battery.
Civil battery consists of an intentional, unpermitted contact upon the person of another which
is either unlawful, harmful or offensive. The intent necessary for battery is the intent to commit the
act, not the intent to cause harm. Further, lack of consent is also an essential element of battery.
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Consent obtained by fraud or misrepresentation vitiates the consent and can render the offending
party liable for a battery.
The district court concluded that Thomas Neal’s failure to disclose the fact of his sexual
relationship with LaGasse did not vitiate Mary Neal’s consent to engage in sexual relations with him,
such consent being measured at the time of the relations. We do not agree with the district court’s
reasoning. To accept that the consent, or lack thereof, must be measured by only those facts which
are known to the parties at the time of the alleged battery would effectively destroy any exception
for consent induced by fraud or deceit. Obviously if the fraud or deceit were known at the time of
the occurrence, the “consented to” act would never occur.
Mary Neal’s affidavit states that: “[I]f the undersigned had realized that her husband was having
sexual intercourse with counterdefendant LaGasse, the undersigned would not have consented to
sexual intercourse with counterdefendant Neal and to do so would have been offensive.” The district
court opined that because the act was not actually offensive at the time it occurred, her later
statements that it would have been offensive were ineffective. This reasoning ignores the possibility
that Mary Neal may have engaged in a sexual act based upon a substantial mistake concerning the
nature of the contact or the harm to be expected from it, and that she did not become aware of the
offensiveness until well after the act had occurred. Mary Neal’s affidavit at least raises a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether there was indeed consent to the alleged act of battery.
The district court also noted that Mary Neal’s later sexual relations with her husband after
becoming aware of his infidelity, extinguished any offensiveness or lack of consent. The fact that she
may have consented to sexual relations on a later occasion cannot be said to negate, as a matter of
law, an ineffective consent to prior sexual encounters. Again, her affidavit raises a question of fact
regarding whether these prior sexual encounters were nonconsensual. This factual issue precluded
the dismissal of the battery claim by the district court….
1.

QUESTIONS
Harmful or Offensive I: What’s Mary’s theory of why this was battery? Does she think
the contact was harmful or offensive?

2.

Forgive and Forget: Does it matter that Mary had sex with Thomas after discovering the
affair? What does the court say, and do you agree? Should it affect the legal
determination of whether she consented? How about whether the contact was offensive?

3.

The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away: Why does the court feel empowered to
abolish the tort of criminal conversation?
McPHERSON v. McPHERSON
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (1998)

Dana, Justice:
Nancy McPherson appeals from the judgment of the Superior
Court denying her claims for [assault and battery]. These claims
arise from her claim that her husband, Steven McPherson, infected
her with a sexually transmitted disease he acquired through an
extramarital affair…. Nancy filed a complaint against Steven, after
their divorce, claiming that he had infected her with…Human
Papilloma Virus (HPV). Nancy alleged that Steven acquired HPV
through a clandestine extramarital affair with Jane Doe. The
complaint further alleges that Steven transmitted the disease to
her, prior to their divorce, through sexual intercourse.
Following a jury-waived trial, the court made the following
factual findings: that Nancy “has been and may still be infected
with HPV”; that it is more likely than not that she was infected with
HPV through sexual contact with another individual; that Steven
was the only sexual partner that Nancy has ever had; and that it was more likely than not that Steven
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infected Nancy with HPV. The court also noted that, even though Steven did not then exhibit
evidence of the HPV infection, “this is in no way proof that he is not now in a latent stage nor does
it demonstrate or have any probative value as to whether or not he was a carrier” at the time he
allegedly infected Nancy. The court found further that Steven had a sexual relationship with Doe,
that he had sexual intercourse with Nancy after having intercourse with Doe, that he did not disclose
his sexual relationship with Doe to Nancy, and that he took no steps to protect Nancy from possible
infection with a sexually transmitted disease. Finally, the court found that Steven “did not know or
have reason to know” that he might have HPV at the time he infected Nancy because he had no
physical symptoms of HPV infection, he had no knowledge of any other partner having symptoms
of HPV, and he had no medical diagnosis of any kind of a sexually transmitted disease….
The court found that no assault and battery occurred because the sexual intercourse between
Steven and Nancy was consensual. She argues that her consent to have sexual intercourse with
Steven was vitiated by the fact that he failed to inform her of his extramarital affair.
One who effectively consents to conduct of another intended to invade his interests cannot
recover in an action of tort for the conduct or for harm resulting from it. Consent may be vitiated,
however by misrepresentation:
If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a
substantial mistake concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the
extent of the harm to be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other
or is induced by the other’s misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the
unexpected invasion or harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B(2) (1977). By way of illustration, the Restatement provides:
“A consents to sexual intercourse with B, who knows that A is ignorant of the fact that B has a
venereal disease. B is subject to liability to A for battery.”
Nancy argues only that Steven misled her concerning his fidelity. Given the court’s finding that
Steven neither knew nor should have known of his infection with HPV, however, Nancy cannot
argue that Steven misled her “concerning the nature of the invasion of [her] interest or the extent of
the harm to be expected” therefrom. If the defendant, ignorant of the fact that he was infected with
a sexually transmitted disease, has sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, the defendant will not be
liable, because the plaintiff consented to the kind of touch intended by the defendant, and both were
ignorant of the harmful nature of the invasion. Thus, Steven may not be held liable for assault and
battery…. Judgment affirmed.
1.

QUESTIONS
Harmful or Offensive II: What’s Nancy’s theory of why this was battery? Does she think
the contact was harmful or offensive?

2.

Sex Ed: The court stresses that there was no reason Steven should have known about his
HPV infection. What if HPV infection rates had been unusually high in their town?

3.

Seeing the Forest: Now that we’ve covered several key concepts in the law of battery and
assault, consider how the same facts might be relevant to multiple parts of the overall
legal analysis. Can you see the possible overlap between facts establishing the
offensiveness of a touching, the existence of implicit consent, the scope of consent, and
the presence of duress?
ANTI-VAX PROBLEM

In June 2021, Taylor flew into Canada. Everyone seemed to think that COVID-19 was becoming
a non-issue, especially with the rollout of vaccines in many parts of the world. The CDC had even
lifted mask recommendations for vaccinated individuals. When Taylor landed in Montreal, she
noticed a long line forming under a sign saying “COVID-19 Safety Procedures.” She knew that most
countries require travelers to take some sort of precautionary steps, so she joined the queue. As
Taylor reached the front of the line, a man in a white coat said, “Bonjour-Hi! Roll up your sleeve
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and hold out your arm, s’il vous plaît.” She did as he said, and the man injected her with the COVID19 vaccine. Taylor urges that she didn’t want the vaccine and sues for battery.
(a) Does Taylor have a decent battery claim? Does the man in the white coat have a defense?
(b) What if the sign had instead said “Tourist Information and Services”?
(c) Imagine, instead, that plain-clothes Canadian agents were planted in the middle seat of
each row of planes flying into Montreal. One of the agents, Jean-Guy, sat next to Taylor.
They made small talk, and Jean-Guy, as he was trained to do, convinced Taylor of the
benefits of the COVID-19 vaccine. After Taylor receives her shot from the man in the
white coat, she sees Jean-Guy walk out of a nearby door labeled “authorized personnel
only.” Ever suspicious of authority figures, Taylor decides to sue for battery and argue
that she didn’t freely give consent. What result?

D. Defense of People & Property
HAEUSSLER v. De LORETTO
California Court of Appeals (1952)
Vallee, Justice:

ã

[Plaintiff appeals a judgment in favor of defendant] for
damages for assault and battery…. [O]n May 21, 1950,
about 10:30 p.m., plaintiff went to the home of defendant, a
neighbor, to inquire about his dog which was missing and
which frequently had gone to defendant’s home. The dog
had been the subject of disagreement between the wives of
the parties on several previous occasions. When defendant,
in response to plaintiff’s knock, opened the door, the dog
ran out from inside the house. Defendant testified that
plaintiff immediately started talking in a loud tone of voice, told him he did not want defendant or
his wife to feed the dog or keep it at their house; that plaintiff kept “waving his hands, and while he
talked, his face was pretty flushed and he was pretty excited, like he had been drinking, and he kept
arguing with me and one word led to another and I don’t know the man, but I do know of him. I
know he had trouble with the Teamsters’ Union and [he] beat up a couple of friends of mine, and I
got a little afraid, and towards the end, after I had asked him to go three times, and he kept waving
his hands, I thought he was going to strike me, and I struck him or pushed him, and I went in and
closed the door.” Plaintiff called the police but no arrest was made nor was any criminal action had.
The [trial] court found that plaintiff precipitated the argument; defendant ordered plaintiff to
leave his premises; plaintiff advanced threateningly toward defendant; defendant struck him once;
two of plaintiff’s teeth were loosened, necessitating dental care; defendant used reasonable force in
defense of himself and in removing plaintiff from his premises; plaintiff failed to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that defendant used or attempted to use wilful and unlawful force upon
the person of plaintiff.
The issue of self-defense was pleaded by defendant and litigated. The determination of which of
the two parties precipitated the fight, and whether defendant acted in self-defense, and whether in
so doing he used more force than was reasonably necessary under the circumstances, were questions
for the trier of fact. One who is involved in an altercation with another has the right to use such force
as is necessary to protect himself from bodily injury, and the question of the amount of force
justifiable under the circumstances of a particular case is also one for the trier of fact. As the court
found that defendant used reasonable force in defense of himself, it necessarily follows the force
used was not wilful or unlawful and that plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof. Since the
conflicts in the evidence were resolved in defendant’s favor, and the foregoing narration of the
evidence supports the findings, this court may not disturb the judgment. Affirmed.
ã
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QUESTIONS
The Logic of Self-Defense: How is the availability of self-defense as a legal defense
consistent with the goals of tort law? How is it inconsistent?

2.

Factual Findings: The court in Haeussler recounts what happened in great detail. Facts
are always important in tort law, but detailed factual findings can be particularly crucial
in judging self-defense. The factfinder—usually the jury, though here the trial judge—
must determine whether the defendant actually and reasonably believed it was necessary
to injure another to avoid injury that was imminent, and that they used no more force
than reasonably necessary under the circumstances. Paying attention to each italicized
word or phrase in that standard, which facts were important?

3.

But They Started It! If you provoke a fight that then leads you to use force in selfdefense, should you be allowed to escape liability for battery?
KATKO v. BRINEY
Supreme Court of Iowa (1971)

Moore, Chief Justice:

ã

The primary issue presented here is whether an owner may protect
personal property in an unoccupied boarded-up farm house against
trespassers and thieves by a spring gun capable of inflicting death or serious
injury. We are not here concerned with a man’s right to protect his home
and members of his family. Defendants’ home was several miles from the
scene of the incident to which we refer infra.
Plaintiff’s action is for damages resulting from serious injury caused by
a shot from a 20-gauge spring shotgun set by defendants in a bedroom of an
old farm house which had been uninhabited for several years. Plaintiff and
his companion, Marvin McDonough, had broken and entered the house to
find and steal old bottles and dated fruit jars which they considered antiques.
At defendants’ request plaintiff’s action was tried to a jury consisting of residents of the
community where defendants’ property was located. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and
against defendants for $20,000 actual and $10,000 punitive damages….
Most of the facts are not disputed. In 1957 defendant Bertha L. Briney inherited her parents’
farm land in Mahaska and Monroe Counties. Included was an 80-acre tract in southwest Mahaska
County where her grandparents and parents had lived. No one occupied the house thereafter. Her
husband, Edward, attempted to care for the land. He kept no farm machinery thereon. The
outbuildings became dilapidated. For about 10 years, 1957 to 1967, there occurred a series of
trespassing and housebreaking events with loss of some household items, the breaking of windows
and “messing up of the property in general.” The latest occurred June 8, 1967, prior to the event on
July 16, 1967 herein involved.
Defendants through the years boarded up the windows and doors in an attempt to stop the
intrusions. They had posted “no trespass” signs on the land several years before 1967. The nearest
one was 35 feet from the house. On June 11, 1967 defendants set “a shotgun trap” in the north
bedroom. After Mr. Briney cleaned and oiled his 20-gauge shotgun, the power of which he was well
aware, defendants took it to the old house where they secured it to an iron bed with the barrel
pointed at the bedroom door. It was rigged with wire from the doorknob to the gun’s trigger so it
would fire when the door was opened. Briney first pointed the gun so an intruder would be hit in
the stomach but at Mrs. Briney’s suggestion it was lowered to hit the legs. He admitted he did so
“because I was mad and tired of being tormented” but “he did not intend to injure anyone.” He gave
no explanation of why he used a loaded shell and set it to hit a person already in the house. Tin was
nailed over the bedroom window. The spring gun could not be seen from the outside. No warning
of its presence was posted.
ã
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Plaintiff lived with his wife and worked regularly as a gasoline station attendant in Eddyville, seven
miles from the old house. He had observed it for several years while hunting in the area and
considered it as being abandoned. He knew it had long been uninhabited. In 1967 the area around
the house was covered with high weeds. Prior to July 16, 1967 plaintiff and McDonough had been to
the premises and found several old bottles and fruit jars which they took and added to their collection
of antiques. On the latter date about 9:30 p.m. they made a second trip to the Briney property. They
entered the old house by removing a board from a porch window which was without glass. While
McDonough was looking around the kitchen area plaintiff went to another part of the house. As he
started to open the north bedroom door the shotgun went off striking him in the right leg above the
ankle bone. Much of his leg, including part of the tibia, was blown away. Only by
McDonough’s assistance was plaintiff able to get out of the house and after crawling some distance was
put in his vehicle and rushed to a doctor and then to a hospital. He remained in the hospital 40 days.
Plaintiff’s doctor testified he seriously considered amputation but eventually the healing process
was successful. Some weeks after his release from the hospital plaintiff returned to work on crutches.
He was required to keep the injured leg in a cast for approximately a year and wear a special brace
for another year. He continued to suffer pain during this period.
There was undenied medical testimony plaintiff had a permanent deformity, a loss of tissue, and
a shortening of the leg…. [He] incurred $710 medical expense, $2,056.85 for hospital service, $61.80
for orthopedic service and $750 as loss of earnings. In addition thereto the trial court submitted to
the jury the question of damages for pain and suffering and for future disability.
Plaintiff testified he knew he had no right to break and enter the house with intent to steal bottles
and fruit jars therefrom. He further testified he had entered a plea of guilty to larceny in the
nighttime of property of less than $20 value from a private building. He stated he had been fined $50
and costs and paroled during good behavior from a 60-day jail sentence. Other than minor traffic
charges this was plaintiff’s first brush with the law. On this civil case appeal it is not our prerogative
to review the disposition made of the criminal charge against him.
The main thrust of defendants’ defense in the trial court and on this appeal is that “the law
permits use of a spring gun in a dwelling or warehouse for the purpose of preventing the unlawful
entry of a burglar or thief.”… In the statement of issues the trial court stated plaintiff and his
companion committed a felony when they broke and entered defendants’ house. [The trial court
instructed the jury that the property owners were not permitted to use excessive force, including
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm, to protect their property, unless it would prevent
violent felonies that themselves would endanger human life. The instructions explained that
breaking and entering did not rise to this level of violent felony.]…
The overwhelming weight of authority…supports the trial court’s statement of the applicable
principles of law…. Restatement of Torts, section 85, page 180, states:
The value of human life and limb, not only to the individual concerned but also
to society, so outweighs the interest of a possessor of land in excluding from it
those whom he is not willing to admit thereto that a possessor of land has, as is
stated in § 79, no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious
harm against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or
meddle with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily
harm to the occupiers or users of the premises…. A possessor of land cannot do
indirectly and by a mechanical device that which, were he present, he could not
do immediately and in person. Therefore, he cannot gain a privilege to install, for
the purpose of protecting his land from intrusions harmless to the lives and limbs
of the occupiers or users of it, a mechanical device whose only purpose is to inflict
death or serious harm upon such as may intrude, by giving notice of his intention
to inflict, by mechanical means and indirectly, harm which he could not, even
after request, inflict directly were he present.
In Volume 2, Harper and James, The Law of Torts, section 27.3, pages 1440, 1441, this is found:
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The possessor of land may not arrange his premises intentionally so as to cause
death or serious bodily harm to a trespasser. The possessor may of course take
some steps to repel a trespass. If he is present he may use force to do so, but only
that amount which is reasonably necessary to effect the repulse. Moreover if the
trespass threatens harm to property only—even a theft of property—the possessor
would not be privileged to use deadly force, he may not arrange his premises so
that such force will be inflicted by mechanical means. If he does, he will be liable
even to a thief who is injured by such device….
The legal principles stated by the trial court in [its] instructions…are well established and
supported by the authorities cited and quoted supra. There is no merit in defendants’ objections and
exceptions thereto….
Larson, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, first, because the majority wrongfully assumes that by installing a spring
gun in the bedroom of their unoccupied house the defendants intended to shoot any intruder who
attempted to enter the room. Under the record presented here, that was a fact question. Unless it is
held that these property owners are liable for any injury to an intruder from such a device regardless
of the intent with which it is installed, liability under these pleadings must rest upon two definite
issues of fact, i.e., did the defendants intend to shoot the invader, and if so, did they employ
unnecessary and unreasonable force against him?…
[The jury should have been instructed that it could not impose liability unless it found the
defendants intended to kill or seriously injure an intruder by setting up the spring gun. A reasonable
jury could have found that such intent was lacking because of testimony claiming the gun was only
set up to scare intruders.]
In the case at bar the plaintiff was guilty of serious criminal conduct, which event gave rise to his
claim against defendants. Even so, he may be eligible for an award of compensatory damages which
so far as the law is concerned redresses him and places him in the position he was prior to sustaining
the injury. The windfall he would receive in the form of punitive damages is bothersome to the
principle of damages, because it is a response to the conduct of the defendants rather than any
reaction to the loss suffered by plaintiff or any measurement of his worthiness for the award.
When such a windfall comes to a criminal as a result of his indulgence in serious criminal conduct,
the result is intolerable and indeed shocks the conscience. If we find the law upholds such a result, the
criminal would be permitted by operation of law to profit from his own crime…. We cannot in good
conscience ignore the conduct of the plaintiff. He does not come into court with clean hands, and
attempts to make a claim to punitive damages in part on his own criminal conduct. In such
circumstances, to enrich him would be unjust, and compensatory damages in such a case itself would
be a sufficient deterrent to the defendant or others who might intend to set such a device…. The
admonitory function of the tort law is adequately served where the compensatory damages claimed
are high and the granted award itself may act as a severe punishment and a deterrence. In such a case
as we have here there is no need to hold out the prospect of punitive damages as an incentive to sue
and rectify a minor physical damage such as a redress for lost dignity….
1.

QUESTIONS
The Underlying Tort: Did Briney commit a battery? Did he have the requisite intent?
How could Katko rely on Garratt v. Dailey to support his claim? Even if there wasn’t a
battery, was there an assault?

2.

Self-Help: If the spring gun wasn’t a permissible option, what else could Briney have
done to protect his property? Is there anything he could have done with the gun that
would have been constituted reasonable force?

3.

Unclean Hands: Should it matter that Katko was committing a crime when he was shot?
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E. False Imprisonment
FOJTIK v. CHARTER MEDICAL CORP.
Court of Appeals of Texas (1999)
Chavez, Justice:

ã

Felix Fojtik appeals from a…summary judgment entered
against him on his claim against Charter Medical Corporation.
Fojtik had brought a false imprisonment cause of
action against Charter arising from his stay at a Charter
hospital where he was treated for alcoholism…. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court….
Fojtik’s admission to Charter was preceded by an
“intervention,” where Dorrill Nabours and Valerie Bullock
from Charter, along with a group of Fojtik’s family and friends, confronted him and told him that
he needed to go through an inpatient treatment at Charter for alcohol abuse. Fojtik’s medical records
indicate that he told Charter staff he had admitted himself to Charter because those conducting the
“intervention” had told him that, if he did not voluntarily admit himself, they would have him
committed to the hospital and have him brought in wearing handcuffs. When admitted, Fojtik was
angry about being at Charter and refused to be photographed or to agree to permit Charter to
contact him after he left the treatment program. While at the hospital Fojtik made several requests
for a “pass” permitting him to leave the Charter facility. His initial requests were denied on the
ground that he was not “eligible” for a pass until he was further into his stay. Fojtik expressed his
opinion that he was getting a “raw deal” because he was “locked up and couldn’t get away.” Later
Fojtik was granted passes for a few hours at a time, and always returned to Charter voluntarily and
on time. Fojtik explained that he had vowed to follow all of the rules at Charter. Although nothing
in the record explains the reason Fojtik made this “vow,” he argues on appeal that he had decided to
follow all the rules only because he hoped that obedient behavior might speed his release.
Charter produced summary judgment evidence that Fojtik was free to leave at any time. Charter
employees explained that, although they used a system of “passes” and preferred to follow certain
procedures when patients left the hospital, if a patient insisted on leaving without following Charter
procedures, Charter would permit the patient to leave. Charter also refers us to Fojtik’s admission
documents, which indicate that he consented to inpatient treatment….
The elements of a false imprisonment cause of action are: (1) willful detention by the defendant,
(2) without consent of the detainee, and (3) without authority of law. A detention may be
accomplished by violence, by threats, or by any other means that restrain a person from moving
from one place to another. Where it is alleged that a detention is effected by a threat, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the threat was such as would inspire in the threatened person a just fear of
injury to his person, reputation, or property. Threats to call the police are not ordinarily sufficient
in themselves to effect an unlawful imprisonment. In determining whether such threats are
sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s free will, factors such as the relative size, age, experience, sex,
and physical demeanor of the participants may be considered….
Although Fojtik was not physically restrained, he alleges that he was detained against his will by
threats that, if he did not submit to his detention, he would be forcibly committed and “brought in
in handcuffs.” Fojtik also contends that Charter used “other means” in addition to threats of
commitment in order to restrain him. We first consider whether the evidence raises a question of
fact regarding whether Fojtik was restrained by threats.
A review of false imprisonment case law is instructive. In Black v. Kroger, an eighteen year old
woman with a tenth grade education and a two-year-old daughter was accused by her employers of
stealing. She was led into a small, windowless room lit by bare light bulbs, where the store manager
and another man who worked for “Kroger Security” were waiting. She was told repeatedly that they
knew she had been stealing, and that if she did not admit to stealing they would handcuff her and
take her to jail. She testified that she made a false confession, explaining “I just had it in my head
ã
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that they were going to put me in jail no matter what I did, and I wasn’t going to see my little girl for
a long, long time.” The court noted the woman’s lack of business experience and the harsh and
intimidating nature of her questioning. The court held that under these facts the jury could have
reasonably concluded that the threats to the woman intimidated her to the point where she was not
free to leave and was unreasonably detained.
Skillern & Sons, Inc. v. Stewart presents a similar set of facts. A female employee was accused of
stealing. She was led by the arm to a room where two men she had never met beat on a desk while telling
her “we have the goods on you…we know you’ve been stealing money.” She was threatened with
imprisonment, and told that she could not leave until she wrote a confession. She managed to leave, but
was ordered back, and again told that she would either sign a confession or she would go to jail, but that
she could not leave without confessing. When she tried to stand up she was physically pushed back into
a chair by her accusers. These facts were held to support a recovery for false imprisonment.
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn, the evidence was held insufficient to support a finding that
the plaintiff was falsely imprisoned. In this case as well, an employee was led to a secluded room
where others were waiting to accuse him of theft. The employee’s path to the door, if he had desired
to leave, was not blocked. The only physical contact between the employee and his accusers was a
handshake. When the employee denied stealing anything he was accused of lying and threatened
with jail. The employee spent thirty to forty minutes with his accusers. The court held that, where
there is nothing else particularly overbearing about this kind of meeting, threats of imprisonment
are not enough to establish a claim for false imprisonment, and the court reversed the jury’s verdict
in the plaintiff’s favor.
In Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, the plaintiff was a store employee accused of stealing.
She was told to either wait in an office or to work on a volunteer project in a particular area. She
waited in the office, but left twice and returned each time. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiff’s contention that the store management had impliedly threatened her person, because no
one was guarding her and she had in fact left the office twice. Summary judgment in favor of the
store on the employee’s false imprisonment claim was upheld.
In evaluating Fojtik’s claim of false imprisonment, the issue is essentially this: to what extent
must plaintiffs insist on their freedom and have it denied to them before they can recover for false
imprisonment? Under some circumstances, a combination of the plaintiff’s vulnerability and
oppressive circumstances permit recovery, even when the plaintiffs does not actually resist their
detention. Comparing the facts of this case to previous reported cases, however, indicates that this
is not one of those cases. None of the factors that are considered in evaluating whether threats are
sufficient to overcome the plaintiff’s free will, i.e., the relative size, age, experience, sex, and physical
demeanor of the participants, weigh in Fojtik’s favor. Fojtik was a forty-five-year-old man who had
run several businesses. He was not a young, inexperienced woman, like the plaintiff in Black. He was
not physically restrained, like the plaintiff in Skillern. Although he was threatened with the police,
there were no other factors adding to the intimidating effect of those threats, and, as
in Amburn, such threats, standing alone, are not enough to establish false imprisonment. Fojtik left
and voluntarily returned, as the plaintiff did in Johnson, where the plaintiff’s actions were held to
negate her false imprisonment theory.
Fojtik contends that his frequent comments at Charter about being “locked up” and his generally
uncooperative attitude are evidence that he did not consider himself free to leave. While it may be
true that Fojtik considered himself restrained, the issue is not Fojtik’s subjective interpretation of his
situation, but rather whether he had a just fear of injury. The facts of this case do not raise a fact issue
on whether Fojtik had a “just fear” of injury. The record before us indicates that, while Fojtik certainly
complained about being at Charter, he never insisted that he be permitted to leave. As discussed
above, there is nothing in this case to suggest that Fojtik was a person whose weakness or susceptibility
to intimidation might excuse his failure to insist on leaving when he felt he was falsely imprisoned.
Aside from threats of legal commitment, the “other means” of restraint identified by Fojtik are:
(1) constantly telling him that he was an alcoholic and treating him as though he were, and
(2) permitting him to leave on temporary passes. Appellant’s argument appears to be that these
methods lessened his will to insist on being released. We do not believe that such trifling matters as
these constitute restraint. Treating Fojtik as an alcoholic did not restrain him; if it contributed to his
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ongoing presence at the Charter hospital, it did so by persuading Fojtik that he did have a problem
with alcohol that should be addressed, not by any actual restraint. The fact that Charter
permitted Fojtik to leave on passes undermines his claim for false imprisonment rather than
supporting it….
1.

QUESTIONS
Stereotypes: Detentions may be accomplished through violence, threats, or other means
of restraint. What types of threats are legally sufficient? What factors are considered?
How might characteristics like gender or race become relevant? Should they be?

2.

Supermarket Sweep: Map out the features of Black, Skillern, Safeway, Randall’s, and
Fojtik—the reason for the detention, the nature of the explicit or implicit threat, the
characteristics of the people involved, and the courts’ ultimate conclusions. Can you
discern a logic tying these cases together? Or is each court just making it up on the fly?

3.

Blissful Ignorance: Some states require plaintiffs claiming false imprisonment to show
that they were aware of their confinement, while other states don’t. Which states have
the better rule? Why?
GRANT v. STOP-N-GO MARKET OF TEXAS, INC.
Court of Appeals of Texas (1999)

O’Connor, Justice:

ã

Gerald Grant, the appellant, sued Stop-N-Go Market of Texas, Inc.,
the appellee, for false imprisonment…. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Stop-N-Go. We reverse and remand….
The elements of false imprisonment are (1) a willful detention, (2)
without consent, and (3) without authority of law. Stop-N-Go argues it
negated the first two elements of Grant’s claim because it established
Grant was not wilfully detained without his consent. Stop-N-Go argues
Grant chose to remain in the store, and he could have left if he so desired.
In the alternative, Stop-N-Go argues it negated the third element of a
false imprisonment claim because its actions were authorized by law
under Chapter 124 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
1. The Summary Judgment Evidence
…The summary judgment evidence is summarized as follows.
Grant’s Deposition Testimony
In his deposition, Grant said he went to the Stop-N-Go store with his girlfriend. His girlfriend
stayed in the car, which was parked in front of the door to the store. Grant paid for a can of beer,
and then decided he wanted to buy some potato chips. He left the bag with the can of beer on the
counter, and picked out two bags of potato chips which were marked on sale, two for 99 cents. Grant
returned to the clerk and laid both bags of potato chips on the counter along with a one dollar bill.
The store clerk rang up the chips at 69 cents each. Grant told the clerk that the chips were on
sale. The store clerk said something to Grant, but Grant did not understand what was said because
the clerk spoke with a heavy foreign accent. The store clerk and Grant went back to the chip display.
The clerk told Grant that the chips he selected were not on sale, but that another brand was on sale.
Although Grant thought the clerk was wrong, he decided to buy the brand that the clerk said was on
sale because he was in a hurry.
As the clerk began to total the price for the two bags of chips, Grant noticed someone leaning
through the window of his car and apparently talking to his girlfriend. The appellant became
concerned for his girlfriend because he did not recognize the person. He went to the door to make
sure she was alright. As Grant walked to the door, he picked up the one dollar bill which he had
ã
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previously laid on the counter. Grant opened the door to the store with his right hand and held the
dollar bill in his left hand. After determining that the person leaning on his car was an acquaintance,
Grant returned to the counter, paid for the two bags of chips, and began to walk out of the store. As
he walked away from the counter, Grant told the clerk that he (the clerk) needed to learn his job
better, a reference to the verbal altercation concerning the price of the chips.
Just as Grant reached the door, the store manager, Calhoun, came from the back of the store,
grabbed him by the arm, and said words to the effect, “he (the clerk) is doing his job well, let’s talk
about the cigarettes that you stole.” Grant said he was pulled back when Calhoun grabbed his arm.
When Calhoun made the accusation against Grant, his voice was loud enough that all the patrons
in the store heard what he was saying. Calhoun said words to the effect, “everything was on a
surveillance videotape and there is nothing to talk about.”
Grant said Calhoun went behind the counter and asked the store clerk three times what it was
that Grant had stolen. The clerk did not respond until Calhoun asked if a pack of cigarettes was on
the counter, to which the clerk responded affirmatively. Calhoun repeated his accusation that Grant
stole a pack of cigarettes and passed them through the door.
Grant tried to explain to Calhoun that he did not steal any cigarettes. Grant said Calhoun told
him to shut up. Grant said he got real quiet after Calhoun told him to shut up because he was afraid.
After Calhoun grabbed him and accused him of stealing, Grant felt he could not leave. He thought
if he did leave, the police would come looking for him.
Calhoun’s Affidavit
In his affidavit, Calhoun said he was in the back room of the store where a monitor for the store’s
surveillance camera was located. On the monitor, he saw Grant pick up something from the counter
which appeared to him to be a pack of cigarettes. Calhoun said Grant went to the door and stepped
at least part way outside, while still holding the object in his hand. Calhoun said a car was parked
directly in front of the door to the store. He then saw Grant return to the counter and complete his
purchase. However, Calhoun did not see Grant return the item that he picked up from the counter.
Calhoun said he left the back room and approached Grant as he was leaving the store because,
after watching the monitor, he believed Grant had passed a pack of cigarettes out the door. He put
his hand on Grant’s arm to get his attention, and then he asked Grant about the cigarettes he thought
were stolen. Calhoun said his hand was only on Grant’s arm for a few seconds because, as soon as
Grant turned around, Calhoun quit touching his arm.
According to Calhoun’s affidavit, Grant denied stealing any cigarettes. Calhoun thought Grant’s
attitude was hostile and somewhat threatening, and so he decided to call the police to investigate the
matter. He said he feared a confrontation with Grant. Calhoun said that when he told Grant he was
going to call the police, Grant responded by saying to go ahead and call the police.
The police arrived within 15 to 20 minutes. Calhoun said Grant and the officer viewed the
surveillance video. He said Grant told the officer he had picked up a dollar before stepping out the
door. Calhoun told the officer he thought the object Grant picked up looked like a pack of cigarettes.
According to Calhoun, the officer said he would take Grant in, but Calhoun never asked or directed
the officer to do so. Calhoun gave the officer the surveillance video, and then the officer left the store
with Grant.
Calhoun said he had no physical contact with Grant other than the initial touching to get Grant’s
attention. Once he got his attention, Calhoun said he and Grant remained on opposite sides of the
counter while they waited for the police. Calhoun said a woman, perhaps Grant’s girlfriend, came
into the store and waited with Grant. Calhoun said nobody threatened Grant, nobody told Grant he
could not leave, nobody prevented Grant from leaving, and nobody told Grant he was under arrest.
According to Calhoun, Grant had a clear path to the door, nothing prevented Grant from leaving
the store, Grant was never directed to remain in the store, and Grant was not put in or asked to go
to a back room.
The Surveillance Videotape
Grant claims the surveillance videotape is the best evidence to determine the reasonableness of
Calhoun’s belief that he stole cigarettes and of Calhoun’s actions…. The police report states the
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videotape was returned to Stop-N-Go…. However, in a response to a request to produce the
surveillance videotape, Stop-N-Go said, “none.” During oral argument before this Court, Stop-NGo said the tape was lost.
The Police Report
In the police report, Officer Anderson said when he walked into the Stop-N-Go store, Calhoun
and Grant were arguing. Calhoun told the officer Grant stole a pack of cigarettes, and that it would
be on the surveillance video. Anderson said he took Grant to the station to view the videotape. After
reviewing the tape with Sergeant Hartley, Anderson determined the allegations against Grant were
unfounded and released him. Anderson said the videotape was returned to Stop-N-Go.
2. Willful Detention Without Consent
Stop-N-Go relies on Morales v. Lee, 668 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), to argue that
Grant was not willfully detained without his consent as a matter of law. It argues Grant was not
detained because he was not restrained from moving from one place to another. When, as here, a
plaintiff alleges the detention was effected by a threat, the plaintiff must demonstrate the threat was
such as would inspire a just fear of injury to his person, reputation, or property…. According to
Grant, Calhoun told Grant he could not leave and that he (Calhoun) was calling the police. This
contradicts Calhoun’s affidavit, in which Calhoun said he did not tell Grant that he could not leave.
This raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Grant was detained, and whether he
consented to stay in the store.
Stop-N-Go also argues that threats of future actions, such as to call the police, are not sufficient
to constitute false imprisonment. However, Calhoun did more than threaten to call the police; he
actually called the police. Grant said he was afraid of what was going to happen; he had never been
in trouble with the police before. He was afraid to try and leave the store because Calhoun had
already grabbed him and told him not to leave. Grant was afraid that if he left, he would be labeled
a fugitive from justice, causing even more damage to his reputation…. [W]e conclude Grant raised
fact issues concerning whether he was willfully detained without his consent.
3. The Shopkeeper’s Privilege
In its motion for summary judgment, Stop-N-Go claimed its actions were authorized by law
under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 124.001, the shopkeeper’s privilege. If this is true,
then Stop-N-Go would have negated the third element of Grant’s false imprisonment claim. Grant
argues he raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Stop-N-Go established this
privilege as a matter of law.
Stop-N-Go’s only summary judgment evidence was from an interested witness, Calhoun.
Calhoun’s affidavit explains what Calhoun saw on the surveillance monitor. The videotape is the
best evidence of what happened. However, Stop-N-Go has refused to produce the videotape, and
each time Stop-N-Go was asked for it, it gave a different reason why it could not be produced.
The shopkeeper’s privilege provides that a person who reasonably believes another person has
stolen, or is attempting to steal property, is privileged to detain that person in a reasonable manner
and for a reasonable time to investigate ownership of the property. Thus, there are three components
to the shopkeeper’s privilege: (1) a reasonable belief a person has stolen or is attempting to steal;
(2) detention for a reasonable time; and (3) detention in a reasonable manner…. [T]he shopkeeper’s
privilege is limited in its application to false imprisonment claims arising from investigative
detentions. The test of liability is not based on the store patron’s guilt or innocence, but instead on
the reasonableness of the store’s action under the circumstances; the trier of fact usually determines
whether reasonable belief is established. Whether Calhoun was reasonable in believing Grant had
committed a theft, or reasonable in detaining Grant, is a question to be determined by the jury.
Stop-N-Go relies on Wal-Mart v. Resendez, 962 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. 1998), to argue that a ten to
15 minute detention is reasonable as a matter of law. This is a true statement of the law in Resendez.
While Resendez held a ten to 15 minute detention was reasonable as a matter of law, it so held,
“without deciding the outer parameters of a permissible period of time under section 124.001.”
Resendez does not support Stop-N-Go’s position, because Grant was detained for more than ten to
15 minutes. According to Calhoun, the police arrived 15 to 20 minutes after they were called. Once
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the police arrived, they viewed the tape at the store, and then they took Grant to the police station
and viewed the tape again. Grant said he spent approximately an hour in police custody. Thus,
Grant’s detention lasted for more than an hour and 20 minutes….
Stop-N-Go did not negate any element of Grant’s false imprisonment claim as a matter of law,
and Grant raised genuine issues of material fact on each element. Therefore, summary judgment on
this claim was improper.
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
The Fuzz: Stop-N-Go argues that Grant was free to leave, but Grant claims he wasn’t
because Calhoun said the police were being called. This disputed fact is key to resolving
two distinct parts of the legal analysis. What are they?
Posse Comitatus: Going beyond the shopkeeper’s
privilege, some states allow citizens to make
arrests in other settings, creating legal privileges
for people who witness crimes. These laws date
back to medieval times, when King Edward I
lacked an organized police force in the late 1200s.
The legal concept traveled across the pond to the
United States, where it could take days for law
enforcement to travel to crime scenes during the country’s infancy. Nowadays, these
laws usually permit arrests when a serious crime (often a felony) has been committed
and the person effecting the arrest has probable cause (i.e., objectively reasonable
grounds) to believe that the detainee committed it. Should these laws apply so broadly?
Should they be limited to special circumstances, like shopkeepers catching shoplifters or
restaurant owners witnessing “dine and dash” customers? Or should they be repealed
entirely? This question became national news in 2020 after
the killing of Ahmaud Arbery, a young Black man from
Brunswick, Georgia. While Arbery was jogging, three white
men pursued him before one of the men, Travis McMichael,
shot and killed Arbery. The men claimed Arbery resembled
a suspect in a string of burglaries, though nothing ever linked
him to those incidents. Lawmakers responded by repealing
Georgia’s citizen’s arrest law, making it the first state in the
country to do so. Should other states follow suit? What are
some of the benefits of deputizing private citizens with police
powers? What are some of the risks and problems?
ã

BAR TRIP PROBLEM
It’s July 2025. Zay lands at LaGuardia after his post-Bar Exam trip to Jamaica. Unbeknownst to
him, the local New York police have been investigating a smuggling operation that Andre is suspected
of orchestrating from the Caribbean island. The police believe Andre is on Zay’s flight. Unfortunately,
Zay has the same green suitcase as Andre—a suitcase that the police know Andre owns.
At baggage claim, Zay grabs what he thinks is his bag and walks toward the exit, but the sniffer
dogs lunge at him and alert their handlers to the scent of drugs. The police handcuff Zay before
locking him in an interrogation room with his hands and feet tied while they question him.
Zay is released seven hours later after the confusion gets cleared up. On his way home, he calls
you, his old Torts classmate, and asks if he can sue for false imprisonment.
(a) What do you tell Zay?
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Matthew Almon Roth, Black Lives Matter March in Portland, OR. June 4, 2020 (CC BY-NC 2.0); Steve Devol, Ahmaud
Arbery Memorial (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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(b) What if, instead, Zay wasn’t handcuffed and the officers say “please come with us” before
he walks into an interrogation room where the door is left open and he isn’t tied up?
(c) Imagine that the police never stop Zay at the airport. He makes it to his apartment with
Andre’s drug-filled bag. His neighbor, Davis, owns a German Shepherd that he has
trained to sniff drugs. As Zay walks up the stairs and Davis is on his way down to let his
dog out, the dog alerts. Davis, an aspiring police officer, blocks the staircase and tells
Zay, “Don’t move or I’ll sic my dog on you, and sit tight while I call the cops.” It takes
twenty minutes for the police to arrive, followed by two hours of officers questioning
Zay on the staircase before they tell him he can return to his apartment. Zay sues Davis,
who, having read online about the hunt to catch Andre, argues that he was acting under
the authority of the law. What result?

CASES & CRITIQUE

CHAPTER

2:

49

PROPERTY TORTS

A. Trespass to Land
JACQUE v. STEENBERG HOMES, INC.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1997)
Bablitch, Justice:

ã

Steenberg Homes had a mobile home to
deliver. Unfortunately for Harvey and Lois
Jacque (the Jacques), the easiest route of
delivery was across their land. Despite
adamant protests by the Jacques, Steenberg
plowed a path through the Jacques’ snowcovered field and via that path, delivered the
mobile home…. At trial, Steenberg Homes
conceded the intentional trespass, but argued
that no compensatory damages had been proved, and that punitive damages could not be awarded
without compensatory damages…. We conclude that when nominal damages are awarded for an
intentional trespass to land, punitive damages may, in the discretion of the jury, be awarded….
I.
…Plaintiffs, Lois and Harvey Jacques, are an elderly couple, now retired from farming, who own
roughly 170 acres near Wilke’s Lake in the town of Schleswig. The defendant, Steenberg Homes, Inc.
(Steenberg), is in the business of selling mobile homes. In the fall of 1993, a neighbor of the Jacques
purchased a mobile home from Steenberg…. Steenberg preferred transporting the home across the
Jacques’ land because the only alternative was a private road which was covered in up to seven feet
of snow and contained a sharp curve which would require sets of “rollers” to be used when
maneuvering the home around the curve. Steenberg asked the Jacques on several separate occasions
whether it could move the home across the Jacques’ farm field. The Jacques refused. The Jacques
were sensitive about allowing others on their land because they had lost property valued at over
$10,000 to other neighbors in an adverse possession action in the mid-1980’s. Despite repeated
refusals from the Jacques, Steenberg decided to sell the mobile home…and delivered it on February
15, 1994.
On the morning of delivery, Mr. Jacque observed the mobile home parked on the corner of
the town road adjacent to his property…. The movers, who were Steenberg employees, showed Mr.
Jacque the path they planned to take with the mobile home to reach the neighbor’s lot. The path cut
across the Jacques’ land. Mr. Jacque informed the movers that it was the Jacques’ land they were
planning to cross and that Steenberg did not have permission to cross their land…. One of
Steenberg’s employees called the assistant manager, who then came out to the Jacques’ home. In the
meantime, the Jacques called and asked some of their neighbors and the town chairman to come
over immediately. Once everyone was present, the Jacques showed the assistant manager an aerial
map and plat book of the township to prove their ownership of the land, and reiterated their demand
that the home not be moved across their land.
At that point, the assistant manager asked Mr. Jacque how much money it would take to get
permission. Mr. Jacque responded that it was not a question of money; the Jacques just did not want
Steenberg to cross their land. Mr. Jacque testified that he told Steenberg to “[F]ollow the road, that
is what the road is for.”… [U]pon coming out of the Jacques’ home, the assistant manager stated: “I
don’t give a —— what [Mr. Jacque] said, just get the home in there any way you can.”… The
employees, after beginning down the private road, ultimately used a “bobcat” to cut a path through
the Jacques’ snow-covered field and hauled the home across the Jacques’ land to the neighbor’s lot.
One employee testified that upon returning to the office and informing the assistant manager that
they had gone across the field, the assistant manager reacted by giggling and laughing…. When a
ã
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neighbor informed the Jacques that Steenberg had, in fact, moved the mobile home across the
Jacques’ land, Mr. Jacque called the Manitowoc County Sheriff’s Department…[and] an officer from
the sheriff’s department issued a $30 citation to Steenberg’s assistant manager.
The Jacques commenced an intentional tort action…. The jury awarded the Jacques $1 nominal
damages and $100,000 punitive damages….
II.
…Steenberg argues that, as a matter of law, punitive damages could not be awarded by the jury
because punitive damages must be supported by an award of compensatory damages and here the
jury awarded only nominal and punitive damages. The Jacques contend that the rationale
supporting the compensatory damage award requirement is inapposite when the wrongful act is an
intentional trespass to land. We agree with the Jacques….
The general rule was stated in Barnard v. Cohen, 162 N.W.2d 480 (Wis. 1917), where the
question presented was: “In an action for libel, can there be a recovery of punitory damages if only
nominal compensatory damages are found?” With the bare assertion that authority and better
reason supported its conclusion, the Barnard court said no. Barnard continues to state the general
rule of punitive damages in Wisconsin. The rationale for the compensatory damage requirement is
that if the individual cannot show actual harm, he or she has but a nominal interest, hence, society
has little interest in having the unlawful, but otherwise harmless, conduct deterred, therefore,
punitive damages are inappropriate.
However, whether nominal damages can support a punitive damage award in the case of an
intentional trespass to land has never been squarely addressed by this court…. In 1854 the court
established punitive damages, allowing the assessment of “damages as a punishment to the
defendant for the purpose of making an example.” McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 377 (1854).
The McWilliams court related the facts and an illustrative tale from the English case of Merest v.
Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814), to explain the rationale underlying punitive damages.
In Merest, a landowner was shooting birds in his field when he was approached by the local
magistrate who wanted to hunt with him. Although the landowner refused, the magistrate
proceeded to hunt. When the landowner continued to object, the magistrate threatened to have him
jailed and dared him to file suit. Although little actual harm had been caused, the English court
upheld damages of 500 pounds, explaining “in a case where a man disregards every principle which
actuates the conduct of gentlemen, what is to restrain him except large damages?”
To explain the need for punitive damages, even where actual harm is slight, McWilliams related
the hypothetical tale from Merest of an intentional trespasser:
Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his window, and
that a man intrudes and walks up and down before the window of his house, and
looks in while the owner is at dinner, is the trespasser permitted to say “here is a
halfpenny for you which is the full extent of the mischief I have done.” Would that
be a compensation? I cannot say that it would be.
Thus, in the case establishing punitive damages in this state, this court recognized that in certain
situations of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be minimal,
but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property and, the court
implied that this right may be punished by a large damage award despite the lack of measurable
harm….
The Jacques argue that the rationale for not allowing nominal damages to support a punitive
damage award is inapposite when the wrongful act involved is an intentional trespass to land. The
Jacques argue that both the individual and society have significant interests in deterring intentional
trespass to land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm that results. We agree with the Jacques.
An examination of the individual interests invaded by an intentional trespass to land, and society’s
interests in preventing intentional trespass to land, leads us to the conclusion that the Barnard rule
should not apply when the tort supporting the award is intentional trespass to land.
We turn first to the individual landowner’s interest in protecting his or her land from trespass….
[T]he private landowner’s right to exclude others from his or her land is one of the most essential
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sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property…. Yet a right is hollow if
the legal system provides insufficient means to protect it. Felix Cohen offers the following analysis
summarizing the relationship between the individual and the state regarding property rights:
[T]hat is property to which the following
label can be attached:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission,
which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private Citizen Endorsed: The state
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, IX Rutgers Law Review 357, 374 (1954). Harvey and
Lois Jacque have the right to tell Steenberg Homes and any other trespasser, “No, you cannot cross
our land.” But that right has no practical meaning unless protected by the State. And, as this court
recognized as early as 1854, a “halfpenny” award does not constitute state protection.
The nature of the nominal damage award in an intentional trespass to land case further supports
an exception to Barnard…. The law recognizes actual harm in every trespass to land whether or not
compensatory damages are awarded. Thus, in the case of intentional trespass to land, the nominal
damage award represents the recognition that, although immeasurable in mere dollars, actual harm
has occurred.
The potential for harm resulting from intentional trespass also supports an exception
to Barnard. A series of intentional trespasses, as the Jacques had the misfortune to discover in an
unrelated action, can threaten the individual’s very ownership of the land. The conduct of an
intentional trespasser, if repeated, might ripen into prescription or adverse possession and, as a
consequence, the individual landowner can lose his or her property rights to the trespasser….
Society has an interest in punishing and deterring intentional trespassers beyond that of
protecting the interests of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in preserving the
integrity of the legal system. Private landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who trespass
upon their land will be appropriately punished. When landowners have confidence in the legal
system, they are less likely to resort to “self-help” remedies. In McWilliams, the court recognized the
importance of “preventing the practice of dueling, by permitting juries to punish insult by exemplary
damages.” Although dueling is rarely a modern form of self-help, one can easily imagine a frustrated
landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when faced with a brazen trespasser, like
Steenberg, who refuses to heed no trespass warnings.
People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished. Punitive damages have the effect of
bringing to punishment types of conduct that, though oppressive and hurtful to the individual,
almost invariably go unpunished by the public prosecutor. The $30 forfeiture was certainly not an
appropriate punishment for Steenberg’s egregious trespass in the eyes of the Jacques. It was more
akin to Merest’s “halfpenny.” If punitive damages are not allowed in a situation like this, what
punishment will prohibit the intentional trespass to land? Moreover, what is to stop Steenberg
Homes from concluding, in the future, that delivering its mobile homes via an intentional trespass
and paying the resulting Class B forfeiture, is not more profitable than obeying the law? Steenberg
Homes plowed a path across the Jacques’ land and dragged the mobile home across that path, in the
face of the Jacques’ adamant refusal. A $30 forfeiture and a $1 nominal damage award are unlikely
to restrain Steenberg Homes from similar conduct in the future. An appropriate punitive damage
award probably will.
In sum,…the Barnard rule sends the wrong message to Steenberg Homes and any others who
contemplate trespassing on the land of another. It implicitly tells them that they are free to go where
they please, regardless of the landowner’s wishes…. We conclude that both the private landowner
and society have much more than a nominal interest in excluding others from private land.
Intentional trespass to land causes actual harm to the individual, regardless of whether that harm
can be measured in mere dollars….
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1.

QUESTIONS
What’s Tort Law Up To? How does the Jacque decision serve the goals of tort law?

2.

Trivial Pursuits: In the famous Case of the Thorns (1466), a man sued his neighbor for
trespass after the neighbor’s hedge-trimming left thorns on the man’s land. Who do
think prevailed? Who do you think should prevail?

3.

21st Century Trespass: If Steenberg flew a drone over the Jacques’ land, should they still
be liable for trespass?
BURNS PHILP FOOD, INC v. CAVALEA CONTINENTAL FREIGHT, INC.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1998)

Easterbrook, Judge:

ã

Nabisco broke up a tract of industrial real estate in Chicago. Cavalea
Continental Freight bought several parcels and Burns Philp Food the
remainder. In 1986 real estate records were changed to reflect these
transactions, but something went awry…. [As a result, Burns Philp
mistakenly paid almost $125,000 in property taxes on land owned by
Cavalea. It notified Cavalea of the mistake in 1993.] Instead of resolving
matters amicably, these neighbors have acted like the Hatfields and
McCoys. Cavalea refused to pay a dime, leading Burns Philp to sue [in
restitution to obtain reimbursement for the tax payments]. Cavalea filed a
counterclaim accusing Burns Philp of building a fence that encroached
onto its parcel…. The district judge…entered a judgment from which,
predictably, both sides have appealed.
[Under the applicable statute of limitations, Burns Philp cannot recover for taxes unwittingly
paid on behalf of Cavalea for the five years immediately prior to the filing of the suit.]…
Now for Cavalea’s counterclaim. Burns Philp constructed a fence on what it thought was the
border between its property and Cavalea’s. Whoever surveyed the land to fix the border for the fence
did a lousy job. The border is 205 feet long. One end of the fence was located several feet inside
Burns Philp’s lot and the other was 20 feet into Cavalea’s. Burns Philp thus occupied about 2,000
square feet of land that belonged to Cavalea. After Ameritech conducted a survey in 1995, Cavalea
learned that some of its land was on the other side of the fence. It did not notify Burns Philp of the
problem until November 1995, when it filed the counterclaim seeking damages for trespass and an
injunction requiring Burns Philp to remove the fence. Burns Philp responded by denying liability;
it did not verify the accuracy of Cavalea’s survey or move the fence back to the property line. In
December 1996 Cavalea ripped out the fence and appurtenances without Burns Philp’s leave and
placed a large container right at the property line, interfering with the use of Burns Philp’s loading
dock. Burns Philp now concedes that Cavalea was entitled to do these things. But the district judge
held that Cavalea is not entitled to damages, because it did not notify Burns Philp that the fence had
been erected on its land. Trespass is a strict liability tort, and an obligation to notify the intruder is
inconsistent with the idea of strict liability. Nonetheless, the district judge stated: “That [notice
requirement] may be difficult to rationalize in terms of the traditional law of trespass, but it’s not
difficult for me to rationalize in terms of elemental justice, and that’s the way I come out.”
In diversity litigation, however, state law prevails over notions of “elemental justice.” The only
question for decision is whether Illinois conditions damages on the landowner’s notice to the
trespasser. (Cavalea contends that the counterclaim filed in 1995 gave whatever notice state law
requires, a possibility the district judge did not discuss, but we need not pursue that prospect.)
Burns Philp locates a notice-to-trespassers requirement in cases holding that a landowner who
has consented to entry may not complain about trespass until the consent has been revoked. The
proposition is unremarkable. Trespass is entry without consent; while the consent lasts there can be
no trespass, and therefore no legal remedy. How can this assist Burns Philp? Cavalea did not consent
ã
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to the construction of a fence on its land. Had it done so, a change of mind would not necessarily
require demolition of the fence—the original consent may grant a license that can be revoked only
with compensation. But Burns Philp did not seek anyone’s consent to build the fence. It thought
that the fence was on its land, and no one knew otherwise until 1995. Knowledge of a fence’s
existence is not equivalent to consent—not, at least, when the landowner does not suspect that the
border has been crossed. Paths that cut diagonals across parcels with known borders and similarly
obvious intrusions, where failure to protest might imply consent, pose different
questions…. Cavalea accordingly is entitled to damages—if it suffered monetary loss.
Cavalea offered evidence that it used the land along its border with Burns Philp to store trailers
and freight containers, and that it could have stored 102 additional trailers or containers had the
fence been located correctly. It charges shippers and truckers $25 per day to store loaded containers,
75¢ a day for empty truck trailers, and 55¢ a day for empty containers. Proposing that all 102 places
would have been used all of the time, Cavalea demanded nearly $1 million in damages, which would
make this the most valuable twentieth of an acre in Chicago. Burns Philp responds that its employees
consistently noticed empty places at Cavalea’s facility even before the fence was removed, and it
argues that access to the extra land accordingly would not have added to Cavalea’s receipts. Because
it concluded that Cavalea could not maintain an action for trespass, the district judge did not resolve
this dispute. It is not our place to play factfinder, but we hope that it will prove possible for the new
district judge to wrap things up after reviewing the existing record without taking additional
evidence…. The judgment is vacated and the case remanded…to calculate and award the damages
(if any) that Cavalea sustained from the trespass.
1.

QUESTIONS
Nosy Neighbors: Cavalea knew that the fence was there and didn’t do anything about it
for years. Why isn’t that enough to show that the company implicitly consented to the
trespass on its land?

2.

Elemental Justice: Did Burns Philp Food do anything wrong by building the fence? Is
the court’s decision fair to the company? Would your answer change if, on remand,
Cavalea got the $1 million in damages that it sought?

3.

Intentional Acts: What type of intent is required to commit a trespass? Do you need to
intend harm or to know that you’re trespassing? What if you’re in a car accident that
sends you flying into your neighbor’s front yard? What if kidnappers hold you hostage
in a stranger’s abandoned barn? What if you tie your boat to a dock in order to keep safe
during a sudden storm?
FÚTBOL IS LIFE PROBLEM

Roy and Jamie have been next-door neighbors for several years. Until recently, they were great
friends who regularly showed up at each other’s houses unannounced, borrowed tools from each
other’s sheds without asking, and even mowed the other’s lawn whenever they did their own.
Everything changed when Roy’s beloved AFC Richmond played in the cup final against Jamie’s pick,
Manchester City. Before kick-off, both men had several beers and agreed to a $500 bet on the game.
With Manchester City victorious at the final whistle, Jamie demanded his winnings. An irate Roy
began screaming that it wouldn’t be fair to make him pay because of the referee’s appalling decision
to send off Ted, Richmond’s talismanic coach. Jamie and Roy argued until Roy finally stormed out.
A few days later, Roy left for a romantic weekend with his girlfriend Keeley. While Roy was gone,
Jamie hosted a party. To accommodate his guests, Jamie stored some of his things in Roy’s shed.
Roy got an app alert to his phone from his home-security camera and watched Jamie enter through
the back gate and deposit his things in the shed. The things were gone by the time Roy and Keeley
returned. Still seething over their fight, Roy decides to sue Jamie for trespass.
(a) Can Roy satisfy the elements of trespass? Does it matter that Roy wasn’t home or using
his shed that weekend? Does it matter that Jamie’s presence left no trace on Roy’s land?
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(b) If Roy can satisfy the elements of trespass, what relief could he seek?
(c) Does it matter that Roy and Jamie seem to have had an unspoken agreement about
entering each other’s land? Would it make any difference if, during the week before their
fight, Roy had given Jamie a key to his house and told him, “Feel free to use the house,
shed, garage, yard—whatever you need while I’m off with Keeley”?

B. Conversion
THYROFF v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
New York Court of Appeals (2007)
Graffeo, Judge:

ã

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
certified a question to us that asks whether the common-law cause of
action of conversion applies to certain electronic computer records
and data….
I
Plaintiff Louis Thyroff was an insurance agent for defendant
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. In 1988, the parties had
entered into an Agent’s Agreement that specified the terms of their
business relationship. As part of the arrangement, Nationwide agreed
to lease Thyroff computer hardware and software, referred to as the agency office-automation
(AOA) system, to facilitate the collection and transfer of customer information to Nationwide. In
addition to the entry of business data, Thyroff also used the AOA system for personal e-mails,
correspondence and other data storage that pertained to his customers. On a daily basis, Nationwide
would automatically upload all of the information from Thyroff’s AOA system, including Thryoff’s
personal data, to its centralized computers.
The Agent’s Agreement was terminable at will and, in September 2000, Thyroff received a letter
from Nationwide informing him that his contract as an exclusive agent had been cancelled. The next
day, Nationwide repossessed its AOA system and denied Thyroff further access to the computers
and all electronic records and data. Consequently, Thyroff was unable to retrieve his customer
information and other personal information that was stored on the computers.
Thyroff initiated an action against Nationwide in the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York, asserting several causes of action, including a claim for the
conversion of his business and personal information stored on the computer hard drives. In
response to Nationwide’s motion to dismiss, District Court held that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action for conversion…. In his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Thyroff sought reinstatement of his conversion cause of action, along with other relief.
Nationwide countered that a conversion claim cannot be based on the misappropriation of
electronic records and data because New York does not recognize a cause of action for the
conversion of intangible property. The Second Circuit determined that the issue was unresolved in
New York and therefore certified the following question of law to this Court: is a claim for the
conversion of electronic data cognizable under New York law?
II
The hand of history lies heavy upon the tort of conversion. The “ancient doctrine” has gone
through a great deal of evolution over time, dating back to the Norman Conquest of England in
1066…. By 1252, a new cause of action—trespass de bonis asportatis [a Latin phrase meaning
“trespass for carrying goods away”]—was introduced. It allowed a plaintiff to obtain pecuniary
damages for certain misappropriations of property and, following a favorable jury verdict, the sale
of the defendant’s property to pay a plaintiff the value of the stolen goods. If, however, the defendant
offered to return the property to its rightful owner, the owner had to accept it and recovery was
ã
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limited to the damages he had sustained through his loss of possession, or through harm to the
chattel, which were usually considerably less than its value.
In the late 15th century, the common law was extended to fill the gap left by the action of trespass
by providing a more comprehensive remedy in cases where a defendant’s interference with property
rights was so serious that it went beyond mere trespass to a conversion of the property. Known as
“trover,” this cause of action was aimed at a person who had found goods and refused to return them
to the title owner, and was premised on the theory that the defendant, by “converting” the chattel to
his own use, had appropriated the plaintiff’s rights, for which he was required to make
compensation. The plaintiff was therefore not required to accept the chattel when it was tendered
back to him; and he recovered as his damages the full value of the chattel at the time and place of the
conversion. The effect was that the defendant was compelled, because of his wrongful appropriation,
to buy the chattel at a forced sale, of which the action of trover was the judicial instrument….
Trover gave way slowly to the tort of conversion, which was created to address some
interferences with chattels for which the action of trover would not lie, such as a claim dealing with
a right of future possession. The technical differences between trover and conversion eventually
disappeared. The Restatement (Second) of Torts now defines conversion as an intentional act of
“dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control
it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel.”
III
As history reveals, the common law has evolved to broaden the remedies available for the
misappropriation of personal property. [With changes in society,] the courts became willing to
consider new species of personal property eligible for conversion actions.
Conversion and its common-law antecedents were directed against interferences with or
misappropriation of “goods” that were tangible, personal property. This was consistent with the
original notions associated with the appeals of robbery and larceny, trespass and trover because
tangible property could be lost or stolen. By contrast, real property and all manner of intangible
rights could not be “lost or found” in the eyes of the law and were not therefore subject to an action
for trover or conversion.
Under this traditional construct, conversion was viewed as the unauthorized assumption and
exercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner’s
rights. Thus, the general rule was that an action for conversion will not normally lie, when it involves
intangible property because there is no physical item that can be misappropriated.
Despite this long-standing reluctance to expand conversion beyond the realm of tangible
property, some courts determined that there was no good reason for keeping up a distinction that
arose wholly from that original peculiarity of the action of trover (that an item had to be capable of
being lost and found) and substituted a theory of conversion that covered things represented by
valuable papers, such as certificates of stock, promissory notes, and other papers of value. This, in
turn, led to the recognition that an intangible property right can be united with a tangible object for
conversion purposes. In Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 251 (1934), which involved the conversion of
intangible shares of stock, this Court applied the so-called “merger” doctrine because:
for practical purposes [the shares] are merged in stock certificates which are
instrumentalities of trade and commerce. Such certificates are treated by business
men as property for all practical purposes. Indeed, this court has held that the shares
of stock are so completely merged in the certificate that conversion of the certificate
may be treated as a conversion of the shares of stock represented by the certificate.
More recently, we concluded that a plaintiff could maintain a cause of action for conversion where
the defendant infringed on the plaintiff’s intangible property right to a musical performance by
misappropriating a master recording—a tangible item of property capable of being physically taken.
IV
We have not previously had occasion to consider whether the common law should permit
conversion for intangible property interests that do not strictly satisfy the merger test. Although
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some courts have adhered to the traditional rules of conversion, others have taken a more flexible
view of conversion and held that the cause of action can embrace intangible property.
A variety of arguments have been made in support of expanding the scope of conversion. Some
courts have decided that a theft of intangible property is a violation of the criminal law and should
be civilly remediable…. On the other hand, the primary argument for retaining the traditional
boundaries of the tort is that it seems preferable to fashion other remedies, such as unfair
competition, to protect people from having intangible values used and appropriated in unfair ways.
Nonetheless, advocates of this view readily concede that there is perhaps no very valid and essential
reason why there might not be conversion of intangible property and that there is very little practical
importance whether the tort is called conversion, or a similar tort with another name because in
either case the recovery is for the full value of the intangible right so appropriated….
V
It is the strength of the common law to respond, albeit cautiously and intelligently, to the
demands of commonsense justice in an evolving society. That time has arrived. The reasons for
creating the merger doctrine and departing from the strict common-law limitation of conversion
inform our analysis. The expansion of conversion to encompass a different class of property, such
as shares of stock, was motivated by society’s growing dependence on intangibles. It cannot be
seriously disputed that society’s reliance on computers and electronic data is substantial, if not
essential. Computers and digital information are ubiquitous and pervade all aspects of business,
financial and personal communication activities. Indeed, this opinion was drafted in electronic
form, stored in a computer’s memory and disseminated to the Judges of this Court via e-mail. We
cannot conceive of any reason in law or logic why this process of virtual creation should be treated
any differently from production by pen on paper or quill on parchment. A document stored on a
computer hard drive has the same value as a paper document kept in a file cabinet.
The merger rule reflected the concept that intangible property interests could be converted only
by exercising dominion over the paper document that represented that interest. Now, however, it is
customary that stock ownership exclusively exists in electronic format. Because shares of stock can
be transferred by mere computer entries, a thief can use a computer to access a person’s financial
accounts and transfer the shares to an account controlled by the thief. Similarly, electronic documents
and records stored on a computer can also be converted by simply pressing the delete button.
Furthermore, it generally is not the physical nature of a document that determines its worth, it is
the information memorialized in the document that has intrinsic value. A manuscript of a novel has
the same value whether it is saved in a computer’s memory or printed on paper. So too, the information
that Thyroff allegedly stored on his leased computers in the form of electronic records of customer
contacts and related data has value to him regardless of whether the format in which the information
was stored was tangible or intangible. In the absence of a significant difference in the value of the
information, the protections of the law should apply equally to both forms—physical and virtual.
In light of these considerations, we believe that the tort of conversion must keep pace with the
contemporary realities of widespread computer use. We therefore answer the certified question in
the affirmative and hold that the type of data that Nationwide allegedly took possession of—
electronic records that were stored on a computer and were indistinguishable from printed
documents—is subject to a claim of conversion in New York. Because this is the only type of
intangible property at issue in this case, we do not consider whether any of the myriad other forms
of virtual information should be protected by the tort….
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
Phone a Friend: Why would a federal appeals court certify a legal question to a state
supreme court? Why do you think the Second Circuit certified this question?
Blameless Conversions: Is it possible to have a blameless conversion? Imagine that you
make a reasonable mistake that damages someone else’s property—you shoot a pet dog
because you genuinely think it’s a wolf, or you steal a bike that you believe is yours but
is actually your neighbor’s. Should the owner be able to recover damages?
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Harmless Conversions: Is it possible to have a harmless conversion? We’ve seen
defendants be liable for trespass to land despite causing no damage to the plaintiff’s
property. Should similar liability attach for torts protecting legal interests in possessions?
Or should the plaintiff have to show actual injury when bringing a conversion claim?

C. Trespass to Chattels
INTEL CORP. v. HAMIDI
Supreme Court of California (2003)
Werdegar, Justice:

ã

…[Kourosh Kenneth] Hamidi, a former Intel
engineer, together with others, formed an organization
named Former and Current Employees of Intel (FACEIntel) to disseminate information and views critical of
Intel’s employment and personnel policies and practices.
FACE-Intel maintained a Web site…containing such
material. In addition, over a 21-month period Hamidi, on
behalf of FACE-Intel, sent six mass e-mails to employee
addresses on Intel’s electronic mail system. The messages
criticized Intel’s employment practices, warned
employees of the dangers those practices posed to their careers, suggested employees consider
moving to other companies, solicited employees’ participation in FACE-Intel, and urged employees
to inform themselves further by visiting FACE-Intel’s Web site. The messages stated that recipients
could, by notifying the sender of their wishes, be removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list; Hamidi
did not subsequently send messages to anyone who requested removal.
Each message was sent to thousands of addresses (as many as 35,000 according to FACE-Intel’s
Web site), though some messages were blocked by Intel before reaching employees. Intel’s attempt
to block internal transmission of the messages succeeded only in part; Hamidi later admitted he
evaded blocking efforts by using different sending computers. When Intel, in March 1998,
demanded in writing that Hamidi and FACE-Intel stop sending e-mails to Intel’s computer system,
Hamidi asserted the organization had a right to communicate with willing Intel employees; he sent
a new mass mailing in September 1998.
The summary judgment record contains no evidence Hamidi breached Intel’s computer security
in order to obtain the recipient addresses for his messages; indeed, internal Intel memoranda show
the company’s management concluded no security breach had occurred. Hamidi stated he created
the recipient address list using an Intel directory on a floppy disk anonymously sent to him. Nor is
there any evidence that the receipt or internal distribution of Hamidi’s electronic messages damaged
Intel’s computer system or slowed or impaired its functioning. Intel did present uncontradicted
evidence, however, that many employee recipients asked a company official to stop the messages
and that staff time was consumed in attempts to block further messages from FACE-Intel. According
to the FACE-Intel Web site, moreover, the messages had prompted discussions between “[e]xcited
and nervous managers” and the company’s human resources department.
Intel sued Hamidi and FACE-Intel [for trespass to chattels] and seeking both actual damages
and an injunction against further e-mail messages…. [The trial court] granted Intel’s motion for
summary judgment, permanently enjoining Hamidi, FACE-Intel, and their agents “from sending
unsolicited e-mail to addresses on Intel’s computer systems.”… [The Court of Appeal affirmed.]
I. Current California Tort Law
Dubbed by Prosser the “little brother of conversion,” the tort of trespass to chattels allows
recovery for interferences with possession of personal property “not sufficiently important to be
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classed as conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing with which
he has interfered.” Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 14 (1984).
Though not amounting to conversion, the defendant’s interference must, to be actionable, have
caused some injury to the chattel or to the plaintiffs rights in it…. In cases of interference with
possession of personal property not amounting to conversion, the owner has a cause of action for
trespass or case, and may recover only the actual damages suffered by reason of the impairment of the
property or the loss of its use. In modern American law generally, trespass remains as an occasional
remedy for minor interferences, resulting in some damage, but not sufficiently serious or sufficiently
important to amount to the greater tort of conversion.
The Restatement, too, makes clear that some actual injury must have occurred in order for a
trespass to chattels to be actionable. Under section 218 of the Restatement Second of Torts,
dispossession alone, without further damages, is actionable, but other forms of interference require
some additional harm to the personal property or the possessor’s interests in it[:]
The interest of a possessor of a chattel in its inviolability, unlike the similar interest
of a possessor of land, is not given legal protection by an action for nominal
damages for harmless intermeddlings with the chattel. In order that an actor who
interferes with another’s chattel may be liable, his conduct must affect some other
and more important interest of the possessor. Therefore, one who intentionally
intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling is
harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical condition,
quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel
for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest of the possessor is
affected as stated in Clause (c). Sufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest
in the mere inviolability of his chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable
force to protect his possession against even harmless interference….
Intel suggests that the requirement of actual harm does not apply here because it sought only
injunctive relief, as protection from future injuries. But…the fact the relief sought is injunctive does
not excuse a showing of injury, whether actual or threatened. Indeed, in order to obtain injunctive
relief the plaintiff must ordinarily show that the defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to
cause irreparable injuries, ones that cannot be adequately compensated in damages….
The dispositive issue in this case, therefore, is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate
Hamidi’s actions caused or threatened to cause damage to Intel’s computer system, or injury to its
rights in that personal property, such as to entitle Intel to judgment as a matter of law. To review,
the undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened damage to Intel’s computer hardware or
software and no interference with its ordinary and intended operation. Intel was not dispossessed
of its computers, nor did Hamidi’s messages prevent Intel from using its computers for any
measurable length of time. Intel presented no evidence its system was slowed or otherwise impaired
by the burden of delivering Hamidi’s electronic messages. Nor was there any evidence transmission
of the messages imposed any marginal cost on the operation of Intel’s computers. In sum, no
evidence suggested that in sending messages through Intel’s Internet connections and internal
computer system Hamidi used the system in any manner in which it was not intended to function
or impaired the system in any way. Nor does the evidence show the request of any employee to be
removed from FACE-Intel’s mailing list was not honored. The evidence did show, however, that
some employees who found the messages unwelcome asked management to stop them and that Intel
technical staff spent time and effort attempting to block the messages. A statement on the FACEIntel Web site, moreover, could be taken as an admission that the messages had caused “[e]xcited
and nervous managers” to discuss the matter with Intel’s human resources department.
Relying on a line of decisions, most from federal district courts, applying the tort of trespass to
chattels to various types of unwanted electronic contact between computers, Intel contends that,
while its computers were not damaged by receiving Hamidi’s messages, its interest in the physical
condition, quality or value of the computers was harmed. We disagree. The cited line of decisions
does not persuade us that the mere sending of electronic communications that assertedly cause
injury only because of their contents constitutes an actionable trespass to a computer system
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through which the messages are transmitted. Rather, the decisions finding electronic contact to be
a trespass to computer systems have generally involved some actual or threatened interference with
the computers’ functioning.
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the California Court of
Appeal held that evidence of automated searching of a telephone carrier’s system for authorization
codes supported a cause of action for trespass to chattels. The defendant’s automated dialing
program overburdened the plaintiff’s system, denying some subscribers access to phone lines,
showing the requisite injury. [Following Thrifty-Tel, a series of federal district court decisions held
that sending spam through an Internet service provider’s (ISP) equipment may constitute trespass
to the ISP’s computer system.]
In each of these spamming cases, the plaintiff showed, or was prepared to show, some
interference with the efficient functioning of its computer system. In CompuServe, the plaintiff ISP’s
mail equipment monitor stated that mass [spam] mailings, especially from nonexistent addresses
such as those used by the defendant, placed “a tremendous burden” on the ISP’s equipment, using
“disk space and draining the processing power,” making those resources unavailable to serve
subscribers. Similarly, in Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., the court found the evidence
supported a finding that the defendant’s mailings “fill[ed] up Hotmail’s computer storage space and
threatened to damage Hotmail’s ability to service its legitimate customers.”…
Building on the spamming cases, in particular CompuServe, three even more recent district court
decisions addressed whether unauthorized robotic data collection from a company’s publicly
accessible Web site is a trespass on the company’s computer system…. In the leading case, eBay, Inc.
v. Bidder’s Edge, the defendant Bidder’s Edge (BE), operating an auction aggregation site, accessed
the eBay Web site about 100,000 times per day, accounting for between 1 and 2 percent of the
information requests received by eBay and a slightly smaller percentage of the data transferred by
eBay. The district court rejected eBay’s claim that it was entitled to injunctive relief because of the
defendant’s unauthorized presence alone, or because of the incremental cost the defendant had
imposed on operation of the eBay site, but found sufficient proof of threatened harm in the potential
for others to imitate the defendant’s activity: “If BE’s activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it
would encourage other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay
system such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system
unavailability, or data losses.” Again, in addressing the likelihood of eBay’s success on its trespass to
chattels cause of action, the court held the evidence of injury to eBay’s computer system sufficient
to support a preliminary injunction: “If the court were to hold otherwise, it would likely encourage
other auction aggregators to crawl the eBay site, potentially to the point of denying effective access
to eBay’s customers. If preliminary injunctive relief were denied, and other aggregators began to
crawl the eBay site, there appears to be little doubt that the load on eBay’s computer system would
qualify as a substantial impairment of condition or value.”…
In the decisions so far reviewed, the defendant’s use of the plaintiffs computer system was held
sufficient to support an action for trespass when it actually did, or threatened to, interfere with the
intended functioning of the system, as by significantly reducing its available memory and processing
power…. Intel does not claim the type of functional impact that spammers and robots have been
alleged to cause…. The functional burden on Intel’s computers, or the cost in time to individual
recipients, of receiving Hamidi’s occasional advocacy messages cannot be compared to the burdens
and costs…[of handing] the ever-rising deluge of [spam emails like those seen in other cases].
Intel relies on language in the eBay decision suggesting that unauthorized use of another’s
chattel is actionable even without any showing of injury: “Even if, as [defendant] BE argues, its
searches use only a small amount of eBay’s computer system capacity, BE has nonetheless deprived
eBay of the ability to use that portion of its personal property for its own purposes. The law
recognizes no such right to use another’s personal property.” But as the eBay court went on
immediately to find that the defendant’s conduct, if widely replicated, would likely impair the
functioning of the plaintiffs system, we do not read the quoted remarks as expressing the court’s
complete view of the issue. In isolation, moreover, they would not be a correct statement of
California or general American law on this point. While one may have no right temporarily to use
another’s personal property, such use is actionable as a trespass only if it has proximately caused
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injury. In the absence of any actual damage the action will not lie. Short of dispossession, personal
injury, or physical damage (not present here), intermeddling is actionable only if the chattel is
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel
for a substantial time. In particular, an actionable deprivation of use must be for a time so substantial
that it is possible to estimate the loss caused thereby. A mere momentary or theoretical deprivation
of use is not sufficient unless there is a dispossession. That Hamidi’s messages temporarily used
some portion of the Intel computers’ processors or storage is, therefore, not enough; Intel must, but
does not, demonstrate some measurable loss from the use of its computer system.
In addition to impairment of system functionality, CompuServe and its progeny also refer to the
ISP’s loss of business reputation and customer goodwill, resulting from the inconvenience and cost
that spam causes to its members, as harm to the ISP’s legally protected interests in its personal
property. Intel argues that its own interest in employee productivity, assertedly disrupted by
Hamidi’s messages, is a comparable protected interest in its computer system…. This theory of
“impairment by content” threatens to stretch trespass law to cover injuries far afield from the harms
to possession the tort evolved to protect. Intel’s theory would expand the tort of trespass to chattels
to cover virtually any unconsented-to communication that, solely because of its content, is
unwelcome to the recipient or intermediate transmitter. As the dissenting justice [in the Court of
Appeal] explained,
“Damage” of this nature—the distraction of reading or listening to an unsolicited
communication—is not within the scope of the injury against which the trespassto-chattel tort protects, and indeed trivializes it. After all, the property interest
protected by the old action of trespass was that of possession; and this has
continued to affect the character of the action. Reading an e-mail transmitted to
equipment designed to receive it, in and of itself, does not affect the possessory
interest in the equipment. Indeed, if a chattel’s receipt of an electronic
communication constitutes a trespass to that chattel, then not only are unsolicited
telephone calls and faxes trespasses to chattel, but unwelcome radio waves and
television signals also constitute a trespass to chattel every time the viewer
inadvertently sees or hears the unwanted program.
We agree. While unwelcome communications, electronic or otherwise, can cause a variety of injuries
to economic relations, reputation and emotions, those interests are protected by other branches of
tort law; in order to address them, we need not create a fiction of injury to the communication system.
Nor may Intel appropriately assert a property interest in its employees’ time. The Restatement
test clearly speaks in the first instance to the impairment of the chattel. But employees are not
chattels (at least not in the legal sense of the term). Whatever interest Intel may have in preventing
its employees from receiving disruptive communications, it is not an interest in personal property,
and trespass to chattels is therefore not an action that will lie to protect it. Nor, finally, can the fact
Intel staff spent time attempting to block Hamidi’s messages be bootstrapped into an injury to Intel’s
possessory interest in its computers. To quote, again, from the dissenting opinion in the Court of
Appeal: “[I]t is circular to premise the damage element of a tort solely upon the steps taken to
prevent the damage. Injury can only be established by the completed tort’s consequences, not by the
cost of the steps taken to avoid the injury and prevent the tort; otherwise, we can create injury for
every supposed tort.”
Intel connected its e-mail system to the Internet and permitted its employees to make use of this
connection both for business and, to a reasonable extent, for their own purposes. In doing so, the
company necessarily contemplated the employees’ receipt of unsolicited as well as solicited
communications from other companies and individuals. That some communications would,
because of their contents, be unwelcome to Intel management was virtually inevitable. Hamidi did
nothing but use the e-mail system for its intended purpose—to communicate with employees. The
system worked as designed, delivering the messages without any physical or functional harm or
disruption. These occasional transmissions cannot reasonably be viewed as impairing the quality or
value of Intel’s computer system. We conclude, therefore, that Intel has not presented undisputed
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facts demonstrating an injury to its personal property, or to its legal interest in that property, that
support, under California tort law, an action for trespass to chattels….
Kennard, Justice, concurring:
…Intel has my sympathy. Unsolicited and unwanted bulk e-mail, most of it commercial, is a
serious annoyance and inconvenience for persons who communicate electronically through the
Internet, and bulk e-mail that distracts employees in the workplace can adversely affect overall
productivity. But, as the majority persuasively explains, to establish the tort of trespass to chattels in
California, the plaintiff must prove either damage to the plaintiff’s personal property or actual or
threatened impairment of the plaintiff’s ability to use that property. Because plaintiff Intel has not
shown that defendant Hamidi’s occasional bulk e-mail messages to Intel’s employees have damaged
Intel’s computer system or impaired its functioning in any significant way, Intel has not established
the tort of trespass to chattels.
This is not to say that Intel is helpless either practically or legally. As a practical matter, Intel need
only instruct its employees to delete messages from Hamidi without reading them and to notify
Hamidi to remove their workplace e-mail addresses from his mailing lists. Hamidi’s messages
promised to remove recipients from the mailing list on request, and there is no evidence that Hamidi
has ever failed to do so. From a legal perspective, a tort theory other than trespass to chattels may
provide Intel with an effective remedy if Hamidi’s messages are defamatory or wrongfully interfere
with Intel’s economic interests. Additionally, the Legislature continues to study the problems caused
by bulk e-mails and other dubious uses of modern communication technologies and may craft
legislation that accommodates the competing concerns in these sensitive and highly complex areas….
Brown, Justice, dissenting:
Candidate A finds the vehicles that candidate B has provided for his campaign workers, and A
spray paints the water soluble message, “Fight corruption, vote for A” on the bumpers. The
majority’s reasoning would find that notwithstanding the time it takes the workers to remove the
paint and the expense they incur in altering the bumpers to prevent further unwanted messages,
candidate B does not deserve an injunction unless the paint is so heavy that it reduces the cars’ gas
mileage or otherwise depreciates the cars’ market value. Furthermore, candidate B has an obligation
to permit the paint’s display, because the cars are driven by workers and not B personally, because
B allows his workers to use the cars to pick up their lunch or retrieve their children from school, or
because the bumpers display B’s own slogans. I disagree.
Intel has invested millions of dollars to develop and maintain a computer system. It did this not
to act as a public forum but to enhance the productivity of its employees. Kourosh Kenneth Hamidi
sent as many as 200,000 e-mail messages to Intel employees. The time required to review and delete
Hamidi’s messages diverted employees from productive tasks and undermined the utility of the
computer system. There may be situations in which the value to the owner of a particular type of
chattel may be impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical condition.
This is such a case….
Of course, Intel deserves an injunction even if its objections are based entirely on the e-mail’s
content. Intel is entitled, for example, to allow employees use of the Internet to check stock market
tables or weather forecasts without incurring any concomitant obligation to allow access to
pornographic Web sites. A private property owner may choose to exclude unwanted mail for any
reason, including its content…. Those who have contempt for grubby commerce and reverence for
the rarified heights of intellectual discourse may applaud today’s decision, but even the flow of ideas
will be curtailed if the right to exclude is denied….
Mosk, Justice, dissenting:
…The majority fail to distinguish open communication in the public “commons” of the Internet
from unauthorized intermeddling on a private, proprietary intranet. Hamidi is not communicating
in the equivalent of a town square or of an unsolicited “junk” mailing through the United States
Postal Service. His action, in crossing from the public Internet into a private intranet, is more like
intruding into a private office mailroom, commandeering the mail cart, and dropping off unwanted
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broadsides on 30,000 desks. Because Intel’s security measures have been circumvented by Hamidi,
the majority leave Intel, which has exercised all reasonable self-help efforts, with no recourse unless
he causes a malfunction or systems “crash.” Hamidi’s repeated intrusions did more than merely
“prompt discussions between ‘excited and nervous managers’ and the company’s human resource
department” ; they also constituted a misappropriation of Intel’s private computer system contrary
to its intended use and against Intel’s wishes….
1.

QUESTIONS
Spot the Difference: What’s the difference between conversion and trespass to chattels?

2.

Self-Help: In justifying the type of rule applied in Intel, the Restatement asserts that
“[s]ufficient legal protection of the possessor’s interest in the mere inviolability of his
chattel is afforded by his privilege to use reasonable force to protect his possession
against even harmless interference.” What does that mean? And do you agree?

3.

Straight from the Horse’s Mouth: After the
trial court enjoined Hamidi from sending
unsolicited emails, he didn’t give up
challenging Intel. As he put it, “They thought I
was this bozo, coming here from some weird
country. ‘He is helpless,’ ‘He will come to his
knees.’” Unsatisfied with merely filing a legal
appeal, he rode on horseback to Intel’s
headquarters—as shown here—to deliver a
floppy disk and later returned in a horsedrawn carriage with 40,000 printed copies of
an email notifying employees that he was
barred from communicating with them
through the internet. Could Intel have won
punitive damages and an injunction barring
him from the premises? Should trespass to
land and trespass to chattels apply identically?
ã

NFT PROBLEM
Twitter CEO, Jack Dorsey, recently auctioned off his inaugural tweet—“just setting up my twttr,”
published on March 21, 2006—for $2.9m. The tweet was sold as a nonfungible token (NFT), a
unique digital certificate e-signed and verified by Dorsey stating who owns the media and including
the original tweet’s metadata. The buyer, Malaysia-based businessman Sina Estavi, celebrated with
glee: “This is not just a tweet! I think years later people will realize the true value of this tweet, like
the Mona Lisa painting.”
Jane, a Silicon Valley businesswoman, thought the tweet belonged in the hands (or on the screen)
of a Californian or nobody at all. She traveled to Malaysia and took Sina’s phone from a coffee-shop
table. After cracking the phone’s passcode, she accessed the NFT on Sina’s cloud-based storage
system and used malicious software to corrupt the NFT, making it impossible to see who owned the
certificate or view the metadata. Sina was able to restore the NFT to its original condition 14 months
later. He promptly flipped it for a $3.4m profit, in part due to the hype surrounding the scandal.
(a) Despite the large profit, Sina wants to sue. Which tort gives him the best chance?
(b) What if Sina restored the NFT in just five minutes?
(c) What if, instead of corrupting the NFT, the malicious software irrevocably listed Jane’s
name as the owner on the digital certificate?
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TANK PROBLEM
Lauren, who went blind at the age of 14 due to a childhood accident, now specializes in Supreme
Court litigation at Nogan & Hix in Washington, D.C. Her guide dog, Tank, helps her with everyday
tasks and getting to work. Lauren’s neighbor, Marco, constantly pets Tank, whistles at him, and says
“hi buddy” even though Tank is working, Lauren politely asks Marco to refrain from doing so, and
Tank’s vest reads “Do Not Pet.”
Lauren lives in an apartment complex called The Haven. One morning, as she was taking Tank
out to use the bathroom and play, she heard a yelp. Tank had sliced his paw on a piece of glass in
the grassy area in middle of the complex. Lauren had an important meeting that day, but Tank
simply couldn’t walk because of the paw injury. She missed the meeting and, as a result, failed to
reach her billable-hours goal and missed out on a $75,000 bonus. It turns out that Vicky, Lauren’s
old nemesis from law school who was also trying to make partner at Nogan & Hix, planted the glass.
(a) Does Lauren have any viable claims for conversion or trespass to chattels? Based on what
personal property?
(b) Should Lauren sue anyone for battery?
(c) Once you’ve covered negligence, return to this problem. Does Lauren have any other
decent claims?

D. Consent
COPELAND v. HUBBARD BROADCASTING, INC.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota (1995)
Lansing, Judge:

ã

…In the spring of 1993, KSTP television [(owned and operated by
Hubbard)] broadcast an investigative report on the practices of two
metro-area veterinarians. One of the veterinarians, Dr. Sam Ulland,
treated Greg and Betty Copeland’s cat. Before an April 1993 visit to
the Copeland home, Dr. Ulland received the Copelands’ permission
to bring along a student interested in a career in veterinary medicine.
The student, Patty Johnson, did not tell the Copelands or Dr. Ulland
that, in addition to being a part-time student at the University of
Minnesota, she was also an employee of KSTP and was videotaping Dr. Ulland’s practice methods.
When the investigative report was broadcast, it included two brief video portions filmed inside
the Copelands’ house. The Copelands sued KSTP and Johnson (collectively KSTP) for trespass….
The district court…granted KSTP’s summary judgment motion on the trespass claim….
A trespass is committed when a person enters the land of another without consent. Consent may
be implied from the conduct of the parties, but silence alone will not support an inference of consent.
Consent may be geographically or temporally restricted.
The district court concluded that KSTP was entitled to summary judgment on the Copelands’
trespass claim because Johnson did not exceed the geographic boundaries of the Copelands’ consent
and the Copelands did not expressly limit their consent to Johnson’s educational or vocational goals.
We read the case law differently…. Minnesota case law establishes that an entrant may become a
trespasser by moving beyond the possessor’s invitation or permission. See State v. Brooks-Scanlon
Lumber Co., 150 N.W. 912 (Minn. 1915) (when consent given to cut mature trees, cutting of
immature trees exceeded scope of consent and constituted trespass). Although trespass in BrooksScanlon related to tangible objects, the decision nonetheless demonstrates that the scope of consent
can be exceeded even though the entrant remains within the geographic limits of the consent…. [In
other words,] wrongful conduct following an authorized entry on land can result in trespass.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, KSTP cites Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745
(N.D. Cal. 1993), for the proposition that the scope of consent can be exceeded only when physical
ã
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boundaries are crossed. Baugh is, however, factually distinguishable. In Baugh, the homeowner
granted the broadcaster permission to videotape events at her house so long as they were not shown
on television. The homeowner brought a trespass action when the videotape was subsequently
broadcast. The court held that the scope of consent was not exceeded because the plaintiff agreed to
the initial videotaping and the homeowner’s cause of action was not trespass. Baugh has limited
applicability to this case because the Copelands did not consent to any videotaping.
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized trespass as a remedy when broadcasters use secret
cameras for newsgathering. Newsgathering does not create a license to trespass or to intrude by
electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or office.
Whether a possessor of land has given consent for entry is, when disputed, a factual issue. The
district court determined that the Copelands did not present any evidence indicating that the scope
of consent was limited to educational purposes. The record, however, indicates that consent was
given only to allow a veterinary student to accompany Dr. Ulland. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Copelands, there is sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment….
1.

QUESTIONS
The Fourth Estate: The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress
shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” Is Copeland
sufficiently deferential to that constitutional command? Should there be a
newsgathering exception to the tort of trespass?

2.

Newsgathering: Do you think Copeland comes out the same way if, instead of
videotaping, Patty took a stealthy photo with her cellphone? Or an audio-only
recording? What if Patty simply took notes while inside the Copelands’ home? Or if she
took notes from memory once she got back to KSTP headquarters?

3.

Consent Conundrums: What if Patty reasonably but mistakenly believed that the
Copelands consented to her videotaping? Would it matter if that mistaken belief was
due to (1) her boss at KSTP showing her a forged videotaping consent form purportedly
signed by the Copelands or (2) statements made by the Copelands that implied their
knowledge and acceptance of the surreptitious recording? (Hint: The consent rules here
largely mirror those surrounding intentional torts like assault and battery.)
The following case discusses sexual assault.
DESNICK v. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1995)

Posner, Chief Judge:

ã

The plaintiffs—an ophthalmic clinic known as the “Desnick
Eye Center” after its owner, Dr. Desnick, and two ophthalmic
surgeons employed by the clinic, Glazer and Simon—appeal
from the dismissal of their suit against the ABC television
network, a producer of the ABC program PrimeTime
Live named Entine, and the program’s star reporter, Donaldson.
The suit is for trespass, defamation, and other torts arising out
of the production and broadcast of a program segment
of PrimeTime Live that was highly critical of the Desnick Eye
Center…. The suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim….
In March of 1993 Entine telephoned Dr. Desnick and told him that PrimeTime Live wanted to
do a broadcast segment on large cataract practices. The Desnick Eye Center has 25 offices in four
midwestern states and performs more than 10,000 cataract operations a year, mostly on elderly
persons whose cataract surgery is paid for by Medicare. The complaint alleges…that Entine told
ã
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Desnick that the segment would not be about just one cataract practice, that it would not involve
“ambush” interviews or “undercover” surveillance, and that it would be “fair and balanced.” Thus
reassured, Desnick permitted an ABC crew to videotape the Desnick Eye Center’s main premises in
Chicago, to film a cataract operation “live,” and to interview doctors, technicians, and patients.
Desnick also gave Entine a videotape explaining the Desnick Eye Center’s services.
Unbeknownst to Desnick, Entine had dispatched persons equipped with concealed cameras to
offices of the Desnick Eye Center in Wisconsin and Indiana. Posing as patients, these persons—
seven in all—requested eye examinations. Plaintiffs Glazer and Simon are among the employees of
the Desnick Eye Center who were secretly videotaped examining these “test patients.”
The program aired on June 10. Donaldson introduces the segment by saying, “We begin tonight
with the story of a so-called ‘big cutter,’ Dr. James Desnick. In our undercover investigation of the
big cutter you’ll meet tonight, we turned up evidence that he may also be a big charger, doing
unnecessary cataract surgery for the money.” Brief interviews with four patients of the Desnick Eye
Center follow. One of the patients is satisfied (“I was blessed”); the other three are not—one of them
says, “If you got three eyes, he’ll get three eyes.” Donaldson then reports on the experiences of the
seven test patients. The two who were under 65 and thus not eligible for Medicare reimbursement
were told they didn’t need cataract surgery. Four of the other five were told they did. Glazer and
Simon are shown recommending cataract surgery to them. Donaldson tells the viewer
that PrimeTime Live has hired a professor of ophthalmology to examine the test patients who had
been told they needed cataract surgery, and the professor tells the viewer that they didn’t need it—
with regard to one he says, “I think it would be near malpractice to do surgery on him.” Later in the
segment he denies that this could just be an honest difference of opinion between professionals.
An ophthalmic surgeon is interviewed who had turned down a job at the Desnick Eye Center
because he would not have been “able to screen who I was going to operate on.” He claims to have
been told by one of the doctors at the Center (not Glazer or Simon) that “as soon as I reject them
[i.e., turn down a patient for cataract surgery], they’re going in the next room to get surgery.” A
former marketing executive for the Center says Desnick took advantage of “people who had
Alzheimer’s, people who did not know what planet they were on, people whose quality of life
wouldn’t change one iota by having cataract surgery done.” Two patients are interviewed who report
miserable experiences with the Center—one claiming that the doctors there had failed to spot an
easily visible melanoma, another that as a result of unnecessary cataract surgery her “eye ruptured,”
producing “running pus.” A former employee tells the viewer that Dr. Desnick alters patients’
medical records to show they need cataract surgery—for example, changing the record of one
patient’s vision test from 20/30 to 20/80—and that he instructs all members of his staff to use pens
of the same color in order to facilitate the alteration of patients’ records.
One symptom of cataracts is that lights of normal brightness produce glare. Glazer is shown
telling a patient, “You know, you’re getting glare. I would say we could do significantly better [with
an operation].” And Simon is shown asking two patients, “Do you ever notice any glare or blurriness
when you’re driving, or difficulty with the signs?” Both say no, and immediately Donaldson tells the
viewer that “the Desnick Center uses a very interesting machine, called an auto-refractor, to
determine whether there are glare problems.” Donaldson demonstrates the machine, then says that
“Paddy Kalish is an optometrist who says that when he worked at the Desnick clinic from 1987 to
1990, the machine was regularly rigged. He says he watched a technician tamper with the machine,
this way”—and then Kalish gives a demonstration, adding, “This happened routinely for all the older
patients that came in for the eye exams.” Donaldson reveals that Dr. Desnick has obtained a
judgment against Kalish for defamation, but adds that “Kalish is not the only one to tell us the
machine may have been rigged. PrimeTime talked to four other former Desnick employees who say
almost everyone failed the glare test.”
There is more, including mention of a proceeding begun by the Illinois Medical Board in which
Dr. Desnick is charged with a number of counts of malpractice and deception—and an “ambush”
interview. Donaldson accosts Desnick at O’Hare Airport and cries, “Is it true, Doctor, that you
changed medical records to show less vision than your patients actually have? We’ve been told,
Doctor, that you’ve changed the glare machine so we have a different reading. Is that correct?
Doctor, why won’t you respond to the questions?”
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The plaintiffs’ claims fall into two distinct classes. The first arises from the broadcast itself….
The broadcast is alleged to have defamed the three plaintiffs by charging that the glare machine is
tampered with…. [Due to ongoing factual disputes, it] is not so clear at this stage that the defamation
count of the complaint can properly be dismissed. The second class of claims in this case
concerns…the methods that the defendants used to create the broadcast segment. [Specifically,
plaintiffs allege] that the defendants committed a trespass in insinuating the test patients into the
Wisconsin and Indiana offices of the Desnick Eye Center….
To enter upon another’s land without consent is a trespass. The force of this rule has, it is true,
been diluted somewhat by concepts of privilege and of implied consent. But there is no journalists’
privilege to trespass. And there can be no implied consent in any non-fictitious sense of the term
when express consent is procured by a misrepresentation or a misleading omission. The Desnick
Eye Center would not have agreed to the entry of the test patients into its offices had it known they
wanted eye examinations only in order to gather material for a television exposé of the Center and
that they were going to make secret videotapes of the examinations. Yet some cases…deem consent
effective even though it was procured by fraud. There must be something to this surprising result.
Without it a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when he ordered a meal, or a browser
pretend to be interested in merchandise that he could not afford to buy. Dinner guests would be
trespassers if they were false friends who never would have been invited had the host known their
true character, and a consumer who in an effort to bargain down an automobile dealer falsely
claimed to be able to buy the same car elsewhere at a lower price would be a trespasser in the dealer’s
showroom. Some of these might be classified as privileged trespasses, designed to promote
competition. Others might be thought justified by some kind of implied consent—the restaurant
critic for example might point by way of analogy to the use of the “fair use” defense by book
reviewers charged with copyright infringement and argue that the restaurant industry as a whole
would be injured if restaurants could exclude critics. But most such efforts at rationalization would
be little better than evasions. The fact is that consent to an entry is often given legal effect even
though the entrant has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him for
perfectly understandable and generally ethical or at least lawful reasons to revoke his consent.
The law’s willingness to give effect to consent procured by fraud is not limited to the tort of
trespass. The Restatement gives the example of a man who obtains consent to sexual intercourse by
promising a woman $100, yet (unbeknownst to her, of course) he pays her with a counterfeit bill
and intended to do so from the start. The man is not guilty of battery, even though unconsented-to
sexual intercourse is a battery. Yet we know that to conceal the fact that one has a venereal disease
transforms “consensual” intercourse into battery. Seduction, standardly effected by false promises
of love, is not rape; intercourse under the pretense of rendering medical or psychiatric treatment is,
at least in most states. Trespass presents close parallels. If a homeowner opens his door to a
purported meter reader who is in fact nothing of the sort—just a busybody curious about the interior
of the home—the homeowner’s consent to his entry is not a defense to a suit for trespass. And
likewise if a competitor gained entry to a business firm’s premises posing as a customer but in fact
hoping to steal the firm’s trade secrets.
How to distinguish the two classes of case—the seducer from the medical impersonator, the
restaurant critic from the meter-reader impersonator? The answer can have nothing to do with
fraud; there is fraud in all the cases. It has to do with the interest that the torts in question, battery
and trespass, protect. The one protects the inviolability of the person, the other the inviolability of
the person’s property. The woman who is seduced wants to have sex with her seducer, and the
restaurant owner wants to have customers. The woman who is victimized by the medical
impersonator has no desire to have sex with her doctor; she wants medical treatment. And the
homeowner victimized by the phony meter reader does not want strangers in his house unless they
have authorized service functions. The dealer’s objection to the customer who claims falsely to have
a lower price from a competing dealer is not to the physical presence of the customer, but to the
fraud that he is trying to perpetuate. The lines are not bright—they are not even inevitable. They are
the traces of the old forms of action, which have resulted in a multitude of artificial distinctions in
modern law. But that is nothing new.

CASES & CRITIQUE

67

There was no invasion in the present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass
seeks to protect. The test patients entered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for
ophthalmic services and videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal,
communications with strangers (the testers themselves). The activities of the offices were not
disrupted,…[n]or was there any invasion of a person’s private space, as in our hypothetical meterreader case, as in the famous case of De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (where a doctor,
called to the plaintiff’s home to deliver her baby, brought along with him a friend who was curious
to see a birth but was not a medical doctor, and represented the friend to be his medical
assistant)…and as in Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971), on which the plaintiffs
in our case rely. Dietemann involved a home. True, the portion invaded was an office, where the
plaintiff performed quack healing of nonexistent ailments. The parallel to this case is plain enough,
but there is a difference. Dietemann was not in business, and did not advertise his services or charge
for them. His quackery was private.
No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody’s life were publicized in the present case. There
was no eavesdropping on a private conversation; the testers recorded their own conversations with
the Desnick Eye Center’s physicians. There was no violation of the doctor-patient privilege. There
was no theft, or intent to steal, trade secrets; no disruption of decorum, of peace and quiet; no noisy
or distracting demonstrations. Had the testers been undercover FBI agents, there would have been
no violation of the Fourth Amendment, because there would have been no invasion of a legally
protected interest in property or privacy. “Testers” who pose as prospective home buyers in order
to gather evidence of housing discrimination are not trespassers even if they are private persons not
acting under color of law. The situation of the defendants’ “testers” is analogous. Like testers seeking
evidence of violation of anti-discrimination laws, the defendants’ test patients gained entry into the
plaintiffs’ premises by misrepresenting their purposes (more precisely by a misleading omission to
disclose those purposes). But the entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of interest
of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference with the ownership or
possession of land. We need not consider what if any difference it would make if the plaintiffs had
festooned the premises with signs forbidding the entry of testers or other snoops. Perhaps none, but
that is an issue for another day….
One further point about the claims concerning the making of the program segment, as distinct
from the content of the segment itself, needs to be made. The Supreme Court in the name of the
First Amendment has hedged about defamation suits, even when not brought by public figures, with
many safeguards designed to protect a vigorous market in ideas and opinions. Today’s “tabloid”
style investigative television reportage, conducted by networks desperate for viewers in an
increasingly competitive television market, constitutes—although it is often shrill, one-sided, and
offensive, and sometimes defamatory—an important part of that market. It is entitled to all the
safeguards with which the Supreme Court has surrounded liability for defamation. And it is entitled
to them regardless of the name of the tort, and, we add, regardless of whether the tort suit is aimed
at the content of the broadcast or the production of the broadcast. If the broadcast itself does not
contain actionable defamation, and no established rights are invaded in the process of creating it
(for the media have no general immunity from tort or contract liability), then the target has no legal
remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious, confrontational,
unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly….
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1.

QUESTIONS
If It Ducks Like a Quack: In Dietemann
v. Time, mentioned briefly above in
Desnick, two Life magazine reporters
writing an article on medical quackery
targeted Antone Dietemann, a disabled
veteran and plumber who professed to
heal people with herbs and other
unusual remedies. The reporters entered
Dietemann’s home posing as patients
and used hidden cameras and
microphones to photograph and record
what happened. Life ultimately published the photos and a partial transcript of the
conversation, while also giving the materials to a local district attorney, who prosecuted
Dietemann for practicing medicine without a license. After Dietemann sued the
magazine’s publisher, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Constitution doesn’t give
reporters a special right to trespass or invade people’s privacy: “The First Amendment
has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed
during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass,
to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another’s home or office.
It does not become such a license simply because the person subjected to the intrusion
is reasonably suspected of committing a crime.” Do you agree with that decision? Is
Desnick to the contrary? Do undercover journalists need the First Amendment if they
can rely on decisions like Desnick to raise the defense of consent?
ã

TECH SUPPORT PROBLEM
Professor Peaves teaches Privacy Law at St. Mark’s School of Law. Despite being quite tech-savvy,
she could never get her slides to show on the screen during class. One Friday, she stuck around after
class to figure it out once and for all. After calling IT for some help, one of the support staff named
Joan emailed Peaves a link and told her to click it. Peaves, who was using her personal laptop, did as
Joan asked. Through the link, Joan seized control of Peaves’s computer and used it as an extension
of her own. Peaves watched as Joan moved the mouse around and clicked various settings for a total
of four minutes.
On her end, Joan was downloading all of Peaves’s personal photos while deleting them from
Peaves’s computer as she went along. Although the issue with the slides was resolved, a few days
later Peaves found herself fired after some photos showing her engaging in illegal activity were sent
to the Dean of St. Mark’s.
(a) Suspecting Joan as the culprit, what possible tort claims does Peaves have?
(b) Does consent defeat Peaves’s claim against Joan?
(c) Once you’ve covered public disclosure of private facts, come back to this problem. Does
Peaves have a viable claim?

ã

A Crackdown on Quackery, LIFE (Nov. 1, 1963).
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COMMUNICATIONS TORTS

A. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
Publicity Given to Private Life (1965)
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private
life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that
ã

(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public….
a. Publicity.…“Publicity”…means that the matter is made
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so
many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. The…means of communication…may be
oral, written or by any other means…. Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy…to
communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or even to a small group
of persons. On the other hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small
circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any broadcast over the radio,
or statement made in an address to a large audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning
of the term as it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between private and
public communication….
b. Private life.…There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to
information about the plaintiff that is already public…. On the other hand, if the record is one not
open to public inspection, as in the case of income tax returns, it is not public, and there is an
invasion of privacy when it is made so. Similarly, there is no liability for giving further publicity to
what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus he normally cannot complain when
his photograph is taken while he is walking down the public street and is published in the defendant’s
newspaper. Nor is his privacy invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity
in which the plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public. On the other hand, when a photograph
is taken without the plaintiff’s consent in a private place, or one already made is stolen from his
home, the plaintiff’s appearance that is made public when the picture appears in a newspaper is still
a private matter, and his privacy is invaded. Every individual has some phases of his life and his
activities and some facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely
to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close friends. Sexual relations, for example, are
normally entirely private matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or
humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a man’s life in his home, and
some of his past history that he would rather forget. When these intimate details of his life are spread
before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, there is an
actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of legitimate public interest….
1.

2.

ã

QUESTIONS
Judges and Juries: Who should decide whether publicizing a matter would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person? How about whether the matter is of legitimate public
concern? Are these tasks better entrusted to judges or juries? What are the benefits and
risks to each decisionmaker?
Facebook Friends and Foes: How does comment a from Restatement § 652D translate
into the digital age? If you post a private fact about someone on Twitter or Snapchat, are
you on the hook? What about in a DM on Instagram? How about in a Facebook group
or on your Facebook wall?

Daniel Novta, Land of the Tabloids (CC BY 2.0).
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The second question after the following case discusses sexual assault.
SIDIS v. F-R PUBLISHING CORP.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1940)
Clark, Judge:

ã

William James Sidis was the unwilling subject of a brief
biographical sketch and cartoon printed in The New Yorker weekly
magazine for August 14, 1937…. He brought an action in the district
court against the publisher, F-R Publishing Corporation,…[and]
alleged violation of his right of privacy….
William James Sidis was a famous child prodigy in 1910. His
name and prowess were well known to newspaper readers of the
period. At the age of eleven, he lectured to distinguished
mathematicians on the subject of Four-Dimensional Bodies. When
he was sixteen, he was graduated from Harvard College, amid
considerable public attention. Since then, his name has appeared in
the press only sporadically, and he has sought to live as
unobtrusively as possible. Until the articles objected to appeared in
The New Yorker, he had apparently succeeded in his endeavor to avoid the public gaze.
Among The New Yorker’s features are brief biographical sketches of current and past
personalities. In the latter department, which appears haphazardly under the title of “Where Are
They Now?” the article on Sidis was printed with a subtitle “April
Fool.” The author describes his subject’s early accomplishments
in mathematics and the wide-spread attention he received, then
recounts his general breakdown and the revulsion which Sidis
thereafter felt for his former life of fame and study. The
unfortunate prodigy is traced over the years that followed,
through his attempts to conceal his identity, through his chosen
career as an insignificant clerk who would not need to employ
unusual mathematical talents, and through the bizarre ways in
which his genius flowered, as in his enthusiasm for collecting
streetcar transfers and in his proficiency with an adding machine.
The article closes with an account of an interview with Sidis at his
present lodgings, “a hall bedroom of Boston’s shabby south end.”
The untidiness of his room, his curious laugh, his manner of
speech, and other personal habits are commented upon at length,
as is his present interest in the lore of the Okamakammessett
[tribe]. The subtitle is explained by the closing sentence, quoting Sidis as saying “with a grin” that it
was strange, “but, you know, I was born on April Fool’s Day.” Accompanying the biography is a
small cartoon showing the genius of eleven years lecturing to a group of astounded professors.
It is not contended that any of the matter printed is untrue. Nor is the manner of the author
unfriendly; Sidis today is described as having “a certain childlike charm.” But the article is merciless
in its dissection of intimate details of its subject’s personal life, and this in company with elaborate
accounts of Sidis’ passion for privacy and the pitiable lengths to which he has gone in order to avoid
public scrutiny. The work possesses great reader interest, for it is both amusing and instructive; but
it may be fairly described as a ruthless exposure of a once public character, who has since sought
and has now been deprived of the seclusion of private life….
[W]e are asked to declare that this exposure transgresses upon plaintiff’s right of
privacy…. None of the cited rulings goes so far as to prevent a newspaper or magazine from
publishing the truth about a person, however intimate, revealing, or harmful the truth may be. Nor
are there any decided cases that confer such a privilege upon the press….
ã
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All comment upon the right of privacy must stem from the famous article by Warren and
Brandeis on The Right of Privacy in 4 Harvard Law Review 193. The learned authors of that paper
were convinced that some limits ought to be imposed upon the privilege of newspapers to publish
truthful items of a personal nature[:]
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and
of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. The intensity
and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered
necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have
become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention
have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Warren and Brandeis realized that the interest of the individual in privacy must inevitably
conflict with the interest of the public in news. Certain public figures, they conceded, such as holders
of public office, must sacrifice their privacy and expose at least part of their lives to public scrutiny
as the price of the powers they attain. But even public figures were not to be stripped bare. “In
general, then, the matters of which the publication should be repressed may be described as those
which concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an individual, and have no legitimate
connection with his fitness for a public office. Some things all men alike are entitled to keep from
popular curiosity, whether in public life or not, while others are only private because the persons
concerned have not assumed a position which makes their doings legitimate matters of public
investigation.” Warren and Brandeis, supra, at 216.
It must be conceded that under the strict standards suggested by these authors plaintiff’s right of
privacy has been invaded. Sidis today is neither politician, public administrator, nor statesman. Even
if he were, some of the personal details revealed were of the sort that Warren and Brandeis believed
“all men alike are entitled to keep from popular curiosity.”
But despite eminent opinion to the contrary, we are not yet disposed to afford to all of the
intimate details of private life an absolute immunity from the prying of the press. Everyone will agree
that at some point the public interest in obtaining information becomes dominant over the
individual’s desire for privacy. Warren and Brandeis were willing to lift the veil somewhat in the
case of public officers. We would go further, though we are not yet prepared to say how far. At least
we would permit limited scrutiny of the “private” life of any person who has achieved, or has had
thrust upon him, the questionable and indefinable status of a “public figure.”
William James Sidis was once a public figure. As a child prodigy, he excited both admiration and
curiosity. Of him great deeds were expected. In 1910, he was a person about whom the newspapers
might display a legitimate intellectual interest, in the sense meant by Warren and Brandeis, as
distinguished from a trivial and unseemly curiosity. But the precise motives of the press we regard
as unimportant. And even if Sidis had loathed public attention at that time, we think his uncommon
achievements and personality would have made the attention permissible. Since then Sidis has
cloaked himself in obscurity, but his subsequent history, containing as it did the answer to the
question of whether or not he had fulfilled his early promise, was still a matter of public concern.
The article in The New Yorker sketched the life of an unusual personality, and it possessed
considerable popular news interest.
We express no comment on whether or not the news worthiness of the matter printed will always
constitute a complete defense. Revelations may be so intimate and so unwarranted in view of the
victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency. But when focused upon public
characters, truthful comments upon dress, speech, habits, and the ordinary aspects of personality
will usually not transgress this line. Regrettably or not, the misfortunes and frailties of neighbors
and “public figures” are subjects of considerable interest and discussion to the rest of the population.
And when such are the mores of the community, it would be unwise for a court to bar their
expression in the newspapers, books, and magazines of the day.
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Plaintiff…charged actual malice in the publication, and now claims that an order of dismissal
was improper in the face of such an allegation. We cannot agree. If plaintiff’s right of privacy was
not invaded by the article, the existence of actual malice in its publication would not change that
result. Unless made so by statute, a truthful and therefore non-libelous statement will not become
libelous when uttered maliciously. A similar rule should prevail on invasions of the right of privacy.
Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the offence, any more than in an ordinary case of trespass to
person or to property. Nor does the malice give rise to an independent wrong based on an
intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in mental and emotional tranquillity. This interest,
however real, is one not yet protected by the law….
1.

QUESTIONS
What’s the Matter (of Public Concern)? The court concludes that Sidis’s history
remained a “matter of public concern.” Is this a descriptive or normative concept?
Specifically, do we care whether people actually are concerned (descriptively) or whether
they should be concerned (normatively)?

2.

Quasi-Constitutional Rules: Notice that Sidis never mentions the Constitution, nor
does it explicitly invoke First Amendment freedoms of speech or the press. Instead, the
court relies on the quasi-constitutional concept of whether liability would restrict
communications about matters of public concern. As the Restatement explains in a
“special note” following § 652D, although the Supreme Court “has placed a number of
substantial restrictions on tort actions involving false and defamatory publications,” the
questions of whether and when the public-disclosure tort is constitutional “has not been
established with certainty.” Under Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
we know that the First Amendment bars recovery for disclosure of truthful facts that are
a matter of public record—in that case, the name of a sexual-assault victim—but the case
leaves unsettled whether courts may constitutionally impose liability for disclosing other
private facts that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that aren’t of
legitimate concern. How is it possible that such important legal questions remain
unanswered? What do you think the answer should be?

3.

Picketing Priests: Three priests protest a healthcare clinic by carrying large signs
displaying the names of two women due to have abortions and imploring the women
not to “kill their babies.” The women had kept their abortion plans private, but members
of their community now see the signs and a passerby tweets photos from the scene. Are
the priests liable for public disclosure of private facts? Does it matter how the priests
discovered the women’s names? What if they had climbed into a nearby dumpster and
found discarded schedules showing the clinic’s upcoming appointments? What if the
women aren’t ashamed of their decision to get an abortion?
DAILY TIMES DEMOCRAT v. GRAHAM
Supreme Court of Alabama (1964)

Harwood, Justice:

ã

This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action
charging an invasion by the defendant of the plaintiff’s right of privacy.
Damages were assessed by the jury at $4,166.00….
Appellee is a woman 44 years of age who has lived in Cullman County,
Alabama her entire life. She is married and has two sons, ages 10 and 8.
The family resides in a rural community where her husband is engaged in
the business of raising chickens. The appellee has led the usual life of a
housewife in her community, participating in normal church and
community affairs.
ã
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On 9 October 1961, the Cullman County Fair was in progress. On that day the appellee took her
two children to the Fair. After going on some of the rides, the boys expressed a wish to go through
what is called in the record the “Fun House.” The boys were afraid to enter alone so the appellee
accompanied them. She testified she had never been through a Fun House before and had no
knowledge that there was a device that blew jets of air up from the platform of the Fun House upon
which one exited therefrom.
The appellee entered the Fun House with her two boys and as she was leaving her dress was
blown up by the air jets and her body was exposed from the waist down, with the exception of that
portion covered by her “panties.” At this moment the appellant’s photographer snapped a picture
of the appellee in this situation. This was done without the appellee’s knowledge or consent. Four
days later the appellant published this picture on the front page of its newspaper…. On the Sunday
following the publication of the picture, the appellee went into the city of Cullman. There she saw
the appellant’s newspaper display with her picture on the front page in one of the appellant’s
newspaper racks, and she also saw copies of the said newspaper in other places.
While the appellee’s back was largely towards the camera in the picture, her two sons are in the
picture, and the photograph was recognized as being of her by other people with whom she was
acquainted. The matter of her photograph was mentioned to the appellee by others on several
occasions. Evidence offered by the appellee during the trial tended to show that the appellee, as a
result of the publication of the picture, became embarrassed, self-conscious, upset and was known
to cry on occasions.
Since the article by Warren and Brandeis, 4 Harvard Law Review 193, formulating the action for
invasion of one’s privacy, the decisions in those states accepting such doctrine have been
numerous…. Among the alternative statements of what may constitute an actionable invasion of
one’s right of privacy, this court stated that such action accrued upon the wrongful intrusion into
one’s private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation
to a person of ordinary sensibilities.
There is a fertile medium in this field of torts for the production of conflicts between the right of
the individual to be let alone, and the right of the public to know—the latter concept being
crystalized in our age old concept of freedom of speech and of the press.
The right of action for invasion of privacy has had to give way to the interest of the public to be
informed, where as stated by the late Dean Hepburn in his Cases on Torts:
(4) It does not exist where the person has published the material complained of or
consented thereto. It does not exist where a person has become so prominent that
by his very prominence he has dedicated his life to the public and thereby waived
his right to privacy. (5) There can be no privacy in that which is already public.
(6) It does not exist in the dissemination of news and news events nor in the
discussion of events of the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest,
nor where the information would be of public benefit as in the case of a candidate
for public office.
…Counsel [for the appellant] contends that as a matter of law the publication of the photograph
was a matter of legitimate news of interest to the public; that the publishing of the picture was in
connection with a write-up of the Fair, which was a matter of legitimate news. If this be so, then of
course the appellant would have been privileged to have published the picture…. We can see nothing
of legitimate news value in the photograph. Certainly it discloses nothing as to which the public is
entitled to be informed. Even so,…Mr. Prosser in his article on “Privacy” observes: “It may
nevertheless be suggested that there must be yet some undefined limits of common decency as to
what can be published about anyone; and that a photograph of indecent exposure, for example, can
never be legitimate ‘news.’”
In the Restatement of the Law of Torts…it is provided: “A person who unreasonably and
seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness
exhibited to the public is liable to the other.” In the comment under this section it is stated: “These
limits” (justifiable invasion of privacy) “are exceeded where intimate details of the life of one who
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has never manifested a desire to have publicity are exposed to the public, or where photographs of a
person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously taken and published.”
Not only was this photograph embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities, we think it could
properly be classified as obscene, in that “obscene” means offensive to modesty or decency; or
expressing to the mind or view something which delicacy, purity, or decency forbid to be expressed….
Counsel further argues that the court erred in refusal of appellant’s requested affirmative charges
in that appellee’s picture was taken at the time she was a part of a public scene, and the publication
of the photograph could not therefore be deemed an invasion of her privacy as a matter of law. The
proposition for which appellant contends is probably best illustrated by the following quotation
from Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1963):
On the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no right to be
alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about.
Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a place, since this
amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essentially from a
full written description of a public sight which anyone present would be free to see.
Admittedly this principle is established by the cases…. [But] when a legal principle is pushed to
an absurdity, the principle is not abandoned, but the absurdity avoided. In other words, a purely
mechanical application of legal principles should not be permitted to create an illogical conclusion.
To hold that one who is involuntarily and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose
forfeits her right of privacy merely because she happened at the moment to be part of a public scene
would be illogical, wrong, and unjust.
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an incidental part of that
scene in his ordinary status. Where the status he expects to occupy is changed without his volition
to a status embarrassing to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he should not be
deemed to have forfeited his right to be protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right
of privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public place….
1.

QUESTIONS
Community Standards: How is the outrageousness of a disclosure determined by a
community-based standard? And how should the law deal with shifting conceptions of
privacy in the modern world? Should the legal rules adjust over time, or do we need
those rules to remain stable to prevent changing social norms from eroding our privacy?
ã

2.

ã

The Streisand Effect: In 2003,
singer-actress Barbara Streisand
sued
an
environmentalist
photographer,
Kenneth
Adelman, who took an aerial
photo of her house for the
California Coastal Records
Project, an initiative showing
degradation of the California
coast. The trial court held that
the photo captured a matter of
public concern, noting that
Streisand had opened her home to reporters in the past and that no one was visible in the
photo. This case is the root of the so-called “Streisand Effect”—a social phenomenon that
occurs when efforts to hide information has the unintended consequence of further
publicizing it, often via the internet. The Streisand Effect can also be understood as a legal
phenomenon, particularly for privacy torts: suing can garner greater attention, thereby
worsening the privacy invasion sought to be remedied by the lawsuit. Indeed, before
Streisand sued, the photo was downloaded six times (twice by her lawyers); after the
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lawsuit, 420,000 people did so in a month. For a
recent example involving a different tort,
consider the parody Twitter account, Devin
Nunes’ cow (@DevinCow). Unamused,
Congressman Devin Nunes sued the satirist
(and Twitter) for defamation. The account had
1,200 followers before the lawsuit, but soon
boasted over 600,000 acolytes. Are the potential
benefits of suing worth the likely costs?

TOUR DE ATLANTA PROBLEM
Jaden had just finished second in the Tour de Atlanta, a 105-mile bike race through Metro Atlanta.
President Bennett, an Atlanta native and avid cyclist, was preparing to award the medals when Jaden
noticed a woman reaching into her fanny pack for what looked like a small pistol. Jaden made his way
towards the woman, relying on his instincts from a brief stint in the military. The would-be assassin
got a shot off, but Jaden grabbed her arm just as she fired. The bullet missed the president.
Jaden became an instant media star. A few newspapers speculated as to why President Bennett
hadn’t publicly thanked Jaden. The Gwinnett Globe, for example, published an piece suggesting that
Jaden was a prominent member of Savannah’s gay community and claiming that Jaden’s sexual
orientation explained the president’s silence. Jaden sues the Globe for public disclosure of private facts.
(a) What would Jaden’s main arguments be? And the Globe’s counterarguments?
(b) What if Jaden wasn’t prominent in Savannah’s gay community and the only people who
knew of his sexual orientation were members of his pickup basketball team?
(c) What if Jaden isn’t gay and is happily married to his high-school sweetheart, Cindy,
who’s mortified about the Globe story?
(d) Would it matter whether this incident happened during or after the era of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” a U.S. government directive that barred openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people from military service from 1994 to 2011?
(e) The Globe argues that this sort of “speculation” about the president’s motivations
constitutes a “newsworthy” fact. If the court agrees, does that give media outlets undue
power to evade liability under this tort?
(f) What other claims might Jaden bring? Is our next tort, defamation, a viable option?

B. Defamation
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–559, 564–566
Invasions of Interest in Reputation (1965)
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
an unprivileged publication to a third party;
fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
[harm].

A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him
in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him….
A defamatory communication is made concerning the person to whom its recipient correctly, or
mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it was intended to refer….
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement of fact…. [Or it] may consist of a
statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
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1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Defaming the Dead: Some tort claims can survive a person’s death. Not so with
defamation. As Don Herzog observes in his 2017 book, Defaming the Dead: “Any
journalist will assure you it’s axiomatic that there’s no such thing as defaming the dead.
Not that it’s impossible to publish false statements of fact that damage their reputations:
nothing easier. Rather that once you’re dead, tort law will not protect your reputation.”
Does this rule square with the goals of tort law? And is it consistent with the interests
underlying the tort of defamation? (Note the curious statute that appears unique to
Rhode Island: if you’re defamed in an obituary within three months of your death, your
estate may sue.)
Write No Evil, Speak No Evil, Do No Evil: Libel consists of publishing defamatory
matter by written or printed words, whereas slander usually involves defamation by
spoken words. A person may even defame through gestures by using hand motions,
facial expressions, and other bodily movements to substitute for words. Some states also
permit “defamation by conduct” when a person’s physical actions, though not intended
to substitute for words, convey a defamatory message to anybody watching. Can you
think of examples of each type of defamation?
ã

The following cases describe Black people using outdated language now considered offensive
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN
Supreme Court of Alabama (1962)
Harwood, Justice:
This is an appeal from a judgment in the
amount of $500,000.00 awarded as damages in
a libel suit. The plaintiff below was L. B.
Sullivan, a member of the Board of
Commissioners of the City of Montgomery,
where he served as Police Commissioner. The
defendants below were The New York
Times…and four [civil-rights activists and
associates of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.], Ralph
D. Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay,
Sr., and J. E. Lowery. [The plaintiff’s complaint
alleged that the defendants published an
advertisement in the New York Times entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices” that contained “false and
defamatory matter or charges reflecting upon the conduct of the plaintiff…and imputing improper
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conduct to him, and subjecting him to public contempt, ridicule and shame, and prejudicing the
plaintiff in his office, profession, trade or business, with an intent to defame the plaintiff.”]…
We hold that the matter complained of is…libelous per se, if it was published of and concerning
the plaintiff…. The [trial] court did not err in overruling the demurrer….
It is appellant’s contention that refusal [to properly instruct the jury] contravenes Amendment
One of the United States Constitution and results in an improper restraint of freedom of the press….
In argument in support of this assignment, counsel for appellant asserts that the advertisement was
only an appeal for support of King and “thousands of Southern Negro students” said to be “engaged
in widespread non-violent demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to live in human
dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” The fallacy of such argument
is that it overlooks the libelous portions of the advertisement which are the very crux of this suit.
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not protect libelous publications….
Counsel have also argued…that error infects this record because, (1) the courtroom was
segregated during the trial below, and (2) the trial judge was not duly and legally elected because of
alleged deprivation of voting rights to negroes. Neither of the above matters were presented in the
trial below, and cannot now be presented for review….
1.

QUESTIONS
Counting Chickens: After the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review the Alabama
Supreme Court’s decision, legend has it that Sullivan asked his lawyer “Can they win?”
and the lawyer replied “The Supreme Court would have to change 200 years of libel law
for us to lose!” What do you think happened next?
NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. SULLIVAN
Supreme Court of the United States (1964)

Brennan, Justice:
We are required in this case to determine for the
first time the extent to which the constitutional
protections for speech and press limit a State’s power
to award damages in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct.
Respondent L. B. Sullivan…brought this civil libel
action against the four individual petitioners, who are
Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and against
petitioner
the
New
York
Times
Company…. Respondent’s complaint alleged that he
had been libeled by statements in a full-page
advertisement that was carried in the New York Times
on March 29, 1960. Entitled “Heed Their Rising
Voices,” the advertisement began by stating that “As
the whole world knows by now, thousands of Southern
Negro students are engaged in widespread non-violent
demonstrations in positive affirmation of the right to
live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.” It went on to
charge that “in their efforts to uphold these guarantees,
they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror
by those who would deny and negate that document
which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom.”
Succeeding paragraphs purported to illustrate the “wave of terror” by describing certain alleged
events. The text concluded with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the student
movement, “the struggle for the right-to-vote,” and the legal defense of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
leader of the movement, against a perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery….
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Of the 10 paragraphs of text in the advertisement, the third and a portion of the sixth were the
basis of respondent’s claim of libel. They read as follows:
Third paragraph:
In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang ‘My Country, ‘Tis of Thee’ on the
State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police
armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When
the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their
dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.
Sixth paragraph:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests
with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife
and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times—for
‘speeding,’ ‘loitering’ and similar ‘offenses.’ And now they have charged him with
‘perjury’—a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years.
Although neither of these statements mentions respondent by name, he contended that the word
“police” in the third paragraph referred to him as the Montgomery Commissioner who supervised
the Police Department, so that he was being accused of “ringing” the campus with police. He further
claimed that the paragraph would be read as imputing to the police, and hence to him, the
padlocking of the dining hall in order to starve the students into submission. As to the sixth
paragraph, he contended that since arrests are ordinarily made by the police, the statement “They
have arrested [Dr. King] seven times” would be read as referring to him; he further contended that
the “They” who did the arresting would be equated with the “They” who committed the other
described acts and with the “Southern violators.” Thus, he argued, the paragraph would be read as
accusing the Montgomery police, and hence him, of answering Dr. King’s protests with
“intimidation and violence,” bombing his home, assaulting his person, and charging him with
perjury. Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or all of the
statements as referring to him in his capacity as Commissioner.
It is uncontroverted that some of the
statements contained in the paragraphs
were not accurate descriptions of events
which occurred in Montgomery.
Although Negro students staged a
demonstration on the State Capitol steps,
they sang the National Anthem and not
“My Country, ‘Tis of Thee.” Although
nine students were expelled by the State
Board of Education, this was not for
leading the demonstration at the Capitol, but for demanding service at a lunch counter in the
Montgomery County Courthouse on another day…. Although the police were deployed near the
campus in large numbers on three occasions, they did not at any time “ring” the campus, and they
were not called to the campus in connection with the demonstration on the State Capitol steps, as
the third paragraph implied. Dr. King had not been arrested seven times, but only four; and although
he claimed to have been assaulted some years earlier in connection with his arrest for loitering
outside a courtroom, one of the officers who made the arrest denied that there was such an assault….
Respondent made no effort to prove that he suffered actual pecuniary loss as a result of the
alleged libel. One of his witnesses, a former employer, testified that if he had believed the statements,
he doubted whether he “would want to be associated with anybody who would be a party to such
things that are stated in that ad,” and that he would not re-employ respondent if he believed “that
he allowed the Police Department to do the things that the paper say he did.” But neither this witness
ã
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nor any of the others testified that he had actually believed the statements in their supposed reference
to respondent….
Alabama law denies a public officer recovery of punitive damages in a libel action brought on
account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first makes a written demand for
a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to comply. Respondent served such a demand
upon each of the petitioners. None of the individual petitioners responded to the demand, primarily
because each took the position that he had not authorized the use of his name on the advertisement
and therefore had not published the statements that respondent alleged had libeled him. The Times
did not publish a retraction in response to the demand, but wrote respondent a letter stating, among
other things, that “we are somewhat puzzled as to how you think the statements in any way reflect
on you,” and “you might, if you desire, let us know in what respect you claim that the statements in
the advertisement reflect on you.” Respondent filed this suit a few days later without answering….
The trial judge submitted the case to the jury under instructions that the statements in the
advertisement were libelous per se and were not privileged, so that petitioners might be held liable
if the jury found that they had published the advertisement and that the statements were made “of
and concerning” respondent. The jury was instructed that, because the statements were libelous per
se, “the law implies legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself,” “falsity and malice are
presumed,” “general damages need not be alleged or proved but are presumed,” and “punitive
damages may be awarded by the jury even though the amount of actual damages is neither found
nor shown.”… In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court of Alabama sustained the trial judge’s
rulings and instructions in all respects. It held that “where the words published tend to injure a
person libeled by them in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with an
indictable offense, or tend to bring the individual into public contempt,” they are “libelous per se.”…
We reverse the judgment. We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is
constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press
that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct….
Under Alabama law as applied in this case, a publication is “libelous per se” if the words “tend
to injure a person…in his reputation” or to “bring [him] into public contempt”; the trial court stated
that the standard was met if the words are such as to “injure him in his public office, or impute
misconduct to him in his office, or want of official integrity, or want of fidelity to a public trust.”
The jury must find that the words were published “of and concerning” the plaintiff, but where the
plaintiff is a public official his place in the governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support
a finding that his reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of which
he is in charge. Once “libel per se” has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated
facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars…. The question
before us is whether this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against
critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by
the first and Fourteenth Amendments.
Respondent relies heavily, as did the Alabama courts, on statements of this Court to the effect
that the Constitution does not protect libelous publications…[, but none] of the cases sustained the
use of libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the official conduct of public
officials…. The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by
the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions….
Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the
major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The
question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by
its alleged defamation of respondent.
Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to
recognize an exception for any test of truth—whether administered by judges, juries, or
administrative officials—and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker.
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The constitutional protection does not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs which are offered. As Madison said, “Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper
use of every thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the press.” 4 Elliot’s Debates
on the Federal Constitution (1876)…. That erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that
it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the “breathing space” that they “need
to survive,” [has been widely recognized.]
Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be
free than does factual error…. This is true even though the utterance contains “half-truths” and
“misinformation.”… Criticism of [government actors’] official conduct does not lose its constitutional
protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official reputations.
If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from
criticism of official conduct, the combination of the two elements is no less inadequate. This is the
lesson to be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798, which first crystallized
a national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment. That statute made it a crime,
punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison, “if any person shall write, print, utter or publish
any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States,
or either house of the Congress, or the President, with intent to defame or to bring them, or either
of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred
of the good people of the United States.” The Act allowed the defendant the defense of truth…[but]
was vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison….
The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view,
a fundamental principle of the American form of government. Although the Sedition Act was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history….
What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked
by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a
criminal statute…. Whether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such judgments, the pall
of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere
in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.
The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth…. A rule compelling
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so on pain
of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to…“self-censorship.” Allowance of the
defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech
will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate safeguard have recognized the
difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which
steer far wider of the unlawful zone. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate…. The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not….
We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in
actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Since this is such an
action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable…. [W]e consider that the proof
presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard
demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under
the proper rule of law. The case of the individual petitioners requires little discussion. Even assuming
that they could constitutionally be found to have authorized the use of their names on the
advertisement, there was no evidence whatever that they were aware of any erroneous statements or
were in any way reckless in that regard….
As to the Times, we similarly conclude that the facts do not support a finding of actual malice.
The statement by the Times’ Secretary that, apart from the padlocking allegation, he thought the
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advertisement was “substantially correct,” affords no constitutional warrant for the Alabama
Supreme Court’s conclusion that it was a “cavalier ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement from
which the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of The Times, and its
maliciousness inferable therefrom.” The statement does not indicate malice at the time of the
publication; even if the advertisement was not “substantially correct”—although respondent’s own
proofs tend to show that it was—that opinion was at least a reasonable one, and there was no
evidence to impeach the witness’ good faith in holding it….
We also think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of
supporting the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made “of and concerning”
respondent…. There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement, either by name or official
position. A number of the allegedly libelous statements—the charges that the dining hall was
padlocked and that Dr. King’s home was bombed, his person assaulted, and a perjury prosecution
instituted against him—did not even concern the police; despite the ingenuity of the arguments
which would attach this significance to the word “They,” it is plain that these statements could not
reasonably be read as accusing respondent of personal involvement in the acts in question….
Although the statements may be taken as referring to the police, they did not on their face make
even an oblique reference to respondent as an individual….
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed and the case is remanded to that
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion….
Black, Justice, concurring:
I concur in reversing this half-million-dollar judgment against the New York Times Company
and the four individual defendants…. I base my vote to reverse on the belief that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments not merely “delimit” a State’s power to award damages to “public officials
against critics of their official conduct” but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power.
The Court goes on to hold that a State can subject such critics to damages if “actual malice” can be
proved against them. “Malice,” even as defined by the Court, is an elusive, abstract concept, hard to
prove and hard to disprove. The requirement that malice be proved provides at best an evanescent
protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the
sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment. Unlike the Court, therefore, I vote to reverse
exclusively on the ground that the Times and the individual defendants had an absolute,
unconditional constitutional right to publish in the Times advertisement their criticisms of the
Montgomery agencies and officials…. In my opinion the Federal Constitution has dealt with this
deadly danger to the press in the only way possible without leaving the free press open to
destruction—by granting the press an absolute immunity for criticism of the way public officials do
their public duty…. We would, I think, more faithfully interpret the First Amendment by holding
that at the very least it leaves the people and the press free to criticize officials and discuss public
affairs with impunity….
This Nation, I suspect, can live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public
affairs and public officials. But I doubt that a country can live in freedom where its people can be
made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their government, its actions, or its officials….
An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the
minimum guarantee of the First Amendment. I regret that the Court has stopped short of this
holding indispensable to preserve our free press from destruction.
Goldberg, Justice, concurring in the result:
…In my view, the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen
and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm
which may flow from excesses and abuses. The prized American right to speak one’s mind about
public officials and affairs needs breathing space to survive…
The conclusion that the Constitution affords the citizen and the press an absolute privilege for
criticism of official conduct does not leave the public official without defenses against
unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements. Under our system of government,
counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose these matters, not abridgment
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of free speech. The public official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens
to media of communication…. As Mr. Justice Brandeis correctly observed, “sunlight is the most
powerful of all disinfectants.”…
1.

QUESTIONS
Malicious Misnomer: Sullivan is famous for establishing “actual malice” as a
constitutional standard in defamation claims. Read the actual-malice standard carefully.
Must the plaintiff show that the defendant was being cruel or intended to do harm? Does
the standard contain the biggest misnomer in constitutional law?

2.

Sullivan’s Creep: It didn’t take long for the Court to extend the actual-malice standard
to other prominent but non-governmental plaintiffs, starting with a university’s athletic
director in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court then flirted
with greater doctrinal expansion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S 29 (1971),
when a plurality sought to apply the rule to all defamation claims involving speech on
matters of public concern, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public or private
figure. This approach was rebuffed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
when the Court endorsed it for only public figures—that is, any defamation plaintiff who
has “pervasive fame or notoriety” (general public figures) or who “voluntarily injects
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy” (limited-purpose public
figures). Notably, the Gertz Court mused ambiguously about another potential public
figure, observing that “truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.” This
remark has been prophetic: the Court hasn’t encountered its mythical character in the
forty years that have since passed. What should the rule be for those involuntarily thrust
into the limelight? Does the internet make public figures of us all? Note also the
plurality’s decision in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985), holding that the actual-malice standard doesn’t apply to “speech on matters of
purely private concern.”

3.

Party Poopers: Eminent First Amendment scholar Alexander Meiklejohn famously said
that the Sullivan decision was “an occasion for dancing in the streets.” Nearly sixty years
later, do you still feel like partying? At least two current Supreme Court justices, it seems,
don’t like the music. Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (urging reconsideration of Sullivan “given the momentous
changes in the Nation’s media landscape since 1964” and the fact that “private citizens
can become ‘public figures’ on social media overnight”); McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (describing Sullivan and its
progeny as “policy-driven decisions masquerading as constitutional law”).
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POTTER PROBLEM
Harry Potter lives in Little
Whinging at number four Privet
Drive, the home of his aunt and
uncle, Petunia and Vernon Dursley.
One summer day, Harry is out in the
garden and sees a pair of large eyes
watching him from the bushes—the
eyes of Dobby the house-elf, a
magical servant belonging to the
wicked Malfoy family. Over the
course of the summer, Dobby has
been intercepting all of Harry’s owl post—birthday cards and all—in an attempt to keep Harry from
returning to Hogwarts School, where Dobby fears Harry will be in danger.
On the night of a special dinner at the Dursleys’ home with Mr. and Mrs. Mason, Dobby creeps
upstairs into Harry’s bedroom. Harry invites him to sit down, leading Dobby to howl in distress.
After refusing to return Harry’s mail, Dobby makes enough noise to startle Uncle Vernon, who
comes upstairs, spitting with rage, and furiously yells at Harry to “shut it” or Harry would wish he’d
“never been born.” After Uncle Vernon leaves, Dobby attempts to convince Harry not to go back to
Hogwarts. When Harry refuses and tells Dobby to leave before he gets Harry in trouble, Dobby runs
downstairs to the kitchen and levitates Aunt Petunia’s glorious pudding before Harry’s eyes, making
Harry’s stomach sink with dread. “No,” pleads Harry, “they’ll kill me!” Dobby says he won’t throw
the pudding if Harry promises to remain at the Dursleys’ house during the upcoming school year.
When Harry again refuses to swear that he won’t return to Hogwarts, Dobby replies, “Then Dobby
must do it, sir, for Harry Potter’s own good.” Dobby floats the pudding into the living room and, to
the Dursleys’ shock, drops it on Mrs. Mason’s hat, splattering the guests and walls with cream and
shattering the dish. Uncle Vernon tells Harry that he’s going to flay him to within an inch of his life
when the Masons leave. An owl sent by Mafalda Hopkirk at the Ministry of Magic’s Improper Use
of Magic Office then flies into the living room and drops a letter on Mrs. Mason’s head, making her
scream like a banshee and run from the house. Mr. Mason storms out, telling the Dursleys that his
wife is terrified of birds. An enraged Uncle Vernon locks Harry in his room, barely feeding him and
letting him out only to use the bathroom.
After not hearing from Harry all summer, Harry’s friend Ron Weasley grows concerned. He and
his brothers, Fred and George, fly their father’s magical car to Little Whinging. They tie ropes to the
bars that Uncle Vernon has attached to Harry’s bedroom window and dislodge the bars and part of
the window. Uncle Vernon storms into the bedroom, grabbing Harry’s leg as he attempts to escape.
Harry kicks out, sending his uncle flying backwards, and jumps into the car as it flies away.
(a) What tort claims should be brought?
(b) What counterarguments and defenses should be raised?
(c) What factual uncertainties would need to be resolved?
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CHAPTER

4:

NEGLIGENCE

A. Injury
There are four basic elements to a negligence claim: injury, duty, breach, and cause. We start
with the simplest—injury. Several types of harm can constitute injury under negligence law. One is
bodily injury, meaning physical harm to your body. Another is property injury, such as damage to
your land, buildings, or possessions. Then there’s economic injury, including loss of wealth. And
finally there’s emotional injury, like any distress you experience caused by a tortious act.
Note that the legal issue of injury is conceptually distinct from that of damages, though there’s
certainly overlap between the two. Injury is an element that the plaintiff must satisfy in order to state
a viable negligence claim; only those plaintiffs alleging the right sort of injury caused by the
defendant’s actions may proceed in litigating their case. Damages, by contrast, are the typical remedy
that tort law provides to those who establish injury and the remaining elements of negligence. You
can certainly receive damages for your injuries, but not all damages are designed to compensate you
for your injuries. We’ll return to damages in Chapter 6. For now, consider the following case as an
introduction to injury and the remaining elements of a negligence claim.
WALTER v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (2000)
Calkins, Justice:

ã

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appeals from a judgment…following
a jury trial awarding damages to Antoinette Walter in the
amount of $550,000 for her claim of pharmacist malpractice….
I. FACTS
Walter, an eighty-year-old resident of Rockland, was
diagnosed with a type of cancer which attacks the lymphatic
system. Dr. Stephen Ross, Walter’s treating physician and a
board-certified oncologist, termed her condition treatable with
the proper medication. Dr. Ross prescribed Chlorambucil, a chemotherapy drug, for Walter. On the
prescription slip, he explicitly called for Chlorambucil, the generic name, because he feared that the
drug’s brand name, Leukeran, could be confused with other drugs with similar trade names.
Walter took the prescription for Chlorambucil to the pharmacy in the Wal-Mart store in
Rockland on May 7, 1997. Henry Lovin, a Maine licensed pharmacist and an employee of Wal-Mart,
was on duty at the pharmacy. Instead of giving Walter Chlorambucil, as called for in the
prescription, Lovin gave her a different drug with the brand name of Melphalen. The generic name
for Melphalen is Alkeran. Lovin did not speak with Walter at the time he filled the prescription, but
he provided her with an information sheet which described the effects of Melphalen. Melphalen is
also a chemotherapy drug, but it is a substantially more powerful medication than Chlorambucil.
Melphalen is typically given in smaller doses over shorter periods of time than is Chlorambucil, and
doctors monitor it more closely. Melphalen has a very toxic effect on the body, and it substantially
suppresses bone marrow. It has a longer life in the body than Chlorambucil, which means that any
side effects from it last longer.
To the extent that Walter noticed that the information sheet and bottle label read Melphalen, it
did not make an impression on her. She assumed that the drug she had been given was the same as
Dr. Ross had prescribed, and she began taking the prescribed dosage. Within seven to ten days of
starting the drug treatment, Walter began to suffer from nausea and lack of appetite. When she
referred to the information sheet, Walter saw that such side effects are common for chemotherapy
drugs. She continued to take the Melphalen. During the third week after starting the medication
Walter noticed bruises on her arms and legs, and during the fourth week she developed a skin rash
ã

Mike Mozart, Walmart Pharmacy (CC BY 2.0).
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on her arms and legs. Although the information sheet warned that bruises and rashes should prompt
a call to the doctor, Walter waited a few days before attempting to contact Dr. Ross.
Dr. Ross testified at trial that his notes indicated that Walter should have had blood tests two
weeks after starting medication and that she was to have scheduled an appointment with him within
four weeks of beginning the medication. He also testified that because Chlorambucil is slow-acting,
he does not insist that his patients have blood tests done in fourteen days but only that they have
blood work periodically. Walter testified that she understood she was to have a follow-up
appointment with Dr. Ross in four weeks and blood tests sometime before that appointment.
On the twenty-third day after starting the medication, Walter had blood tests done. She
attempted to reach Dr. Ross by phone to tell him about the side effects, but she was unsuccessful
until June 3, 1997. On that day Dr. Ross told her that her blood levels were low and to stop taking
the medication immediately. He scheduled an appointment for June 5. Walter, however, was rushed
to the hospital later in the day on June 3 when she suffered gastrointestinal bleeding. Following her
emergency admission, Walter remained in the hospital five weeks and received numerous blood
transfusions. She suffered several infections, and a catheter was placed in her chest. The bruising
and skin rash continued. For a period of time she was unable to eat because of bleeding gums and
an infection in her mouth. Because of her weakened immune system, Walter’s visitors could not
come within ten feet of her.
Prior to receiving the Melphalen, Walter lived independently and was active. Following her
hospital discharge on July 7, 1997, she was physically weak. She initially had to make daily trips to
the hospital and later went less frequently. She had to have additional transfusions after she left the
hospital. Melphalen did have the effect of causing her cancer to go into remission. Walter’s total
medical bills for her treatment came to $71,042.63.
The two-day jury trial was held in February 1999. Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of
law at the close of Walter’s case on the grounds that she had failed to present expert testimony on
the standard of care by pharmacists, and the motion was denied. At the close of the evidence Walter
moved for a judgment as a matter of law, and the court granted Walter’s motion concluding that she
was entitled to judgment on liability. During Walter’s closing argument, Wal-Mart moved for a
mistrial arguing that certain comments by Walter’s counsel were improper, and the motion was
denied. The jury awarded Walter $550,000 in damages. Wal-Mart’s post-trial motion for judgment
as a matter of law or a new trial was denied. [Wal-Mart appealed.]
II. WALTER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON LIABILITY
…The effect of the [trial] court’s grant of Walter’s motion was a determination, as a matter of
law, that Wal-Mart had a duty to Walter which it breached; that breach caused Walter harm; and
Walter was not negligent—or if she was negligent, her negligence did not proximately cause her
harm. The only issue left for the jury was the amount of damages caused by Wal-Mart’s negligence
and whether those damages should be reduced because of any action or inaction by Walter to take
reasonable steps to reduce the extent of her injuries.
A. Wal-Mart’s Representations to the Jury
Wal-Mart argues that the court erred in granting Walter’s motion for judgment as a matter of
law because it should have submitted the issues of negligence, proximate cause, and comparative
negligence to the jury. Walter contends that Wal-Mart…admitted liability in its opening statement
to the jury.1 Wal-Mart’s opening statement admitted the error made by its pharmacist in filling the
1
Wal-Mart’s counsel began his opening statement by explaining the process of a lawsuit and why Wal-Mart denied
liability in its answer [to Walter’s complaint]. He then stated: “What I’m here to tell you right now is since the filing of the
complaint and filing of the answer, Wal-Mart has never denied responsibility for this incident. Never. Going back to what
happened. [Walter’s attorney] and I are in substantial agreement in terms of what happened…. [We] have a difference of
opinion as to what constitutes fair, reasonable and just compensation for Mrs. Walter. That’s why we are here. We can’t
agree. It’s as simple as that. We just can’t agree on that issue. We need your help. It’s not because we are blaming Mrs. Walter.
It’s not because we are trying to deflect blame. And it’s not because we are trying to sort of make the issues obscure or
distracting. We are going to put all the cards on the table. There are no secrets. There are no major disputes as to what
occurred…. The hardest issue and the one that is going to be in your laps at the end of tomorrow is what monetary amount
represents fair and just compensation for Mrs. Walter? You will be asked to consider medical bills and what she went through
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prescription but because negligence consists of both law (whether a duty exists and what that duty
is) and facts (whether the duty was breached), there was no…admission of negligence. Furthermore,
the statement taken in its entire context, does not contain an unequivocal admission that the mistake
in filling the prescription caused Walter’s harm….
B. Wal-Mart’s Negligence
Walter had the burden to prove that Wal-Mart, through its pharmacist employee, owed a duty
to Walter that it breached, thereby causing her harm. In Tremblay v. Kimball, 77 A. 405 (Me.
1910), we held that pharmacists owe their customers a duty of ordinary care, but that “ordinary care”
for a pharmacist means that “the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and
vigilance and the most exact and reliable safeguards” must be taken.
Lovin, the Wal-Mart pharmacist, readily admitted that he made an error in filling Walter’s
prescription. He testified that he thought that the brand name for Chlorambucil was Alkeran, and
he filled the prescription with Alkeran, which is Melphalen. Lovin said that he made a “serious error”
that did not “satisfy the proper standard of care for a pharmacist.” He admitted that he would have
discovered the error if he had followed the standard four-step process utilized to check for errors.
He acknowledged that to comply with the standard of pharmacy care he should have checked the
stock bottle against the prescription. He further admitted that the standard of practice required that
he counsel Walter when she picked up the prescription, at which time he would have showed her
the drug and discussed it with her. He testified that he did not counsel her, but if he had done so, he
would have discovered the error. He also said that Walter would have no reason to suspect that she
was given the wrong drug.
Pursuant to the standard of “the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and
vigilance and the most exact and reliable safeguards”…, Lovin’s testimony established that the
standard was breached. Even if we were to determine that the standard of practice for pharmacists
is the skill and diligence exercised by similar professionals, Lovin’s testimony established that
standard and the breach of it. None of this evidence was disputed. A jury, acting reasonably, could
not have found that Wal-Mart was not negligent.
C. Causation
In order to establish liability a plaintiff in any negligence action must show that the defendant’s
negligence was the…cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Wal-Mart argues that Walter’s motion should
have been denied because she failed to prove that Wal-Mart’s negligence in filling the prescription
was the cause of her injury. Causation means that there be some reasonable connection between the
act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered….
There was uncontroverted medical evidence that Melphalen, which Wal-Mart provided Walter
erroneously, caused damage to her body…. Dr. Ross testified that the Melphalen made Walter
seriously ill, to the point that he was not sure she would survive, and that her lack of energy after her
release from the hospital was the result of the illness caused by the wrong medication. Wal-Mart’s
expert oncologist also testified that the side effects of Melphalen caused the lengthy hospitalization,
and the hospitalization itself likely caused Walter’s malaise and depression after her discharge.
Wal-Mart[’s]…expert speculated that if a blood test had been done fourteen days after starting
the medication it might have shown lowered blood levels and, depending on how low those levels
were, Walter’s physician might have stopped the medication, and if the medication had been
stopped sooner, the harmful effect may have been less. Wal-Mart’s expert did not testify that there
would have been no damage if a blood test had been done on the fourteenth day. In fact, in his

during the hospitalization and what she has done [sic] through since then. Wal-Mart is here, and I’m here to ask you as the
conscience of the community what that figure is. That’s really why we are here…. The evidence in this case will show
that…Mr. Lovin was given a prescription for Chlorambucil. What came to his mind was Alkeran. And from there the mistake
was made. And it was sort of on a path of not being able being [sic] corrected in his mind. He was confident that Chlorambucil
was Alkeran. It was a mistake. And it’s a mistake for which he’s deeply sorry. But that’s irrelevant. The fact is that a mistake
was made. That he didn’t realize it at the time and wasn’t told of the mistake until June 3rd when he received a call from Dr.
Ross…. I would ask you to keep your eye on the target: fair and just and reasonable compensation. That’s going to be the
issue that you will have to decide when you go into the jury room at the end of the evidence.”
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description of Melphalen, he noted it has a long life in the body and that its side effects last longer.2
… No reasonable factfinder could have found that Wal-Mart’s negligent act in misfilling the
prescription was not a substantial cause in bringing about Walter’s suffering. When the totality of
the evidence adduced in any particular case is so overwhelming that it leaves open to a factfinder,
acting rationally, only one conclusion on the issue, the issue is then determined as a matter of law.
The trial court did not err in granting judgment as a matter of law to Walter on the issue of causation.
D. Comparative Negligence and Mitigation of Damages
…Under Maine’s comparative negligence statute, the damages owing to a plaintiff may be
reduced when the plaintiff’s harm is partly the result of the plaintiff’s own fault, and fault is defined
as the negligence that would give rise to the defense of contributory negligence. If the plaintiff’s fault
is equal to or greater than that of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover damages….
[Wal-Mart argued that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider whether
Walter was at fault for not realizing that she had been given the wrong prescription when she first
received it. Wal-Mart argued that the jury, had it received this instruction, might have assigned some
fault to Walter and reduced or eliminated her damages. Because] Lovin testified that Walter “would
have no way of knowing” that she had been given the wrong medication, and there was no evidence
that Walter should have been expected to discover Wal-Mart’s negligence[, there was no basis for
assigning Walter fault. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give that instruction.]…
Wal-Mart [also argues that the jury should have been instructed to consider whether] Walter’s
delay in calling her doctor to report the skin rash and bruising was negligence on her part that
contributed to her suffering. [Another instruction on the calculation of damages was sufficient to
inform the jury that it could reduce Walter’s damages if they believed her to be at fault, so there was
no error in refusing to give Wal-Mart’s preferred instruction.]…
III. WAL-MART’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Walter failed to present
any expert evidence on the pharmacist’s standard of care. It points out that Lovin was not designated
as an expert. In this case the testimony of an expert was not necessary. We have said that where
professional negligence and its harmful results are sufficiently obvious as to lie within common
knowledge no expert testimony is necessary. The negligence of the pharmacist and the harmful
results were sufficiently obvious to be within the common knowledge of a lay person. It does not
take an expert to know that filling a prescription with the wrong drug and failing to take the steps in
place in that pharmacy to check for the wrong drug is negligence.
IV. WAL-MART’S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL
Wal-Mart moved for a mistrial because of three comments made by Wal-Mart’s counsel during
closing argument. First, Walter’s attorney stated that the pharmacist attempted to accept
responsibility but his employer, Wal-Mart, refused to accept responsibility for Walter’s injury. WalMart objected, and the objection was sustained. The court admonished counsel that the only issue
was damages and told the jury that they were not to be swayed by any bias or predisposition towards
one party or the other. Second, Walter’s counsel said that Walter was sent home “not with the smilely
face as we hear about at Wal-Mart…but with a bottle of poison…a bottle of medication that was not
meant for her.” Wal-Mart objected and moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied, and the judge
told the jurors that the issue was damages. Third, while referring to the amount of damages the jury
could award, during rebuttal, Walter’s counsel told the jury it should consider how much money
professional basketball players are paid. Wal-Mart objected and the objection was sustained. WalMart argues that the effect of the three comments was to prejudice the jury against Wal-Mart so that
it would punish Wal-Mart by the amount of damages.

2
The blood tests alone did not reveal that the wrong medication had been given. Dr. Ross did not discover that she was
taking the wrong medication until after she was admitted to the hospital.
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We review a refusal to grant a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. The judge sustained
the objections to the comments, told the jurors to ignore the comments, and gave curative
instructions. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion….
V. WAL-MART’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
After the verdict Wal-Mart moved for a new trial…. Wal-Mart…contends that the damages
were excessive and the size of the verdict demonstrates that the judge and jury were biased against
Wal-Mart. When a court refuses to grant a new trial on the ground of an excessive damage award,
the ruling will not be reversed except for clear and manifest abuse of discretion….
Walter’s total medical bills and expenses equaled $71,042.63. The jury awarded Walter $550,000
in damages. Presumably, the additional $479,000 of Walter’s recovery is in compensation for her
pain and suffering. The jury heard several witnesses, including Walter herself, testify about the
painful treatment she received in the hospital, the long recovery process, and the continuing
difficulties she faces. In light of this evidence, which must be considered favorably to Walter, the
jury’s award of damages is rational. Although the verdict may seem large, it reflects the considered
opinion of the jury within the range of evidence of sufficient probative character….
1.

QUESTIONS
Let the Master Answer: Is Walter suing Wal-Mart because she claims that the company
itself was negligent? Do you think Wal-Mart changed its corporate policies after the
lawsuit? Should it?

2.

Risky Business: Justice Wathen concurred in the court’s judgment, but he and two
colleagues reached the result on different grounds to Justice Calkins: “In my judgment,
defense counsel in this case admitted liability in his opening statement when he told the
jury that Wal-Mart had never denied liability and that the only issue concerned the
amount of fair and just compensation. Having made that statement, he then sought to
try the issue of liability behind the jurors’ backs. To countenance such a strategy would
be to ignore the requirement of the Maine Bar Rules that trial counsel employ ‘such
means only as are consistent with truth, and shall not seek to mislead the jury by any
artifice or false statement of fact or law.’” Are you on Team Wathen or Team Calkins?
And, perhaps more importantly, what do you think Wal-Mart’s lawyer was up to with
this risky strategy? Was this lawyering at its finest or worst?

3.

Superbad: Is Lovin a bad guy? Is it fair to hold him responsible? Would the opposite
result be fair?

G.O.A.T. PROBLEM
Milan Petrovic is one of the world’s top tennis players (perhaps even the greatest of all time,
depending on who you ask). During the North American Open tennis tournament, he encountered
a surprisingly talented challenger in the opening round. After Petrovic fell behind in the first set, he
struck an extra ball towards the back of the court in frustration. Unfortunately for Petrovic, the ball
happened to hit a line judge, Carmen Garcia, in the neck. Garcia crouched to the ground, holding
her neck until medics arrived to evaluate her injury. Though she wasn’t severely injured, she did
experience pain, swelling, and bruising on her neck after the incident. She now wants to sue Petrovic,
but she’s not sure which claims, if any, would be likely to succeed.
(a) How would you advise Garcia to proceed? Are there any claims worth pursuing?
(b) What questions would you ask Garcia in order to discover details that might be
important to the viability of any claims?
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B. Duty
MUSSIVAND v. DAVID
Supreme Court of Ohio (1989)
Resnick, Justice:

ã

[Dr. Tofigh Mussivand (right) sued Dr. George David for injuries
allegedly stemming from sexual relations between David and Dr. Dixie
West, who was Mussivand’s wife at the time. Mussivand claimed David
infected West with venereal warts, which West then transmitted to
Mussivand. Mussivand argued that David was negligent in having sex with
West without telling her about his infection or failing to take precautions to
avoid infecting her. David responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing
that he did not owe Mussivand a duty of care. The trial court granted the
motion, but the first appellate court reversed that decision.] This case comes
to us on a dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action….
It long has been held that one who has a contagious disease must take the
necessary steps to prevent the spread of the disease. This standard of care has been imposed by the courts
in cases concerning the spread of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis…. A similar standard of
care exists for preventing the spread of a venereal disease. In Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.
1979), the plaintiff alleged that her former paramour was grossly negligent when he infected her with
gonorrhea…. [T]he court held that “one who negligently exposes another to an infectious or contagious
disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be held liable in damages for his actions.”
Recently several jurisdictions have allowed tort actions for negligent…transmission of genital
herpes where the person infected with genital herpes fails to disclose to his or her sexual partner that
he or she is infected with such a disease…. In other words, people with a venereal disease have a
duty to use reasonable care to avoid infecting others with whom they engage in sexual conduct….
Our research reveals, however, that [prior] cases differ from the cause before us in one very
important aspect: that is, appellee [Mussivand] herein alleges that appellant [David] owed him a
duty even though appellee was not appellant’s sexual partner and had no direct sexual contact with
appellant. The issue which we must decide in this case, therefore, is what duty, if any, does a person
infected with a venereal disease owe to the spouse of his paramour. Determining whether a duty
exists is crucial since a person’s failure to exercise ordinary care in doing or failing to do something
will not amount to actionable negligence unless such person owed to someone injured by such
failure a duty to exercise such ordinary care….
The existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law for the court to
determine. There is no formula for ascertaining whether a duty exists. Duty is the court’s expression
of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff
is entitled to protection. Any number of considerations may justify the imposition of duty in
particular circumstances, including the guidance of history, our continually refined concepts of
morals and justice, the convenience of the rule, and social judgment as to where the loss should fall.
The common-law duty of due care is that degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent person exercises, or is accustomed to exercising, under the same or similar circumstances.
A person is to exercise that care necessary to avoid injury to others.
A person who has a venereal disease does not have the duty to disclose his condition to everyone.
As has been stated, “[i]t should be made clear that this court is not stating here that herpes victims
have a specific duty to warn any person of their condition; however, they, like all citizens, are to be
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, and they
may be sued in this state for negligence in the omission to do something which a reasonable person
would do.” Long v. Adams, 333 S.E. 2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
We find the reasoning of these other jurisdictions persuasive and accordingly hold that a person
who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with a venereal disease has the duty to abstain
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from sexual conduct or, at the minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or she expects to
have sexual relations of his or her condition.
There is a strong public policy behind imposition of this duty. In general, we are reminded that
the health of the people is an economic asset. The law recognizes its preservation as a matter of
importance to the state. To the individual nothing is more valuable than health. The laws of this
state have been framed to protect the people, collectively and individually, from the spread of
communicable diseases. More specifically, we recognize that venereal diseases are often serious, and,
in some instances, there is no known cure for them. Transmission of a venereal disease is generally
through sexual contact. The likelihood that one will contract a venereal disease from someone
infected with such a disease is often high.
Furthermore, there is statutory support for this duty. R.C. 3701.81(A) states: “No person,
knowingly or having reasonable cause to believe that he is suffering from a dangerous, contagious
disease, shall knowingly fail to take reasonable measures to prevent exposing himself to other
persons, except when seeking medical aid.”…
Appellant argues, however, that while he may have had a duty to appellee’s wife to disclose his
condition, this duty does not extend to appellee. The existence of a duty will depend on the
foreseeability of the injury to appellee. The test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent
person would have anticipated that an injury was likely to result from the performance or
nonperformance of an act. Thus whether appellant owed appellee a duty turns on whether a
reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that appellee would be injured by way of
appellant’s alleged negligence. In this case appellant, allegedly infected with a venereal disease,
engaged in sexual relations with a married woman. A reasonably prudent person would anticipate
that a wife and husband will engage in sexual relations. In addition, Dr. David is a medical doctor
who, more than most people, should be aware of the method of transmitting a venereal disease, its
likelihood of spreading through sexual contact, and its potentially devastating effect. If one
negligently exposes a married person to a sexually transmissible disease without informing that
person of his exposure, it is reasonable to anticipate that the disease may be transmitted to the married
person’s spouse. Hence liability to a third party for failure to disclose to the original sexual partner
turns on whether, under all the circumstances, injury to the third-party spouse was foreseeable….
We do not, however, mean to say that appellant, subsequent to his affair with appellee’s wife,
will be liable to any and all persons with whom she may have sexual contact. A spouse, however, is
a foreseeable sexual partner. Furthermore, the liability of a person with a sexually transmissible
disease to a third person, such as a spouse, would be extinguished as soon as the paramour spouse
knew or should have known that he or she was exposed to or had contracted a venereal disease. She
or he then would become a conscious and responsible agency which could or should have eliminated
the hazard. For example, if appellant told appellee’s wife he had a venereal disease or if she noticed
symptoms of the disease on herself, she then would have the duty to abstain from sexual relations
or warn her sexual partner. Whether appellee’s wife knew, or should have known, of her exposure
to a venereal disease is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact…. Accordingly, the trial
court erred in granting appellant’s motion to dismiss…the negligence cause of action.
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
In Sickness and in Health: The court purportedly rests its conclusion on the fact that a
spouse is a foreseeable sexual partner, especially to a paramour. Is this true? Should the
court have cited data on sexual intimacy between married couples? Or conducted
factfinding on Dixie and Tofigh’s sex life? What if Dixie had told George that she and
Tofigh no longer shared a marital bed? What if Dixie and Tofigh called each other
“hubby” and “wifey” but had never got around to filing marriage paperwork? How much
work is foreseeability really doing in the analysis?
Discharging Duties: George could’ve “extinguished” his liability by warning Dixie of his
infection or, presumably, abstaining from sex altogether. Is there anything else he
could’ve done to discharge his duty? Would wearing a condom have sufficed?
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NMP: According to the court, George is off the hook if the jury finds that Dixie should
have suspected her exposure to a venereal disease. Why is that the rule? Why shouldn’t
they both be on the hook for as long as Tofigh was in the dark?
OSTERLIND v. HILL
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (1928)

Braley, Justice:

ã

This is an action of tort brought by the plaintiff
as administrator of the estate of Albert T. Osterlind
to recover damages for the conscious suffering and
death of his intestate. There are four counts in the
original declaration and five counts in the amended
declaration to each of which the defendant
demurred. The first count of the original
declaration alleges, that on or about July 4, 1925, the
defendant was engaged in the business of letting for
hire pleasure boats and canoes to be used on Lake
Quannapowitt in the town of Wakefield; that it was
the duty of the defendant to have a reasonable
regard for the safety of the persons to whom he let
boats and canoes; that the defendant in the early morning of July 4, 1925, in wilful, wanton, or
reckless disregard of the natural and probable consequences, let for hire to the intestate and one
Ryan a frail and dangerous canoe, well knowing that the intestate and Ryan were then intoxicated,
and were then manifestly unfit to go upon the lake in the canoe; that, in consequence of the
defendant’s wilful, wanton, or reckless disregard of his duties, the intestate and Ryan went out in the
canoe which shortly afterwards was overturned and the intestate after hanging to it for
approximately one half hour, and making loud calls for assistance, which calls the defendant heard
and utterly ignored, was obliged to release his hold, and was drowned; that in consequence of the
defendant’s wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct, the intestate endured great conscious mental
anguish and great conscious physical suffering from suffocation and drowning. Count two differs
materially from count one only in so far as negligent conduct is alleged as distinguished from wilful,
wanton, or reckless conduct…. The amended declaration adds allegations to the effect that the
plaintiff’s intestate and Ryan were intoxicated and incapacitated to enter into any valid contract or
to exercise any care for their own safety and that the condition of the intestate was involuntary and
induced through no fault of his own.
The trial court sustained demurrers to both the original and amended declarations and reported
the case for determination by this court….
The declaration must set forth facts which, if proved, establish the breach of a legal duty owed
by the defendant to the intestate…. In the case at bar, however, it is alleged in every count of the
original and amended declaration that after the canoe was overturned the intestate hung to the canoe
for approximately one half hour and made loud calls for assistance. On the facts stated in the
declaration the intestate was not in a helpless condition. He was able to take steps to protect himself.
The defendant violated no legal duty in renting a canoe to a man in the condition of the
intestate…. In view of the absence of any duty to refrain from renting a canoe to a person in the
condition of the intestate, the allegations of involuntary intoxication relating as they do to the issues
of contributory negligence become immaterial. The allegations of wilful, wanton or reckless conduct
also add nothing to the plaintiff’s case. The failure of the defendant to respond to the intestate’s
outcries is immaterial. No legal right of the intestate was infringed. The allegation common to both
declarations that the canoe was “frail and dangerous” appears to be a general characterization of
canoes. It is not alleged that the canoe was out of repair and unsafe….
ã
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1.

QUESTIONS
Couldn’t Care Less: Negligence can have various flavors. A plaintiff might claim, for
example, that a company was careless in hiring or training an employee, or that a
doctor’s botched surgery constituted medical malpractice, or that a shopkeeper’s failure
to clean up spilled milk gave rise to premises liability. There are two distinct forms of
negligence alleged in Osterlind. Can you spot them?

2.

Blackout: If Osterlind had been blind drunk, should this case come out differently? Why?

3.

Bad Samaritans: Though subject to important exceptions, there’s generally no
affirmative duty to protect or rescue under tort law. To quote Restatement § 314: “The
fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action.” Does this rule mean we’re bad people? What are the best justifications for this
legal doctrine?
BAKER v. FENNEMAN & BROWN PROPERTIES, LLC
Court of Appeals of Indiana (2003)

May, Judge:

ã

Aaron Baker appeals the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to…Taco Bell…. Baker raises one issue, which we
restate as whether Taco Bell has a duty to assist a customer
who falls to the floor and loses consciousness when the
customer’s fall was not due to any fault of Taco Bell….
On August 26, 1999, Baker entered the Taco Bell store in
Newburgh, Indiana, to purchase a soft drink. Upon entering
the store, Baker felt nauseous, but he continued to the
counter, where he ordered a drink. Baker handed the cashier
money for the drink and suddenly fell backward. Baker’s
head hit the floor, and he was knocked unconscious and began having convulsions.1
Baker and Taco Bell disagree regarding whether Taco Bell rendered assistance to Baker. Baker
claims that when he regained consciousness, he was staring at the ceiling, he had no idea what was
going on, and he did not know where he was. He claims that no Taco Bell employee called for
medical assistance or helped him in any way. Taco Bell claims that the cashier walked around the
counter to Baker, where she waited for his convulsions to stop, and then she asked Baker if he was
okay and if he needed an ambulance. The employee claims Baker said he was fine and he did not
need an ambulance, so she walked back around the counter.
What happened next is undisputed. Moments after Baker stood up, he fell again. This time,
Baker fell forward and was knocked unconscious. The fall lacerated his chin, knocked out his four
front teeth, and cracked the seventh vertebra of his neck. When Baker regained consciousness, he
was choking on the blood and teeth in his mouth. Baker stumbled out of the store to a friend, who
contacted Baker’s fiance to take him to the hospital.
Baker filed a complaint against Taco Bell, in which he alleged [that] Taco Bell breached its duty
to render assistance to him until he could be cared for by others when Taco Bell employees knew or
should have known that he was ill or injured…. Baker sought damages for medical bills, lost wages,
pain and suffering, and mental anguish. Taco Bell moved for summary judgment, claiming it owed
Baker no duty. Baker responded by arguing Taco Bell had a duty to help him…. The trial court
granted Taco Bell’s motion. When we review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,
we…determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed and whether the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law….
ã

Mike Mozart, Taco Bell (CC BY 2.0).
A doctor determined Baker fell because he experienced “vasovagal syncope.” Vasovagal syncope is a form of syncope
(fainting) that occurs as a part of a normal physiologic response to stress (often emotional stress). The individual becomes
lightheaded, nauseated, flushed, feels warm and then may lose consciousness for several seconds.
1
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Baker claims Taco Bell had a duty to assist him and that it breached that duty by failing to provide
assistance to him. Taco Bell argues it had no duty to assist Baker because it was not responsible for
the instrumentality that caused Baker’s initial injury. We believe Baker is correct.
To effectively assert a negligence claim, Baker must establish: (1) that Taco Bell had a duty to
conform its conduct to a standard of care arising from its relationship with Baker, (2) that Taco Bell
failed to conform its conduct to that standard of care, and (3) that Baker incurred injuries as a
proximate result of Taco Bell’s breach of its duty. The existence of a duty is a question of law for the
court to decide. To determine whether a duty exists, we must balance three factors: (1) the
relationship between the parties; (2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured; and
(3) public policy concerns.
As a general rule, an individual does not have a duty to aid or protect another person, even if he
knows that person needs assistance. L.S. Ayres v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 1942); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action.”). However, both common law and statutory exceptions to that general rule exist. See,
e.g., Restatement § 314B (employer has a duty to protect or aid an injured employee).
Baker claims Taco Bell had the duty to assist him described under Section 314A of the
Restatement, which provides the following exception to the general rule that one person need not
assist another:
§ 314A. Special Relations Giving Rise to Duty to Aid or Protect
(1) A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action:
(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and
(b) to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others.
(2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests.
(3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to
members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
(4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal
opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other.
The duty that arises under Section 314A exists because of the special relationship between the
parties. The relationships listed in the rule are not intended to be exclusive; nevertheless, some
courts have restricted the application of § 314A to business invitees. See, e.g., Gilbertson v.
Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1999) (holding host to an overnight social guest does not
have a duty under § 314A). In addition, the exception applies only while the relationship exists, so
once the passenger leaves the train or the guest leaves the hotel, the railroad or hotel no longer has
a duty to aid or protect an ill or injured individual. But see Kellner v. Lowney, 761 A.2d 421 (N.H.
2000) (holding motel owner could be liable for injury to boy crossing public highway between two
portions of motel property because owner should have foreseen the risk to his guests of crossing the
highway to get from hotel rooms to portion of hotel property where religious services were held).
In L.S. Ayres, our supreme court considered whether a department store, which was not in any
way liable for a boy’s initial injury by an escalator, nevertheless could be held liable for aggravation
of the injuries caused by its employees’ failure to stop the escalator. The court determined
there may be a legal obligation to take positive or affirmative steps to effect the
rescue of a person who is helpless and in a situation of peril, when the one
proceeded against is a master or an invitor or when the injury resulted from use
of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. Such an obligation may
exist although the accident or original injury was caused by the negligence of the
plaintiff or through that of a third person and without any fault on the part of the
defendant. Other relationships may impose a like obligation, but it is not
necessary to pursue that inquiry further at this time.
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The court noted that the boy “was an invitee and he received his initial injury in using an
instrumentality provided by” L.S. Ayres and then held L.S. Ayres could be liable for the aggravation
of the boy’s injury caused by its failure to assist him.
Taco Bell claims it had no duty to assist Baker because it was not responsible for Baker’s initial
illness or injury. It argues that, under L.S. Ayres, an Indiana business has a duty to assist a customer
only if the injury resulted from the use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. In
essence, Taco Bell argues that Indiana law recognizes only a limited duty under § 314A of the
Restatement. Taco Bell’s argument fails for a number of reasons.
First, the cases cited by the supreme court in L.S. Ayres suggest the court did not intend to limit
the application of § 314A to situations where the plaintiff was an invitee and the instrumentality
causing the injury belonged to the defendant. For example, the court discussed Depue v. Flatau, 111
N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907), in which a home owner was held liable for aggravation of injuries to a severely
ill, fainting, and helpless businessman that the home owner sent away unattended on a cold winter
night. There, as here, the initial illness was not the responsibility of the defendant….
Second, when the supreme court had reason later that same year to mention L.S. Ayres in
another of its opinions, it summarized the holding as follows: “this court recognized a duty to one
in peril on the defendant’s premises as an invitee even though the peril was created without
negligence on the part of the defendant.” Jones v. State, 43 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1942). That
summarization suggests the supreme court did not intend, as Taco Bell insists, to limit its holding
to situations where a plaintiff could prove both that he was an invitee and that the defendant’s
instrumentality caused the initial injury.
Third, the Restatement explains:
The duty to give aid to one who is ill or injured extends to cases where the illness
or injury is due to natural causes, to pure accident, to the acts of third person, or
to the negligence of the plaintiff himself, as where a passenger has injured himself
by clumsily bumping his head against a door.
A number of the illustrations provided in the Restatement parallel the fact pattern here and
suggest Taco Bell had a duty to assist Baker. For example,…Illustration 7 provides:
A is a small child sent by his parents for the day to B’s kindergarten. In the course
of the day A becomes ill with scarlet fever. Although recognizing that A is
seriously ill, B does nothing to obtain medical assistance, or to take the child home
or remove him to a place where help can be obtained. As a result, A’s illness is
aggravated in a manner which proper medical attention would have avoided. B is
subject to liability to A for the aggravation of his injuries….
Finally, public policy suggests Taco Bell had a duty to provide reasonable care in this situation.
When a storeowner opens his property to the public, he does so because he hopes to gain some
economic benefit from the public. Social policy dictates that the storeowner, who is deriving this
economic benefit from the presence of the customer, should assume the affirmative duty to help
customers who become ill as a cost of doing business.
Taco Bell argues placing this duty on businesses is unreasonable because then, in essence, a
business would be required to hire employees who were trained to diagnose and provide medical
services. See Br. of Appellee at 14 (“A rule requiring first aid to be delivered to any invitee, no matter
the type of business and no matter the circumstances that led to the injury, would require an
impossible and frightening standard of care for persons employed in the service industry.”); id. at
15 (“Taco Bell sells tacos. Taco Bell does not and has never held itself out to be a medical treatment
facility. To require Taco Bell to treat these ‘patients’ would be unfair and unsafe for the ‘patient’ and
the Taco Bell employee alike.”). We disagree.
As comment f to Section 314A of the Restatement explains:
The business is not required to take any action beyond that which is reasonable
under the circumstances. In the case of an ill or injured person, the business will
seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as it reasonably can, and
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take reasonable steps to turn the sick man over to a physician, or to those who will
look after him and see that medical assistance is obtained. A business is not
required to give any aid to one who is in the hands of apparently competent
persons who have taken charge of him, or whose friends are present and
apparently in a position to give him all necessary assistance.
Accordingly, the duty that arises is a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.
A high school student employed at Taco Bell would not be expected to provide the type of first aid
an emergency room doctor would provide, as such an expectation would not be “reasonable.”…
Moreover, as a practical matter, we fail to see the logic in Taco Bell’s position that it should have
no duty to aid in these types of situations. First, we find it unlikely customers would patronize a
business that left another customer who was ill or injured lying on the floor of the business simply
because the business was not responsible for the customer’s illness or injury.
Second, imposing on a business a duty to provide reasonable care even when the business is not
responsible for an illness or injury will rarely force a business to act in circumstances in which it
should not already have been acting. For example, if, as Taco Bell asserts, a business has no duty to
assist if it is not responsible for the instrumentality, then: 1) if a customer falls to the ground, an
employee should determine before offering assistance whether the customer slipped on ice, in which
case the business has a duty to act, or whether the customer merely passed out from syncope, in
which case the business has no duty; or 2) if a customer’s face is turning blue, an employee should
determine before providing assistance whether the person is choking on a food item from the
business, in which case the employee must offer assistance, or whether the person is having a heart
attack or choking on a food item purchased from a third party, in which case the employee need not
offer assistance. By implementing policies and procedures that allow their employees to assist
injured persons only when the business causes the illness or injury, a business might risk liability
claims caused by an employee’s failure to act, or failure to act promptly, when an illness or
injury was in fact caused by an instrumentality of the business. Consequently, we are not placing a
duty on businesses that they should not have already assumed.
In sum, Indiana case law, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, authority from other jurisdictions,
and public policy all suggest Taco Bell had a duty, as a business that invited members of the public
to enter its facility, to provide reasonable assistance to Baker even though Taco Bell was not
responsible for Baker’s illness. Consequently, we hold Taco Bell had a duty to take reasonable action
to give aid to Baker after he fell and to care for him until he could be cared for by others.
Baker asserts Taco Bell provided no assistance. Taco Bell’s employee claims she offered Baker
assistance, but he refused to accept it. Thus, there is a question of material fact that precludes
summary judgment on this issue, and we must reverse and remand for trial. Reversed and remanded.
1.

QUESTIONS
Bad Host: The court notes that some courts have restricted the reach of Restatement
§ 314A to business invitees, citing the holding in Gilbertson v. Leininger that the host of
an overnight social guest has no affirmative duty under that section. Do you think this
distinction between business customers and social guests is defensible?

2.

Yo Quiero Taco Bell: In a too-cute-by-half move, Taco Bell argues in its defense that
“Taco Bell sells tacos.” While Taco Bell does indeed sell food that arguably passes for a
taco, why does this legal argument fail? What’s Taco Bell really trying to say, and why
doesn’t the court buy it?

3.

BFFs: Certain “special” relationships can give rise to affirmative duties. In the words of
the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 40: “An actor in a special relationship with another
owes the other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope
of the relationship.” Some relationships more clearly fall within the scope of this rule—
shopkeeper–customer, innkeeper–guest, hospital–patient—but what about close
friends? Consider Farwell v. Keaton, 240 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 1976), in which Ricky
Farwell was beaten up after he and his friend had been drinking and followed two girls
to a restaurant. After the fight, Ricky’s friend drove around while he went to sleep in the
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back of the car. At around midnight, the friend parked the car at Ricky’s grandparents’
home, unsuccessfully attempted to rouse Ricky, and left. Ricky died three days later.
Should his friend be liable for negligence? The Michigan Supreme Court held that being
“companions in a social venture” was enough to create a duty to make reasonable efforts
to get Ricky medical care. Should your wingman be on the hook under these
circumstances? How far might this principle extend? What if a group of teenagers is
playing Russian Roulette and one dies when the gun goes off, as in Theobald v.
Dolcimascola, 690 A.2d 1100 (N.J. App. Div. 1997)?
The following case describes Black people using outdated language now considered offensive.
BULLOCK v. TAMIAMI TRAIL TOURS, INC.
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (1959)
Rives, Judge:
The appellants are Negroes, British subjects, natives
of Jamaica, married to each other, and in their early
fifties. For more than twenty years the husband has
been a minister of the Church of England. The wife is a
musician and teacher. Racial segregation is not
practiced in the island of Jamaica. Prior to 1956, the
appellants had left that island on only one trip and that
was to European countries and South American
countries which did not segregate the races. They were
not familiar with the racial segregation practiced in the Southern part of the United States.
In August 1956, they decided to make an extended visit to the United States, landing in Miami
and going by bus first to Kansas City and then to New York. They made arrangements for the trip
through the Mountain Travel Service before leaving Jamaica and bought tickets over the appellee’s
bus line. When the bus arrived in Perry, Florida, they were sitting together in the forward part of the
bus usually occupied by white passengers. The husband was dark or black, while the wife, though a
Negress, appeared to be a white woman. At Perry, Florida, one Milton Poppell entered the bus and
violently assaulted and beat the husband and slapped the wife. The circumstances are well described
in the testimony of Poppell, quoted in the margin.1…

1

“Q. Mr. Poppell did you go on a bus in Perry and assault this man right here? A. Yes, I did….
“Q. Mr. Poppell, how did you know that the Reverend Bullock was on that bus? A. Well, the police and I were sitting
down there drinking coffee and I overheard the conversation of the bus driver telling the police that they were on there. He
didn't say they were on there, he said, talking to them, ‘fellows look what I have got to contend with and nothing I can do
about it.’ And the police says, ‘our hands are tied too.’… I got up and asked if I could buy a ticket on the bus….
“Q. Mr. Poppell have you got anything against colored people, generally? A. Not as long as they stay in their place.
“Q. Well, why did you assault him? A. Because he was out of his place.
“Q. How did you know he was out of his place? The bus wasn’t full then, was it? A. Not at that time, it wasn’t, but when
everybody got on it was full. Whenever I got on it wasn’t full….
“Q. Did anything the bus driver say lead you to believe he wasn’t in his place? A. Well, I don’t know whether you would
figure it was what the bus driver said or what I felt that he was out of his place too….
“Q. Mr. Poppell…, you stated that you had nothing against colored people? A. that’s right….
“Q. Did you attack the Reverend Bullock simply from the fact he was seated on the bus? A. Well, yes. And I wanted to
see and as a matter of fact he was with a white woman.
“Q. What do you mean, with a white woman? A. Well, his wife is supposed to be white, I understand.
“Q. How did you know who his wife was? Had you ever known the Bullocks before this? A. No.
“Q. How did you know who his wife was? A. Well, she was pointed out as she came in the bus station.
“Q. Was it the bus driver that pointed her out? A. I believe he made a remark to the policeman that that was his wife
coming in….
“Q. And she appeared to you to be white at that time? A. Yes, she did.
“Q. Did he say anything about the man on the bus being married to a white woman? A. I don’t remember.
“Q. Maybe this will refresh your recollection — did he say the man on the bus was married to a white woman? A. I believe
he did….
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After reaching New York, the appellants brought suit against the appellee…, claiming that the
appellee had breached the duties owed to them as passengers by omitting to warn them of a
foreseeable danger, by failing to protect them from that danger, and by willfully, or at least
negligently, aggravating the danger…. There the case was tried to the court without a jury…. [T]he
district court entered judgment for the defendant, feeling that the law of the State of Florida required
it to do so…[because] the Florida Supreme Court [had] held that a carrier was not liable to a
passenger for an unprovoked and illegal assault in cases such as this case…. We are not in agreement
with the district court either as to the Florida law or as to the ultimate facts, inferences or conclusions
of duty and breach of duty on the part of the appellant carrier….
In Hall v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 93 So. 151 (Fla. 1921), the case relied upon by the district
court as dispositive of the case at bar, a female passenger was assaulted by a male passenger in a
Pullman berth, they being the only two occupants of the car. Holding that the plaintiff’s proof failed
to support her allegations that a porter and conductor heard her calls and bells in time to have
prevented the assault, the court stated:
The liability of the carrier in such case rests, not upon the tort of the passenger,
but upon the negligent omission of the carrier through its servants to prevent the
tort being committed. A failure to do anything which could have been done by the
servant to prevent the injury renders the carrier liable. But to do something to
prevent an injury resulting from an assault by a fellow passenger implies
knowledge on the part of the servant that the act is contemplated by the stranger,
or by due diligence the servant could have obtained such knowledge, or had the
opportunity to acquire it sufficiently long in advance of its infliction to have
prevented it with the force at his command. In guarding a passenger from a danger
which is not usual or not incident to ordinary travel the carrier is held to the use
of ordinary and reasonable care and diligence. It is the failure of the carrier
through its agents to afford the required protection, after they had reasonable
grounds for believing that violence or the insult was imminent, upon which the
liability of the carrier rests. It is not the fact of injury to the passenger that fixes
the carrier’s liability. The injury must have been of such character and inflicted
under such circumstances as that it might have been reasonably anticipated or
naturally expected to occur….
[T]he rule may be generally stated that a carrier is liable for injury to its passenger caused by a
fellow passenger or a third party if such injury by its nature could have been “reasonably anticipated”
or “naturally expected to occur” or “reasonably foreseen” in time to have prevented the injury. If the
injury could have been reasonably anticipated in time to have prevented its occurrence, the carrier
is subjected to the highest degree of care to its passenger either to protect him from or to warn him
of the danger. [Note that the duty to warn is identical to the duty to protect.]
It was impossible for the driver to have protected the Bullocks from Poppell’s assault after his
intent became evident, but we think that the district court was clearly erroneous in holding that
Tamiami could not have reasonably anticipated or foreseen the danger to the Bullocks in time to
have at least warned them of its imminence. We can visualize no stronger case than this to show a
situation where two bus drivers and the bus company officials should have reasonably anticipated
that mischief was hovering about and that the Bullocks were in some danger.
“Q. Now, of the two things, which do you think is the worse, in your opinion[?] A. Well, that’s about fifty-fifty
proposition…. [H]e was out of his place in my opinion in the front of the bus and he was certainly out of his place being
married to a white woman.
“Q. Mr. Poppell when you went in there and asked him to move you didn’t give him a chance to move? A. Well, I
expected a fight back so I didn’t give him too much a chance.
“Q. Why did you expect a fight back? A. I didn’t figure he was going to give up his seat.
“Q. Why did you figure that he wouldn’t give up the seat? A. Well, just a matter of my opinion.
“Q. Is it a practice that all colored people in Perry have to move back? A. Yes.
“Q. Why did you expect this to be any different? A. Well, I guess by him riding so far without any trouble.
“Q. Actually didn’t you know that he had been asked to move? A. Yes, I did.
“Q. How did you find that out? A. I believe that the bus driver made the statement….
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The first driver testified that many people in West Florida would not approve of the Bullocks’
being seated together toward the front of the bus. Driver Cunningham stated that there would have
been less chance of trouble if the Bullocks had been sitting in the back. The first driver, after
explaining to a complaining passenger that he could not move the Bullocks, heard another passenger
say something like “they probably will move on down the line.” Both drivers had actual notice of the
two Company bulletins dated January 31, 1953, and January 23, 1956, the latter plainly warning the
drivers of possible racial disturbances.2 Certainly, the first driver and, no doubt, Cunningham knew
the Bullocks were Jamaicans and British Nationals, and it is logical to infer that the drivers knew the
Bullocks were not experienced with “southern tradition.” All of the appellee’s witnesses testified that
this was the first instance they knew of in that part of the country where a Negro man and a
seemingly white woman were seated together on a public carrier.
Furthermore, this Court will take judicial notice (as the district court should have done) of the
commonly and generally known fact that the folkways prevalent in Taylor County, Florida, the
county seat being Perry, would cause a reasonable man, familiar with local customs, to anticipate
that violence might result if a Negro man and a seemingly white woman should ride into the county
seated together toward the front of an interurban bus.3
The next question is whether or not Tamiami, so charged with a duty of foreseeing danger to its
passengers, took proper precautions to avoid such danger by the “utmost care and diligence of very
cautious persons.” We think that Tamiami failed to exercise this care in several ways. It should have
instructed its agency in Jamaica to advise Negroes applying for passage through the southern part
of the United States of the South’s tradition of segregation. It should have instructed its driver to
advise Negroes who were obviously foreigners, here known to be such, of segregation customs. The
driver should have explained to the Bullocks his reasons for wanting them to move. Above all, the
driver should not, either willfully or negligently, have informed the assailant of the Bullocks’ position
on the bus and of their apparent color and lack of color…. [W]e conclude that the danger should
reasonably have been foreseen by Tamiami in time to act with the utmost care to avoid injury to its
passengers, particularly by warning them and by not doing foolish things to increase their danger,
and that Tamiami breached the duty owed to its passengers, the appellants. The judgment is
therefore reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for each of the
plaintiffs, appellants, and…to award each of them reasonable compensatory damages, including
damages for physical injury and mental suffering and humiliation….
1.

QUESTIONS
Torts and Equality: Did this case challenge racial and gender hierarchies in 1950s
America? Is tort law—particularly negligence law—an appropriate or effective way to
mount such challenges? Do you think it had an effect on bus companies’ policies going
forward? How would you have advised Tamiami Trail Tours to adapt its practices in
light of this decision?

2.

Eavesdropping: Does it seem to matter to the court whether the bus driver knew that
Poppell could overhear his conversation with the police? Should it matter?

3.

Judicial Sociology: The court mentions the “southern tradition” of segregation and
observes that anyone familiar with “folkways” and “local customs” in this part of Florida
would “anticipate that violence might result if a Negro man and a seemingly white
woman should ride into the county seated together toward the front of an interurban
bus.” If courts are to consider such social norms as part of their legal analyses, how
should they go about discovering and determining them?

2
“Under No Circumstances Shall Police Authorities Be Summoned If A Passenger Refuses A Seating Or Reseating
Request. Should Any Disturbance Arise, Police Authorities May Be Summoned To Quell Such Disturbance.”
3
…We have the right to make use of knowledge of the popular and general customs of the people of this State, and public
conditions therein….
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LEFFLER v. SHARP
Supreme Court of Mississippi (2004)
Cobb, Justice:
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On December 4, 2000, Walter Leffler filed suit in the
Warren County Circuit Court against Kim Free, individually
and d/b/a Quarter Inn (collectively Free) and Harry Sharp,
individually, and Sharp Enterprises (collectively Sharp).
Leffler sought damages for injuries he received when he fell
through the roof of the premises immediately adjacent to the
Quarter Inn in Vicksburg, Mississippi. Following discovery
and the filing of motions for summary judgment by Free and
Sharp, the trial judge determined that Leffler’s status upon
entering the roof was that of a trespasser. The motions for
summary judgment were granted, thereby dismissing all claims against Free and Sharp. Leffler
appeals arguing the following issue: Whether the trial court erred in finding Leffler to be a trespasser
and in granting summary judgment to Free and Sharp on that basis, when there were unresolved
issues of fact regarding legal status and duty owed.
Leffler visited the Quarter Inn, a restaurant and lounge in Vicksburg, Mississippi, while he was
in town conducting work on the old Mississippi River bridge. At approximately 10:00 p.m. one
evening, Leffler and his co-workers arrived at a casino where they gambled and consumed alcoholic
beverages until 11:30 p.m. They left the casino, went to a local sports bar, and continued to consume
alcoholic beverages until approximately 2:00 a.m. on February 6, 2000. From the sports bar, they all
went to the Quarter Inn. Leffler was a first-time visitor to the Quarter Inn.
While at the Quarter Inn, Leffler noticed an open window leading to the rooftop. (The small
window is thirty-two and one-half inches from the floor and when fully opened provides a
maximum opening of twenty-four inches in length and thirty-two inches in width.). After Leffler
observed individuals on the rooftop, he presumed the area was open to Quarter Inn patrons.
Although a locked glass door with “NOT AN EXIT” stenciled on the glass was only four feet away,
Leffler entered the roof through the open window. As he was walking on the rooftop, he fell through
the roof approximately twenty feet to the ground.
At the time of the incident, Kim Free owned and managed the Quarter Inn which is located on
the second floor of a building owned by Sharp Enterprises, Inc. Harry Sharp is the president of Sharp
Enterprises, Inc. Sharp, individually, has no ownership interest in the property which is the subject
of this appeal.
The premises occupied by the Quarter Inn originally included a rooftop terrace, access to which
was through a glass door inside the premises. In addition, there were at least two windows which
overlooked the rooftop terrace from a common area of the Quarter Inn. Although previous
businesses that occupied the present location of the Quarter Inn may have utilized the roof area as
a part of their business, Free and Sharp assert that the roof was never part of the leased premises.
The lease agreement offered as proof included the provision that “lessees will not have access to the
roof terrace at the rear of 1302 Washington Street.”
Prior to the date of the lease between Sharp and Free, Sharp considered leasing the rooftop area.
To determine the safety of the roof, Sharp consulted with an architect and structural engineer who
advised him that the roof was not safe for his intended use. Sharp then informed Free of this defect,
and the two individuals, along with Jo Jo Saucier (a lessee of the premises with Free, but not a named
party in the trial court or on appeal) discussed what measures should be taken to secure the roof
area. The parties then decided that Saucier’s husband would weld bars over the window in order to
keep people off of the roof. However, neither the bars, nor any other protective measures, were ever
placed over the window.
This appeal involves the dispute over whether Leffler should be classified as an invitee, licensee,
or trespasser at the time the injury occurred. It is undisputed that Leffler was an invitee upon his
ã
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entrance into the Quarter Inn. The status dispute arises, however, when Leffler entered the roof and
subsequently fell through it. Although Leffler insists that at the time of his injury he remained an
invitee, he does argue in the alternative that his status was at least that of an implied licensee. Leffler
also argues for the sake of argument that if he is a trespasser, the owner of the premises has a duty
to refrain from willfully and wantonly injuring him.
Free and Sharp argue that upon Leffler’s entrance onto the roof, he became a trespasser. As a
result, they maintain that there is no showing that they acted willfully and wantonly, resulting in
Leffler’s injury. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to a grant of summary judgment by
the trial court. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom
the motion has been made. A motion for summary judgment lies only when there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law….
Mississippi applies a three-step process to determine premises liability. The first step consists of
classifying the status of the injured person as an invitee, licensee, or a trespasser. Following this
identification, the duty which was owed to the injured party is determined. The third step is to
determine whether this duty was breached by the landowner or business operator. The
determination of which status a particular plaintiff holds can be a jury question, but where the facts
are not in dispute the classification becomes a question of law for the trial judge.
As to the first step, determination of the injured party’s status, this Court has held that as to
status, an invitee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or
implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage. A licensee is one who enters
upon the property of another for his own convenience, pleasure, or benefit pursuant to the license
or implied permission of the owner whereas a trespasser is one who enters upon another’s premises
without license, invitation, or other right…[and] merely for his own purposes, pleasure, or
convenience, or out of curiosity, and without any enticement, allurement, inducement or express or
implied assurance of safety from the owner or person in charge.
The second step is to identify the duty owed to the injured party. The owner of the premises is
not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, but does owe to an invitee the duty to keep the premises
reasonably safe, and when not reasonably safe, to warn only where there is hidden danger or peril
that is not in plain and open view. Although licensees and trespassers are different classifications,
landowners owe licensees and trespassers the same duty, specifically, to refrain from willfully or
wantonly injuring them.
Leffler maintains that his status upon his arrival and at the time of the accident was that of an
invitee of Free, the Quarter Inn, and Sharp, on the premises so that he could have a good time with
his co-workers by partaking in services provided by the Quarter Inn. In order to receive classification
as an invitee, this Court held that an invitee answers an invitation to enter the owner’s premises for
their mutual advantage. Leffler and the Quarter Inn mutually benefited from the fact that Leffler was
allowed to continue the night’s fun at the Quarter Inn while the restaurant/lounge could continue
making a profit.
Leffler maintains that he remained an invitee at the time of his injury since Free and Sharp held
the roof out as a part of the premises by allowing patrons to enter and use the roof terrace. In a
deposition, Sharp testified that he and Free discussed what action would best secure the window,
thereby keeping patrons off the rooftop. Sharp instructed Free that the roof was not part of the lease
and was not to be used by anyone. In order to secure the window, the parties agreed that bars would
be welded to the window. Although this safety measure never occurred, the dimensions of the
window, being 24 inches by 32 inches, and almost 3 feet above the floor, belie any indication that
patrons were invited to go onto the roof. Leffler asserts that because Sharp anticipated that
customers might eventually try to utilize the rooftop, a question of fact exists as to whether Free and
Sharp knew, or reasonably should have known, that customers were gathering on the roof.
Although Leffler was an invitee at the time he entered the Quarter Inn, he was not an invitee at
the time of the injury. An invitee who goes beyond the bounds of his invitation loses the status of
invitee and the rights which accompany that state. Free and Sharp only extended their invitation to
patrons to come inside the establishment. Upon his entrance to the Quarter Inn, Leffler was an
invitee, but once he exited the establishment and entered onto the roof terrace, he went beyond the
bounds of his invitation, therefore losing his invitee status.

CASES & CRITIQUE

101

An occupant is an invitee where the owner of the premises and the occupant receive mutual
benefits. Neither Free nor Sharp benefited from Leffler’s walk on the roof. In addition to mutual
benefits, a landowner does not have to insure the invitee’s safety, but the landowner must keep the
premises reasonably safe, and when not reasonably safe, to warn only where there is hidden danger.
Free and Sharp kept the Quarter Inn reasonably safe for patrons. Leffler’s accident did not happen
within the walls of the Quarter Inn, but on a rooftop adjacent to the establishment. Free and Sharp’s
acts of locking and marking the exit door were done to keep the Quarter Inn safe for patrons. Leffler
was not an invitee at the location and time of the accident and, therefore, was not owed the duty
given to an invitee.
Leffler argues in the alternative that he was a licensee at the time of the accident. A licensee, in
contrast to a trespasser, enters the property of another pursuant to the license or implied permission
of the owner but enters for the convenience, pleasure or benefit of the licensee. Leffler entered the
roof area for his convenience, pleasure and benefit because the bar was hot, crowded, and loud while
the roof terrace was cool, open, and quiet.
In an effort to further clarify the distinction between the status of an injured party, this Court
in Clark v. Moore Memorial United Methodist Church, 538 So.2d 760 (Miss. 1989), distinguished
between the “invitation” required of an invitee and “permission” required for a licensee. The
word invitation was defined as “conduct which justifies others in believing that the possessor desires
them to enter the land,” while permission was defined as “conduct justifying others in believing that
the possessor is willing that they shall enter, if they desire to do so.” The two terms were further
clarified with “mere permission, as distinguished from invitation, is sufficient to make the visitor a
licensee but it does not make him an invitee.”
Free and Sharp never engaged in conduct signifying to patrons that the roof area was open to
patrons. No dispute exists that the window was open on the night in question. However, based upon
the definition of permission, these facts indicate that they did not intend (or grant permission) for
Leffler or other patrons to enter the roof area through the glass door, or through the open window.
Although Leffler entered the roof terrace for his own benefit, he lacked permission to enter the roof
terrace from Free or Sharp. Leffler did not enjoy the status of a licensee.
Free and Sharp argue that Leffler was a trespasser, citing this Court’s reasoning in Kelley v.
Sportsmen’s Speedway, 80 So.2d 785 (Miss. 1955): “A trespasser is a person who enters the premises
of another without license, invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own,
or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other than, perhaps, to satisfy his
curiosity.” Leffler entered the roof area without invitation or permission from Free or Sharp. On his
way to the restroom, Leffler had seen two individuals standing outside the window. Returning from
the restroom, the two individuals had reentered the Quarter Inn. Wanting to escape the crowd, loud
music, heat, and smoke a cigarette, Leffler entered the roof terrace. There was no sign or indication
within the Quarter Inn inviting or granting permission to patrons to enter the roof terrace. However,
a sign on the glass door warned patrons not to use the door as an exit to the roof terrace.
This Court recently reaffirmed that a trespasser enters another’s property without any
enticement, allurement, inducement. Leffler was neither enticed nor allured onto the roof by Free
or Sharp. Although the window was open, Free and Sharp did not entice the patrons to step through
a high, small, narrow window onto the roof. In addition, neither party has provided evidence that
Quarter Inn employees were aware that some patrons had entered the roof area.
The third step in determining premises liability is determination of whether the owner breached
a duty…. The duty owed to a trespasser is to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the
trespasser. To constitute willful or wanton injury, something more is required to impose liability
than mere inadvertence or lack of attention; there must be a more or less extreme departure from
ordinary standards of care, and conduct must differ in quality, as well as in degree, from ordinary
negligence involving a conscious disregard of a known serious danger. Free and Sharp never
disregarded or took lightly the condition of the roof terrace. In order to keep patrons off of it, Sharp
kept in his possession the only key to the glass door exiting onto the roof in order to ensure that the
door remained locked at all times. They not only kept the door locked; they also stenciled in red
letters “NOT AN EXIT” on the glass door.
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An owner owes trespassers no duty to keep his premises in a safe condition for their use, and as a
general rule, he is not held responsible for an injury sustained by a trespasser upon the premises from
a defect therein. Although the roof terrace was owned by Sharp Enterprises, the roof was not part of
the lease between Free, Sharp, and Sharp Enterprises. The roof was also not a part of the Quarter Inn.
Additionally, a landowner need not make it impossible for persons to trespass before he may treat
intruders as trespassers…. Leffler entered the roof area of the Quarter Inn without invitation or
permission. Free and Sharp took reasonable steps to make sure access to the roof was denied by
keeping the door locked and stenciling the letters “NOT AN EXIT” on the door. Although this Court
is mindful of the fact that Leffler received severe injuries, his status at the time of the incident was that
of a trespasser, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing his claims….
1.

QUESTIONS
Distinguishing Duties: Was Leffler a trespasser, an invitee, or a licensee? Did his status
shift over the course of the night? Why does it matter?

2.

No Smoking: Leffler’s accident occurred in 2000, before many states had banned
smoking indoors. What if the case had happened today? How might you try to use this
change in smoking laws to help Leffler win his case?

3.

Writing on the Wall: The court uses the “NOT AN EXIT” stencil to undermine the
viability of Leffler’s claim. Can you think of an argument why the stencil might have
helped Leffler argue that he wasn’t a trespasser?
POSECAI v. WAL-MART
Supreme Court of Louisiana (1999)

Marcus, Justice:

ã

Shirley Posecai brought suit against Sam’s Wholesale Club
(“Sam’s”) in Kenner after she was robbed at gunpoint in the store’s
parking lot. On July 20, 1995, Mrs. Posecai went to Sam’s to make
an exchange and to do some shopping. She exited the store and
returned to her parked car at approximately 7:20 p.m. It was not
dark at the time. As Mrs. Posecai was placing her purchases in the
trunk, a man who was hiding under her car grabbed her ankle and
pointed a gun at her. The unknown assailant instructed her to
hand over her jewelry and her wallet. While begging the robber to spare her life, she gave him her
purse and all her jewelry. Mrs. Posecai was wearing her most valuable jewelry at the time of the
robbery because she had attended a downtown luncheon earlier in the day. She lost a two and a half
carat diamond ring given to her by her husband for their twenty-fifth wedding anniversary, a
diamond and ruby bracelet and a diamond and gold watch, all valued at close to $19,000.
When the robber released Mrs. Posecai, she ran back to the store for help. The Kenner Police
Department was called and two officers came out to investigate the incident. The perpetrator was never
apprehended and Mrs. Posecai never recovered her jewelry despite searching several pawn shops.
At the time of this armed robbery, a security guard was stationed inside the store to protect the
cash office from 5:00 p.m. until the store closed at 8:00 p.m. He could not see outside and Sam’s did
not have security guards patrolling the parking lot. At trial, the security guard on duty, Kenner Police
Officer Emile Sanchez, testified that he had worked security detail at Sam’s since 1986 and was not
aware of any similar criminal incidents occurring in Sam’s parking lot during the nine years prior
to the robbery of Mrs. Posecai. He further testified that he did not consider Sam’s parking lot to be
a high crime area, but admitted that he had not conducted a study on the issue.
The plaintiff presented the testimony of two other Kenner police officers. Officer Russell Moran
testified that he had patrolled the area around Sam’s from 1993 to 1995. He stated that the
subdivision behind Sam’s, Lincoln Manor, is generally known as a high crime area, but that the
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Kenner Police were rarely called out to Sam’s. Officer George Ansardi, the investigating officer,
similarly testified that Lincoln Manor is a high crime area but explained that Sam’s is not considered
a high crime location. He further stated that to his knowledge none of the other businesses in the
area employed security guards at the time of this robbery.
An expert on crime risk assessment and premises security, David Kent, was qualified and
testified on behalf of the plaintiff. It was his opinion that the robbery of Mrs. Posecai could have
been prevented by an exterior security presence. He presented crime data from the Kenner Police
Department indicating that between 1989 and June of 1995 there were three robberies or “predatory
offenses” on Sam’s premises, and provided details from the police reports on each of these crimes.
The first offense occurred at 12:45 a.m. on March 20, 1989, when a delivery man sleeping in his truck
parked in back of the store was robbed. In May of 1992, a person was mugged in the store’s parking
lot. Finally, on February 7, 1994, an employee of the store was the victim of a purse snatching, but
she indicated to the police that the crime was related to a domestic dispute.
In order to broaden the geographic scope of his crime data analysis, Mr. Kent looked at the crime
statistics at thirteen businesses on the same block as Sam’s, all of which were either fast food
restaurants, convenience stores or gas stations. He found a total of eighty-three predatory offenses
in the six and a half years before Mrs. Posecai was robbed. Mr. Kent concluded that the area around
Sam’s was “heavily crime impacted,” although he did not compare the crime statistics he found
around Sam’s to any other area in Kenner or the New Orleans metro area.
Mrs. Posecai contends that Sam’s was negligent in failing to provide adequate security in the
parking lot considering the high level of crime in the surrounding area. Seeking to recover for mental
anguish as well as for her property loss, she alleged that after this incident she had trouble sleeping
and was afraid to go out by herself at night. After a bench trial, the trial judge held that Sam’s owed
a duty to provide security in the parking lot because the robbery of the plaintiff was foreseeable and
could have been prevented by the use of security. A judgment was rendered in favor of Mrs. Posecai,
awarding $18,968 for her lost jewelry and $10,000 in general damages for her mental anguish. The
trial judge further ruled that Sam’s was 75% at fault and the unknown perpetrator was only 25% at
fault. Sam’s appealed. The court of appeal found that the trial judge erred in apportioning fault
between Sam’s and the criminal who intentionally robbed Mrs. Posecai. It amended the judgment
to find Sam’s solely at fault for the damages suffered by the plaintiff and affirmed the judgment as
amended. Upon Sam’s application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision.
The sole issue presented for our review is whether Sam’s owed a duty to protect Mrs. Posecai
from the criminal acts of third parties under the facts and circumstances of this case.
This court has adopted a duty-risk analysis to determine whether liability exists under the
particular facts presented. Under this analysis the plaintiff must prove that the conduct in question
was the cause-in-fact of the resulting harm, the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, the
requisite duty was breached by the defendant and the risk of harm was within the scope of protection
afforded by the duty breached. Under the duty-risk analysis, all four inquiries must be affirmatively
answered for plaintiff to recover.
A threshold issue in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty.
Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. In deciding whether to impose a duty in a particular
case, the court must make a policy decision in light of the unique facts and circumstances presented.
The court may consider various moral, social, and economic factors, including the fairness of
imposing liability; the economic impact on the defendant and on similarly situated parties; the need
for an incentive to prevent future harm; the nature of defendant’s activity; the potential for an
unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical development of precedent; and the direction in which
society and its institutions are evolving.
This court has never squarely decided whether business owners owe a duty to protect their
patrons from crimes perpetrated by third parties. It is therefore helpful to look to the way in which
other jurisdictions have resolved this question. Most state supreme courts that have considered the
issue agree that business owners do have a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect invitees
from foreseeable criminal attacks.
We now join other states in adopting the rule that although business owners are not the insurers
of their patrons’ safety, they do have a duty to implement reasonable measures to protect their
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patrons from criminal acts when those acts are foreseeable. We emphasize, however, that there is
generally no duty to protect others from the criminal activities of third persons. This duty only arises
under limited circumstances, when the criminal act in question was reasonably foreseeable to the
owner of the business. Determining when a crime is foreseeable is therefore a critical inquiry.
Other jurisdictions have resolved the foreseeability issue in a variety of ways, but four basic
approaches have emerged. The first approach, although somewhat outdated, is known as the specific
harm rule. According to this rule, a landowner does not owe a duty to protect patrons from the
violent acts of third parties unless he is aware of specific, imminent harm about to befall them.
Courts have generally agreed that this rule is too restrictive in limiting the duty of protection that
business owners owe their invitees.
More recently, some courts have adopted a prior similar incidents test. Under this test,
foreseeability is established by evidence of previous crimes on or near the premises. The idea is that
a past history of criminal conduct will put the landowner on notice of a future risk. Therefore, courts
consider the nature and extent of the previous crimes, as well as their recency, frequency, and
similarity to the crime in question. This approach can lead to arbitrary results because it is applied
with different standards regarding the number of previous crimes and the degree of similarity
required to give rise to a duty.
The third and most common approach used in other jurisdictions is known as the totality of the
circumstances test. This test takes additional factors into account, such as the nature, condition, and
location of the land, as well as any other relevant factual circumstances bearing on foreseeability….
The application of this test often focuses on the level of crime in the surrounding area and courts
that apply this test are more willing to see property crimes or minor offenses as precursors to more
violent crimes. In general, the totality of the circumstances test tends to place a greater duty on
business owners to foresee the risk of criminal attacks on their property and has been criticized as
being too broad a standard, effectively imposing an unqualified duty to protect customers in areas
experiencing any significant level of criminal activity.
The final standard that has been used to determine foreseeability is a balancing test, an approach
which has been adopted in California and Tennessee…in response to the perceived unfairness of
the totality test. The balancing test seeks to address the interests of both business proprietors and
their customers by balancing the foreseeability of harm against the burden of imposing a duty to
protect against the criminal acts of third persons…. Under this test, the high degree of foreseeability
necessary to impose a duty to provide security, will rarely, if ever, be proven in the absence of prior
similar incidents of crime on the property.
We agree that a balancing test is the best method for determining when business owners owe a
duty to provide security for their patrons. The economic and social impact of requiring businesses
to provide security on their premises is an important factor. Security is a significant monetary
expense for any business and further increases the cost of doing business in high crime areas that
are already economically depressed. Moreover, businesses are generally not responsible for the
endemic crime that plagues our communities, a societal problem that even our law enforcement and
other government agencies have been unable to solve. At the same time, business owners are in the
best position to appreciate the crime risks that are posed on their premises and to take reasonable
precautions to counteract those risks.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we adopt the following balancing test to be used in
deciding whether a business owes a duty of care to protect its customers from the criminal acts of
third parties. The foreseeability of the crime risk on the defendant’s property and the gravity of the
risk determine the existence and the extent of the defendant’s duty. The greater the foreseeability
and gravity of the harm, the greater the duty of care that will be imposed on the business. A very
high degree of foreseeability is required to give rise to a duty to post security guards, but a lower
degree of foreseeability may support a duty to implement lesser security measures such as using
surveillance cameras, installing improved lighting or fencing, or trimming shrubbery. The plaintiff
has the burden of establishing the duty the defendant owed under the circumstances.
The foreseeability and gravity of the harm are to be determined by the facts and circumstances
of the case. The most important factor to be considered is the existence, frequency and similarity of
prior incidents of crime on the premises, but the location, nature and condition of the property
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should also be taken into account. It is highly unlikely that a crime risk will be sufficiently foreseeable
for the imposition of a duty to provide security guards if there have not been previous instances of
crime on the business’ premises.
In the instant case, there were only three predatory offenses on Sam’s premises in the six and a
half years prior to the robbery of Mrs. Posecai. The first of these offenses occurred well after store
hours, at almost one o’clock in the morning, and involved the robbery of a delivery man who was
caught unaware as he slept near Sam’s loading dock behind the store. In 1992, a person was mugged
while walking through the parking lot. Two years later, an employee of the store was attacked in the
parking lot and her purse was taken, apparently by her husband. A careful consideration of the
previous incidents of predatory offenses on the property reveals that there was only one other crime
in Sam’s parking lot, the mugging in 1992, that was perpetrated against a Sam’s customer and that
bears any similarity to the crime that occurred in this case. Given the large number of customers
that used Sam’s parking lot, the previous robbery of only one customer in all those years indicates a
very low crime risk. It is also relevant that Sam’s only operates during daylight hours and must
provide an accessible parking lot to the multitude of customers that shop at its store each year.
Although the neighborhood bordering Sam’s is considered a high crime area by local law
enforcement, the foreseeability and gravity of harm in Sam’s parking lot remained slight.
We conclude that Sam’s did not possess the requisite degree of foreseeability for the imposition
of a duty to provide security patrols in its parking lot. Nor was the degree of foreseeability sufficient
to support a duty to implement lesser security measures. Accordingly, Sam’s owed no duty to protect
Mrs. Posecai from the criminal acts of third parties under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Having found that no duty was owed, we do not reach the other elements of the duty-risk analysis
that must be proven in establishing a negligence claim….
1.

QUESTIONS
Shirley, You Can’t Be Serious? Why is it even debatable whether Sam’s owed Shirley
Posecai a duty? Wasn’t it all the robber’s fault?

2.

Deep Pockets: The court picks the balancing test to determine whether business owners
owe a duty to protect their patrons from crimes committed by third parties, in part
because security can be expensive. Sam’s parent company, Wal-Mart, was the world’s
largest company by revenue in 2020, with over $548 billion. Can’t it afford better
security? Should profitability be relevant when courts determine the duty question?

3.

Be the Judge: If you were on the Louisiana Supreme Court, which test would you pick?
The following case discusses stalking.
TARASOFF v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California (1976)

Tobriner, Justice:

ã

On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana
Tarasoff. Plaintiffs, Tatiana’s parents, allege that two months earlier
Poddar confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a
psychologist employed by the Cowell Memorial Hospital at the
University of California at Berkeley. They allege that on Moore’s request,
the campus police briefly detained Poddar, but released him when he
appeared rational. They further claim that Dr. Harvey Powelson, Moore’s
superior, then directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar.
No one warned plaintiffs of Tatiana’s peril….
Plaintiffs’ complaints predicate liability on two grounds: defendants’
failure to warn plaintiffs of the impending danger and their failure to
ã

Marc Buehler, UC Berkeley Campus Tower (CC BY-NC 2.0).
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[confine Poddar under California statutes specifying the conditions under which persons may be
involuntarily committed for psychological treatment.] Defendants, in turn, assert that they owed no
duty of reasonable care to Tatiana….
We shall explain that defendant therapists cannot escape liability merely because Tatiana herself
was not their patient. When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an
obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge
of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the
nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary
under the circumstances.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs admit that defendant therapists notified the police, but argue on
appeal that the therapists failed to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana in that they did not
confine Poddar and did not warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger. Defendant
therapists, however, are public employees [who enjoy statutory immunity for certain “discretionary”
acts, including their failure to confine Poddar]. No specific statutory provision, however, shields
them from liability based upon failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger….
Plaintiffs therefore can amend their complaints to allege that, regardless of the therapists’
unsuccessful attempt to confine Poddar, since they knew that Poddar was at large and dangerous,
their failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of the danger constituted a breach of the
therapists’ duty to exercise reasonable care to protect Tatiana.
Plaintiffs, however, plead no relationship between Poddar and the police defendants which
would impose upon them any duty to Tatiana, and plaintiffs suggest no other basis for such a duty.
Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to show that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the
police defendants without leave to amend.
…Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, entitled “Failure to Detain a Dangerous Patient,” alleges that
on August 20, 1969, Poddar was a voluntary outpatient receiving therapy at Cowell Memorial
Hospital. Poddar informed Moore, his therapist, that he was going to kill an unnamed girl, readily
identifiable as Tatiana, when she returned home from spending the summer in Brazil. Moore, with
the concurrence of Dr. Gold, who had initially examined Poddar, and Dr. Yandell, assistant to the
director of the department of psychiatry, decided that Poddar should be committed for observation
in a mental hospital. Moore orally notified Officers Atkinson and Teel of the campus police that he
would request commitment. He then sent a letter to Police Chief William Beall requesting the
assistance of the police department in securing Poddar’s confinement.
Officers Atkinson, Brownrigg, and Halleran took Poddar into custody, but, satisfied that Poddar
was rational, released him on his promise to stay away from Tatiana. Powelson, director of the
department of psychiatry at Cowell Memorial Hospital, then asked the police to return Moore’s
letter, directed that all copies of the letter and notes that Moore had taken as therapist be destroyed,
and “ordered no action to place Prosenjit Poddar in 72-hour treatment and evaluation facility.”
Plaintiffs’ second cause of action, entitled “Failure to Warn On a Dangerous Patient,”
incorporates the allegations of the first cause of action, but adds the assertion that defendants
negligently permitted Poddar to be released from police custody without “notifying the parents of
Tatiana Tarasoff that their daughter was in grave danger from Posenjit Poddar.” Poddar persuaded
Tatiana’s brother to share an apartment with him near Tatiana’s residence; shortly after her return
from Brazil, Poddar went to her residence and killed her….
The second cause of action can be amended to allege that Tatiana’s death proximately resulted
from defendants’ negligent failure to warn Tatiana or others likely to apprise her of her
danger…. Defendants, however, contend that in the circumstances of the present case they owed no
duty of care to Tatiana or her parents and that, in the absence of such duty, they were free to act in
careless disregard of Tatiana’s life and safety.
In analyzing this issue, we bear in mind that legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but
merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for
damage done. As stated in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968): “The assertion that liability
must be denied because defendant bears no ‘duty’ to plaintiff begs the essential question—whether
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the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. Duty is not
sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which
lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”
In the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), Justice Peters recognized
that liability should be imposed “for injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or
skill”…. Thus, …whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to
another that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct he would cause danger of
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid
such danger.
We depart from this fundamental principle only upon the balancing of a number of
considerations; major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
The most important of these considerations in establishing duty is foreseeability. As a general
principle, a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his
conduct, with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. As we shall
explain, however, when the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to control the
conduct of another person, or to warn of such conduct, the common law has traditionally imposed
liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person or to the
potential victim. Since the relationship between a therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement,
we need not here decide whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another’s conduct.
Although…as a general rule, one person owed no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to
warn those endangered by such conduct, the courts have carved out an exception to this rule in cases
in which the defendant stands in some special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs
to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct. Applying this
exception to the present case, we note that a relationship of defendant therapists to either Tatiana
or Poddar will suffice to establish a duty of care; as explained in section 315 of the Restatement
Second of Torts, a duty of care may arise from either “(a) a special relation between the actor and
the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a
special relation between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection.”
Although plaintiffs’ pleadings assert no special relation between Tatiana and defendant
therapists, they establish as between Poddar and defendant therapists the special relation that arises
between a patient and his doctor or psychotherapist. Such a relationship may support affirmative
duties for the benefit of third persons. Thus, for example, a hospital must exercise reasonable care
to control the behavior of a patient which may endanger other persons. A doctor must also warn a
patient if the patient’s condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving a car,
dangerous to others.
Although the California decisions that recognize this duty have involved cases in which the
defendant stood in a special relationship both to the victim and to the person whose conduct created
the danger, we do not think that the duty should logically be constricted to such situations. Decisions
of other jurisdictions hold that the single relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to
support the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating from the
patient’s illness. The courts hold that a doctor is liable to persons infected by his patient if he
negligently fails to diagnose a contagious disease, or, having diagnosed the illness, fails to warn
members of the patient’s family.
Since it involved a dangerous mental patient, the decision in Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
of Fargo v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967), comes closer to the issue. The Veterans
Administration arranged for the patient to work on a local farm, but did not inform the farmer of
the man’s background. The farmer consequently permitted the patient to come and go freely during
nonworking hours; the patient borrowed a car, drove to his wife’s residence and killed her.
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Notwithstanding the lack of any “special relationship” between the Veterans Administration and
the wife, the court found the Veterans Administration liable for the wrongful death of the wife….
Defendants contend, however, that imposition of a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
third persons is unworkable because therapists cannot accurately predict whether or not a patient
will resort to violence. In support of this argument amicus representing the American Psychiatric
Association and other professional societies cites numerous articles which indicate that therapists,
in the present state of the art, are unable reliably to predict violent acts; their forecasts, amicus claims,
tend consistently to overpredict violence, and indeed are more often wrong than right. Since
predictions of violence are often erroneous, amicus concludes, the courts should not render rulings
that predicate the liability of therapists upon the validity of such predictions….
We recognize the difficulty that a therapist encounters in attempting to forecast whether a
patient presents a serious danger of violence. Obviously, we do not require that the therapist, in
making that determination, render a perfect performance; the therapist need only exercise that
reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of
that professional specialty under similar circumstances. Within the broad range of reasonable
practice and treatment in which professional opinion and judgment may differ, the therapist is free
to exercise his or her own best judgment without liability; proof, aided by hindsight, that he or she
judged wrongly is insufficient to establish negligence.
In the instant case, however, the pleadings do not raise any question as to failure of defendant
therapists to predict that Poddar presented a serious danger of violence. On the contrary, the present
complaints allege that defendant therapists did in fact predict that Poddar would kill, but were
negligent in failing to warn.
Amicus contends, however, that even when a therapist does in fact predict that a patient poses a
serious danger of violence to others, the therapist should be absolved of any responsibility for failing
to act to protect the potential victim. In our view, however, once a therapist does in fact determine,
or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses
a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
foreseeable victim of that danger. While the discharge of this duty of due care will necessarily vary
with the facts of each case,1 in each instance the adequacy of the therapist’s conduct must be
measured against the traditional negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under the
circumstances….
The risk that unnecessary warnings may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of
possible victims that may be saved. We would hesitate to hold that the therapist who is aware that
his patient expects to attempt to assassinate the President of the United States would not be obligated
to warn the authorities because the therapist cannot predict with accuracy that his patient will
commit the crime.
Defendants further argue that free and open communication is essential to psychotherapy; that
unless a patient is assured that information revealed by him can and will be held in utmost
confidence, he will be reluctant to make the full disclosure upon which diagnosis and treatment
depends. The giving of a warning, defendants contend, constitutes a breach of trust which entails
the revelation of confidential communications.
We recognize the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in
protecting the rights of patients to privacy, and the consequent public importance of safeguarding
the confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication. Against this interest, however, we
must weigh the public interest in safety from violent assault. The Legislature has undertaken the
difficult task of balancing the countervailing concerns. In Evidence Code section 1014, it established
a broad rule of privilege to protect confidential communications between patient and
psychotherapist. In Evidence Code section 1024, the Legislature created a specific and limited
1
Defendant therapists and amicus also argue that warnings must be given only in those cases in which the therapist
knows the identity of the victim. We recognize that in some cases it would be unreasonable to require the therapist to
interrogate his patient to discover the victim’s identity, or to conduct an independent investigation. But there may also be
cases in which a moment’s reflection will reveal the victim’s identity. The matter thus is one which depends upon the
circumstances of each case, and should not be governed by any hard and fast rule.
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exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege: “There is no privilege if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be
dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of the
communication is necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”
We realize that the open and confidential character of psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages
patients to express threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. Certainly a therapist should
not be encouraged routinely to reveal such threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the
patient’s relationship with his therapist and with the persons threatened. To the contrary, the
therapist’s obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure
is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that
would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the
threatened danger.
The revelation of a communication under the above circumstances is not a breach of trust or a
violation of professional ethics; as stated in the Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical
Association (1957): “A physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in the course of
medical attendance unless he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to
protect the welfare of the individual or of the community.” We conclude that the public policy
favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must
yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege
ends where the public peril begins.
Our current crowded and computerized society compels the interdependence of its members. In
this risk-infested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result
from a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal. If the exercise of reasonable
care to protect the threatened victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those
who can reasonably be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would
protect and justify concealment. The containment of such risks lies in the public interest. For the
foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiffs’ complaints can be amended to state a cause of action
against defendants Moore, Powelson, Gold, and Yandell…for breach of a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect Tatiana….
Turning now to the police defendants, we conclude that they do not have any such special
relationship to either Tatiana or to Poddar sufficient to impose upon such defendants a duty to warn
respecting Poddar’s violent intentions. Plaintiffs suggest no theory, and plead no facts that give rise
to any duty to warn on the part of the police defendants absent such a special relationship. They
have thus failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in denying leave to amend as to the police
defendants….
Mosk, Justice, concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result…only because the complaints allege that defendant therapists did in fact
predict that Poddar would kill and were therefore negligent in failing to warn of that danger. Thus
the issue here is very narrow: we are not concerned with whether the therapists, pursuant to the
standards of their profession, “should have” predicted potential violence; they allegedly did so in
actuality. Under these limited circumstances I agree that a cause of action can be stated….
Clark, Justice, dissenting:
…Policy generally determines duty…. Overwhelming policy considerations weigh against
imposing a duty on psychotherapists to warn a potential victim against harm. While offering
virtually no benefit to society, such a duty will frustrate psychiatric treatment, invade fundamental
patient rights and increase violence…. Assurance of confidentiality is important for three reasons.
First, without substantial assurance of confidentiality, those requiring treatment will be deterred
from seeking assistance. It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that people seeking psychiatric
guidance tend to become stigmatized. Apprehension of such stigma—apparently increased by the
propensity of people considering treatment to see themselves in the worst possible light—creates a
well-recognized reluctance to seek aid. This reluctance is alleviated by the psychiatrist’s assurance
of confidentiality.
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Second, the guarantee of confidentiality is essential in eliciting the full disclosure necessary for
effective treatment…. Until a patient can trust his psychiatrist not to violate their confidential
relationship, the unconscious psychological control mechanism of repression will prevent the recall
of past experiences.
Third, even if the patient fully discloses his thoughts, assurance that the confidential relationship
will not be breached is necessary to maintain his trust in his psychiatrist—the very means by which
treatment is effected…. Patients will be helped only if they can form a trusting relationship with the
psychiatrist….
Given the importance of confidentiality to the practice of psychiatry, it becomes clear the duty
to warn imposed by the majority will cripple the use and effectiveness of psychiatry. Many people,
potentially violent—yet susceptible to treatment—will be deterred from seeking it; those seeking it
will be inhibited from making revelations necessary to effective treatment; and, forcing the
psychiatrist to violate the patient’s trust will destroy the interpersonal relationship by which
treatment is effected….
By imposing a duty to warn, the majority contributes to the danger to society of violence by the
mentally ill and greatly increases the risk of civil commitment—the total deprivation of liberty—of
those who should not be confined….*
1.

QUESTIONS
Relationship Status—“It’s Complicated”: Is Tarasoff of the same kin as cases like
Osterlind and Baker, which explore how certain special relationships can create
exceptions to the general rule that there’s no affirmative duty to protect or rescue? Or is
there something slightly different going on here?

2.

Professionals and the Public: Why didn’t the police officers owe the same duty to
Tarasoff as the therapists? And do you think other professionals should owe similar
duties? How about clergy, teachers, parents, social workers, or lawyers? Why not extend
this type of duty to anyone who has a hunch about imminent physical violence?

3.

Institutional Expertise: What do you think about judges playing this role of determining
professional duties, even if they’re aided by amici (as the court was here)? Do courts have
the information and abilities to develop a sensible plan to reduce the occurrence of
violent attacks by people with a mental illness? Is the legislature better positioned? Even
if they are, can we trust them to regulate effectively in this area?
GRAFF v. BEARD
Supreme Court of Texas (1993)

Cornyn, Judge:

ã

We are asked in this case to impose a common-law duty on a
social host who makes alcohol available to an intoxicated adult
guest who the host knows will be driving. For the reasons given
below, we decline to do so….
Houston Moos consumed alcohol at a party hosted by the
Graffs and Hausmons, and allegedly left in his vehicle in an
intoxicated condition. En route from the party, Moos collided
* A shocking illustration of psychotherapists’ inability to predict dangerousness…is cited and discussed in Ennis,
Prisoners of Psychiatry: Mental Patients, Psychiatrists, and the Law (1972): “In a well-known study, psychiatrists predicted
that 989 persons were so dangerous that they could not be kept even in civil mental hospitals, but would have to be kept in
maximum security hospitals run by the Department of Corrections. Then, because of a United States Supreme Court decision,
those persons were transferred to civil hospitals. After a year, the Department of Mental Hygiene reported that one-fifth of
them had been discharged to the community, and over half had agreed to remain as voluntary patients. During the year, only
7 of the 989 committed or threatened any act that was sufficiently dangerous to require retransfer to the maximum security
hospital. Seven correct predictions out of almost a thousand is not a very impressive record. Other studies, and there are
many, have reached the same conclusion: psychiatrists simply cannot predict dangerous behavior.”…
ã
Laura LaRose, Beer Pong (CC BY 2.0).
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with a motorcycle, injuring Brett Beard. Beard sued both Moos and his hosts for his injuries…. An
en banc divided court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment [against Beard]…, holding for
the first time in Texas jurisprudence that social hosts may be liable to third parties for the acts of
their intoxicated adult guests.
Under the court of appeals’ standard, a social host violates a legal duty to third parties when the
host makes an alcoholic beverage available to an adult guest who the host knows is intoxicated and
will be driving. In practical effect, this duty is twofold. The first aspect of the host’s duty is to prevent
guests who will be driving from becoming intoxicated. If the host fails to do so, however, a second
aspect of the duty comes into play—the host must prevent the intoxicated guest from driving.
The legislatures in most states, including Texas, have enacted dram shop laws that impose a
statutory duty to third parties on commercial providers under specified circumstances. We have
recently held that when the legislature enacted the Texas dram shop statute it also imposed a duty
on the provider that extends to the patron himself. Because the dram shop statute applies only to
commercial providers, however, it does not govern the duty asserted in this case.
We think it significant in appraising Beard’s request to recognize common-law social host
liability that the legislature has considered and declined to create such a duty. A version of the bill
that eventually became our dram shop statute provided for social host liability. Although that
version passed the Senate, the House rejected it. The Senate-House conference committee deleted
social host liability from the bill the legislature eventually enacted.
The highest courts in only four states have done what we are asked to do today: judicially impose
a duty to third parties on social hosts who make alcohol available to adult guests.1 In two of these
states, California and Iowa, the legislatures subsequently abrogated the judicially-created duty.
Neither of the two remaining jurisdictions, Massachusetts and New Jersey, had dram shop statutes
when their courts acted. Rather, their courts first imposed a common-law duty to third parties on
commercial establishments and then extended the duty to social hosts.
It is fundamental that the existence of a legally cognizable duty is a prerequisite to all tort liability.
Historically, the law recognized no common-law duty to third parties on the part of a provider of
alcohol—the rationale being that the consumption of alcohol, rather than the provision of it,
proximately caused the injury. In El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987), this court
created a common-law duty to injured third parties on the part of commercial providers, but that
duty was almost simultaneously superseded by the legislature’s enactment of the dram shop statute.
The statute became the exclusive basis for the civil liability of commercial providers of alcohol. The
statutory duty established by the legislature also placed a less onerous burden on commercial
providers and a correspondingly higher burden of proof on injured parties than the common-law
duty created by the court: vendors were made legally accountable only when it was apparent at the
time the patron was served that the patron was “obviously intoxicated to the extent that he presented
a clear danger to himself and others.” It is against this backdrop that we consider whether a
common-law duty for social hosts should be recognized in Texas.
Deciding whether to impose a new common-law duty involves complex considerations of public
policy. We have said that these considerations include social, economic, and political questions, and
their application to the particular facts at hand. Among other factors, we consider the extent of the
risk involved, the foreseeability and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the
actor’s conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences
of placing the burden on the defendant. We have also emphasized other factors. For example,
questions of duty have turned on whether one party has superior knowledge of the risk, and whether
a right to control the actor whose conduct precipitated the harm exists. See e.g., Seagram v. McGuire,
814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991) (declining to recognize a legal duty of an alcohol manufacturer to warn
consumers against danger of alcoholism because the risk is common knowledge).
…[W]e deem it appropriate to focus on two tacit assumptions underlying the holding of the
court of appeals: that the social host can reasonably know of the guest’s alcohol consumption and
1

The majority of cases cited by Justice Gammage address only liability imposed on adults for the acts of intoxicated
minors. E.g., Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18 (Or. 1971). Provision of alcohol to
minors is not involved in this case.

112

TORT LAW

possible intoxication, and possesses the right to control the conduct of the guest. Under Texas law,
in the absence of a relationship between the parties giving rise to the right of control, one person is
under no legal duty to control the conduct of another, even if there exists the practical ability to do
so. For example, in Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1984), we held that an
employer breached a duty of care to the public when he directed an intoxicated employee to drive
home and the employee caused a fatal car crash. While we noted that there is no general duty to
control the conduct of another, we recognized a duty in that instance because of the employer’s
authority over the employee…. [O]ur decision in Otis was premised on the employer’s negligent
exercise of control over the employee, rather than on a general duty to prevent intoxicated individuals
from driving.
Instead of focusing on the host’s right of control over the guest, the court of appeals conditioned
a social host’s duty on the host’s “exclusive control” of the alcohol supply. The court defined
“exclusive control,” however, as nothing more than a degree of control “greater than that of the guest
user.” Under the court’s definition, at a barbecue, a wedding reception, a back-yard picnic, a
pachanga, a Bar Mitzvah—or a variety of other common social settings—the host would always have
exclusive control over the alcohol supply because the host chooses whether alcohol will be provided
and the manner in which it will be provided. The duty imposed by the court of appeals would
apparently attach in any social setting in which alcohol is available regardless of the host’s right to
control the guest. Thus, as a practical matter, the host has but one choice—whether to make alcohol
available to guests at all.
But should the host venture to make alcohol available to adult guests, the court of appeals’
standard would allow the host to avoid liability by cutting off the guest’s access to alcohol at some
point before the guest becomes intoxicated. Implicit in that standard is the assumption that the
reasonably careful host can accurately determine how much alcohol guests have consumed and
when they have approached their limit. We believe, though, that it is far from clear that a social host
can reliably recognize a guest’s level of intoxication. First, it is unlikely that a host can be expected
to know how much alcohol, if any, a guest has consumed before the guest arrives on the host’s
premises. Second, in many social settings, the total number of guests present may practically inhibit
the host from discovering a guest’s approaching intoxication. Third, the condition may be apparent
in some people but certainly not in all. The point at which intoxication is reached varies from person
to person, as do the signs of intoxication. One national study, for instance, found that of the drivers
with a blood alcohol concentration above 0.10%, the legal limit for driving in many states, only one
half actually exhibited signs of intoxication. The guest, on the other hand, is in a far better position
to know the amount of alcohol he has consumed, his state of sobriety, and the consequential risk he
poses to the public.
This brings us to the second aspect of the duty implicit in the court of appeals’ standard: that
should the guest become intoxicated, the host must prevent the guest from driving. Unlike the court
of appeals, however, we cannot assume that guests will respond to a host’s attempts, verbal or
physical, to prevent the guests from driving. Nor is it clear to us precisely what affirmative actions
would discharge the host’s duty under the court of appeals’ standard. Would a simple request not to
drive suffice? Or is more required? Is the host required to physically restrain the guests, take their
car keys, or disable their vehicles? The problems inherent in this aspect of the court of appeals’
holding are obvious. The implications of these unaddressed questions demonstrate the frail
foundation upon which the court of appeals has constructed social host liability.
Ideally, guests will drink responsibly, and hosts will monitor their social functions to reduce the
likelihood of intoxication. Once a guest becomes impaired by alcohol to the point at which he
becomes a threat to himself and others, we would hope that the host can persuade the guest to take
public transportation, stay on the premises, or be transported home by an unimpaired driver. But
we know that too often reality conflicts with ideal behavior. And, given the ultimate power of guests
to control their own alcohol consumption and the absence of any legal right of the host to control
the guest, we find the arguments for shifting legal responsibility from the guest to the host, who
merely makes alcohol available at social gatherings, unconvincing. As the common law has long
recognized, the imbiber maintains the ultimate power and thus the obligation to control his own
behavior: to decide to drink or not to drink, to drive or not to drive. We therefore conclude that the
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common law’s focus should remain on the drinker as the person primarily responsible for his own
behavior and best able to avoid the foreseeable risks of that behavior….
Gammage, Judge, dissenting:
…The majority errs in holding that the legislature must “create” the duty for social hosts not to
send intoxicated guests driving in our streets to maim and kill. Logic, legal experience and this
court’s own earlier decisions dictate a contrary result. The legislature may enact a statute that creates
a duty. But the legislature’s failure to act does not “un-create” an existing duty. A duty created by
the common law continues to exist unless and until the legislature changes it, and such an existing
common law duty applies to the defendants here.
Consider what earlier relevant Texas cases hold. First and foremost is El Chico Corp. v. Poole,
732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987). Poole recognizes the common law duty of commercial vendors of
alcoholic beverages not to serve patrons alcoholic beverages when the liquor licensee knew or should
have known that the patron was intoxicated and was going to drive a motor vehicle…. The majority
fails to acknowledge Poole’s rationale that the most important factor in recognizing a duty under the
common law of negligence is the foreseeability of the risk…. Probably the most quotable line from
Poole suggests the foreseeability here is analogous to letting a rattlesnake loose on an unsuspecting
public: “The risk and likelihood of injury from serving alcohol to an intoxicated person whom the
licensee knows will probably drive a car is as readily foreseen as injury resulting from setting loose
a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.” If we substitute “social host” for “licensee,” the statement
remains equally true…. In addressing the victims of DWI, it is clear the Poole analysis applies with
equal strength to social hosts who engage in such dangerous conduct. Indeed,
it is small comfort to the widow whose husband has been killed in an accident
involving an intoxicated driver to learn that the driver received his drinks from a
hospitable social host rather than by purchase at a bar. The danger of ultimate
harm is as equally foreseeable to the reasonably perceptive host as to the
bartender. The danger and risk to the potential victim on the highway is equally
as great, regardless of the source of the liquor….
The only difference between the commercial vendor and the social host is the relationship to the
intoxicated driver. The risk and foreseeability of harm to the general public is the same. Balancing the
relationship factor, in determining whether a duty exists, must tip in favor of the public interest….
The majority dismisses Otis Engineering on the ground it was “the employer’s negligent exercise of
control over the employee” that distinguishes the situation from the social host’s position…. The
position of the social host is somewhat different, in that the host is serving alcohol to an intoxicated
person knowing he will drive. In Otis Engineering the control was over the sending (or driving),
whereas for the social host the control is over the furnishing of the intoxicating beverage. In either
case the risk is knowingly letting that rattlesnake loose on the public streets and highways. [We have]
set forth the factors for determining whether to impose a duty and thereby recognize a negligence
tort action: the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the
actor’s conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences
of placing the burden on the defendant, acknowledging foreseeability of the risk is the foremost and
dominant consideration…. Instead of weighing all factors with an appropriate emphasis on this risk
and its foreseeability, the majority selects two lesser factors favoring its desired result, and more or
less dismisses the rest. Once again, both the legislature and the Poole decision have provided the
answer. Does the social utility of a host’s providing liquor to an obviously intoxicated driver
outweigh the foreseeability of risk? No, as both the Poole holding and the legislature’s enactment of
a dram shop act demonstrate. The majority addresses the difficulty of guarding against injury, but
it ignores the fact that the injury is a consequence of the intoxication. It is not significantly more
difficult for the social host to refuse to serve alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated guest than it is
for the bartender to refuse to sell to the drunken patron. Moreover, when the dram shop law
addresses liability in the commercial context, but fails to address social host liability, the duty
imposed upon this court to fill the illogical and unjust void in the law is even greater….
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The majority dismisses what is perhaps the earliest social host common law duty holding in
Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 485 P.2d 18, 23 (Or. 1971), as one of
the “only a duty owed to minors” case. The Gamma Phi Chapter case did involve intoxication of a
minor, but it was immaterial whether the third party who was injured in the accident, and to whom
the duty was owed, was injured by a minor or by an adult drunk. In fact, on a foreseeability analysis,
it is just as foreseeable that an intoxicated adult driving a vehicle will cause third party injury as it is
for an intoxicated minor…. A rattlesnake is just as deadly, its bite just as lethal, whether it is a young
“adolescent” rattlesnake or an older more mature rattlesnake. The duty to the driver on the highway
to not set the venomous snake loose is the same….
The majority confuses issues of proof with issues of whether to recognize the tort duty. The
majority is concerned that the social host might not be able to persuade or control his intoxicated
guest to keep him or her from driving. The host, however, clearly does control whether alcohol is
being served, and in what quantities and form. The answer to the “duty” question is that the host
should not let the driving guest have the alcohol in intoxicating quantities. If the guest becomes
inebriated, however, just as with any other dangerous situation one helps create, the host has the
duty to make every reasonable effort to keep the dangerously intoxicated guest from driving. If the
guest resists those efforts, then there is a question for the factfinder to resolve whether the host’s
efforts were all that reasonably could be done under the circumstances.
The majority expresses concern that “the reasonably careful host” may not be able to detect when
some guests are intoxicated…. If that is so, then the factfinder should have no difficulty determining
that the host did not serve them while they were “obviously intoxicated.” The majority further
asserts…that the “guest…is in a far better position to know the amount of alcohol he has consumed”
than the host…. This assertion defies common sense, because from personal observation we know
that most persons, as they become intoxicated, along with losing their dexterity and responsive
mental faculties, gradually become less and less cognizant of how much they’ve had and how badly
intoxicated they are…. Intoxicated guests need someone to tell them not to drive. It bears repeating
that, if the guest did not appear intoxicated, the factfinder should have no trouble concluding that
the host did not serve alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person.
If circumstances do not permit the social host to adequately monitor and control the quantity of
alcoholic beverages a guest consumes, the host still retains absolute control over whether alcoholic
beverages should be served at all. Lest there be some fear that recognizing social host liability will
impair the celebrity of every backyard barbecue in Texas, it should not, and its effect should be
salubrious. Moreover, it should be remembered that the innocent and sober guest en route to the
party is entitled to the same legal protection from a drunken and dangerous departing guest as any
other member of the driving public….
The majority seeks to…stop the evolving common law dead in its tracks. Virtually all
jurisdictions have discarded that obsolete “drinker’s fault only” rationale and provided meaningful
doctrines to protect the public from rattlesnakes in its midst…. This court should…keep both sets
of rattlesnakes—those created by commercial vendors, and those created by social hosts—off our
public streets and highways. The drunk who causes the accident is not excused from liability because
the social host who intoxicated him is also responsible. All culpable parties should be liable—the
social host who knowingly intoxicated the guest and the guest who drunkenly caused the accident….
The television commercial says, “Friends don’t let friends drive drunk.” That is sound public policy.
But today the majority says, “Intoxicate your friends and send them out upon the public streets and
highways to drive drunk. Don’t worry, you won’t be liable.” That is, in the kindest term I can muster,
unsound policy….
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Boozy Chaperone: Should adults who supply alcohol to minors owe a legal duty to third
parties who are then injured when the minor drives drunk? Should you owe a similar
duty if you lend your twenty-year-old sibling your ID on a Friday night? How do your
answers to these questions fit with how you see the Graff decision?
Bartender, Pour Me Another: The dissent argues that it’s “not significantly more
difficult for the social host to refuse to serve alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated guest
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than it is for the bartender to refuse to sell to the drunken patron.” Do you agree? Is it
easier in some ways and harder in others? How much should the law be influenced by
phenomena like social awkwardness and peer pressure?
3.

Hostess with the Mostess: The majority tells us that Massachusetts and New Jersey
recognize that social hosts who make alcohol available to guests owe a duty to third
parties, whereas California and Iowa don’t. Do you think people have less fun at parties
in Boston and Trenton than in Sacramento and Des Moines? Do they host fewer parties?
Do they fall out with their friends more often? What effects are these legal deviations
likely to have on peoples’ lives?

C. Breach
MARTIN v. EVANS
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1998)
Newman, Justice:

ã

…This personal injury suit arose from an accident in
which [Weldon] Evans’ tractor-trailer backed into Appellee
Anthony Martin. The parties presented conflicting testimony
relating directly to the issue of Evans’ negligence, and the jury
concluded that Evans was not negligent. Because the verdict
rested on a credibility determination, we hold that the trial
court usurped the jury’s responsibility by disregarding its
finding that Evans was not negligent…and reinstate the jury’s
verdict….
On May 24, 1989, Evans was driving a tractor-trailer that was forty-five feet long, eight feet wide
and thirteen feet, six inches tall…. [H]e pulled into the Canonsburg rest stop. Along the left-hand
side of the parking lot, there were parallel parking spots for trucks. Evans pulled his truck into what
he believed to be the last parallel parking spot in that row. Because it was the last spot, he had to
angle the cab of the truck to the trailer to maneuver the truck into the space.
Evans left the truck running, and went to the restrooms. When he returned, he looked in back
of the truck before he got into the cab and noticed that no one was parked behind him. He recorded
the stop in his logbook, which took approximately two minutes, then he prepared to back up. Evans
testified that he put the truck into reverse and released both the emergency brake for the cab and the
emergency brake for the tractor. When released, the emergency brakes emit a hissing sound that
lasts for about two seconds. He activated his four-way flashers, which are similar to an automobile’s
hazard lights. Then he looked through the side-view mirrors, but because of the angle of the truck
and the length of the trailer, he could not see directly behind him. He reversed the truck “slower
than you could walk” until he felt a nudge and saw someone waving at him to stop. He stopped the
truck and through his right-hand rear view mirror he saw someone fall just to the right, rear of his
truck. When he got out of his truck to investigate, Evans saw Martin lying on the ground.
Martin and Rochester Steverson were driving southbound on Interstate 79 on May 24, 1989,
when they, too, stopped at the Canonsburg rest area. Their truck was an Isuzu box truck that was
about twenty feet long and ten feet wide. The driver of the truck parked approximately seven to ten
feet directly behind Evans’ tractor-trailer. Martin was either walking or standing between the Isuzu
truck and Evans’ tractor-trailer when the tractor-trailer began to back into him. He claimed that he
tried to get out of the way but was unable to do so. He became pinned between the two vehicles.
Once he realized what was happening, Steverson put the Isuzu truck into reverse to free Martin, who
fell to the ground. Martin suffered injuries to his right arm and back. As result, Martin brought a
negligence action against Evans….

ã

Carl Spencer, Renault Magnum – Reversing (CC BY-NC 2.0).
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[At trial, the] parties presented conflicting testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding
the accident. The trial court instructed the jury on negligence, contributory negligence, and
comparative negligence. The court presented the following interrogatories to the jury…:
Question 1a
Do you find that defendant Weldon R. Evans was negligent?
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “Yes” to Question 1a, go on to Question 1b. If you answered “No”
to Question 1a, the plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer any further
questions and should return to the courtroom.
Question 1b
Was the defendant’s negligence a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiff’s harm?
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “Yes” to Question 1b, go on to Question 2a. If you answered “No”
to Question 1b, the plaintiff cannot recover and you should not answer any further
questions and should return to the courtroom.
Question 2a
Do you find that plaintiff Anthony Martin was contributorily negligent?
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “Yes” to Question 2a, go on to Question 2b. If you answered “No”
to Question 2a, go on to Question 4.
Question 2b
Was plaintiff’s contributory negligence a substantial factor in bringing about his
harm?
Yes ____ No ____
If you answered “Yes” to Question 2b, go on to Question 3. If you answered “No”
to Question 2b, go on to Question 4.
The jury answered “No” to Question 1a, therefore, did not answer the remaining questions. The trial
court molded the jury’s answer into a verdict in favor of Appellants.
Martin moved for a new trial. The trial court granted the motion on the grounds that the jury’s
verdict “shocked the Court’s sense of justice.” The court reasoned that because Evans sat in his truck
for “a couple of minutes” before backing up, he was aware that there were blind spots in his mirrors
such that he was unable to see directly behind his vehicle, and it was a busy rest area and likely that
a pedestrian or vehicle could stand or park directly behind him, the jury’s verdict that Evans was not
negligent was unacceptable.
Evans appealed to the Superior Court, which concluded…that the trial court properly granted a
new trial, and thus affirmed. This Court [heard Evans’s appeal] to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in granting a new trial where the parties presented conflicting testimony that
required a credibility determination. We now reverse.
A new trial is warranted when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s
sense of justice…. Negligence is the absence of ordinary care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in the same or similar circumstances. The mere occurrence of an accident does not establish
negligent conduct. Rather, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant engaged in conduct that deviated from the general standard of care
expected under the circumstances, and that this deviation proximately caused actual harm.
The trial court instructed the jury with regard to the definition of negligence as follows:
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The legal term, negligence, otherwise known as carelessness, is the absence of
ordinary care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise in the
circumstances here presented.
Negligent conduct may consist either of an act or an omission to act when
there is a duty to do so. In other words, negligence is the failure to do something
which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a
reasonably careful person would not do in light of all the surrounding
circumstances established by the evidence in this case. It is for you to determine
how a reasonably careful person would act in those circumstances.
Now, I told you in defining negligence that part of that definition was absence
of ordinary care. I want to define ordinary care for you. Ordinary care is the care
a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances presented in this
case. It is the duty of every person to use ordinary care not only for his own safety
and the protection of his property, but also to avoid injury to others. What
constitutes ordinary care varies according to the particular circumstances and
conditions existing then and there. The amount of care required by law must be
in keeping with the degree of danger involved.
Thus, the trial court called upon the jury to evaluate the testimony and decide whether Evans
exercised ordinary care under the circumstances.
The evidence presented to the jury on the issue of whether Evans was negligent in the operation
of his vehicle was contradictory in several respects, including: (1) whether Evans took the necessary
precautions prior to moving his tractor-trailer in reverse, specifically, whether he activated his fourway flashers and released the emergency brakes which emit a loud hissing sound; (2) whether Martin
or Steverson was driving the Isuzu truck; (3) whether Martin was parked in a legal parking space;
and (4) Martin’s position when the incident occurred.
Evans testified that when he pulled into the Canonsburg rest area, he parked in what he believed
to be the last legal parking space in that particular row. As proof of this, he stated that he had to park
at an angle to fit his tractor-trailer into the lines. When he returned from the restrooms, he claimed
that no one was parked behind him. He knew that he only had to back up a couple of feet to be able
to pull out of the space. After he made a recording in his logbook, he put in the clutch, put the truck
into low reverse, activated his four-way flashers, and checked his mirrors. Evans further stated that
although he could not see directly behind him at that moment, he kept his eye on the right mirror
because he knew he would be able to see out of that side first. According to Evans, he moved his
tractor-trailer backwards “slower than you could walk.” When he felt a nudge and saw someone
waving at him to stop in his rear view mirror, he stopped instantly.
Martin testified that he was driving the Isuzu truck southbound on Interstate 79 on May 24,
1989, despite the fact that he did not have a valid driver’s license at that time. He claimed that he
saw his brother Neil Martin, who waved to him to pull off at the next rest area. He stated that he
pulled into the last parking space and parked approximately ten feet behind the tractor-trailer and
turned off the ignition. Then, after about a minute and a half, he exited the truck and walked between
the front of his vehicle and the tractor-trailer. He proceeded about two-thirds of the width of the
tractor-trailer when he realized that the tractor-trailer was moving towards him. He testified that he
did not hear the truck’s engine or the release of the emergency brakes, nor did he see any flashing
lights from the back of the tractor-trailer. After the tractor-trailer pushed him up against the Isuzu
truck, he claimed that Steverson jumped into the truck, started it, and put it in reverse, at which
point Martin fell to the ground. Neil Martin corroborated this version of the events.
Steverson, on the other hand, claimed that he, not Martin, had been driving the truck. Steverson
testified that he parked the truck approximately ten feet behind the tractor-trailer and turned off the
ignition. According to Steverson, Martin got out of the passenger’s seat, and walked in front of the
Isuzu truck and leaned against it while talking to his brother, Neil, for a couple of minutes. When
Steverson realized that the tractor-trailer was moving towards them and that Martin was caught
between the two, he started the truck and put it in reverse.
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State Police Trooper Dennis Spirk, who arrived at the scene of the accident to investigate,
testified that he interviewed Evans, Steverson and Anthony Martin concerning how the accident
occurred. When questioned by Trooper Spirk, Evans stated that when he returned from the
restrooms he walked around the back of his truck before he got into the cab, and that from the cab
he did not see anything behind him. Trooper Spirk stated that Steverson indicated that he was the
driver of the smaller truck. In response to questioning, Anthony Martin told Trooper Spirk that he
was standing between the two trucks, with his back to the tractor-trailer and facing the truck he had
just exited, when the tractor-trailer backed up and hit him.
Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury. A jury is entitled to believe
all, part or none of the evidence presented. A jury can believe any part of a witness’ testimony that
they choose, and may disregard any portion of the testimony that they disbelieve. Consequently,
because of the conflicting versions of the events surrounding the accident, it was the jury’s duty to
make a credibility determination and to decide whether Evans exercised ordinary care under the
circumstances. The jury obviously chose to believe Evans and Steverson, and found that Evans was
not negligent.
However, the trial court concluded that “under all of the facts and circumstances of this case,
even when viewed most favorably to the verdict winner, this Court cannot accept the jury’s
conclusion that Evans was not negligent.” In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited evidence
supporting the fact that Evans made no effort during the two minutes after he entered his cab and
prior to putting his truck in motion, to determine if there was anyone or anything behind his vehicle.
This, coupled with the facts that the rest area was busy and there were “blind spots” in the mirrors,
caused the trial court to reach its conclusion.
However, the evidence equally supports a finding that Evans exercised ordinary care under the
circumstances. Evans testified that he parked in what he believed to be the last legal parking space
in the row. In fact, he stated that he had to park his tractor-trailer with the cab at an angle to the
trailer because it was the last spot and there was barely enough room for his vehicle. When he
returned to his truck, no one was parked behind him. Before backing up, he activated his four-way
flashers and released his emergency brakes, which he knew made a loud hissing sound. Then, he
proceeded to move the truck backwards “slower than you could walk.” Therefore, if the jury were to
believe Evans’ account of the events, he took the necessary precautions required by the
circumstances and proceeded with care.
A resolution of whether Evans was negligent relied upon a credibility determination and the
jury’s assessment of what constituted ordinary care under the circumstances. Because this
assessment was solely within the province of the jury, the trial court was not at liberty to reassess the
evidence and make its own credibility determinations simply because it would have reached a
different conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding
the jury’s credibility determination and substituting its own. The verdict was not so contrary to the
evidence so as to shock one’s sense of justice. We reverse and reinstate the jury’s verdict.
1.

QUESTIONS
Jury Duty: Set aside the court’s legal analysis for a moment and focus only on the facts.
If you were a juror in this case, how would you have voted? Did Evans show ordinary
care? Had you been in Evans’s position, would you have reversed the truck in the same
way? Are those last two questions synonymous?

2.

Judicial Paternalism: The trial judge wiped out the jury’s verdict because its answer to
the breach question “shocked the Court’s sense of justice.” When the issue on the table
is “ordinary care,” should the judge ever second-guess the jury? Is one person in a robe
ever justified in overruling what twelve citizens conclude a “reasonably prudent person”
would do under the circumstances?

3.

Jumping the Gun: Did the jurors in Martin perhaps get ahead of themselves? Maybe
they felt that, although Evans failed to show ordinary care, Martin was also careless in
standing behind the truck or ignoring the flashing lights. If that’s what they thought,
should they have answered the questions differently? Would it have made a difference?
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PINGARO v. ROSSI
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division (1999)
Havey, Judge:

ã

A jury awarded $300,000 in damages to plaintiff Ellen Pingaro, a
meter reader for defendant New Jersey Natural Gas Company (NJNG),
for injuries she sustained as a result of a dog bite she suffered from a
German Shepherd owned by defendant Joseph Rossi….
[O]n June 27, 1996, [Pingaro was] performing her meter reading
duties…. When she arrived at Rossi’s house, her data cap, a hand-held
computer, “beeped” a message: “bad dog, knock.” The data cap provides
the meter reader with the name of the street and location of the meter and
at times displays specialized messages pertaining to the customer, such as
whether a “bad dog” may be present.
According to plaintiff, she had never been to Rossi’s home before. She
knocked on Rossi’s door but received no answer. She proceeded to the
fenced-in backyard, rattled the gate and her keys and yelled “gas company.” There was no response.
She looked around the backyard for dogs or other animals. After satisfying herself that the yard was
clear, she unhooked the gate and walked towards the meter. Immediately upon entering the back
yard two dogs approached her. One dog, a large German Shepard, jumped up, knocked her down
and bit her on both arms, legs and head. She subdued the dog by hitting it with her flashlight, exited
the yard and called for help. A nearby construction worker summoned an ambulance which took
her to Community Medical Center where she received numerous stitches and was released later that
afternoon. [She required physical therapy and was out of work for six weeks. She also suffered scars
on her arms and legs, as well as anxiety, fear, and depression related to the incident.]…
Rossi testified that the dog which attacked plaintiff was kept fenced in his backyard. The only
gate to the backyard was the gate utilized by plaintiff in entering the yard. He stated that a large
“Beware of Dog” sign was posted on the gate.
According to Rossi, over the course of ten years he had spoken with several meter readers about
his dog and told them they should not enter his yard if no one was home. The meter readers
responded that they would comply with his request. Rossi noted that this arrangement had worked
for over ten years, and when he was not at home the meter readers would estimate his bill, leave a
card for him to mail in or come back at a later date….
The so-called “dog bite” statute, N.J.S.A. § 4:19-16, reads in pertinent part:
The owner of any dog which shall bite a person while such person is on or in a
public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the
owner of the dog, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person
bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner’s knowledge
of such viciousness.
There is no question that plaintiff fulfilled the three elements necessary to establish Rossi’s
liability under the statute. Rossi was the owner of the dog, the dog bit plaintiff and the bite occurred
while plaintiff was lawfully on Rossi’s property. Satisfaction of the elements of the statute imposes
strict liability upon Rossi for damages sustained by plaintiff…. In order for plaintiff to prevail under
the “dog-bite” statute, she need not prove scienter; that is, that Rossi knew of the dog’s dangerous
propensities….
1.

ã

QUESTIONS
Barking Up the Wrong Tree: Rossi offered evidence about the steps he took to ensure
that his dog didn’t bite visitors to his home. Do you think he showed ordinary care? Do
you see why the answer to that question is legally irrelevant here?

JJ Look, 1 Pound of Fury (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
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2.

What’s Tort Law Up To? Is New Jersey’s “dog bite” statute fair? Does it create good
incentives? How is it likely to affect behavior in the state? How does it affect the legal
process of tort law to impose strict liability instead of ordinary negligence liability?
CAMPBELL v. KOVICH
Court of Appeals of Michigan (2006)

Per curiam:

ã

…Karie [Campbell] was struck in the eye by an unknown,
unrecovered object that she alleges was ejected from a lawn mower
being operated by Ashton [Minish], who was mowing the Koviches’
lawn. [After Karie sued Ashton and the Koviches for negligence, the
trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition.]…
[P]laintiffs contend that they presented sufficient evidence to
establish that Ashton breached duties he owed in this case. We
disagree…. [N]o Michigan authority specifically address[es] what
degree of care a person mowing a lawn must exercise. In Gore v. Ohio
Dep’t of Transportation, 774 N.E.2d 817 (Ohio Ct. Cl., 2002), a
limousine passenger brought an action against the Ohio Department of
Transportation (ODOT) as the employer of an independent contractor
that mowed grass on a highway median, alleging that ODOT was liable
for injuries she sustained when a piece of rubber thrown from a mower struck her in the head. On
ODOT’s motion for summary judgment, the court held that ODOT was not liable for the
independent contractor’s negligence. The court also reasoned that “removing debris from the
mower’s path is a routine precaution, which any careful contractor could be expected to take in the
exercise of ordinary care.” Thus, Ohio authority persuasively suggests that inspecting a mower’s path
is what ordinary care requires.
Adopting the Ohio requirement for ordinary care as our own, there is insufficient evidence that
Ashton failed to exercise reasonable care. On September 14, 2004, before mowing the Koviches’
lawn, Ashton inspected the lawn for a couple of minutes. Karie admitted that while Ashton was
mowing the lawn, he was not doing anything unusual, but was merely pushing the lawn mower, and
that he did not appear to be in a hurry and appeared to be watching where he was walking. Before
Karie was struck, Ashton was watching the area in front of him, and he did not see anything in front
of the lawn mower. Karie also acknowledged in her deposition that Ashton never acknowledged that
he had mowed over anything. Under these facts, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether Ashton exercised reasonable care in the operation of the lawn mower….
Ashton was not required to exercise extraordinary care. Ordinarily prudent people, when
mowing a lawn, do not go to such extraordinary lengths that they do more than a brief inspection
of the lawn before mowing, avoid mowing altogether when other persons are within 75 feet, mow
only under close parental supervision, or look anywhere but ahead of where they are going while
mowing. The evidence suggests that Ashton exercised ordinary care, but an accident of unclear
causation occurred. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, reasonable minds
could not disagree that Ashton exercised due care. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting
summary disposition to Ashton….
1.
2.

ã

QUESTIONS
Grass Is Always Greener: Could Ashton have done anything to make his mowing safer?
If so, why doesn’t the court hold him responsible for not taking those precautions?
Duty versus Breach: Are you starting to see the relationship between duty and breach?
When defendants deny that they owed a duty, what are they saying about their need to

Troy B. Thompson, Mowing Concentration (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
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take care? When they deny that they breached a duty, what are they saying about the
care they took? How does foreseeability play a key, yet distinct, role in each element?
ZAP PROBLEM
Twelve-year-old Jameela is swinging a piece of metal wire while she’s walking over a pedestrian
bridge above Amtrak’s railroad tracks. Jameela’s wire, which is around eight feet long, brushes
against an electric wire that Amtrak concealed beneath the bridge nearly five feet below the pathway
where pedestrians walk. When the two wires touch, Jameela suffers serious electrical burns. She sues
for negligence. In its defense, Amtrak introduces uncontroverted evidence that nobody standing on
the bridge could see or reach Amtrak’s wire. An expert electrician also testifies that insulating
Amtrak’s wires would make them ineffective. A safer alternative would be to bury the wires
underground, but that costly and difficult process would take years to complete.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Did Amtrak owe Jameela a duty? If so, would it be a duty of ordinary or extraordinary care?
Assuming there’s a duty, was there a breach of due care?
In determining breach, would foreseeability play any role?
Should it matter whether it was customary in the railroad industry to place wires beneath
bridges in this manner?
(e) Should we care how hard or expensive safer measures would be for Amtrak to adopt?
(f) Is it relevant if Amtrak’s wiring complied with or violated relevant safety regulations?

FARDELL v. POTTS
Court of Appeal of England and Wales (1924)
The Master of the Rolls:

ã

The Court of Appeal to-day delivered judgment
in this important case….
In this case the appellant was a Mrs. Fardell, a
woman, who, while navigating a motor-launch on the
River Thames collided with the respondent, who was
navigating a punt, as a result of which the respondent
was immersed and caught cold. The respondent
brought an action for damages, in which it was
alleged that the collision and subsequent immersion
were caused by the negligent navigation of the appellant. In the Court below the learned judge
decided that there was evidence on which the jury might find that the defendant had not taken
reasonable care, and, being of that opinion, very properly left to the Jury the question whether in
fact she had failed to use reasonable care or not. The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him
two hundred and fifty pounds damages. This verdict we are asked to set aside on the ground of
misdirection by the learned judge, the contention being that the case should never have been allowed
to go to the Jury; and this contention is supported by a somewhat novel proposition, which has been
ably, though tediously, argued by Sir Ethelred Rutt.
The Common Law of England has been laboriously built about a mythical figure—the figure of
‘The Reasonable Man’. In the field of jurisprudence this legendary individual occupies the place
which in another science is held by the Economic Man, and in social and political discussions by the
Average or Plain Man. He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities which we
demand of the good citizen. No matter what may be the particular department of human life which
falls to be considered in these Courts, sooner or later we have to face the question: Was this or was
it not the conduct of a reasonable man? Did the defendant take such care to avoid shooting the
ã
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plaintiff in the stomach as might reasonably be expected of a reasonable man? (Moocat v.
Radley (1883) 2 Q.B.) Did the plaintiff take such precautions to inform himself of the circumstances
as any reasonable man would expect of an ordinary person having the ordinary knowledge of an
ordinary person of the habits of wild bulls when goaded with garden-forks and the persistent
agitation of red flags? (Williams v. Dogbody (1841) 2 A.C.)
I need not multiply examples. It is impossible to travel anywhere or to travel for long in that
confusing forest of learned judgments which constitutes the Common Law of England without
encountering the Reasonable Man. He is at every turn, an ever-present help in time of trouble, and
his apparitions mark the road to equity and right. There has never been a problem, however difficult,
which His Majesty’s judges have not in the end been able to resolve by asking themselves the simple
question, ‘Was this or was it not the conduct of a reasonable man?’ and leaving that question to be
answered by the jury.
This noble creature stands in singular contrast to his kinsman the Economic Man, whose every
action is prompted by the single spur of selfish advantage and directed to the single end of monetary
gain. The Reasonable Man is always thinking of others; prudence is his guide, and ‘Safety First’, if I
may borrow a contemporary catchword, is his rule of life. All solid virtues are his, save only that
peculiar quality by which the affection of other men is won. For it will not be pretended that socially
he is much less objectionable than the Economic Man. Though any given example of his behaviour
must command our admiration, when taken in the mass his acts create a very different set of
impressions. He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the
immediate foreground before he executes a leap or bound; who neither star-gazes nor is lost in
meditation when approaching trap-doors or the margin of a dock; who records in every case upon
the counterfoils of cheques such ample details as are desirable, scrupulously substitutes the word
‘Order’ for the word ‘Bearer’, crosses the instrument ‘a/c Payee only’, and registers the package in
which it is despatched; who never mounts a moving omnibus, and does not alight from any car while
the train is in motion; who investigates exhaustively the bona fides of every mendicant before
distributing alms, and will inform himself of the history and habits of a dog before administering a
caress; who believes no gossip, nor repeats it, without firm basis for believing it to be true; who never
drives his ball till those in front of him have definitely vacated the putting-green which is his own
objective; who never from one year’s end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife, his
neighbours, his servants, his ox, or his ass; who in the way of business looks only for that narrow
margin of profit which twelve men such as himself would reckon to be ‘fair’, contemplates his fellowmerchants, their agents, and their goods, with that degree of suspicion and distrust which the law
deems admirable; who never swears, gambles, or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in
moderation, and even while he flogs his child is meditating only on the golden mean. Devoid, in
short, of any human weakness, with not one single saving vice, sans prejudice, procrastination, illnature, avarice, and absence of mind, as careful for his own safety as he is for that of others, his
excellent but odious character stands like a monument in our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to
his fellow-citizens to order their lives after his own example.
I have called him a myth; and, in so far as there are few, if any, of his mind and temperament to
be found in the ranks of living men, the title is well chosen. But it is a myth which rests upon solid
and even, it may be, upon permanent foundations. The Reasonable Man is fed and kept alive by the
most valued and enduring of our juridical institutions—the common jury. Hateful as he must
necessarily be to any ordinary citizen who privately considers him, it is a curious paradox that where
two or three are gathered together in one place they will with one accord pretend an admiration for
him; and, when they are gathered together in the formidable surroundings of a British jury, they are
easily persuaded that they themselves are, each and generally, reasonable men. Without stopping to
consider how strange a chance it must have been that has picked fortuitously from a whole people
no fewer than twelve examples of a species so rare, they immediately invest themselves with the
attributes of the Reasonable Man, and are therefore at one with the Courts in their anxiety to support
the tradition that such a being in fact exists Thus it is that while the Economic Man has under the
stress of modern conditions almost wholly disappeared from view his Reasonable cousin has gained
in power with every case in which he has figured.
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To return, however, as every judge must ultimately return, to the case which is before us—it has
been urged for the appellant, and my own researches incline me to agree, that in all that mass of
authorities which bears upon this branch of the law there is no single mention of a reasonable
woman. It was ably insisted before us that such an omission, extending over a century and more of
judicial pronouncements, must be something more than a coincidence; that among the innumerable
tributes to the reasonable man there might be expected at least some passing reference to a
reasonable person of the opposite sex; that no such reference is found, for the simple reason that no
such being is contemplated by the law; that legally at least there is no reasonable woman, and that
therefore in this case the learned judge should have directed the jury that, while there was evidence
on which they might find that the defendant had not come up to the standard required of a
reasonable man, her conduct was only what was to be expected of a woman, as such.
It must be conceded at once that there is merit in this contention, however unpalatable it may at
first appear. The appellant relies largely on Baxter’s Case, 1639 (2 Bole, at page 100), in which it was
held that for the purposes of estover the wife of a tenant by the mesne was at law in the same position
as an ox or other cattle demenant (to which a modern parallel may be found in the statutory
regulations of many railway companies, whereby, for the purposes of freight, a typewriter is counted
as a musical instrument). It is probably no mere chance that in our legal text-books the problems
relating to married women are usually considered immediately after the pages devoted to idiots and
lunatics. Indeed, there is respectable authority for saying that at Common Law this was the status of
a woman. Recent legislation has whittled away a great part of this venerable conception, but so far
as concerns the law of negligence, which is our present consideration, I am persuaded that it remains
intact. It is no bad thing that the law of the land should here and there conform with the known facts
of every day experience. The view that there exists a class of beings, illogical, impulsive, careless,
irresponsible, extravagant, prejudiced, and vain, free for the most part from those worthy and
repellent excellences which distinguish the Reasonable Man, and devoted to the irrational arts of
pleasure and attraction, is one which should be as welcome and as well accepted in our Courts as it
is in our drawing-rooms—and even in Parliament. The odd stipulation is often heard there that
some new Committee or Council shall consist of so many persons ‘one of which must be a woman’:
the assumption being that upon scientific principles of selection no woman would be added to a
body having serious deliberative functions. That assumption, which is at once accepted and resented
by those who maintain the complete equality of the sexes, is not founded, as they suppose, in some
prejudice of Man but in the considered judgments of Nature. I find that at Common Law
a reasonable woman does not exist. The contention of the respondent fails and the appeal must be
allowed. Costs to be costs in the action, above and below, but not costs in the case.
Bungay, L. F., and Blow, L. F., concurred.
1.

QUESTIONS
The Reasonable Man: What do you make of this so-called “Reasonable Man”? Is he
odious? Is he ordinary? Would you enjoy being around him? Would you admire him?

2.

Curiosity Killed the Juror: Is the “curious paradox” mentioned in Fardell really so
curious? Can you make sense of it?

3.

The Reasonable Woman: Though we’re told that “at Common Law a reasonable
woman does not exist,” would tort law be better off replacing the Reasonable Man with her?
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VAUGHAN v. MENLOVE
Court of Common Pleas (1837)
[Defendant owned land next to a group of cottages
belonging to Plaintiff.]… At the trial it appeared that the
rick in question had been made by the Defendant near
the boundary of his own premises; that the hay was in
such and state when put together, as to give rise to
discussions on the probability of fire; that though there
were conflicting opinions on the subject, yet during a
period of five weeks, the Defendant was repeatedly
warned of his peril; that his stock was insured; and that
upon one Occasion, being advised to take the rick down to avoid all danger, he said “he would
chance it.” He made an aperture or chimney through the rick; but in spite, or perhaps in
consequence of this precaution, the rick at length burst into flames from the spontaneous heating of
its materials; the flames communicated to the Defendant’s barn and stables, and thence to the
Plaintiff’s cottages, which were entirely destroyed[, causing damage worth £500].
Patteson J. before whom the cause was tried, told the jury that the question for them to consider,
was, whether the fire had been occasioned by gross negligence on the part of the Defendant; adding,
that he was bound to proceed with such reasonable caution as a prudent man would have exercised
under such circumstances.
A verdict having been found for the Plaintiff, a rule nisi for a new trial was obtained, on the
ground that the jury should have been directed to consider, not, whether the Defendant had been
guilty of gross negligence with reference to the standard of ordinary prudence, a standard too
uncertain to afford any criterion; but whether he had acted bona fide to the best of his judgment; if
he had, he ought not to be responsible for the misfortune of not possessing the highest order of
intelligence….
ã

Tindal, Judge:
…It is contended…that the learned Judge was wrong in leaving this to the jury as a case of gross
negligence, and that the question of negligence was so mixed up with reference to what would be
the conduct of a man of ordinary prudence that the jury might have thought the latter the rule by
which they were to decide; that such a rule would he too uncertain to act upon; and that the question
ought to have been whether the Defendant had acted honestly and bona fide to the best of his own
judgment. That, however, would leave so vague a line as to afford no rule at all, the degree of
judgment belonging to each individual being infinitely various: and though it has been urged that
the care which a prudent man would take, is not an intelligible proposition as a rule of law, yet such
has always been the rule adopted in cases of bailment…. Though in some cases a greater degree of
care is exacted than in others, …[t]he care taken by a prudent man has always been the rule laid
down; and as to the supposed difficulty of applying it, a jury has always been able to say, whether,
taking that rule as their guide, there has been negligence on the occasion in question.
Instead, therefore, of saying that the liability for negligence should be co-extensive with the
judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as the length of the foot of each individual,
we ought rather to adhere to the rule which requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of
ordinary prudence would observe. That was in substance the criterion presented to the jury in this
case, and therefore the present rule must be discharged….
Vaughan, Judge:
…It was, if anything, too favourable to the Defendant to leave it to the jury whether he had been
guilty of gross negligence; for when the Defendant upon being warned as to the consequences likely
to ensue from the condition of the rick, said, “he would chance it,” it was manifest he adverted to
his interest in the insurance office. The conduct of a prudent man has always been the criterion for
ã
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the jury in such cases: but it is by no means confined to them. In insurance cases, where a captain
has sold his vessel after damage too extensive for repairs, the question has always been, whether he
had pursued the course which a prudent man would have pursued under the same circumstance.
Here, there was not a single witness whose testimony did not go to establish gross negligence in the
Defendant. He had repeated warnings of what was likely to occur, and the whole calamity was
occasioned by his procrastination….
1.

QUESTIONS
Rights and Wrongs: Is Vaughan an example of how someone can act wrongly without
being blameworthy? Does your answer depend on whether you believe that Menlove
was really doing the best he could?

2.

Objectivity: There are two distinct ways that we might view the reasonable-person
standard as objective. Can you see them?

3.

Je Suis Menlove: Most of us are “Menloves” at something. Perhaps you’re a bad driver
or just generally a clumsy person. What can you do about it to minimize the risks you
pose to others?
APPELHANS v. McFALL
Appellate Court of Illinois (2001)

Byrne, Justice:

ã

Plaintiff, Maxine Appelhans, …who was 66 years old at
the time, was walking north [on a rural road with no
sidewalk] when William [McFall], who was five years old,
rode his bicycle and struck plaintiff from behind. Plaintiff fell
and suffered a fractured hip. At the time of the accident, it
was daylight outside, the pavement was clear and dry, and no
other pedestrians, automobiles, or bicyclists were present.
The roadway in the area was straight and flat.
In count I, plaintiff alleged that William’s parents negligently failed to (1) instruct their son on
the proper use of his bicycle, or (2) supervise him while he rode his bicycle on a public roadway
because they knew or should have known that his youth would prevent him from considering the
safety of pedestrians such as plaintiff…. In count II, plaintiff generally asserted that William
negligently caused the collision.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss…. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that
William’s youth rendered him incapable of negligence and that plaintiff failed to allege specific facts
that would have put William’s parents on notice that he might ride his bicycle negligently. This
timely appeal followed.
The Tender Years Doctrine
Defendants’ motion to dismiss…admits all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom…. The fact that disposes of this issue is undisputed: William was five
years old when he collided with plaintiff.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that we should abandon the well-settled rule that a child is
incapable of negligence if he is less than seven years old. She argues that we should adopt the
“Massachusetts Rule,” under which any child will be found capable of negligence if the fact finder
decides that the child failed to exercise a degree of care that is reasonable for similarly
situated children.
Section 283A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) mirrors the Massachusetts
Rule and provides that “if the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to
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avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under
like circumstances.” Comment b to section 283A further provides in relevant part:
Some courts have endeavored to lay down fixed rules as to a minimum age below
which the child is incapable of being negligent, and a maximum age above which
he is to be treated like an adult. Usually these rules have been derived from the old
rules of the criminal law, by which a child under the age of seven was considered
incapable of crime, and one over fourteen was considered to be as capable as an
adult. The prevailing view is that in tort cases no such arbitrary limits can be fixed.
Undoubtedly there is a minimum age, probably somewhere in the vicinity of four
years, below which negligence can never be found; but with the great variation in
the capacities of children and the situations which may arise, it cannot be fixed
definitely for all cases.
In 1886, our supreme court held that an injured child who was seven years and three months old
at the time of the accident “was too young, at the time she was injured, to observe any care for her
personal safety.” Chicago, St. Louis & Pittsburgh R.R. Co. v. Welsh, 9 N.E. 197 (Ill. 1886). The court
later expressly adopted the tender years doctrine, which states that a child is incapable
of…negligence if he is less than seven years old…. The rationale for the tender years doctrine is the
belief that a child under the age of seven is incapable of recognizing and appreciating risk and is
therefore deemed incapable of negligence as a matter of law. The child’s immaturity limits his
liability regardless of whether, as a litigant, he is the plaintiff or the defendant….
Defendants contend that we must follow the tender years doctrine simply because Illinois courts
have applied it for nearly 100 years. Plaintiff responds that profound societal changes since the
adoption of the rule undermine…stare decisis. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the judiciary that
crafted the rule did not envision “cable television, video games, the internet, pre-teen gangs, and
violent crime.” She argues that, in response to these modern-day challenges, children are instructed
at an early age that they must exercise good judgment for themselves and others and therefore we
may hold them to a reasonable standard of care based upon their age.
In reaffirming its preference for the Massachusetts Rule, the Supreme Court of Minnesota [in
Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 250 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1977)] quoted an opinion it drafted in 1936 [Eckhardt
v. Hanson, 264 N.W. 776 (Minn. 1936)]:
Under present-day circumstances a child of tender years is permitted to assume
many responsibilities. There is much opportunity for him to observe and thus
become cognizant of the necessity for exercising some degree of care. Compulsory
school attendance, the radio, the movies, and traffic conditions all tend to have
this effect. The Illinois rule has no basis in sound reason or logic. It is based upon
an outworn historical rule of criminal law which refused to acknowledge any
capacity on the part of any child under seven years of age to distinguish between
right and wrong.
The Minnesota high court recognized that children were sufficiently sophisticated in 1936 to be
held to a reasonable standard of care. As society has changed dramatically since the Eckhardt court
made its observations, children have become even more sophisticated. Because the tender years
doctrine is based on the assumption that young children cannot recognize or appreciate risk, the
rule is increasingly undermined as society more thoroughly educates them on safety issues. We
find Eckhardt to be persuasive, and it lends great weight to plaintiff’s argument that Illinois children
under the age of seven may be negligent.
Plaintiff further contends that the tender years doctrine is unreasonable because it arbitrarily
sets an age below which a child is presumed to be incapable of negligence. Plaintiff contends that
the use of an arbitrary age leads to “ridiculous” results because a child does not “magically” know to
exercise due care after his seventh birthday…. [S]everal jurisdictions have accepted this argument
and rejected the tender years doctrine accordingly. We agree with plaintiff that the arbitrariness of
the rule supports its abandonment. However, we reluctantly conclude that the principle of stare
decisis requires this court to reassert the tender years doctrine.
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It is well settled that where it is clear that a court has made a mistake in adopting a rule, it should
not decline to correct it, even though the rule may have been reasserted and acquiesced in for many
years. No person has a vested right in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain for
his benefit. However, when a rule of law has been settled, it should be followed unless a party can
show that serious detriment prejudicial to the public interest is likely to arise. The rule of stare
decisis is founded upon sound principles in the administration of justice, and a court should not
depart from rules long recognized as the law merely because the court believes that it might decide
the issue differently if the question were novel…. The modification in the law that plaintiff advocates
is…far-reaching…, and we decline to announce such a sweeping change here. Instead, we invite our
supreme court or the legislature to revisit the viability of the tender years doctrine.
When a child is between 7 and 14 years old, the trier of fact must consider the “age, capacity,
intelligence, and experience of the child” in light of the rebuttable presumption that a child between
the ages of 7 and 14 is incapable of negligence. However, it is well settled in Illinois that a child who
is 14 years old or who engages in an adult activity is held to an adult standard of care. Because bicycle
riding on a public street is not an adult activity, a bicyclist between the ages of 7 and 14 is held to a
reasonable standard of care based upon his age and experience. Therefore, one could argue that,
when a child under the age of 7 engages in an activity that children between the ages of 7 and 14
normally pursue, such as riding a bicycle, the child should be held to the standard of care of a
reasonable 7-year-old. However, we do not answer this question here…. We conclude that the trial
court correctly dismissed count II of plaintiff’s complaint because William was incapable of
negligence at the time of the accident.
Negligent Parental Supervision
Plaintiff next asserts that William’s parents were negligent for failing to supervise William or
instruct him on the proper use of his bicycle…. In Illinois, the parent-child relationship does not
automatically render parents liable for the torts of their minor children. Parents may be liable,
however, if they do not adequately control or supervise their child. To prove a claim of negligent
supervision, a plaintiff must show that (1) the parents were aware of specific instances of prior
conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of was likely to occur and (2) the
parents had the opportunity to control the child….
Here, plaintiff alleged that the parents’ mere knowledge of William’s age sufficiently informed
them that ongoing supervision was necessary. Plaintiff did not assert that the parents knew of a
specific prior incident where William negligently struck a pedestrian while he rode his bicycle.
Plaintiff essentially contends that parents should be liable for all negligent acts of their children.
However, we conclude that holding parents strictly liable for failing to prevent their child’s
negligence is unreasonable and unsupported by the law. Cf. Chu v. Bowers, 656 N.E.2d 436 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1995) (“it is in the nature of children to be careless and thoughtless on occasion, and society
must be ever aware of the need to exercise extraordinary caution when children are present”).
In Lott v. Strang, 727 N.E.2d 407 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), the plaintiffs sued the parents of an
unemancipated minor who caused a traffic collision while he was allegedly intoxicated. In support
of their negligent parental supervision claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the parents knew that their
son was likely to drive negligently because he had been at fault in an earlier traffic accident.
The…Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal, concluding that section 316 of the Restatement does
not require parents to prevent their children from ever entering into a situation where they might
commit a negligent act. The court further noted that the parents had no duty to discipline their child
and regulate his conduct on a long-term ongoing basis. Parents are not liable for such broadly
defined omissions. In this case, plaintiff defines the omission in parenting even more broadly than
the alleged parental negligence addressed in Lott. Furthermore, plaintiff does not allege that the
parents had an opportunity to follow William to ensure that he rode his bicycle safely. We conclude
that plaintiff did not allege the two elements of negligent parental supervision….
1.

QUESTIONS
Breaking the (Piggy) Bank: Why does Maxine sue William for thousands of dollars? Is
William likely to have that kind of pocket money?
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2.

Biker Gangs: Maxine challenges the tender-years doctrine by pointing to the existence
of “cable television, video games, the internet, pre-teen gangs, and violent crime.” Is she
suggesting that five-year-old William was part of some juvenile bicycle gang and that
this was a drive-by attack? What’s her point?

3.

You Can Never Leave the Family: Notice that William’s parents aren’t subject to
respondeat superior liability, of the kind we saw in Leichtman and Walter. Instead,
Maxine’s claim against the parents must show independent carelessness based on their
allegedly negligent supervision. Why shouldn’t we treat families like firms? Shouldn’t
parents simply be on the hook when their kids carelessly injure others?
PYRAMID PROBLEM

Lapo had owned Bellapais Sporting Goods Store for almost a decade when a new bookstore
opened next-door. As he greeted his new neighbors, he was impressed by their elaborate display
featuring hundreds of books stacked in a 12-foot-high pyramid at the center of the store. To
celebrate his own store’s 10-year anniversary, Lapo got the grand idea to set up a similar display
using footballs, rugby balls, and basketballs instead. As Lapo excitedly described this vision to his
family over dinner, his husband Simon and their teenage kids pointed out that books are flat and
well-suited for stacking, whereas balls aren’t so easy to arrange. Lapo countered that all the best
stores in town had ambitious displays, but Simon still fretted about the structure’s intended size and
said he was worried about it falling on a customer and hurting someone. Intent on proving his family
wrong, Lapo watched hours of YouTube videos on erecting displays, worked hard to balance the
balls precisely, and was quite proud of the finished product.
A few hours after Lapo finished his project, the Randle family came in to purchase 5-year-old
Mary her first bicycle. Mary picked out a sleek blue bike and was pedaling around the store while
her parents chatted with Lapo and began checking out. Unfortunately for everyone involved, the
display suddenly came crashing down, hurting both Mary and another shopper, Piers. Security
footage didn’t show anyone touching the display or otherwise causing it to fall. Mary needed stitches
after one ball knocked her forehead into her new handlebars, while Piers suffered a bad concussion.
(a) Was Lapo negligent in setting up his display? What standard of care would apply in a
negligence claim against Lapo? Does it matter that Lapo’s husband and kids told him that
this was a bad idea? Would your answer change if Lapo was known for being a fun but
sometimes foolish guy who often seems to make dodgy decisions?
(b) Could Piers have a viable claim against Lapo for negligence? How about against Mary or
her parents?

CASES & CRITIQUE

129

LAKE SHORE & MICHIGAN SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. v. MILLER
Supreme Court of Michigan (1872)
Christiancy, Chief Justice:*
ã

The defendant in error sued the railroad
company…for injuries received by her in a
collision between the locomotive of a passenger
train and the wagon in which she was riding with
one Eldridge, the owner of the team and wagon,
who was driving, or undertook to drive, across the
railroad track at the crossing of a highway; claiming
that the collision took place and the injury was
caused by the negligence of the company…. [T]he
only negligence which can be claimed in the mode
of running the train, must rest upon the ground that the company having obscured the view and
deadened the sound of the approaching train [by piling up wood near the track] were bound for that
reason, to run at much less than their usual rate of speed in approaching that crossing, or to keep a
flagman there, or use some other extra means to warn people traveling the highway, of the approach
of trains from the west….
[In general,] if an engineer see a team and carriage, or a man, in the act of crossing the track, far
enough ahead of him to have ample time…to get entirely out of the way before the approach of the
engine…, and is not aware that he is deaf or insane, or from some other cause insensible of the
danger,… he has a right to rely upon the laws of nature and the ordinary course of things, and to
presume that the man driving the team or walking upon the track, has the use of his senses, and will
act upon the principles of common sense and the motive of self-preservation common to mankind
in general; that they will, therefore, get out of the way…; and he, therefore, has the right to go on,
without checking his speed, until he sees that the team or the man is not likely to get out of the way,
when it would become his duty to give extra alarm by bell or whistle, and if that is not heeded, then,
as a last resort, to check his speed or stop his train, if possible, in time to avoid disaster. If however,
he sees a child of tender years, or any person known to him to be, or from his appearance giving him
good reason to believe that he is, insane, or badly intoxicated, or otherwise insensible of danger, or
unable to avoid it, he has no right to assume that he will get out of the way, but should act upon the
belief that he might not, or would not, and he should therefore take means to stop his train in time.
A more stringent rule than this—a rule that would require the engineer to check his speed or
stop his train, whenever he sees a team crossing the track or a man walking on it, far enough ahead
to get out of the way in time…or which would require the engineer to know the deafness or
blindness, or acuteness of hearing or sight, or habits of prudence or recklessness or other personal
peculiarities of all those persons he may see approaching or upon the track…—any such rule, if
enforced, must effectually put an end to all railroads, as a means of speedy travel or transportation,
and reduce the speed of trains below that of canal-boats forty years ago; and would effectually defeat
the object of the legislature in authorizing this mode of conveyance.
But how are railroad companies, or their engineers or employees, to know the personal
peculiarities, the infirmities, personal character or station in life, of the hundreds of persons crossing
or approaching their track? By inspiration or intuition? And if they do not know, then how and why
shall the company be required to run their road, or regulate their own conduct, or that of their
servant, by such personal peculiarities of strangers, of which they know nothing?
These questions suggest their own answers; and these considerations sufficiently show, that the
[trial] court erred in adopting, as the standard of reasonable care on the part of Eldridge and the
plaintiff, “such care as persons of their situation or condition in life, would ordinarily exert under
* The Miller case excerpt, along with the next eight excerpts (Daniels, Eichhorn, Tucker, Asbury, Tankersly, Fox,
Lorentzen, and Denton), are based on materials originally prepared by Margo Schlanger, who graciously let me adapt them.
She explores issues raised by these cases in Margo Schlanger, Injured Women before Common Law Courts, 1860-1930, 21
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 79 (1998).
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like circumstances,” and in charging that “any greater care than this she was not required to
exercise.”… I think the judgment should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial awarded….
1.

QUESTIONS
Saying the Quiet Part Out Loud: Is this case about gender? Does Chief Justice
Christiancy seem to think that gender is relevant to the outcome?
DANIELS v. CLEGG
Supreme Court of Michigan (1873)

Christiancy, Chief Justice:

ã

This was an action…brought by Clegg against Daniels.
[After a jury trial,] the plaintiff recovered a judgment for fifty
dollars, which Daniels brings to this court by writ of error….
On the trial in the circuit the plaintiff gave evidence
tending to show that while his daughter, aged about twenty
years, was driving a horse and buggy of the plaintiff’s, …and
being in great haste to find her father on account of the
dangerous illness of a sister, she came to a hill which she
commenced to descend, when she observed the defendant driving on [the same side of the road as
she was] coming up the hill with two horses and a wagon; that defendant did not turn out for her at
all, but drove directly on, and although she turned as far as she possibly could to the [side], a collision
ensued by which the buggy or carriage in which she was riding was overturned and damages, and
the daughter was thrown out…; that the horse was a gentle family horse, that the buggy was injured
to the amount of ten dollars, and the horse damaged to the amount of fifty dollars.
The defendant gave evidence tending to show that [although he was driving on the left side of
the road, he drove appropriately, and that the accident was the plaintiff’s daughter’s fault]….
The trial court was correct in charging [the jury] that “in deciding whether the plaintiff’s
daughter exercised ordinary care in driving the horse, or was guilty of [contributory] negligence, the
jury should consider the age of the daughter, and the fact that she was a woman”; and “that she
would not be guilty of negligence if she used that degree of care that a person of her age and sex
would ordinarily use”; and in refusing to charge, that “for the purpose of this case, the daughter
should be held to the same degree of care and skill that would be required of the plaintiff himself,
had he been driving at the time of the collision.”
The case, upon this point, does not, as to the defendant, stand upon the same, or even similar
grounds with respect to the plaintiff’s daughter, as the case of a railroad engineer or conductor in
respect to person approaching a railroad track while the train is in rapid motion, with teams and
wagons which cannot be seen, or the persons driving be recognized, until so close to the track as to
render any knowledge of the character or the capacity of such persons of any avail; as in the case of
the Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R.R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 (1872)…. And yet, even in that
case, as to children upon the track, ahead of the train, who could be seen by the engineer, or other
persons known to him to be incompetent or deprived of any of their faculties necessary to their
safety under such circumstances, it was held that the engineer was bound to act with reference to
the incapacity of such persons thus appearing or known to him, and so far as in his power, to govern
his train accordingly, until such persons were out of danger. And the same principle [has been]
recognized with respect to the rights and duties of street railway companies towards children upon,
or getting on or off, their cars.
These cases fully recognized the principle that, in deciding upon the degree of diligence to be
required of children, or other persons more or less incompetent, that incompetency must be taken
into account; and no higher degree of diligence must be required of such persons than we have a
right to expect, or than experience has shown such persons generally would be likely to exercise
under like circumstance; and that other persons to whom that incompetency is apparent, or who
ã
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know or have good reason to believe it, are bound to exercise towards such persons a
correspondingly higher degree of care, according to the degree of that incompetency, so far as, under
the circumstances, it may be reasonably within their power. This principle, thus limited, is one of
simple justice, of common sense and common humanity, too obvious to require comment, and has
often been recognized by courts in various forms.
The charge in this case comes directly within this principle. The defendant saw the plaintiff’s
daughter approaching, driving the horse and carriage. No one would ordinarily expect, and the
defendant had no right to expect, from a young woman thus situated, the same amount of
knowledge, skill, dexterity, steadiness of nerve, or coolness of judgment, in short the same degree of
competency, which he would expect of ordinary men under like circumstances; nor, consequently,
would it be just to hold her to the same high degree of care and skill. The incompetency indicated
by her age or sex—without evidence (of which there is none) of any unusual skill or experience on
her part—was less in degree, it is true, than in the case of a mere child; but the difference is in degree
only, and not in principle…. [T]he judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
1.

QUESTIONS
Baselines: Does the court’s decision effectively give a benefit to women who drive a horse
and buggy by excusing them for poor driving that injures others? Is that fair to women?
Is it fair to the people who are injured?

2.

Tropes: Is this case just a historical artefact? It’s easy to treat it that way, given that it was
written nearly 150 years ago. But have you ever heard someone make a sexist quip about
“women drivers”? Can we really consign this case to the history books so easily?

3.

Pursuing Equality: Let’s assume that, in 1983, female drivers were on average less able
to control a horse and buggy than male drivers, perhaps due to common physical
characteristics or a lack of opportunities or training to drive. Which breach standard
best serves equality goals? Does a gender-blind “reasonable person” standard undermine
equality by making driving more expensive and less appealing for women? At the same
time, does a gender-conscious “reasonable woman” standard reinforce stereotypes and
essentialize people in ways that undermine equality?
EICHHORN v. MISSOURI, K. & T. RAILWAY CO.
Supreme Court of Missouri (1895)

Gantt, Judge:

ã

This is an action to recover damages
resulting from personal injuries received by
the plaintiff, a married woman, in attempting
to board one of defendant’s passenger trains at
Harriston station, on defendant’s railroad, in
Cooper county, Mo., on February 19, 1892.
The petition alleges that on said 19th day of
February, and for a long time prior thereto, the
defendant had carelessly and negligently failed
to construct and maintain any platform or provide any other means suitable and safe to enable
passengers to get on and off the cars of the defendant at said station; that the plaintiff took passage
on one of defendant’s passenger trains at Harriston, to go to Pilot Grove; that plaintiff was at the
time pregnant with child, and while getting aboard of defendant’s train as aforesaid, through the
carelessness and negligence of the defendant in not having any platform or other suitable and safe
means for getting onto defendant’s said passenger train, the plaintiff, without any fault on her part,
slipped from one of the steps of one of the cars in defendant’s said passenger train, and was strained
and wounded in the spine, and the right side and right arm, leg, and foot…to her damage in the sum
ã
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of $10,000, for which she asked judgment. The answer was a general denial and a plea of contributory
negligence, to which the plaintiff replied in a general denial. Upon the trial, the plaintiff got a verdict
and judgment for $3,000. Defendant…brings the case here by appeal.
At the trial the following facts were substantially established: …Some time in the month of
September, 1891, [the Harriston] depot building was destroyed by fire. Thereafter the trains stopped
at a point north of where the depot had stood originally, and at a place where a county road crossed
the railroad track. At this point the evidence showed that it was from 30 inches to 3 feet from the
ground to the lowest step on the passenger coaches. Harriston was a regular station on the line of
this railroad…. No platform or other means of any kind had been erected or provided by the railroad
company to aid passengers in getting on and off its cars after the depot was burned. A small pine
box had at one time been placed by one of the neighbors on the west side of the track, that passengers
might step on, in order to get on and off the cars. Some time prior to the 19th day of February, 1892,
the wife of the witness Nixon had stepped on this box in attempting to get on the train, and had
crushed it; and on the 19th day of February, and for some time prior thereto, this box had not been
in use, and was not at the place.
[On the day in question,] Mrs. Meisel preceded the plaintiff into the car, and boarded it without
any difficulty. The plaintiff, in attempting to get on the train, took hold of the iron bar with her right
hand, placed her right foot on the step, which was some 30 inches or 3 feet high, and, in attempting
to get on the cars, she slipped, and fell from the steps, and, in falling, sprained her ankle, and twisted
her body and spine, and the jar and shock seriously injured her, and caused her much suffering, and
resulted in a permanent injury to the spine, which has produced a partial paralysis of her entire right
side…. After her foot had slipped and she had fallen, she testified that the porter came out of the
cars, stepped down on the east side, where she was standing, and aided her in getting aboard the
cars. The evidence tends to show that, prior to this date, the plaintiff was a strong, healthy Norwegian
woman, who, unaided, had done all of her own housework; and the evidence further shows that,
immediately upon entering the car, she complained of having sprained her ankle; that her right foot
began to swell, and so pained her that she was forced to unbutton her shoe. A few days afterwards
she began to discover pains in her spine, just below the shoulders; and when she would attempt to
lift any article of weight, or lean back suddenly in her chair, the pain in her spine was so intense that
it would bring on spells of fainting and sickness….
Upon the conclusion of the evidence, the court gave the following instructions for the plaintiff,
over the defendant’s objections:
(1) …[I]f you…believe from the evidence that plaintiff, while getting aboard said
train, through the carelessness and negligence of the defendant in not having any
platform or other reasonably safe and suitable means for getting onto said train,
and without any fault or negligence on her part, the plaintiff slipped from one of
the steps of one of the cars in said train, and was [injured] then you will find the
issues for the plaintiff, unless you further find from the evidence that plaintiff’s
injuries, if any, were caused by her own negligence contributing directly thereto…
(2) The jury are instructed that the words ‘carelessly,’ ‘negligently,’ and
‘negligence,’ used in the instruction, mean the lack of such care and caution as
reasonable and prudent men would exercise under like circumstances.
[In addition, at the request of the defendant, the court added the following:]
The court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff
was injured in attempting to get upon one of defendant’s trains at Harriston
station, and that such injury was occasioned in whole or in part by the plaintiff’s
failure or neglect to exercise such care, caution, and foresight as a woman of
ordinary care, caution, and foresight would have exercised under the
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time, then such injury was due to
the plaintiff’s negligence, and your verdict must be for the defendant….
The instructions…very fairly present the only controverted issue in this case. It was the plain
duty of the defendant to provide suitable, safe, and convenient means for the ingress and egress of
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its passengers into and out of its trains. It had wholly failed to comply with this obligation…. Carriers
of passengers should anticipate that both old and young women, feeble and delicate people, as well
as the strong and robust, will seek passage on their cars, and provide suitable platforms or steps for
that purpose….
As to the criticism of the court’s instructions because it defined negligence to mean the lack of
such care and caution as reasonable and prudent “men” would exercise under like circumstances,
instead of “women,” it is only necessary to say the defendant’s own instruction cured this defect, if
any; but the jury would have been utterly unfit to try any case if they did not understand that “men,”
in this instruction, was generic, and embraced “women.” The judgment is affirmed.
1.

QUESTIONS
Gender as a Shield I: The railway company sought a “reasonable woman” standard in
the jury instructions. Why did it imagine that this might help it escape liability?
TUCKER v. HENNIKER
Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire (1860)

CASE, for damages resulting to the plaintiff from
alleged defects in a public highway in Henniker. On trial,
it appeared that on the afternoon of July 28, 1858, Dr.
Jonas Ball hired a horse and carriage at Hillsborough
Bridge, to go to the village of Henniker, where he arrived
about sunset, taking the plaintiff and his daughter with
him. Dr. Ball stopped at the hotel in Henniker; while the
plaintiff and his daughter started with the horse and
carriage to go to the plaintiff’s mother’s, about half a mile
distant; and on the way thither, the plaintiff driving the horse at the time, the accident occurred.
The defendants…contended that the unskillfulness or want of care of the plaintiff in the
management of the horse contributed to the accident; and upon this point the court instructed the
jury, that if the plaintiff were guilty of any fault in the management of the horse, any want of ordinary
care, skill and prudence in driving or controlling the horse, which contributed to the accident,
without which the accident would not have occurred, notwithstanding the defect in the highway,
she could not recover; because she was bound to exercise ordinary care, skill and prudence in
managing the horse, such care, skill and prudence as ordinary persons like herself were accustomed
to exercise in managing their horses. To the instructions…the defendants excepted.
Fowler, Justice:
…The instructions…although generally correct, contain a single expression in the explanation
of what constitutes ordinary care and skill, which, in the opinion of the court, might have misled the
jury as to the proper standard by which to determine it. The plaintiff was bound only to the exercise
of ordinary care, skill and prudence in the management of her horse; such care, skill and prudence
as persons or people in general were accustomed to exercise in managing their horses. Common or
ordinary diligence is defined by Story as “that degree of diligence which men in general exert in
respect to their own concerns”; “which men of common prudence generally exercise about their
own affairs in the age and country in which they live.” In a country where women are accustomed,
as among us, to drive horses and carriages, there can be no doubt that the degree of care, skill and
prudence required of a woman in managing her horse would be precisely that degree of care, skill
and prudence which persons of common prudence, or mankind in general, usually exercise, or are
accustomed to exert, in the management of the horses driven by them. Now the language of the
charge in the court below might be construed as making the average care, skill and prudence of
women in managing horses, instead of the average care, skill and prudence of mankind generally,
including all those accustomed to manage horses, whether men or women, boys or girls, the
standard by which to determine whether or not the plaintiff had been guilty of any unskillfulness or
want of care in the management of her horse at the time of the accident. As it may be doubtful
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whether this average would be higher or lower than that of mankind in general, and as it is not the
precise standard prescribed by the law, and the jury may possibly have been misled by it, the
instructions must be held to have been erroneous on this point…. With these views, the verdict
rendered for the plaintiff must be set aside, and a new trial be granted.
1.

QUESTIONS
Markedness: In reviewing the trial court’s jury instruction, the appellate court could’ve
construed “person” as gender-neutral language but instead concluded that using the
phrase “ordinary persons like herself” erroneously called upon the jury to consider the
plaintiff’s gender. Would the court have reached the same conclusion about “himself”?
ASBURY v. CHARLOTTE ELECTRIC RAILWAY, LIGHT & POWER CO.
Supreme Court of North Carolina (1899)

Montgomery, Justice:
This action was brought by the feme plaintiff to
recover damages for injuries received by her, and
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
defendant. The particular allegation of the complaint is
that the feme plaintiff was a passenger on one of the
street cars of the defendant, and while she was in the act
of disembarking therefrom the servants and agents of
the defendant in charge of said car negligently caused
the car to be suddenly started forward, and that the said
plaintiff, in consequence thereof, was thrown to the
ground and injured. The defendant denied the imputed
negligence, and averred that plaintiff was negligent in assuming a dangerous position, and in
alighting from the car.
[The plaintiff testified that an obstruction prevented her from getting off directly from the floor
of the street car to the step or the running board at its exit. As she was trying to get past the
obstruction, she says the car started with a jerk, and toppled her over. All the evidence of other
witnesses was that the plaintiff had tripped in exiting the car, perhaps because she stepped on her
long skirt, but that the car did not move at any relevant point. The defendant objected to various
jury instructions.]…
His honor told the jury in his charge that “due care” meant “such care as an ordinarily prudent
man, placed in circumstances like or similar to those in which the person whose conduct is in
question was placed, would use.”…
Under the head of “due care,” the defendant contended, further, that when his honor laid down
the rule of “the prudent man,” in reference to the conduct of the feme plaintiff at the time of her
injury, he committed error. The argument was that the definition of “due care” was misleading “as
the care to be exercised by a woman, when she is placed in a dangerous position, would be greater
than that required of a man surrounded by the same circumstances; that she is supposed to be less
able to take care of herself than is a man, and the danger to her will therefore be greater; that, when
this is the case (that is, when the danger is greater), the law requires a greater degree of care to be
exercised in avoiding it.” [But] [t]here is nothing in [the precedent defendant cites in support of its
contention] which even squints toward a holding that a woman is not bound by the rule of “the
prudent man,” but ordinarily by a stricter rule…. No error.
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Gender as a Shield II: Is the railway company in Asbury making the same type of
argument as the railway company in Eichhorn? Can you see what the companies are up
to now?
Consistency: Can you favor the Daniels rule but object to the Asbury/Eichhorn rule?
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LITTLE ROCK & FORT SMITH RAILWAY CO. v. TANKERSLY
Supreme Court of Arkansas (1890)
Hemingway, Justice:
[Plaintiff, a passenger on defendant’s train,
endeavored to alight therefrom at a station while
the cars were in motion, and was injured. She
alleges that the train did not stop long enough to
permit her to alight before it was again started.]
Two questions were therefore involved in the
proper determination of the cause—First. Was
the injury attributable to any misconduct of the
defendant? Second. Did the plaintiff contribute
to it by any negligence on her part?…
On the law applicable to the negligence of the plaintiff, the [trial court’s jury] charge is subject
to objection. [The charge was given at the request of the plaintiff, and erred in implying that, if the
defendant stopped the train for an insufficiently long time,] that would excuse a hazardous attempt
by plaintiff to alight. That is not the law. The conduct of the plaintiff must be judged from present
conditions, and upon them the past delinquency of another sheds no light. If it would seem to a
person of ordinary prudence and caution to be safe to step off, considering the train’s speed, the
situation of the place of alighting, the opportunity to see where the step was made, and the activity
of the person making it, and all other circumstances reasonably affecting the safety of the attempt,
it could not be deemed negligence in the plaintiff to do it. But the failure of a train to stop, does not
justify an attempt to alight that is hazardous, nor is it an element to be considered in determining in
any given case whether such attempt was prudent or hazardous….
[Moreover, the] eighth instruction asked by the defendant should have been given. The act of
the plaintiff was to be judged by a comparison with the acts of persons of ordinary prudence under
similar circumstances. Her age, sex, and physical condition were circumstances necessarily affecting
her safety in stepping from a moving train, and should have been considered by the jury, in
connection with all other such circumstances in proof, in determining whether she acted prudently
or recklessly. A young, active man might prudently alight, when the attempt would be reckless in an
old or lame man; and any man might do so prudently, when it would be dangerous for a lady in
female attire to attempt it…. [T]he judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
1.

QUESTIONS
Circumstances: The court concludes that Tankersly’s “age, sex, and physical condition
were circumstances necessarily affecting her safety in stepping from a moving train, and
should have been considered by the jury.” When determining ordinary care, does
considering a person’s sex involve a similar logic to considering their age? How about
their sex as compared to their physical condition? Are all of these so-called
“circumstances” analytically similar for purposes of this legal analysis?
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FOX v. TOWN OF GLASTENBURY
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut (1860)
Sanford, Justice:

ã

Action…brought by the plaintiff, [Henry Fox,] as
administrator of [the estate of] Harriet Fox, to recover
damages for the loss of her life by reason of the
negligence of the defendants in not maintaining a
railing along the sides of a causeway, which was a part
of a public highway of the town…. The jury rendered
a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendants moved
for a new trial for a verdict against evidence.
[U]pon a very careful examination of the evidence before us, we are satisfied that, however
negligent the defendants may have been, the unfortunate woman who lost her life, essentially
contributed to the production of that result by her own culpable imprudence and indiscretion; so
that upon the well established principles of law, promulgated and recognized by this court in many
cases, the plaintiff was not entitled to the verdict which he obtained.
[The facts were these:] [H]aving procured a horse and wagon, [the deceased and her companion,
Mrs. Clarinda Fox] started to go over the causeway, from the main land to the ferry. There was a
freshet in the river, and the water had in consequence risen in the cove so as to cover the causeway,
was rising rapidly, and there was a strong wind…. As they approached the causeway, the cove and
the condition of the water in it could not have escaped their notice. They saw, and observed, that the
causeway was entirely submerged, that a swift and strong current of turbid water was passing over
it, that there was no rail or visible object of any kind, above the surface of the water, on the sides of
the causeway, by which they could be protected or guided in their course, and the depth of the water
it was obviously impossible, before they went into it, with any degree of accuracy, to calculate or
determine. East of the bridge, the water rose to the hubs of the fore wheels of their wagon, but they
reached the bridge in safety. The bridge was raised about two feet and a half above the level of the
causeway. On the bridge they stopped, noticed and remarked upon the height of the water and the
rapidity of its current, and felt some degree of alarm, but concluded to proceed. As they drove from
the bridge into the water on the west side of it, they began to apprehend the extent of their danger,
and became frightened; the horse stopped; they urged him forward with the whip, and becoming
more frightened they probably attempted to turn around, and went off the causeway, nearly at a
right angle with it, into the deep water on the north side…. [W]e think in driving upon the causeway
at all, even easterly of the bridge, submerged as they saw it was, and with nothing visible above the
surface of the water to indicate its true location, these ladies disregarded the dictates of ordinary
prudence and discretion….
On th[e] bridge they were safe; and if they could not, unaided, have turned around and retraced
their steps, they could, and should have remained where they were, until relieved from their
unpleasant but not perilous situation. And again, when, after they had entered the water west of the
bridge, their horse, true to the instincts of his noble nature, faltered, and stood still, they should have
heeded his kindly admonition and there waited for assistance and deliverance, instead of forcing the
animal forward to his fate. The boat, by means of which one of them was rescued, with two boys in
it, was sailing close at hand; a wagon, with two men in it, was approaching the causeway from the
west; and the residence of Mrs. French, with whom they had just been conversing, was within the
reach of their voices. Their outcry would have brought almost immediate relief….
[T]he attempt of these ladies to pass over this causeway, and especially over the western part of
it, was an act of rashness, which, upon the well settled principles of law applicable in cases of this
character, bars all claims in their behalf for damages from the town. We think no person of ordinary
discretion in their circumstances, and exercising ordinary prudence and discretion, would have
made such an attempt.
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We are not unmindful of the fact urged upon our attention by the plaintiff’s counsel, that these
travelers were females. And in that fact, and in the timidity, inexperience, and want of skill which it
implies, we can find an explanation of their injudicious and fatal attempt to turn around in the water,
but no reason or excuse for the recklessness of their conduct in driving into it…. If men of ordinary
prudence and discretion would regard the ability of the party inadequate for the purpose, without
hazard or danger, the risk should not be assumed…. We think a new trial should be granted.
1.

QUESTIONS
Gender and Driving: Does Fox again rest on stereotypes about women drivers? If so,
what work are those stereotypes doing in the court’s legal analysis? What’s the court
effectively telling the twelve members of the (all-male) jury to remember at the new trial?
Do they have to consider whether they, as men, would have crossed the causeway, or
must they instead determine whether a woman driver should have crossed?
DENVER & RIO GRANDE RAILROAD CO. v. LORENTZEN
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (1897)

Thayer, Judge:

ã

This is a suit to recover damages for injuries sustained at a railroad
crossing by Mrs. Anna Marie Lorentzen, the defendant in error, who was
the plaintiff below. Mrs. Lorentzen was riding in a public conveyance,
termed a ‘hack,’ which was in charge of a driver…. While crossing the
defendant’s track, the vehicle in which she was riding was struck and
overturned by an outgoing train of the defendant company, as the plaintiff
below alleged, because of the neglect of the engineer on the outgoing train
to ring the bell or sound the whistle….
In the course of its charge, the trial court used the following language:
Probably we would not exact the same degree of care and diligence from a woman
that we would from a man under the same circumstances. I am inclined to think
that, if this plaintiff were a man suing for a recovery, I should be constrained to
advise you that he could be no more relieved from the duty of looking out for the
train than the driver of the wagon; but this plaintiff being a woman, a person who
is not accustomed, or very much accustomed, to such places, and to going in this
fashion from one depot to another, I think it is a matter fairly for your
consideration whether she used the care and diligence which should be expected
of a person in her situation, in going across this road.
An exception was taken to the aforesaid language, whereupon the court further instructed the
jury as follows:
I do not state that to you, gentlemen, as a matter of law or proposition of law, but
simply as a matter for your consideration. I want you to consider whether there is
less diligence to be exacted or expected from a woman than would be expected
from a man. In fact, I am not considering any of these propositions as matters of
law. I am merely explaining them for you to find and pass upon. The facts are with
you, gentlemen, and not with the court.
The exception first taken is insisted upon, notwithstanding the explanatory remarks of the court.
We think, however, that the exception is not well founded. Considering all that was said, it appears
that the jury was left at liberty to determine, as it had an undoubted right to do, whether, in view of
the plaintiff’s sex and all the surrounding circumstances, she exercised such care and diligence as
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should reasonably be expected of her. This was the proper test by which to determine if she was
guilty of any contributory fault…. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
1.

QUESTIONS
Menlove Revisited: Can this case—and indeed many of the other cases in this section—
be squared with the view of ordinary care espoused in Menlove? If the jury determined
that we should expect “less diligence” from Lorentzen as a woman, why couldn’t
Menlove’s apparent lack of good judgment immunize him for his carelessness?
DENTON v. MISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS RAILWAY CO.
Supreme Court of Kansas (1916)

Burch, Justice:
The action was one for damages for injuries which a
woman, riding in an automobile driven by her husband,
sustained by being struck by a switch engine on a street
crossing in the defendant’s yards in the city of Parsons.
The plaintiff recovered, and the defendant appeals.
The plaintiff, her husband, F. M. Denton, her son, E.
E. Denton, and her son’s wife, occupied the automobile.
F. M. Denton, sitting on the right-hand side, was driving
the car. E. E. Denton occupied the front seat with the
driver. The plaintiff and her daughter-in-law occupied
the rear seat. [They were driving on a city street across a wide set of 24 railroad tracks.] The plaintiff
and her husband had not been on the crossing before. The plaintiff’s son was an employé of the
defendant, was familiar with the crossing, and said to his father that he would look out for trains.
He testified there was danger in stopping an automobile there because cars were likely to be moved
at any time. The automobile proceeded as slowly as possible without killing the engine, at a speed of
about four or five miles per hour….
The defendant’s principal contentions are that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter
of law, and that judgment should have been rendered for the defendant on the findings of fact….
The plaintiff was required to take the precautions which a reasonably prudent person, not in the
situation of the automobile driver, but in her situation, would have taken. The argument is that she
should have stopped the automobile, or should have called her husband’s attention to the conditions
and requested him to exercise reasonable care. Why should the plaintiff have called her husband’s
attention to the conditions and exhorted him to use due care? She had confidence in his ability as a
driver. The conditions were just as obvious to him as to her. He could see and hear all she could see
and hear. He was responsible for the operation of the automobile, not she, and she had no reason to
doubt that he was exercising his faculties with diligence. Besides this, there was another observer in
the front seat with the driver, who was in fact familiar with the crossing. His safety and his wife’s
safety were at stake, and there is no evidence of any fact indicating to the plaintiff that her son was
not exercising his faculties of observation with diligence. Why ought the plaintiff to have arrogated
to herself control over the automobile and commanded it to stop?... Her opportunities of
observation were not equal to those of her husband. She knew his ability as a driver and trusted him,
and, what is more, she had the right to trust him.
In [a previous case in this Court] it was said:
Common sense would dictate that when a wife goes riding with her children in a
rig driven by her husband she rightfully relies on him not to drive so as to imperil
those in his charge. The law does not depart from common sense by requiring her,
under the circumstances shown here, to impugn her husband’s ability to drive and
assume the prerogative to dictate to him the manner of driving.
This doctrine applies to the case of a wife riding in an automobile driven by her husband, unless
she should know him to be incompetent or under some disability. The judgment…is affirmed.
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QUESTIONS
Gender Roles: How might Denton support the idea that there are separate spheres for
men and women? In particular, how might it reinforce the masculinization of public
spaces through tort law? Do decisions like Denton benefit women injured in accidents?

The following case includes sexist slurs and discusses harassment, assault, and racism.
ELLISON v. BRADY
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1991)
Beezer, Judge:

ã

Kerry Ellison appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the Secretary of the Treasury on her
sexual harassment action brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. This appeal presents two important
issues: (1) what test should be applied to determine whether
conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create a hostile working
environment, and (2) what remedial actions can shield
employers from liability for sexual harassment by co-workers. The district court held that Ellison
did not state a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment. We reverse and remand….
Kerry Ellison worked as a revenue agent for the Internal Revenue Service in San Mateo,
California. During her initial training in 1984 she met Sterling Gray, another trainee, who was also
assigned to the San Mateo office. The two co-workers never became friends, and they did not work
closely together. Gray’s desk was twenty feet from Ellison’s desk, two rows behind and one row over.
Revenue agents in the San Mateo office often went to lunch in groups. In June of 1986 when no one
else was in the office, Gray asked Ellison to lunch. She accepted. Gray had to pick up his son’s
forgotten lunch, so they stopped by Gray’s house. He gave Ellison a tour of his house.
Ellison alleges that after the June lunch Gray started to pester her with unnecessary questions
and hang around her desk. On October 9, 1986, Gray asked Ellison out for a drink after work. She
declined, but she suggested that they have lunch the following week. She did not want to have lunch
alone with him, and she tried to stay away from the office during lunch time. One day during the
following week, Gray uncharacteristically dressed in a three-piece suit and asked Ellison out for
lunch. Again, she did not accept.
On October 22, 1986 Gray handed Ellison a note he wrote on a telephone message slip which read:
I cried over you last night and I’m totally drained today. I have never been in such
constant term oil (sic). Thank you for talking with me. I could not stand to feel
your hatred for another day.
When Ellison realized that Gray wrote the note, she became shocked and frightened and left the
room. Gray followed her into the hallway and demanded that she talk to him, but she left the
building.
Ellison later showed the note to Bonnie Miller, who supervised both Ellison and Gray. Miller
said “this is sexual harassment.” Ellison asked Miller not to do anything about it. She wanted to try
to handle it herself. Ellison asked a male co-worker to talk to Gray, to tell him that she was not
interested in him and to leave her alone. The next day, Thursday, Gray called in sick.
Ellison did not work on Friday, and on the following Monday, she started four weeks of training in
St. Louis, Missouri. Gray mailed her a card and a typed, single-spaced, three-page letter. She describes
this letter as “twenty times, a hundred times weirder” than the prior note. Gray wrote, in part:
I know that you are worth knowing with or without sex. Leaving aside the hassles
and disasters of recent weeks. I have enjoyed you so much over these past few
ã
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months. Watching you. Experiencing you from O so far away. Admiring your
style and elan. Don’t you think it odd that two people who have never even talked
together, alone, are striking off such intense sparks. I will write another letter in
the near future.1
Explaining her reaction, Ellison stated: “I just thought he was crazy. I thought he was nuts. I
didn’t know what he would do next. I was frightened.” She immediately telephoned Miller. Ellison
told her supervisor that she was frightened and really upset. She requested that Miller transfer either
her or Gray because she would not be comfortable working in the same office with him. Miller asked
Ellison to send a copy of the card and letter to San Mateo. Miller then telephoned her supervisor,
Joe Benton, and discussed the problem. That same day she had a counseling session with Gray. She
informed him that he was entitled to union representation. During this meeting, she told Gray to
leave Ellison alone. At Benton’s request, Miller apprised the labor relations department of the
situation. She also reminded Gray many times over the next few weeks that he must not contact
Ellison in any way. Gray subsequently transferred to the San Francisco office on November 24, 1986.
Ellison returned from St. Louis in late November and did not discuss the matter further with Miller.
After three weeks in San Francisco, Gray filed union grievances requesting a return to the San
Mateo office. The IRS and the union settled the grievances in Gray’s favor, agreeing to allow him to
transfer back to the San Mateo office provided that he spend four more months in San Francisco
and promise not to bother Ellison. On January 28, 1987, Ellison first learned of Gray’s request in a
letter from Miller explaining that Gray would return to the San Mateo office. The letter indicated
that management decided to resolve Ellison’s problem with a six-month separation, and that it
would take additional action if the problem recurred.
After receiving the letter, Ellison was “frantic.” She filed a formal complaint alleging sexual
harassment on January 30, 1987 with the IRS. She also obtained permission to transfer to San
Francisco temporarily when Gray returned. Gray sought joint counseling. He wrote Ellison another
letter which still sought to maintain the idea that he and Ellison had some type of relationship.
The IRS employee investigating the allegation agreed with Ellison’s supervisor that Gray’s
conduct constituted sexual harassment. In its final decision, however, the Treasury Department
rejected Ellison’s complaint because it believed that the complaint did not describe a pattern or
practice of sexual harassment covered by the EEOC regulations. After an appeal, the EEOC affirmed
the Treasury Department’s decision on a different ground. It concluded that the agency took
adequate action to prevent the repetition of Gray’s conduct.
Ellison filed a complaint in September of 1987 in federal district court. The court granted the
government’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Ellison had failed to state a prima
facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile working environment. Ellison appeals….
The parties ask us to determine if Gray’s conduct, as alleged by Ellison, was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of Ellison’s employment and create an abusive working
environment. The district court, with little Ninth Circuit case law to look to for guidance, held that
Ellison did not state a prima facie case of sexual harassment due to a hostile working environment.
It believed that Gray’s conduct was “isolated and genuinely trivial.” We disagree….
The government asks us to apply the reasoning of other courts which have declined to find Title
VII violations on more egregious facts. In Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986),
the Seventh Circuit analyzed a female employee’s working conditions for sexual harassment. It
noted that she was repeatedly propositioned and winked at by her supervisor. When she asked for
assistance, he asked “what will I get for it?” Co-workers slapped her buttocks and commented that
she must moan and groan during sex. The court examined the evidence to see if “the demeaning
conduct and sexual stereotyping caused such anxiety and debilitation to the plaintiff that working
conditions were ‘poisoned’ within the meaning of Title VII.” The court did not consider the
environment sufficiently hostile.

1
In the middle of the long letter Gray did say “I am obligated to you so much that if you want me to leave you alone I
will. If you want me to forget you entirely, I can not do that.”
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Similarly, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit
refused to find a hostile environment where the workplace contained posters of naked and partially
dressed women, and where a male employee customarily called women “whores,” “cunt,” “pussy,”
and “tits,” referred to plaintiff as “fat ass,” and specifically stated, “All that bitch needs is a good lay.”
Over a strong dissent, the majority held that the sexist remarks and the pin-up posters had only a de
minimis effect and did not seriously affect the plaintiff’s psychological well-being.
We do not agree with the standards set forth in Scott and Rabidue, and we choose not to follow
those decisions…. It is the harasser’s conduct which must be pervasive or severe, not the alteration
in the conditions of employment. Surely, employees need not endure sexual harassment until their
psychological well-being is seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilitation.
Although an isolated epithet by itself fails to support a cause of action for a hostile environment,
Title VII’s protection of employees from sex discrimination comes into play long before the point
where victims of sexual harassment require psychiatric assistance….
[W]e believe that Gray’s conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of
Ellison’s employment and create an abusive working environment. We first note that the required
showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness
or frequency of the conduct. See King v. Bd. Regents Univ. Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“although a single act can be enough, generally, repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile
environment, with the strength of the claim depending on the number of incidents and the intensity
of each incident.”). For example, in Vance v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d
1503 (11th Cir. 1989), the court held that two incidents in which a noose was found hung over an
employee’s work station were sufficiently severe to constitute a jury question on a racially hostile
environment.
Next, we believe that in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we
should focus on the perspective of the victim. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) §615 (1988)
(courts “should consider the victim’s perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable
behavior.”) If we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing
conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could
continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and victims of
harassment would have no remedy.
We therefore prefer to analyze harassment from the victim’s perspective. A complete
understanding of the victim’s view requires, among other things, an analysis of the different
perspectives of men and women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend
many women. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (“A male
supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that
she has a ‘great figure’ or ‘nice legs.’ The female subordinate, however, may find such comments
offensive”); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) (“men and women are vulnerable in
different ways and offended by different behavior”). See also Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and
Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 Yale L. J. 1177 (1990)
(men tend to view some forms of sexual harassment as “harmless social interactions to which only
overly-sensitive women would object”); Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1203 (1989) (the characteristically male view depicts
sexual harassment as comparatively harmless amusement).
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe
that many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share.2 For example,
because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger
2

One writer explains: “While many women hold positive attitudes about uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social
vulnerability to sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised
in a society where rape and sex-related violence have reached unprecedented levels, and a vast pornography industry creates
continuous images of sexual coercion, objectification and violence. Finally, women as a group tend to hold more restrictive
views of both the situation and type of relationship in which sexual conduct is appropriate. Because of the inequality and
coercion with which it is so frequently associated in the minds of women, the appearance of sexuality in an unexpected
context or a setting of ostensible equality can be an anguishing experience.” Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1205 (1989).
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incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual
harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser’s conduct is merely a prelude to violent
sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum
without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman
may perceive.
In order to shield employers from having to accommodate the idiosyncratic concerns of the rare
hyper-sensitive employee, we hold that a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile
environment sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman3 would
consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment.4 Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1900) (sexual
harassment must detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex as the victim); Yates, 819
F.2d at 637 (adopting “reasonable woman” standard set out in Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611 (Keith, J.
dissenting)); Comment, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII,
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449 (1984); cf. State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (adopting
reasonable woman standard for self defense).
We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women. The reasonable woman standard does not establish a higher level of
protection for women than men. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971)
(invalidating under Title VII paternalistic state labor laws restricting employment opportunities for
women). Instead, a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men. By acknowledging and not trivializing
the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can work towards ensuring that
neither men nor women will have to run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living.
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt today classifies conduct as unlawful sexual
harassment even when harassers do not realize that their conduct creates a hostile working
environment. Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis of a
sexual harassment cause of action if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff would
consider the comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a condition of employment and create
an abusive working environment.5 That is because Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme. Title
VII is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice and not at the motivation of
co-workers or employers. To avoid liability under Title VII, employers may have to educate and
sensitize their workforce to eliminate conduct which a reasonable victim would consider unlawful
sexual harassment. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(f) (“Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of
sexual harassment.”).
The facts of this case illustrate the importance of considering the victim’s perspective. Analyzing
the facts from the alleged harasser’s viewpoint, Gray could be portrayed as a modern-day Cyrano de
Bergerac wishing no more than to woo Ellison with his words. There is no evidence that Gray
harbored ill will toward Ellison. He even offered in his “love letter” to leave her alone if she wished.
Examined in this light, it is not difficult to see why the district court characterized Gray’s conduct
as isolated and trivial.
Ellison, however, did not consider the acts to be trivial. Gray’s first note shocked and frightened
her. After receiving the three-page letter, she became really upset and frightened again. She
immediately requested that she or Gray be transferred. Her supervisor’s prompt response suggests

3

Of course, where male employees allege that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment, the
appropriate victim’s perspective would be that of a reasonable man.
4
We realize that the reasonable woman standard will not address conduct which some women find offensive. Conduct
considered harmless by many today may be considered discriminatory in the future. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. Fortunately,
the reasonableness inquiry which we adopt today is not static. As the views of reasonable women change, so too does the
Title VII standard of acceptable behavior.
5
If sexual comments or sexual advances are in fact welcomed by the recipient, they, of course, do not constitute sexual
harassment. Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination in employment does not require a totally desexualized work place.
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that she too did not consider the conduct trivial. When Ellison learned that Gray arranged to return
to San Mateo, she immediately asked to transfer, and she immediately filed an official complaint.
We cannot say as a matter of law that Ellison’s reaction was idiosyncratic or hyper-sensitive. We
believe that a reasonable woman could have had a similar reaction. After receiving the first bizarre
note from Gray, a person she barely knew, Ellison asked a co-worker to tell Gray to leave her alone.
Despite her request, Gray sent her a long, passionate, disturbing letter. He told her he had been
“watching” and “experiencing” her; he made repeated references to sex; he said he would write again.
Ellison had no way of knowing what Gray would do next. A reasonable woman could consider
Gray’s conduct, as alleged by Ellison, sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a condition of
employment and create an abusive working environment.
Sexual harassment is a major problem in the workplace. Adopting the victim’s perspective
ensures that courts will not sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned by the
offenders. Congress did not enact Title VII to codify prevailing sexist prejudices. To the contrary,
Congress designed Title VII to prevent the perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of degradation
which serve to close or discourage employment opportunities for women. We hope that over time
both men and women will learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the other sex. When
employers and employees internalize the standard of workplace conduct we establish today, the
current gap in perception between the sexes will be bridged….
Stephens, Judge, dissenting:
This case comes to us on appeal in the wake of the granting of a summary judgment motion.
There was no trial, therefore no opportunities for cross examination of the witnesses. In addition,
there are factual gaps in the record that can only lead by speculation. Consequently, I believe that it
is an inappropriate case with which to establish a new legal precedent which will be binding in all
subsequent cases of like nature in the Ninth Circuit. I refer to the majority’s use of the term
“reasonable woman,” a term I find ambiguous and therefore inadequate.
Nowhere in section 2000e of Title VII, the section under which the plaintiff in this case brought
suit, is there any indication that Congress intended to provide for any other than equal treatment in
the area of civil rights. The legislation is designed to achieve a balanced and generally gender neutral
and harmonious workplace which would improve production and the quality of the employees’
lives. In fact, the Supreme Court has shown a preference against systems that are not gender or race
neutral, such as hiring quotas. While women may be the most frequent targets of this type of conduct
that is at issue in this case, they are not the only targets. I believe that it is incumbent upon the court
in this case to use terminology that will meet the needs of all who seek recourse under this section
of Title VII. Possible alternatives that are more in line with a gender neutral approach include
“victim,” “target,” or “person.”
The term “reasonable man” as it is used in the law of torts, traditionally refers to the average
adult person, regardless of gender, and the conduct that can reasonably be expected of him or her.
For the purposes of the legal issues that are being addressed, such a term assumes that it is applicable
to all persons. Section 2000e of Title VII presupposes the use of a legal term that can apply to all
persons and the impossibility of a more individually tailored standard. It is clear that the authors of
the majority opinion intend a difference between the “reasonable woman” and the “reasonable man”
in Title VII cases on the assumption that men do not have the same sensibilities as women. This is
not necessarily true. A man’s response to circumstances faced by women and their effect upon
women can be and in given circumstances may be expected to be understood by men.
It takes no stretch of the imagination to envision two complaints emanating from the same
workplace regarding the same conditions, one brought by a woman and the other by a man.
Application of the “new standard” presents a puzzlement which is born of the assumption that men’s
eyes do not see what a woman sees through her eyes. I find it surprising that the majority finds no
need for evidence on any of these subjects. I am not sure whether the majority also concludes that
the woman and the man in question are also reasonable without evidence on this subject. I am
irresistibly drawn to the view that the conditions of the workplace itself should be examined as
affected, among other things, by the conduct of the people working there as to whether the
workplace as existing is conducive to fulfilling the goals of Title VII….
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It is my opinion that the case should be reversed with instructions to proceed to trial. This would
certainly lead to filling in the factual gaps left by the scanty record, such as what happened at the
time of or after the visit of Ellison to Gray’s house to cause her to be subsequently fearful of his
presence. The circumstances existing in the work place where only men are employed are different
than they are where there are both male and female employees. The existence of the differences is
readily recognizable and the conduct of employees can be changed appropriately. This is what Title
VII requires. Whether a man or a woman has sensibilities peculiar to the person and what they are
is not necessarily known. Until they become known by manifesting themselves in an obvious way,
they do not become part of the circumstances of the work place. Consequently, the governing
element in the equation is the workplace itself, not concepts or viewpoints of individual employees.
This does not conflict with existing legal concepts.
The creation of the proposed “new standard” which applies only to women will not necessarily
come to the aid of all potential victims of the type of misconduct that is at issue in this case. I believe
that a gender neutral standard would greatly contribute to the clarity of this and future cases in the
same area….
1.

QUESTIONS
Paul Revisited: Did Ellison have a plausible battery or assault claim against Gray?

2.

Common Care: The court asserts that applying a gender-neutral standard “would run
the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination” because “[h]arassers could
continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common.” Is
that correct? Even setting aside the question of gender, is what we consider “ordinary”
or “reasonable” the same as what we consider “common”?

3.

Intersectionality: Given the court’s logic, do you think it would matter if Gray was gay?
What if Ellison was gay? Or if they were both gay? Should any of this matter to the legal
standard?
THE T.J. HOOPER
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1932)

Hand, Judge:

ã

The barges No. 17 and No. 30, belonging to the
Northern Barge Company, had lifted cargoes of coal at
Norfolk, Virginia, for New York in March, 1928. They were
towed by two tugs of the petitioner, the “Montrose” and the
“Hooper,” and were lost off the Jersey Coast on March
tenth, in an easterly gale. The cargo owners sued the barges
under the contracts of carriage; the owner of the barges sued
the tugs under the towing contract, both for its own loss and
as bailee of the cargoes; the owner of the tug filed a petition to limit its liability. All the suits were
joined and heard together, and the judge found that all the vessels were unseaworthy; the tugs,
because they did not carry radio receiving sets by which they could have seasonably got warnings of
a change in the weather which should have caused them to seek shelter in the Delaware Breakwater
en route. He therefore entered an interlocutory decree holding each tug and barge jointly liable to
each cargo owner, and each tug for half damages for the loss of its barge. The petitioner appealed,
and the barge owner appealed and filed assignments of error.
Each tug had three ocean going coal barges in tow, the lost barge being at the end. The
“Montrose,” which had the No. 17, took an outside course; the “Hooper” with the No. 30, inside.
The weather was fair without ominous symptoms, as the tows passed the Delaware Breakwater about
midnight of March eighth, and the barges did not get into serious trouble until they were about
opposite Atlantic City some sixty or seventy miles to the north. The wind began to freshen in the
ã

George L. Smyth, Tugboat on the Monongahela (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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morning of the ninth and rose to a gale before noon; by afternoon the second barge of the Hooper’s
tow was out of hand and signaled the tug, which found that not only this barge needed help, but that
the No. 30 was aleak. Both barges anchored and the crew of the No. 30 rode out the storm until the
afternoon of the tenth, when she sank, her crew having been meanwhile taken off. The No. 17 sprang
a leak about the same time; she too anchored at the Montrose’s command and sank on the next
morning after her crew also had been rescued. The cargoes and the tugs maintain that the barges
were not fit for their service; the cargoes and the barges that the tugs should have gone into the
Delaware Breakwater, and besides, did not handle their tows properly.
The evidence of the condition of the barges was very extensive, the greater part being taken out
of court. As to each, the fact remains that she foundered in weather that she was bound to
withstand… As to the cargoes, the charters excused the barges if “reasonable means” were taken to
make them seaworthy; and the barge owners amended their answers during the trial to allege that
they had used due diligence in that regard. As will appear, the barges were certainly not seaworthy
in fact, and we do not think that the record shows affirmatively the exercise of due diligence to
examine them. The examinations at least of the pumps were perfunctory; had they been sufficient
the loss would not have occurred….
A more difficult issue is as to the tugs. [The issue here is whether the tugboats were
“unseaworthy” because they did not have working radios that would have allowed their captains to
receive the weather forecasts and reroute to avoid the storm.] The weather bureau at Arlington
broadcasts two predictions daily, at ten in the morning and ten in the evening. Apparently there are
other reports floating about, which come at uncertain hours but which can also be picked up. The
Arlington report of the morning read as follows: “Moderate north, shifting to east and southeast
winds, increasing Friday, fair weather to-night.” The substance of this [forecast] reached a tow
bound north to New York about noon. [With evidence from the forecast and a failing barometer,
the ship’s master decided to enter the Delaware Breakwater that afternoon. Though he may have
been overcautious, three other towboats followed him into the Breakwater, also after having received
the forecast. The boats’ masters all testified at trial.] [T]hey preferred to take no chances, and chances
they believed there were. Courts have not often such evidence of the opinion of impartial experts,
formed in the very circumstances and confirmed by their own conduct at the time.
Moreover, the “Montrose” and the “Hooper” would have had the benefit of the evening report
from Arlington had they had proper receiving sets. This predicted worse weather [with increased
wind and rain]…. [I]f the four tows thought the first report enough, the second ought to have laid
any doubts. The master of the “Montrose” himself, when asked what he would have done had he
received a substantially similar report, said that he would certainly have put in. The master of the
“Hooper” was also asked for his opinion, and said that he would have turned back also, but this
admission is somewhat vitiated by the incorporation in the question of the statement that it was a
“storm warning,” which the witness seized upon in his answer. All this seems to us to support the
conclusion of the judge that prudent masters, who had received the second warning, would have
found the risk more than the exigency warranted; they would have been amply vindicated by what
followed…. Taking the situation as a whole, it seems to us that these masters would have taken
undue chances, had they got the broadcasts.
They did not, because their private radio receiving sets, which were on board, were not in
working order. These belonged to them personally, and were partly a toy, partly a part of the
equipment, but neither furnished by the owner, nor supervised by it. It is not fair to say that there
was a general custom among coastwise carriers so to equip their tugs. One line alone did it; as for
the rest, they relied upon their crews, so far as they can be said to have relied at all. An adequate
receiving set suitable for a coastwise tug can now be got at small cost and is reasonably reliable if
kept up; obviously it is a source of great protection to their tows. Twice every day they can receive
these predictions, based upon the widest possible information, available to every vessel within two
or three hundred miles and more. Such a set is the ears of the tug to catch the spoken word, just as
the master’s binoculars are her eyes to see a storm signal ashore. Whatever may be said as to other
vessels, tugs towing heavy coal laden barges, strung out for half a mile, have little power to maneuvre,
and do not, as this case proves, expose themselves to weather which would not turn back stauncher
craft. They can have at hand protection against dangers of which they can learn in no other way.
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Is it then a final answer that the business had not yet generally adopted receiving sets? There are,
no doubt, cases where courts seem to make the general practice of the calling the standard of proper
diligence…. Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact
common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole
calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and
available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive
be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will
not excuse their omission. But here there was no custom at all as to
receiving sets; some had them, some did not; the most that can be
urged is that they had not yet become general. Certainly in such a
case we need not pause; when some have thought a device
necessary, at least we may say that they were right, and the others
too slack…. We hold the tugs [at fault] because had they been
properly equipped, they would have got the Arlington reports. The
injury was a direct consequence of this unseaworthiness.
ã

1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Keeping Up with the Hands: The T.J. Hooper, one of America’s most important tort
decisions, was written by Judge Learned Hand, one of America’s most influential judges.
(Yes, “Learned Hand” was his real name, not just a workplace nickname. His cousin,
Augustus Noble Hand, was also a federal judge. Quite the family, in name and
reputation.) In what way was Judge Hand promoting a reformist agenda for tort law
through the so-called T.J. Hooper Rule? What role does he think custom should play in
determining breach? Is custom dispositive or merely probative in establishing
“reasonable” care?
Twelve Angry Men: Recall that jurors, not judges, usually determine breach. Are jurors
in a good position to second-guess industry practices? Does it matter which industry?
TORINO PROBLEM

The year is 2031. A peer-reviewed and industry-funded study has just been released showing
that switching entirely to self-driving cars in Georgia would reduce vehicle-related accidents by
87,000 and deaths by 450 each year. The researchers say they’ve finally proved what proponents of
autonomous vehicles have long touted: car accidents are less likely when artificial intelligence makes
driving decisions instead of human intelligence. The U.S. Department of Transportation endorses
the study and declares that Americans should switch to self-driving cars as soon as possible. To
speed up the transition, the federal government and many states announce rebates and tax breaks
for anyone who trades in their old car for an autonomous vehicle.
The year is 2033. Clint, a proud libertarian, likes nothing more than taking his Ford Torino for
long drives. As he rolls down his window and takes in a deep breath of Oconee County air, he
mutters to himself, “Ah, this is the American dream.” Caught up in his moment of freedom, he fails
to notice that he’s drifting over into the left lane. Within seconds he collides into Sally’s oncoming
self-driving car. Though Clint miraculously emerges unscathed, Sally isn’t so lucky. Her estate sues
for negligence and hires an expert to discuss the 2031 study and show that, based on tests done at
the accident scene, an autonomous vehicle wouldn’t have veered into the wrong lane.
(a) Does Clint’s decision to drive a conventional constitute a negligent act?
(b) How might the example of tort liability in the tugboat industry bolster or undermine
your argument?
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JOHNSON v. RIVERDALE ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES
Supreme Court of Georgia (2002)
Sears, Justice:

ã

Certiorari was granted in this medical malpractice
action in order to consider the Court of Appeals’
ruling forbidding the plaintiff from cross-examining
the defendants’ expert witness as to how he personally
would have treated the plaintiffs’ decedent. We
conclude that because the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases is that which is employed by the
medical profession generally, and not what one
individual physician would do under the same or
similar circumstances, how a testifying medical
expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff’s decedent is not relevant to the issue
of whether a defendant physician committed malpractice. Moreover, we conclude that how a
testifying medical expert personally would have treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff’s decedent cannot be
used to impeach the expert’s credibility. Therefore, we affirm.
The decedent, Clair Johnson, suffered a severe adverse reaction to anesthesia she received during
surgery. The reaction caused Mrs. Johnson’s oxygen supply to be interrupted, resulting in massive
brain trauma and death. Her husband, Donald Johnson, along with the administratrix of her estate
(collectively “Johnson”), sued the anesthesiologist, Dr. Lawhead, and his employer, Riverdale
Anesthesia Associates, Inc. (collectively “Anesthesia Associates”), alleging malpractice.
At trial, Johnson alleged that Anesthesia Associates had committed malpractice by failing to
“pre-oxygenate” Mrs. Johnson. Pre-oxygenation is a procedure where, before surgery, a patient is
given a measure of pure oxygen, providing her with a reserve to draw from, should her oxygen
supply be interrupted during surgery. The trial court granted Anesthesia Associates’ motion in
limine to prevent Johnson from cross-examining the defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Caplan, about
whether he, personally, would have pre-oxygenated Mrs. Johnson. After the jury found in favor of
Anesthesia Associates, Johnson appealed, claiming the trial court erred by preventing Johnson from
cross-examining Dr. Caplan as to whether he would have elected to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson….
1. The crux of Johnson’s complaint against Anesthesia Associates was the contention that the
latter violated the applicable standard of care by failing to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson. Johnson
attempted to establish this breach of care through the testimony of an expert witness. Johnson
claimed that if pre-oxygenation had been administered, Mrs. Johnson would have been protected
against the low oxygen levels that occurred during surgery and that led to her death. For its part,
Anesthesia Associates claimed that because its decision not to pre-oxygenate Mrs. Johnson was
consistent with the applicable standard of care, no malpractice occurred. In support of this
argument, Anesthesia Associates presented the testimony of its own medical expert, Dr. Caplan.
It is axiomatic that in order to establish medical malpractice, the evidence presented by the
patient must show a violation of the degree of care and skill required of a physician. Such standard
of care is that which, under similar conditions and like circumstances, is ordinarily employed by the
medical profession generally. Thus, in medical malpractice actions, the applicable standard of care
is that employed by the medical profession generally and not what one individual doctor thought
was advisable and would have done under the circumstances.
Accordingly, in cases where expert medical testimony has been presented either to support or to
rebut a claim that the applicable standard of care was breached, Georgia case law holds that questions
aimed at determining how the expert would have personally elected to treat the patient are
irrelevant. The questioning of a medical expert witness should be disallowed as irrelevant when it
pertains to the expert’s personal views and personal opinions as to the care and treatment he himself
would have rendered. Contrary to Johnson’s argument, this is true regardless of whether the expert’s
personal views are sought through direct testimony or cross-examination; as held by the trial court
ã
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in this case, a defendant’s expert witness is not required to answer questions on cross-examination
“as to what course of treatment he personally would have followed.”
It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Anesthesia Associates’
motion in limine to prohibit Johnson from cross-examining the defendant’s expert witness as to
whether he personally would have pre-oxygenated the decedent, because such questioning was
irrelevant to the issue of whether Anesthesia Associates breached the applicable standard of care.
2. Questions aimed at determining how a defendant’s medical expert personally would have
treated a plaintiff or a plaintiff’s decedent also are irrelevant for purposes of impeaching the expert.
As explained above, a medical expert’s personal practices are irrelevant to the issues in controversy
in a malpractice case. It is axiomatic that a witness may not be impeached with irrelevant facts or
evidence, and cross-examination should be confined to matters that are relevant to the case.
Moreover, when confronted with the same or similar situation, different physicians will, quite
naturally, often elect to administer differing treatments, and will exercise their judgments regarding
a patient’s care differently. However, merely because these procedures and treatments differ, it does
not automatically follow that one of them fails to comply with the applicable standard of care….
[T]estimony showing a mere difference in views between surgeons as to operating techniques, or as
to medical judgment exercised, is irrelevant in a medical malpractice action when the differing views
or techniques are both acceptable and customary within the applicable standard of care….
Therefore, the trial court did not improperly curtail Johnson’s ability to impeach the testimony of
Anesthesia Associates’ medical expert, Dr. Caplan, by granting the defendants’ motion in limine….
Carley, Justice, dissenting:
In a one-sentence footnote, the majority overrules Prevost v. Taylor, 396 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990), which was not even cited by the Court of Appeals. In my opinion, Prevost was simply
overlooked by the Court of Appeals and should not be overruled by this Court because the rationale
of that decision is so persuasive:
It is true, as defendant argues, that the issue in a medical professional negligence
action is whether the treatment met the standard of care of the profession
generally and not what any one individual doctor believes is advisable. However,
those cases cited by defendant involved instances where the only testimony
presented to support plaintiff’s claim is the individual view of one doctor and no
testimony was presented as to the standard of care generally practiced by the
profession. Here, plaintiff did not present the individual opinion of defendant’s
expert for the purpose of establishing the acceptable standard of care but offered
it to impeach the expert’s opinion that the surgery performed by defendant met
the standard of care of the profession generally. Evidence tendered for
impeachment purposes need not be of the kind or quality required for proving the
facts.
Prevost, 396 S.E.2d 17. “The right of a thorough and sifting cross-examination shall belong to every
party as to the witnesses called against him.” OCGA § 24-9-64.
Over one hundred years ago, this Court held that it is the trial court’s duty to allow a searching
and skillful test of the witness’ intelligence, memory, accuracy and veracity, and that it is better for
cross-examination to be too free than too much restricted. Where the purpose is to impeach or
discredit the witness, great latitude should be allowed by the trial court in cross-examination….
As a general rule, the liability test to be employed by the court and the jury is the
“standard of care” that a reasonably prudent physician would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances as the defendant. Therefore, the ultimate test is not
whether the expert would perform a medical act and/or teach a medical act in the
same way or a different way as a particular defendant. However, such a line of
inquiry usually is admissible on the issue of credibility. If, for example, the
plaintiff’s expert testifies that a defendant deviated from a certain standard of care,
said expert’s credibility certainly would be severely shaken if, in fact, it can be

CASES & CRITIQUE

149

shown that this expert has performed a medical act in the same or similar manner
as the defendant. If a defense expert has testified that a defendant’s medical act
conformed with a certain acceptable standard of care, the credibility of said
testimony certainly would be severely shaken, if said expert conceded on crossexamination that he personally does not perform and/or teach the medical act in
the same manner.
Pegalis & Wachsman, American Law of Medical Malpractice 2d § 14:7(e) (1993). The identical
circumstances are present in this case. As demonstrated by an offer of proof, the defendants’ medical
expert would have testified on cross-examination that he would have pre-oxygenated Mrs. Johnson
if she had been his patient. Plaintiffs’ counsel also sought to ask Dr. Caplan how he teaches his
medical students to treat patients in similar situations. Such testimony is particularly relevant to
credibility here, because Dr. Caplan testified on direct examination that there was nothing that could
have been done to make it safer for Mrs. Johnson to have the anesthesia.
A material abridgement or denial of the substantial right of cross-examination of opposing
witnesses is material error and requires the grant of a new trial. Because the trial court did not allow
plaintiffs to conduct a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the defendants’ medical expert, I
dissent to the affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ judgment….
1.

QUESTIONS
Trust Me, I’m a Doctor: Comparing Johnson with The T.J. Hooper, how does custom
seem to play a different role when determining breach in cases of medical malpractice?
What can explain these differing approaches? Is it a justifiable distinction? In what ways
might it be elitist? In what other circumstances do you think the Anti-T.J. Hooper Rule
might apply?

2.

The What and the Where: Plaintiffs in malpractice cases often hire experts to establish
the standard of care. But which experts should they hire? At least two factors are key.
First, the area of expertise: Should the expert focus on the profession generally or a
specialty (or even a sub-specialty) within the profession? Second, location: Should
experts testify as to customs nationally, in similar localities, or in the particular locality
where the tort allegedly occurred?

3.

Stare Decisis: In Condra v. Atlanta Orthopaedic Group, 681 S.E.2d 152 (Ga. 2009), the
Georgia Supreme Court overruled part of Johnson’s holding. Charting a different course,
the justices in Condra held that evidence regarding an experts’ personal practices is
admissible “both as substantive evidence and to impeach the expert’s opinion regarding
the applicable standard of care.” If you were a juror in a malpractice case, would you
want to know if the testifying expert follows the practices they say are customary? Why?
Does it make experts untrustworthy witnesses if they deviate from custom? Does your
answer depend on whether the expert shows greater or lesser care in their own practice?
DR. DISASTER PROBLEM

Dr. Julio Vasquez is the head surgeon and CEO at Athenia Hospital. He’s facing a major lawsuit
arising from an unfortunate series of events.
Ruth Coleman was rushed to the Athenia Hospital emergency room after sustaining serious
injuries during a charity bike race. The doctors assess her injuries and hurry her into surgery to stop
internal bleeding in her abdomen. Dr. Vasquez performs the surgery, stops the bleeding, and does a
blood transfusion to help Ruth make a full recovery.
Later that night, Dr. Vasquez is in a minor car accident. Exhausted from a long shift and rushing
to get home to catch some sleep, he fails to yield on a right turn and collides with Angel Johnson,
Ruth’s best friend, who was on his way to visit Ruth in the hospital. Dr. Vasquez is fine, but Angel
suffers whiplash.
The next day, Ruth isn’t recovering as the doctors expected. Dr. Vasquez runs several tests and
discovers that the blood given to Ruth post-surgery might have caused an infection. Doctors don’t
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generally test the blood given to patients during transfusions; instead, they simply administer the
blood because specialists are supposed to test and treat it ahead of time. Dr. Vasquez, already stressed
out from the previous day, doesn’t inform Ruth about the potential infection, and nor do his
colleagues. Instead, he has the surgical interns run tests to diagnose Ruth, hoping that something
else is causing her symptoms. During their tests, the interns notice a foreign object in Ruth’s
abdomen. It turns out that the blood given to Ruth during surgery was contaminated and that Dr.
Vasquez inadvertently left a surgical pad in Ruth’s abdomen during surgery. Shocked at his own
oversight, Dr. Vasquez immediately assigns Dr. Farmer to take over Ruth’s case. Luckily, Dr. Farmer
is able to both treat the infection and remove the pad without any serious complications.
After Ruth’s second surgery, she has to stay at Athenia Hospital for follow-up treatment and
observation during her recovery. The hospital doesn’t provide any security outside patients’ rooms,
but there haven’t been any security issues in several years. One day, someone sneaks into Ruth’s
room and steals her laptop while Ruth was receiving tests in another part of the hospital. After a few
more weeks of observation, Ruth makes a full recovery.
Traumatized by the whole ordeal, Ruth wants to sue for as much as possible. Should any of the
following negligence claims be treated as malpractice, such that breach will be governed by custom?
(a) Ruth sues Dr. Vasquez for using contaminated blood in the transfusion and for failing
to inform her as soon as he suspected a contamination.
(b) Ruth sues Dr. Vasquez for leaving the surgical pad in her abdomen.
(c) Ruth sues Dr. Vasquez for providing inadequate security in the hospital.
(d) Angel sues Dr. Vasquez for crashing into him while driving.
UNITED STATES v. CARROLL TOWING CO.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1947)
Hand, Judge:
[Three piers in the Hudson River each had
multiple barges attached to them, with each
barge tied to the next. The “Anna C.” was the
innermost barge on the middle pier. It was
owned by Conners Marine Co., leased by the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, and carried
flour owned by the United States Government.
Under the lease terms, Conners was required to
provide a bargee (an employee charged with
supervising the vessel, often by living on it)
daily from 8am–4pm. At all relevant times, the
Anna C’s bargee was not present on board.
At around 12pm on January 4, 1944, the
harbormaster ordered a tugboat named the
Carroll—which was owned by Carroll Towing Co. and leased by Grace Line, Inc.—to tow away a
barge on the northernmost pier. To do so, the Carroll crewmen and the harbormaster had to detach
that barge from the others on the neighboring piers, so they first pulled the ship alongside the
outermost barge in the Anna C’s chain. After the men checked the lines on the barges on that pier
and the lines connecting the Anna C. to the pier, the Carroll pulled away.
Soon after that effort, the entire row of barges broke away from the pier and began floating on
the river. The Anna C. hit a tanker docked at the neighboring pier. The Anna C. suffered a hole
below the waterline without anyone noticing and sank soon after. At the lower court, evidence
indicated that the tugs would have been able to push the Anna C. to shore before it sunk if they had
been made aware of the hole in the hull.
The District Court found that Carroll Towing and Grace were equally at fault for negligently
inspecting the lines holding the Anna C. to the pier. Therefore, they were each liable to Conners for
half of the value of the damage to the Anna C.
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Carroll and Grace argued Conners should be liable because there was no bargee on the Anna C.
during these events. Admiralty law apportioned liability for property damage on a pro rata basis
among all parties deemed legally responsible. Therefore, if Conners was not at fault, it would not be
liable for any damage. If Conners was at fault, it would recover only 1/3 from Carroll and 1/3 from
Grace, and Conners would be responsible for the final third.
The district judge found the lack of a bargee should not diminish Conners’s recovery because
the absence did not contribute to the accident. The bargee was not required to anticipate negligence
by the other men at the pier and thus was not negligent.]…
[E]ven though we assume that the [Anna C.’s] bargee was responsible for [maintaining the Anna
C.’s lines connecting it to the pier], there is not the slightest ground for saying that the [Carroll
crewmen] and the “harbormaster” would have paid any attention to any protest which he might
have made, had he been there. We do not therefore attribute it as in any degree a fault of the “Anna
C” that the flotilla broke adrift. Hence she may recover in full against the Carroll Company and the
Grace Line for any injury she suffered from the contact with the tanker’s propeller, which we shall
speak of as the “collision damages.” On the other hand, if the bargee had been on board, and had
done his duty to his employer, he would have gone below at once, examined the injury, and called
for help from the “Carroll” and the Grace Line tug. Moreover, it is clear that these tugs could have
kept the barge afloat, until they had safely beached her, and saved her cargo. This would have
avoided what we shall call the “sinking damages.” Thus, if it was a failure in [Conners’s] proper care
of its own barge, for the bargee to be absent, the company can recover only one third of the “sinking”
damages from the Carroll Company and one third from the Grace Line. For this reason the question
arises whether a barge owner is slack in the care of his barge if the bargee is absent.
As to the consequences of a bargee’s absence from his barge there have been a number of
decisions; and we cannot agree that it is never ground for liability even to other vessels who may be
injured. [Precedent in this area varies greatly with a deep factual analysis in each case.]
It appears…that there is no general rule to determine when the absence of a bargee or other
attendant will make the owner of the barge liable for injuries to other vessels if she breaks away from
her moorings. However, in any cases where he would be so liable for injuries to others, obviously he
must reduce his damages proportionately, if the injury is to his own barge. It becomes apparent why
there can be no such general rule, when we consider the grounds for such a liability. Since there are
occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a
menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against
resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the
gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves
to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury,
L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether
B > PL. Applied to the situation at bar, the likelihood that a barge will break from her fasts and the
damage she will do, vary with the place and time; for example, if a storm threatens, the danger is
greater; so it is, if she is in a crowded harbor where moored barges are constantly being shifted about.
On the other hand, the barge must not be the bargee’s prison, even though he lives aboard; he must
go ashore at times. We need not say whether, even in such crowded waters as New York Harbor a
bargee must be aboard at night at all; it may be that the custom is otherwise,… and that, if so, the
situation is one where custom should control. We leave that question open; but we hold that it is not
in all cases a sufficient answer to a bargee’s absence without excuse, during working hours, that he
has properly made fast his barge to a pier, when he leaves her. In the case at bar the bargee left at five
o’clock in the afternoon of January 3rd, and the flotilla broke away at about two o’clock in the
afternoon of the following day, twenty-one hours afterwards. The bargee had been away all the time,
and we hold that his fabricated story was affirmative evidence that he had no excuse for his absence.
At the locus in quo—especially during the short January days and in the full tide of war activity—
barges were being constantly “drilled” in and out. Certainly it was not beyond reasonable
expectation that, with the inevitable haste and bustle, the work might not be done with adequate
care. In such circumstances we hold—and it is all that we do hold—that it was a fair requirement
that the Conners Company should have a bargee aboard (unless he had some excuse for his absence),
during the working hours of daylight….
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1.

QUESTIONS
Judging the Judge: Is Judge Hand’s approach in The T.J. Hooper consistent with his
formula in Carroll Towing? Or did his position change in the intervening fifteen years?

2.

A Hand, an Arm, and a Leg: The “burden of adequate precautions” is one variable in
the celebrated but controversial “Hand Formula,” which is often framed as a form of
cost-benefit analysis. What types of burden are appropriate to consider in a breach
analysis? Is the B in B > PL purely a question of money?

3.

Algebraic Analysis: Two years later, in Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1949),
Judge Hand stressed that it’s often impossible to conjure a “quantitative estimate” of any
of the factors comprising the Hand Formula. If mathematical precision is illusory, what’s
the point of his algebraic approach?
RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL TRUST NATIONAL BANK v. ZAPATA CORP.
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (1988)

Breyer, Judge:

ã

The issue that this appeal presents is whether Zapata
Corporation has shown that the system used by Rhode Island
Hospital Trust National Bank for detecting forged checks—a
system used by a majority of American banks—lacks the “ordinary
care” that a bank must exercise under the Uniform Commercial
Code § 4-406(3), embodied here in Rhode Island General Laws,
§ 6A-4-406(3).
[The lower court made the following four determinations:]
1. In early 1985, a Zapata employee stole some blank checks
from Zapata. She wrote a large number of forged checks, almost
all in amounts of $150 to $800 each, on Zapata’s accounts at Rhode
Island Hospital Trust National Bank. The Bank, from March
through July 1985, received and paid them.
2. Bank statements that the Bank regularly sent Zapata first
began to reflect the forged checks in early April 1985. Zapata failed
to examine its statements closely until July 1985, when it found the
forgeries. It immediately notified the Bank, which then stopped
clearing the checks. The Bank had already processed and paid forged checks totaling $109,247.16.
3. The Bank will (and legally must) reimburse Zapata in respect to all checks it cleared before April
25, 1985 (or for at least two weeks after Zapata received the statement that reflected the forgeries).
4. In respect to checks cleared on and after April 25, the Bank need not reimburse Zapata because
Zapata failed to “exercise reasonable care and promptness to examine the [bank] statement.”
The question before us is whether this last-mentioned conclusion is correct or whether Zapata
can recover for the post-April 24 checks on the theory that, even if it was negligent, so was the Bank.
To understand the question, one must examine U.C.C. § 4-406, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-4-406.
Ordinarily a bank must reimburse an innocent customer for forgeries that it honors, but § 6A-4-406
makes an important exception to the liability rule. The exception operates in respect to a series of
forged checks, and it applies once a customer has had a chance to catch the forgeries by examining
his bank statements and notifying the bank but has failed to do so.
The statute, in relevant part, reads as follows:
(1) When a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompanied by items
paid in good faith in support of the debit entries or holds the statement and
items pursuant to a request or instructions of its customer or otherwise in a
reasonable manner makes the statement and items available to the
ã
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customer, the customer must exercise reasonable care and promptness to
examine the statement and items to discover his unauthorized signature or any
alteration on an item and must notify the bank promptly after discovery thereof.
(2) If the bank establishes that the customer failed with respect to an item to
comply with the duties imposed on the customer by subsection (1) the
customer is precluded from asserting against the bank
(a) His unauthorized signature or any alteration on the item if the bank also
establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure; and
(b) An unauthorized signature or alteration by the same wrongdoer on any
other item paid in good faith by the bank after the first item and statement
was available to the customer for a reasonable period not exceeding
fourteen (14) calendar days and before the bank receives notification
from the customer of any such unauthorized signature or alteration.
The statute goes on to specify an important exception to the exception. It says: “(3) The
preclusion under subsection (2) does not apply if the customer establishes lack of ordinary care on
the part of the bank in paying the item(s).” Zapata’s specific claim, on this appeal, is that it falls
within this “exception to the exception”—that the bank’s treatment of the post-April 24 checks
lacked “ordinary care.”…
The statute…says that strict bank liability terminates fourteen days after the customer receives
the bank’s statement unless “the customer establishes lack of ordinary care.” And, the U.C.C.
commentary makes clear that the statute [places the burden of proof on the customer to demonstrate
lack of ordinary care.]…
The record convinces us that Zapata failed to carry its burden of establishing “lack of ordinary
care” on the part of the Bank. First, the Bank described its ordinary practices as follows: The Bank
examines all signatures on checks for more than $1,000. It examines signatures on checks between
$100 and $1,000 (those at issue here) if it has reason to suspect a problem, e.g., if a customer has
warned it of a possible forgery or if the check was drawn on an account with insufficient funds. It
examines the signatures of a randomly chosen one percent of all other checks between $100 and
$1,000. But, it does not examine the signatures on other checks between $100 and $1,000. Through
expert testimony, the Bank also established that most other banks in the nation follow this practice
and that banking industry experts recommend it. Indeed, Trust National Bank’s practices are
conservative in this regard, as most banks set $2,500 or more, not $1,000, as the limit beneath which
they will not examine each signature.
This testimony made out a prima facie case of “ordinary care.” Of course, Zapata might still try
to show that the entire industry’s practice is unreasonable, that it reflects lack of “ordinary care.” The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.). In doing so, however, the prima facie rule
does impose on the party contesting the standards to establish that they are unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unfair.
Second, both bank officials and industry experts pointed out that this industry practice, in
general and in the particular case of the Trust National Bank, saved considerable expense, compared
with the Bank’s pre-1981 practice of examining each check by hand. To be specific, the change saved
the Bank about $125,000 annually. Zapata accepts this testimony as accurate.
Third, both a Bank official and an industry expert testified that changing from an “individual
signature examination” system to the new “bulk-filing” system led to no significant increase in the
number of forgeries that went undetected. Philip Schlernitzauer, a Bank vice-president and the
officer in charge of the Zapata account, testified that under the prior “individual signature
examination” system, some forgeries still slipped through. The Bank’s loss was about $10,000 to
$15,000 per year. He also determined through a feasibility study that by implementing a “bulk-filing”
system in which 99 percent of checks under $1,000 were not individually screened, the loss would
remain between $10,000 and $15,000. Dr. Lipis, an executive vice-president of a large consulting
firm to the financial industry, testified that among its purposes was the following:
Well, it improves the ability to return checks back to customers more correctly,
simply that the checks do not get misplaced when they are handled; generally [it]
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can improve the morale within the bank because the signature verification is very
tedious, very difficult, and not a function that is liked by anybody who does it. In
addition, it does not impact the amount of forgeries that are produced at the bank.
Zapata points to no testimony or other evidence tending to contradict these assertions. An
industry-wide practice that saves money without significantly increasing the number of forged
checks that the banks erroneously pay is a practice that reflects at least “ordinary care.”
Fourth, even if one assumes…that the new system meant some increase in the number of
undetected forged checks, Zapata still could not prevail, for it presented no evidence tending to show
any such increased loss unreasonable in light of the costs that the new practice would save. Instead,
it relied simply upon the assertion that costs saved the bank are irrelevant. But, that is not so, for
what is reasonable or unreasonable insofar as “ordinary care” or “due care” or “negligence” (and the
like) are concerned is often a matter of costs of prevention compared with correlative risks of loss.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.) (“duty” defined by
calculating probability of injury times gravity of harm to determine “burden of precaution” that is
warranted). One does not, for example, coat the base of the Grand Canyon with soft plastic nets to
catch those who might fall in, or build cars like armored tanks to reduce injuries in accidents even
though the technology exists. Compare Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 624 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1980) (under Carroll Towing calculus, gravity of accident at nuclear
reactor merits exercise of “extraordinary vigilance” by employees), with Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979) (under Carroll Towing calculus, Secretary of
Interior should assure that life systems of oceans not “unreasonably jeopardized” by oil and gas
extraction activities). In arguing that the Bank provided “no care” in respect to the checks it did not
examine, Zapata simply assumed the very conclusion (namely, the unreasonableness of a selective
examination system) that it sought to prove. Aside from this assumption, its evidentiary cupboard
is bare….
We have found a few, more modern cases that arguably support Zapata’s view, but they involve
practices more obviously unreasonable than those presented here. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Cos.
v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1979) (no ordinary care where no examination
of any size checks, conspicuous forgeries); Perley v. Glastonbury Bank & Trust Co., 368 A.2d 149,
153 (Conn. 1976) (no ordinary care where no authentication of endorsements of any
size checks); Indiana Nat’l Corp. v. Faco, Inc., 400 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (checks without
signatures paid, 30 check copies lost); Medford Irrigation Dist. v. W. Bank, 676 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984) (same where no examination of any checks under $5,000)….
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is [a]ffirmed.
1.

QUESTIONS
Dollars and Sense: Applying the Hand Formula in Zapata arguably makes sense because
the case has features that are easier to value and easier to estimate. Do you agree?

2.

Utility Maximization: Does it make sense to think of breach as purely a question of
failing to take cost-justified care? Let’s say that 3,000 people die every year in accidents
caused by driving while using a cellphone, but that we could trace significant financial
benefits to business deals conducted during people’s daily commutes. Should a jury be
invited to consider this profitable use of people’s time while driving? Does this kind of
analysis also mean that tort law implicitly endorses driving with greater care in wealthy
neighborhoods?

3.

Playing the Odds: Why shouldn’t we judge reasonable care by simply comparing the
burden of precaution and gravity of injury (B > L)? How does the P variable guide us
toward an ex-ante perspective of breach?
BLACK ISLAND PROBLEM

Black Island, home to one of the world’s most active volcanoes, is owned by the U.S. government,
which performs environmental research there through the Black Island Research Division (BIRD).
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BIRD researchers are the island’s only residents, but the government allows tourists to visit for the
once-in-a-lifetime experience of walking inside a crater. While BIRD’s Special Volcanic Alert System
(SVAS) measures the volcano’s current activity at any given moment, it doesn’t indicate future risk.
Instead, BIRD uses SVAS to issue real-time volcanic alert bulletins on its website and to emergencyresponse agencies.
Ed is a geologist at BIRD, and his partner Felicity came for the weekend to enjoy the outdoors.
When Ed checked SVAS on the morning of her arrival, the system wasn’t showing anything unusual.
Unfortunately, however, the volcano erupted that afternoon, resulting in 24 deaths and 44 injuries.
Felicity and Ed were hiking at the time; Ed was killed and Felicity was injured. A volcanologist at the
University of Pompeii said that the tragedy was “a disaster waiting to happen,” but BIRD’s Scientistin-Chief remarked to the press that “assessing volcanic risk robustly is bloody difficult!”
Felicity sues BIRD, arguing that it negligently failed to anticipate and communicate the risk.
(a) Can Felicity establish breach?
(b) What if there had been two eruptions in the past three months, both after the SVAS
system showed normal readings?
(c) Does it matter that “assessing volcanic risk robustly is bloody difficult”?
BYRNE v. BOADLE
Exchequer Court (1863)
…[T]he evidence adduced on the part of the plaintiff
was as follows: A witness named Critchley said: “On the
18th July, I was in Scotland Road, on the right side going
north, defendant’s shop is on that side. When I was
opposite to his shop, a barrel of flour fell from a window
above in defendant’s house and shop, and knocked the
plaintiff down. He was carried into an adjoining shop.
A horse and cart came opposite the defendant’s door.
Barrels of flour were in the cart. I do not think the barrel
was being lowered by a rope. I cannot say: I did not see
the barrel until it struck the plaintiff. It was not swinging when it struck the plaintiff. It struck him
on the shoulder and knocked him towards the shop. No one called out until after the accident.”
The plaintiff said: “On approaching Scotland Place and defendant’s shop, I lost all recollection.
I felt no blow. I saw nothing to warn me of danger. I was taken home in a cab. I was helpless for a
fortnight.” (He then described his sufferings.) “I saw the path clear. I did not see any cart opposite
defendant’s shop.” Another witness said: “I saw a barrel falling. I don’t know how, but from
defendant’s.” The only other witness was a surgeon, who described the injury which the plaintiff had
received. It was admitted that the defendant was a dealer in flour.
It was submitted, on the part of the defendant, that there was no evidence of negligence for the
jury. The learned Assessor was of that opinion, and nonsuited the plaintiff, reserving leave to him
to move the Court of Exchequer to enter the verdict for him with 50£. damages, the amount assessed
by the jury….
ã

Pollock, Chief Baron:
There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems one of them. I
think it would be wrong to lay down as a rule that in no case can presumption of negligence arise
from the fact of an accident. Suppose in this case the barrel had rolled out of the warehouse and
fallen on the plaintiff, how could he possibly ascertain from what cause it occurred? It is the duty of
persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out, and I think that such
a case would, beyond all doubt, afford prima facie evidence of negligence. A barrel could not roll out
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of a warehouse without some negligence, and to say that a plaintiff who is injured by it must call
witnesses from the warehouse to prove negligence seems to me preposterous.
So in the building or repairing a house, or putting pots on the chimneys, if a person passing along
the road is injured by something falling upon him, I think the accident alone would be prima facie
evidence of negligence. Or if an article calculated to cause damage is put in a wrong place and does
mischief, I think that those whose duty it was to put it in the right place are prima facie responsible,
and if there is any state of facts to rebut the presumption of negligence, they must prove them. The
present case upon the evidence comes to this, a man is passing in front of the premises of a dealer in
flour, and there falls down upon him a barrel of flour. I think it apparent that the barrel was in the
custody of the defendant who occupied the premises, and who is responsible for the acts of his
servants who had the control of it; and in my opinion the fact of its falling is prima facie evidence of
negligence, and the plaintiff who was injured by it is not bound to shew that it could not fall without
negligence, but if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence it is for the defendant to prove them.
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Well, Duh: Although some people quip that res ipsa loquitor is Latin for “duh,” it
actually means “the thing speaks for itself.” In Byrne, what is the thing and what is it
saying for itself?
Res Ipsa’s Role: Carefully ponder the following questions: Is res ipsa loquitor an
independent tort? Does it change the substantive theory of what it means for the
defendant’s conduct to be negligent? Does it alter the plaintiff’s burden of production or
proof? Is there anything the defendant can do once res ipsa loquitor applies?
ã

ã
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YBARRA v. SPANGARD
Supreme Court of California (1944)
Gibson, Chief Justice:

ã

This is an action for damages for personal injuries alleged
to have been inflicted on plaintiff by defendants during the
course of a surgical operation….
On October 28, 1939, plaintiff consulted defendant Dr.
Tilley, who diagnosed his ailment as appendicitis, and made
arrangements for an appendectomy to be performed by
defendant Dr. Spangard at a hospital owned and managed by
defendant Dr. Swift. [Plaintiff was seen and treated by
multiple employees before being brought into surgery, several
of whom are defendants in this action.]… [Once in the
operating room,] Defendant Dr. Reser, the anesthetist, also an employee of Dr. Swift, adjusted
plaintiff for the operation, pulling his body to the head of the operating table and, according to
plaintiff’s testimony, laying him back against two hard objects at the top of his shoulders, about an
inch below his neck. Dr. Reser then administered the anesthetic and plaintiff lost consciousness.
When he awoke early the following morning he was in his hospital room attended by defendant
Thompson, the special nurse, and another nurse who was not made a defendant.
Plaintiff testified that prior to the operation he had never had any pain in, or injury to, his right
arm or shoulder, but that when he awakened he felt a sharp pain about half way between the neck
and the point of the right shoulder. He complained to the nurse, and then to Dr. Tilley, who gave
him…treatments while he remained in the hospital. The pain did not cease, but spread down to the
lower part of his arm, and after his release from the hospital the condition grew worse. He was unable
to rotate or lift his arm, and developed paralysis and atrophy of the muscles around the shoulder.
He received further treatments from Dr. Tilley until March, 1940, and then returned to work,
wearing his arm in a splint on the advice of Dr. Spangard.
Plaintiff also consulted Dr. Wilfred Sterling Clark, who had X-ray pictures taken which showed
an area of diminished sensation below the shoulder and atrophy and wasting away of the muscles
around the shoulder. In the opinion of Dr. Clark, plaintiff’s condition was due to trauma or injury
by pressure or strain, applied between his right shoulder and neck. Plaintiff was also examined by
Dr. Fernando Garduno, who expressed the opinion that plaintiff’s injury was a paralysis of traumatic
origin, not arising from pathological causes, and not systemic, and that the injury resulted in
atrophy, loss of use and restriction of motion of the right arm and shoulder.
Plaintiff’s theory is that the foregoing evidence presents a proper case for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that the inference of negligence arising therefrom makes the [lower
court’s decision] improper. Defendants takes the position that, assuming that plaintiff’s condition
was in fact the result of an injury, there is no showing that the act of any particular defendant, nor
any particular instrumentality, was the cause thereof. They attack plaintiff’s action as an attempt to
fix liability “en masse” on various defendants, some of whom were not responsible for the acts of
others; and they further point to the failure to show which defendants had control of the
instrumentalities that may have been involved. Their main defense may be briefly stated in two
propositions: (1) that where there are several defendants, and there is a division of responsibility in
the use of an instrumentality causing the injury, and the injury might have resulted from the separate
act of either one of two or more persons, the rule of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked against any
one of them; and (2) that where there are several instrumentalities, and no showing is made as to
which caused the injury or as to the particular defendant in control of it, the doctrine cannot apply.
We are satisfied, however, that these objections are not well taken in the circumstances of this case.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: (1) the accident must be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency
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or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to
any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff….
There is, however, some uncertainty as to the extent to which res ipsa loquitur may be invoked
in cases of injury from medical treatment. This is in part due to the tendency, in some decisions, to
lay undue emphasis on the limitations of the doctrine, and to give too little attention to its basic
underlying purpose. The result has been that a simple, understandable rule of circumstantial
evidence, with a sound background of common sense and human experience, has occasionally been
transformed into a rigid legal formula, which arbitrarily precludes its application in many cases
where it is most important that it should be applied. If the doctrine is to continue to serve a useful
purpose, we should not forget that the particular force and justice of the rule, regarded as a
presumption throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the
circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person.
The present case is of a type which comes within the reason and spirit of the doctrine more fully
perhaps than any other. The passenger sitting awake in a railroad car at the time of a collision, the
pedestrian walking along the street and struck by a falling object or the debris of an explosion, are
surely not more entitled to an explanation than the unconscious patient on the operating table.
Viewed from this aspect, it is difficult to see how the doctrine can, with any justification, be so
restricted in its statement as to become inapplicable to a patient who submits himself to the care and
custody of doctors and nurses, is rendered unconscious, and receives some injury from
instrumentalities used in his treatment. Without the aid of the doctrine a patient who received
permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of someone’s negligence, would be
entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily chose to disclose
the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability. If this were the state of the law
of negligence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be forced to invoke the principles of
absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, in actions by persons suffering injuries during the
course of treatment under anesthesia. But we think this juncture has not yet been reached, and that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is properly applicable to the case before us.
The condition that the injury must not have been due to the plaintiff’s voluntary action is of
course fully satisfied under the evidence produced herein; and the same is true of the condition that
the accident must be one which ordinarily does not occur unless someone was negligent. We have
here no problem of negligence in treatment, but of distinct injury to a healthy part of the body not
the subject of treatment, nor within the area covered by the operation. The decisions in this state
make it clear that such circumstances raise the inference of negligence, and call upon the defendant
to explain the unusual result.
The argument of defendants is simply that plaintiff has not shown an injury caused by an
instrumentality under a defendant’s control, because he has not shown which of the several
instrumentalities that he came in contact with while in the hospital caused the injury; and he has not
shown that any one defendant or his servants had exclusive control over any particular
instrumentality. Defendants assert that some of them were not the employees of other defendants,
that some did not stand in any permanent relationship from which liability in tort would follow, and
that in view of the nature of the injury, the number of defendants and the different functions
performed by each, they could not all be liable for the wrong, if any.
We have no doubt that in a modern hospital a patient is quite likely to come under the care of a
number of persons in different types of contractual and other relationships with each other…. But
we do not believe that either the number or relationship of the defendants alone determines whether
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed
for any period was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that no unnecessary harm came to him
and each would be liable for failure in this regard. Any defendant who negligently injured him, and
any defendant charged with his care who so neglected him as to allow injury to occur, would be
liable. The defendant employers would be liable for the neglect of their employees; and the doctor
in charge of the operation would be liable for the negligence of those who became his temporary
servants for the purpose of assisting in the operation.
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In this connection, it should be noted that while the assisting physicians and nurses may be
employed by the hospital, or engaged by the patient, they normally become the temporary servants
or agents of the surgeon in charge while the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed
upon him for their negligent acts under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus a surgeon has
been held liable for the negligence of an assisting nurse who leaves a sponge or other object inside a
patient, and the fact that the duty of seeing that such mistakes do not occur is delegated to others
does not absolve the doctor from responsibility for their negligence….
It may appear at the trial that, consistent with the principles outlined above, one or more
defendants will be found liable and others absolved, but this should not preclude the application of
the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various
agencies or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every
defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. This, we think, places upon them the burden
of initial explanation. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical
treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one
of them as the person who did the alleged negligent act.
The other aspect of the case which defendants so strongly emphasize is that plaintiff has not
identified the instrumentality any more than he has the particular guilty defendant. Here, again,
there is a misconception which, if carried to the extreme for which defendants contend, would
unreasonably limit the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule. It should be enough that the plaintiff
can show an injury resulting from an external force applied while he lay unconscious in the hospital;
this is as clear a case of identification of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to make.
An examination of the recent cases, particularly in this state, discloses that the test of actual
exclusive control of an instrumentality has not been strictly followed, but exceptions have been
recognized where the purpose of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would otherwise be defeated. Thus,
the test has become one of right of control rather than actual control….
[Given the] liberalization of the tests for res ipsa loquitur, there can be no justification for the
rejection of the doctrine in the instant case…. [I]f we accept the contention of defendants herein,
there will rarely be any compensation for patients injured while unconscious. A hospital today
conducts a highly integrated system of activities, with many persons contributing their
efforts…. The number of those in whose care the patient is placed is not a good reason for denying
him all reasonable opportunity to recover for negligent harm. It is rather a good reason for reexamination of the statement of legal theories which supposedly compel such a shocking result.
We do not at this time undertake to state the extent to which the reasoning of this case may be
applied to other situations in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. We merely hold that
where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment,
all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have
caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an
explanation of their conduct. The judgment is reversed.
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
Bend, Don’t Break: How does Ybarra bend the rules of res ipsa loquitor to prevent the
doctrine from breaking?
Cone of Silence: In what way can Ybarra be justified as an information-forcing rule?
May res ipsa loquitor always be justified in this way, or is there something special about
the circumstances in Ybarra?
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KAMBAT v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL
Court of Appeals of the State of New York (1997)
Kaye, Chief Judge:
In this medical malpractice action, an 18-by-18-inch
laparotomy pad was discovered in the abdomen of
plaintiffs’ decedent following a hysterectomy performed
by defendant physician at defendant hospital. The
question before us is whether plaintiffs were entitled to
submit the case to the jury on the theory of res ipsa
loquitur. Contrary to the trial court and Appellate
Division, we conclude that the jury could have inferred
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and
that defendants’ evidence of due care and alternative
causes of the injury did not remove the doctrine from the case. The trial court’s refusal to instruct
the jury regarding res ipsa loquitur thus mandates reversal and a new trial.
In August 1986, defendant physician Ralph Sperrazza performed an abdominal hysterectomy on
decedent, Florence Fenzel, at defendant St. Francis Hospital. Ten laparotomy pads were marked and
available for the operation, and Dr. Sperrazza placed several of these pads in decedent’s peritoneal
cavity, next to the bowel, during the surgery. The patient was unconscious throughout the
procedure.
In the months following the operation decedent’s condition was at first unremarkable.
Eventually, however, she began to complain of stomach pain, and on November 30, 1986 X-rays
taken at another hospital revealed a foreign object in her abdomen. On December 5, a laparotomy
pad measuring 18-by-18 inches—similar to those used during the hysterectomy—was discovered
fully or partially inside decedent’s bowel, and it was removed by Dr. Robert Barone. This finding
was so unanticipated that a photographer was called to document it. Decedent’s condition continued
to deteriorate, and she died on December 29, 1986, from infection-related illnesses.
Plaintiffs, decedent’s husband and children, commenced this medical malpractice action against
Dr. Sperrazza and St. Francis Hospital, alleging that defendants were negligent in leaving the
laparotomy pad inside decedent’s abdomen. At trial, plaintiffs presented evidence that the pad
removed from decedent was the same type and size as those supplied to St. Francis Hospital in 1986
and commonly used during hysterectomies. Plaintiffs also adduced testimony that the pads were
provided only to hospitals with operating rooms, where patients would not have access to them….
[D]efendants introduced evidence that standard procedures were followed during the operation,
and that the number of sponges, medical instruments and laparotomy pads used and removed were
counted several times, carefully and accurately. Defendants’ experts, moreover, opined that the pad
had not been left inside decedent but, rather, that she had swallowed it. According to defendants’
witnesses, laparotomy pads were frequently left in places accessible to patients in hospitals; decedent
suffered from chronic depression; overuse of sleeping pills could suppress the gag reflex and permit
her to swallow the pad; and the human gastrointestinal tract would allow the pad to pass to the small
bowel. Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, by contrast, agreed that it would be anatomically impossible to
swallow the laparotomy pad or for a swallowed pad to reach the bowel.
The trial court denied plaintiffs’ request to charge res ipsa loquitur, and the jury returned a
defendants’ verdict. Plaintiffs moved to set aside the verdict and either enter judgment in their favor
or grant a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to deliver the requested charge. The
court denied the motion, concluding that the lengthy and inconsistent expert testimony
demonstrated that resolution of the case was not within a lay jury’s experience and, thus, res ipsa
loquitur was not applicable….
Where the actual or specific cause of an accident is unknown, under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur a jury may in certain circumstances infer negligence merely from the happening of an event
and the defendant’s relation to it. Res ipsa loquitur simply recognizes what we know from our
everyday experience: that some accidents by their very nature would ordinarily not happen without
negligence.
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Once a plaintiff’s proof establishes the following three conditions, a prima facie case of
negligence exists and plaintiff is entitled to have res ipsa loquitur charged to the jury. First, the event
must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; second, it
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
third, it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
To rely on res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff need not conclusively eliminate the possibility of all other
causes of the injury. It is enough that the evidence supporting the three conditions afford a rational
basis for concluding that it is more likely than not that the injury was caused by defendant’s
negligence. Stated otherwise, all that is required is that the likelihood of other possible causes of the
injury be so reduced that the greater probability lies at defendant’s door. Res ipsa loquitur thus
involves little more than application of the ordinary rules of circumstantial evidence to certain
unusual events, and it is appropriately charged when, upon a commonsense appraisal of the
probative value of the circumstantial evidence, the inference of negligence is justified.
Submission of res ipsa loquitur, moreover, merely permits the jury to infer negligence from the
circumstances of the occurrence. The jury is thus allowed—but not compelled—to draw the
permissible inference. In those cases where conflicting inferences may be drawn, choice of inference
must be made by the jury.
Here, the Appellate Division majority concluded that plaintiffs’ proof at trial failed to satisfy any
of the three conditions. With regard to the first requirement in particular, the appellate court agreed
with the trial court that a lay jury could not determine whether the occurrence was of a kind that
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence without evaluating the parties’ expert
testimony and, therefore, res ipsa loquitur did not apply.
In the typical res ipsa loquitur case, the jury can reasonably draw upon past experience common
to the community for the conclusion that the adverse event generally would not occur absent
negligent conduct. In medical malpractice cases, however, the common knowledge and everyday
experience of lay jurors may be inadequate to support this inference. Courts and commentators across
the country have come to varying conclusions as to whether expert testimony can be used to educate
the jury as to the likelihood that the occurrence would take place without negligence where a basis of
common knowledge is lacking. Courts in this State, as well, have differed as to whether expert
testimony can supply the necessary foundation for consideration of res ipsa loquitur by a jury.
Widespread consensus exists, however, that a narrow category of factually simple medical
malpractice cases requires no expert to enable the jury reasonably to conclude that the accident
would not happen without negligence. Not surprisingly, the oft-cited example is where a surgeon
leaves a sponge or foreign object inside the plaintiff’s body. As explained by Prosser and Keeton in
their classic treatise: “There are, however, some medical and surgical errors on which any layman is
competent to pass judgment and conclude from common experience that such things do not happen
if there has been proper skill and care. When an operation leaves a sponge or implement in the
patient’s interior, the thing speaks for itself without the aid of any expert’s advice.”
Manifestly, the lay jury here did not require expert testimony to conclude that an 18-by-18-inch
laparotomy pad is not ordinarily discovered inside a patient’s abdomen following a hysterectomy in
the absence of negligence. Thus, plaintiffs’ undisputed proof that this occurred satisfied the first
requirement of res ipsa loquitur. We therefore need not resolve today the question whether res ipsa
loquitur is applicable in medical malpractice cases in which the jury is incapable of determining
whether the first res ipsa loquitur condition has been met without the aid of expert testimony.
Plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding how the presence of the pad led to decedent’s ultimate
injury and contradicting defendants’ alternative theory that decedent swallowed the pad did not
render res ipsa loquitur inapplicable. This evidence was probative of the questions of exclusive
control and absence of contributory conduct on the part of decedent—the second and third
foundational elements of res ipsa loquitur. The debate over the use of expert testimony in res ipsa
loquitur cases, however, centers primarily on the first element, since it is with regard to the
likelihood that the accident would not happen without negligence that the jury is generally expected
to draw upon its common knowledge.
Turning to these remaining res ipsa loquitur conditions, plaintiffs’ evidence that similar pads
were used during decedent’s surgery, that decedent was unconscious throughout the operation, that
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laparotomy pads are not accessible to patients and that it would be anatomically impossible to
swallow such pads sufficed to allow the jury to conclude that defendants had exclusive control of the
laparotomy pad at the time of the alleged act of negligence and that it did not result from any
voluntary action by the patient.
We agree with the Appellate Division dissenters, moreover, that defendants’ evidence tending to
rebut the three conditions did not disqualify this case from consideration under res ipsa loquitur.
Plaintiffs were not obligated to eliminate every alternative explanation for the event. Defendants’
evidence that they used due care and expert testimony supporting their competing theory that
decedent might have had access to laparotomy pads and inflicted the injury upon herself by
swallowing the pad merely raised alternative inferences to be evaluated by the jury in determining
liability. The undisputed fact remained in evidence that a laparotomy pad measuring 18 inches
square was discovered in decedent’s abdomen: from this the jury may still be permitted to infer that
the defendant’s witnesses are not to be believed, that something went wrong with the precautions
described, that the full truth has not been told. Thus, the inference of negligence could reasonably
have been drawn upon a commonsense appraisal of the probative value of the circumstantial
evidence, and it was error to refuse plaintiffs’ request to charge res ipsa loquitur.… Accordingly, the
orders of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted as to the first
and second causes of action of the complaint.
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Rebutting Res Ipsa: The court notes the three conditions that support the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor. How does St. Francis Hospital attempt to challenge those conditions
here? Why wasn’t it ultimately successful?
Recognizing Res Ipsa: Outside of the hospital context, can you think of plausible and
likely examples of when res ipsa loquitor would apply?

D. Cause
MUCKLER v. BUCHL
Supreme Court of Minnesota (1967)
Sheran, Justice:

ã

…About 8:30 p.m., on August 11, 1962, plaintiff’s decedent, a 55year-old woman, fell down a flight of stairs extending from the landing
between the first and second floors down to the first floor of the
Minneapolis apartment house in which she had been a tenant for 7
years. She broke her hip in the fall and was taken to a hospital where
she died less than 4 months later….
[D]ecedent’s husband commenced an action for death by wrongful
act against the apartment-house owner. At trial…plaintiff claimed the
accident was caused by defendant’s negligence in having the stairs too
dimly lit for safety contrary to a relevant ordinance and to his
common-law duty. Pursuant to a verdict in favor of plaintiff,
…judgment for $17,000 was entered….
Does the evidence justify a finding that the fall which caused injuries resulting in the death of
plaintiff’s decedent was caused by the negligence of defendant in failing properly to light the stairway
in the apartment building where the fall occurred?…
Were it not for our decision in Majerus v. Guelsow, 113 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1962), we would be
hesitant to affirm the jury’s implicit finding that decedent was caused to fall because of the darkness
of the stairway, there being no direct evidence on the issue.
Just before she fell, decedent was walking down the stairs directly behind a departing guest who
had been visiting her in the second-floor apartment occupied by decedent and her husband. The
ã
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guest gave the following description of the events occurring between the time she left decedent’s
apartment and the time the critical injury was sustained:
Q. As you went out into the hallway and as the door of the apartment was closed,
how can you describe the condition of the light at that time?
The Witness: It was dark. I could distinguish the hand rail and I hung onto that
because I could not tell where the steps were.
Q. I believe there is one flight of steps there from that second floor landing down
about five or six steps to a landing between floors; is that your recollection?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green [plaintiff’s attorney]: Now, you got down to the first floor landing, or
the landing between floors, without any particular incident?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you then make the turn to go down the second flight to the landing on the
first floor?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell us what happened as you went down that second flight of stairs?
A. I was being very careful. I couldn’t tell where the steps were so I had to feel my
way down, and then I don’t know how far I was from the bottom, probably three
or four steps, and I heard something behind me and I imagined it was Mrs.
Muckler tripping or falling—I couldn’t tell then—so I instinctively put my hand
out and there was nothing there, and I heard the scream and the thump and there
she was.
Q. At this point where you heard this noise, had Mrs. Muckler been behind you?
A. Yes, she was behind me.
Q. Where did Mrs. Muckler then finally wind up?
A. I heard the thump and the scream almost simultaneously and then the doors
from the first floor opened so then I could see her.
Q. Where was she?
A. Lying on the floor, on the landing.
If decedent ever said what caused her to fall, the record does not disclose it.
An electrical engineer who measured the light at the place of the accident at a time when,
according to the evidence, conditions were substantially the same as those prevailing at the time of
the event gave testimony from which the jury could infer that the light at and near the place of the
occurrence measured one-tenth of a foot-candle or less—significantly below the two foot-candles
required by an ordinance of the city of Minneapolis.
At the time of the accident the stairway was not lighted by artificial illumination. Defendant’s
agent was in exclusive control of the switch to the lights which could have been used for this purpose.
Except for the inadequacy of the lighting, the evidence shows that there was no defect in the
stairway to which the fall could be attributed. A handrail was in place.
Decedent, about 55 years of age, was in good health except for a diabetic condition which under
the evidence the jury could have found to be controlled. Also there was evidence from which the
jury could have found that decedent did not consume intoxicating liquors on the day of the accident
or at any other time. There is no evidence indicating that decedent had fallen while descending the
steps of the apartment building on any prior occasion during the 7 years she lived there as a tenant.
The evidence is consistent with the theory that decedent fell on the stairway because of the
darkness. But it is also consistent with the possibility that the fall would have occurred no matter
what the lighting condition might have been. We can eliminate the diabetic condition as a probable
explanation of the occurrence in view of the testimony of competent witnesses that decedent was
not suffering observable symptoms before and as she started down the stairway. The possibility that
the fall was attributable to intoxication can be eliminated on the basis of testimony to the effect that
decedent never used intoxicants. But experience tells us that people sometimes fall on stairways even
though fully alert and in the best of health. We cannot say with certitude that this was not one of
those instances.
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Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, as we must, we are
still working in the field of probability. And the degree of probability of a connection between an
alleged cause and a given result needed to sustain an affirmative jury finding cannot be defined with
mathematical certainty. The line separating fact situations where an inference of causation is
permissible from those in which it is not must, of necessity, reflect the general practical experience
of the court called upon to make the demarcation. So considered, it seems reasonable that one
attempting to descend a stairway so dark that the steps are barely discernible would be likely to fall
because of the darkness. And, the accident having happened, it seems to us more probable that the
darkened state of the stairway was the precipitating factor for the accident than otherwise. The
minimum standards for lighting for stairways set by Minneapolis ordinance also suggest an
experience-tested relationship between lack of adequate lighting on stairs and accidents of the type
with which we are here concerned. Admittedly, thE case is a close one….
In Majerus v. Guelsow, 113 N.W.2d 450, negligence on the part of the defendant was proved by
showing that the stairway which decedent had apparently been using had treads of irregular width
and risers of irregular height made more hazardous by the absence of a handrail. The principal
question in the case was whether a causal relationship between these defects and a fall by decedent,
who was found dead 30 feet from the bottom of the stairs, could be sustained, there being no direct
evidence as to what happened. In affirming a jury finding of a causal relationship, the court said:
From the facts and circumstances shown here, a jury could reasonably infer that
the defect in part of the stairway was the cause of the accident which culminated
in decedent’s death. It is true that there are other possible inferences, such as, foul
play resulting in someone pushing him down the stairs, his falling while
intoxicated, an injury received before he returned to the apartment; but none of
these creates as reasonable an inference as that reached by the jury. The jury found
here, based upon evidence as to the time in which alcohol is metabolized and upon
the testimony of those who last saw the decedent, that intoxication was not a cause
of the death….
The basic problem in Majerus, as here, was to decide whether an event which could be an
adequate cause of an accident was in fact the cause of it. We think the probabilities are as great in
the one instance as in the other and therefore resolve our doubts in this borderline situation in favor
of affirmance….
1.

QUESTIONS
Leffler Revisited: Did the property owner owe Mrs. Muckler a duty? If her guest had
fallen too, would the same duty apply? What if Mrs. Muckler didn’t live in the apartment
building and was instead hurrying down the stairs after committing a burglary?

2.

Causal Connection: Imagine you’re the judge in Muckler and the jury asks you how sure
they must be that poor lighting caused Mrs. Muckler’s fall. How should you respond?

3.

Lawyering Causation: Muckler is an example of when actual cause is disputed (as
opposed to proximate cause, which we’ll get to soon). A common way to determine
actual cause is the “but-for test”: But for defendant’s breach, would the plaintiff’s injury
have occurred? How does the but-for test apply in this case? How does the plaintiff’s
theory of breach frame the causation inquiry?
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BUTTS v. WEISZ
United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania (2010)
Conti, Judge:

ã

…[Plaintiff] Levone Butts and her husband, Glen Butts, came to
know [defendants] Lloyd Weisz and Georgia Weisz when the two
couples lived in California…. Defendants moved to [Pennsylvania, but
plaintiff and her husband remained in California.]… On August 21,
2006, plaintiff and her husband were guests at the [Pennsylvania] home
of Lloyd Weisz and Georgia Weisz…. Plaintiff and her husband had not
visited defendants’ home in Pennsylvania prior to August 21, 2006.
Glenn Butts was eighty-four years old on that date.
Defendants’ home is described as a “ranch-style” house. The back
door of the house opened into a landing area. A person entering through
the back door could proceed straight down a stairwell to the basement,
or could turn left and proceed up a single eight-inch stair into the kitchen. There was no door
between the landing and basement stairwell…. There was an overhead lighting fixture at the top of
the basement steps. The light switch for this lighting fixture was not at the top of the basement
stairwell, but rather was located outside the landing area above the entryway.
After arriving at defendants’ home from the airport, the couples entered the home through the
back door; there was ample light in the landing area at the time they entered…. Defendants gave the
Butts a tour of the home. The tour was brief, however, because plaintiff and her husband were
hungry and wanted to eat dinner. Defendants took the Butts out to dinner. In exiting the house the
couples passed through the back door, and returned through the same door. Georgia Weisz
intentionally turned off the light in the landing area after returning.
After dinner, plaintiff and Georgia Weisz sat in the living room of the home, while plaintiff’s
husband and Lloyd Weisz went into the den area of the home. Plaintiff’s husband entered the living
room and stated he was going to “use the little boys’ room.” He walked through the home’s dining
room into the kitchen. Plaintiff asserts that the most direct way to the bathroom from her husband’s
location was through the foyer, although the path he took also leads to the bathroom. Georgia Weisz
saw plaintiff’s husband enter the kitchen, and was confused why he went that way. Georgia Weisz,
however, did not tell him that the other direction was the direct route. Plaintiff’s husband did not
ask for directions to the bathroom and did not ask that any lights be turned on. Although plaintiff
believed her husband was going in the wrong direction, any concern she had was assuaged by
Georgia Weisz’s failure to redirect him.
Defendants and plaintiff heard a crash from the landing area. They walked to the basement
stairwell and found plaintiff’s husband unresponsive at the bottom of the steps. No one saw
plaintiff’s husband fall. Plaintiff attempted to revive her husband, but was unsuccessful. Plaintiff’s
husband was taken to Jameson Memorial Hospital…[and] pronounced dead of blunt head trauma.
At all times when plaintiff’s husband passed through the landing area it was amply lit, with the
exception of when he fell. The lighting was provided either by natural light or by defendants
triggering the light switch. The lighting fixture at the top of the basement stairwell was turned off at
the time of the accident.
Plaintiff retained an architect expert witness, Robert T. Stevens, Jr., R.A. [After both sides
submitted competing motions on the admissibility of Stevens’s testimony, the court decided] that
Stevens’ testimony would be limited to offering an opinion regarding a normal person’s gait, the
dangerousness of a single step, and the possible injuries that could result from that danger:
THE COURT: At this stage, the nature of the step, the configuration of the step,
the nature of the lighting, how a person would normally walk, those are matters
that would be appropriate for Mr. Stevens to opine as to. He is not going to be able
to opine, however, about the reaching for the light switch, because that’s just too
speculative. We have no idea if the decedent reached for the switch or didn’t reach
ã
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for the switch. So that would be a matter of pure speculation. Whether what is left
in terms of the opinion, whether it’s sufficient for proving causation under these
circumstances, I would have to resolve at a motion for summary judgment.
DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL: So I understand, Your Honor, at this point your
ruling is that Mr. Stevens would be allowed to testify, would be allowed to testify
as to the dangerous condition at the top of the stairs, and that it’s possible that Mr.
Butts missed the step, and then, fell to his left?
THE COURT: Depending on the walking; how someone would walk on that kind
of step, and that if someone did fall, they could fall, and going down the steps
would be something, too, that could have happened. But the problem you’re going
to have, quite frankly, is if there’s an equally plausible situation here, I’m not sure
that that’s sufficient to get past a motion for summary judgment. But I can’t
resolve that at this stage….
Glen Butts, a social guest of defendants, was a gratuitous licensee…. Pennsylvania courts refer
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 342 in determining the contours of the duty owed by a
landowner to a gratuitous licensee. Section 342 makes a possessor of land liable to a licensee for
physical harm caused by dangerous conditions known to the possessor that are not made safe and
are not warned of:
A possesser of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by
a condition on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees and
should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the
licensees of the condition and risk involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the
risk involved….
[A] landowner can only be subject to liability for physical harm if the harm is caused by the
landowner’s negligence concerning that condition. Pennsylvania courts have adopted the
Restatement’s ‘substantial factor’ approach concerning legal causation. Negligent conduct is said to
be a legal cause if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. To be a substantial factor, it
need not be the sole factor and need not be quantified as considerable or large, so long as it is
significant or recognizable. The fact that some other cause concurs with the negligence of the
defendant in producing an injury does not relieve defendant from liability unless he can show that
such other cause would have produced the injury independently of his negligence….
Here, plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence that an alleged breach by defendants caused
Glen Butts’ death. The evidence presented by plaintiff in responding to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to causation, such as evidence of a dangerous single step, the failure
to leave on lights, and the failure to warn or alert Glen Butts of potential danger, relates to whether
defendants breached a duty owed to Glen Butts. This evidence does not establish a causal link
between the alleged breaches of duty and the accident. Plaintiff’s expert architect witness, Stevens,
offered an opinion about the cause of the accident, i.e., plaintiff’s husband was reaching for a light
switch, but, upon consideration of defendant’s motion to challenge Stevens’ opinions, the court held
that such testimony is precluded because it was speculative. For purposes of analyzing the pending
summary judgment motions, therefore, the court will limit Stevens’ testimony as set forth on the
record at the June 11, 2009 hearing.
In moving for summary judgment, defendants argue that Stevens’ testimony, as limited for trial
purposes, is insufficient to establish causation. Defendants cite Fedorczyk v. Caribbean Cruise Lines,
Ltd., 82 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1996), in which Fedorcrzyk, a passenger on a cruise ship, slipped and fell in
a bath tub, and sued the ship’s operator for negligently causing her injuries. The tub had abrasive
strips, but plaintiff did not know whether her feet were on the strips when she slipped. An expert
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architect witness opined that the strips failed to provide a sufficiently large area of non-slip surface
to permit safe use of the tub….
The [Fedorcrzyk’s] expert’s testimony was admissible to [the] extent he opined that the less
adequate the strips the greater the potential to slip, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
recognized that testimony of an increased risk of harm resulting from a party’s negligence does not
establish that the party’s negligence caused the harm. The court relied upon a hypothetical for
further explanation:
…A company provides a stairway in which some of the stairs are defective and
some are in fine condition. A person falls on the steps, but does not know which
step she fell on. No evidence is introduced that tends to prove she stepped on the
defective step. The injured party simply testified that she walked down the steps
and fell. We may not reasonably infer that the defective steps probably caused her
injury merely because she may have stepped on a defective stair. Without evidence
establishing a likelihood that the injured party stepped on the defective stair, a
jury would be left to speculate as to the cause of the injury. Simply put, increased
risk of harm due to a defendant’s negligence, standing alone, does not permit an
inference that an injury, more probably than not, was caused by the negligence.
Because the expert’s opinion about the cause of the accident was inadmissible, Fedorczyk did
not provide direct or circumstantial evidence that the ship operator’s negligence caused her injuries.
The court granted summary judgment in the ship operator’s favor.
The evidence in this case is analogous to that presented in Fedorczyk. Stevens’ testimony is
limited to establishing that the conditions of defendants’ rear entry foyer area increased the risk of
harm that an individual would fall down the stairwell. Evidence establishing an increased risk of
harm, however, is not evidence that those conditions caused Glen Butts’ fall. Stevens could not testify
that Glen Butts could have been reaching for the light because there was no evidence that happened.
In other words, the expert would have to speculate to render an opinion with respect to causation.
Like the plaintiff in Fedorczyk, plaintiff’s husband could have fallen for reasons other than
defendants’ negligence. Since plaintiff’s evidence is not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to causation, summary judgment must be granted in defendants’ favor….
1.

QUESTIONS
Hidden Dangers: As a social guest, Glen Butts was a licensee in the Weiszes’ home,
meaning that they owed him a duty to make the premises safe or warn him of hidden
dangers about which they should’ve known. The court here focused on whether the
landing was a dangerous condition that caused Glen’s fall. But could Levone Butts have
advanced a different breach theory based on a failure to warn? How might that have
altered the causation inquiry under the but-for test? How could the Weiszes have
countered that theory?

2.

Belt and Suspenders: On appeal, the Third Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling on
causation, explaining that “the inference that Mr. Butts fell because there were dim
lighting conditions and an allegedly dangerous single step was not an appropriate
inference that the jury could draw or should have been given the opportunity to draw.”
But the appellate court went one step further, concluding that there would also have
been no breach based on the single step because premises liability attaches only if the
possessor of land “should expect that the licensees will not discover or realize the danger”
and “the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk
involved.” What circumstances could justify the Third Circuit’s conclusion as to breach?

3.

Stairway to Heaven: Assume that there was compelling evidence that Glen fell while he
was on the stairwell. Imagine also that there were 100 steps, 51 of which were dangerous
and 49 of which were safe. Would combining these facts be sufficient to establish
causation by a preponderance of the evidence?
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GREEK LIFE PROBLEM
th

Viraj got a brand-new, blacked-out Land Rover Defender for his 18 birthday. On his inaugural
drive to the Sigma Alpha Delta frat party, he took the obligatory video of his steering wheel and the
all-digital dashboard to post on his Instagram story. While swiping through filters before posting
the video, he didn’t realize that his foot was laying on the gas quite heavily. He was going 75 mph in
a 45. As his thumb hovered over the “add to story” button, he hit Kristie’s car.
Kristie had just turned left out of the Wingster parking lot in her Jeep Wrangler, heading back
toward the Omega Mu Gamma sorority house. She was too busy eating her lemon pepper wings to
look before pulling out. Unfortunately, when her car collided with Viraj’s, the vehicles interlocked
and slid onto the sidewalk, careening into Berry and breaking her leg.
Berry sues Viraj and Kristie, alleging that they both drove their cars negligently.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Which driver caused Berry’s injury? Viraj or Kristie? Or did both cause Berry’s injury?
Should Viraj and Kristie be held jointly liable for Berry’s injury?
What if the two cars didn’t interlock? Same result?
If only Viraj had been driving carelessly, could Kristie still be liable?
Was Viraj or Kristie more at fault for the accident? Does it matter?
WILDFIRE PROBLEM

Kirby owns 50 acres in South Georgia, and a railroad owned by Gator Railway runs along the
western edge of her property. Due to a lack of proper maintenance, a passing train gave off an
inordinate amount of sparks as it passed Kirby’s property one day in August. The sparks started a
fire. Meanwhile, a few miles to the southwest, a natural forest fire was raging and heading inexorably
toward Kirby’s property. Both fires grew, and the forest fire eventually reached the railroad fire.
After the two fires combined into one, flames burned Kirby’s land and destroyed her house.
(a) Was the railroad fire an actual cause of the damage to Kirby’s property?
(b) Does the but-for test lead to an equitable or sensible outcome here?
(c) If the forest fire had burned all of Kirby’s property before the railroad fire got there,
could Gator Railway be liable for negligence?
(d) Could Gator Railway be liable if the railroad fire burned the entirety of Kirby’s property
and then the forest fire also consumed the property ten minutes later?
(e) Keeping all other facts the same, imagine that, instead of a natural forest fire, a nearby
camper caused the second fire after failing to extinguish his campfire despite wildfire
warnings at the campsite. In determining Gator Railway’s potential liability, would this
change the analysis or result? And could the camper be liable for negligence?
SUMMERS v. TICE
Supreme Court of California (1948)
Carter, Justice:

ã

Each of the two defendants appeals from a judgment against them in an
action for personal injuries…. Plaintiff’s action was against both defendants
for an injury to his right eye and face as the result of being struck by bird
shot discharged from a shotgun. The case was tried by the court without a
jury and the court found that on November 20, 1945, plaintiff and the two
defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Each of the defendants
was armed with a 12 gauge shotgun loaded with shells containing 7 ½ size
shot. Prior to going hunting plaintiff discussed the hunting procedure with
defendants, indicating that they were to exercise care when shooting and to
ã
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“keep in line.” In the course of hunting plaintiff proceeded up a hill, thus placing the hunters at the
points of a triangle. The view of defendants with reference to plaintiff was unobstructed and they
knew his location. Defendant Tice flushed a quail which rose in flight to a 10-foot elevation and flew
between plaintiff and defendants. Both defendants shot at the quail, shooting in plaintiff’s direction.
At that time defendants were 75 yards from plaintiff. One shot struck plaintiff in his eye and another
in his upper lip. Finally it was found by the court that as the direct result of the shooting by
defendants the shots struck plaintiff as above mentioned and that defendants were negligent in so
shooting and plaintiff was not contributorily negligent….
There is evidence that both defendants, at about the same time or one immediately after the
other, shot at a quail and in so doing shot toward plaintiff who was uphill from them, and that they
knew his location. That is sufficient from which the trial court could conclude that they acted with
respect to plaintiff other than as persons of ordinary prudence….
Defendant Tice states in his opening brief, “we have decided not to argue the insufficiency of
negligence on the part of defendant Tice.” It is true he states in his answer to plaintiff’s petition for
a hearing in this court that he did not concede this point but he does not argue it. Nothing more
need be said on the subject.
Defendant Simonson urges that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and assumed the
risk as a matter of law. He cites no authority for the proposition that by going on a hunting party
the various hunters assume the risk of negligence on the part of their companions. Such a tenet is
not reasonable. It is true that plaintiff suggested that they all “stay in line,” presumably abreast, while
hunting, and he went uphill at somewhat of a right angle to the hunting line, but he also cautioned
that they use care, and defendants knew plaintiff’s position. We hold, therefore, that the trial court
was justified in finding that he did not assume the risk or act other than as a person of ordinary
prudence under the circumstances….
The problem presented in this case is whether the judgment against both defendants may stand.
It is argued by defendants that they are not joint tortfeasors, and thus jointly and severally liable, as
they were not acting in concert, and that there is not sufficient evidence to show which defendant
was guilty of the negligence which caused the injuries—the shooting by Tice or that by Simonson.
Tice argues that there is evidence to show that the shot which struck plaintiff came from Simonson’s
gun because of admissions allegedly made by him to third persons and no evidence that they came
from his gun. Further in connection with the latter contention, the court failed to find on plaintiff’s
allegation in his complaint that he did not know which one was at fault—did not find which
defendant was guilty of the negligence which caused the injuries to plaintiff.
Considering the last argument first, we believe it is clear that the court sufficiently found on the
issue that defendants were jointly liable and that thus the negligence of both was the cause of the
injury or to that legal effect. It found that both defendants were negligent and “That as a direct and
proximate result of the shots fired by defendants, and each of them, a birdshot pellet was caused to
and did lodge in plaintiff’s right eye and that another birdshot pellet was caused to and did lodge in
plaintiff’s upper lip.” In so doing the court evidently did not give credence to the admissions of
Simonson to third persons that he fired the shots, which it was justified in doing. It thus determined
that the negligence of both defendants was the legal cause of the injury—or that both were
responsible. Implicit in such finding is the assumption that the court was unable to ascertain whether
the shots were from the gun of one defendant or the other or one shot from each of them. The one
shot that entered plaintiff’s eye was the major factor in assessing damages and that shot could not
have come from the gun of both defendants. It was from one or the other only.
It has been held that where a group of persons are on a hunting party, or otherwise engaged in
the use of firearms, and two of them are negligent in firing in the direction of a third person who is
injured thereby, both of those so firing are liable for the injury suffered by the third person, although
the negligence of only one of them could have caused the injury. The same rule has been applied in
criminal cases, and both drivers have been held liable for the negligence of one where they engaged
in a racing contest causing an injury to a third person. These cases speak of the action of defendants
as being in concert as the ground of decision, yet it would seem they are straining that concept and
the more reasonable basis appears in Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1927). There two persons
were hunting together. Both shot at some partridges and in so doing shot across the highway
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injuring plaintiff who was travelling on it. The court stated they were acting in concert and thus both
were liable. The court then stated: “We think that each is liable for the resulting injury to the boy,
although no one can say definitely who actually shot him. To hold otherwise would be to exonerate
both from liability, although each was negligent, and the injury resulted from such
negligence.”… Dean Wigmore has this to say:
When two or more persons by their acts are possibly the sole cause of a harm, or
when two or more acts of the same person are possibly the sole cause, and the
plaintiff has introduced evidence that the one of the two persons, or the one of the
same person’s two acts, is culpable, then the defendant has the burden of proving
that the other person, or his other act, was the sole cause of the harm. (b) The real
reason for the rule that each joint tortfeasor is responsible for the whole damage
is the practical unfairness of denying the injured person redress simply because
he cannot prove how much damage each did, when it is certain that between them
they did all; let them be the ones to apportion it among themselves. Since, then,
the difficulty of proof is the reason, the rule should apply whenever the harm has
plural causes, and not merely when they acted in conscious concert.
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would flow if plaintiff
was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a requirement that the burden of proof
on that subject be shifted to defendants becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers—both
negligent toward plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them
injured the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can. The injured
party has been placed by defendants in the unfair position of pointing to which defendant caused
the harm. If one can escape the other may also and plaintiff is remediless. Ordinarily defendants are
in a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the injury. This reasoning
has recently found favor in this court. In a quite analogous situation this court held that a patient
injured while unconscious on an operating table in a hospital could hold all or any of the persons
who had any connection with the operation even though he could not select the particular acts by
the particular person which led to his disability. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). There
the court was considering whether the patient could avail himself of res ipsa loquitur, rather than
where the burden of proof lay, yet the effect of the decision is that plaintiff has made out a case when
he has produced evidence which gives rise to an inference of negligence which was the proximate
cause of the injury. It is up to defendants to explain the cause of the injury. It was there said: “If the
doctrine is to continue to serve a useful purpose, we should not forget that the particular force and
justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing
evidence, consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or
innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person.” Similarly in the
instant case plaintiff is not able to establish which of defendants caused his injury….
In addition to that, however, it should be pointed out that the same reasons of policy and justice
shift the burden to each of defendants to absolve himself if he can—relieving the wronged person of
the duty of apportioning the injury to a particular defendant, apply here where we are concerned
with whether plaintiff is required to supply evidence for the apportionment of damages. If
defendants are independent tortfeasors and thus each liable for the damage caused by him alone,
and, at least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party
should not be deprived of his right to redress. The wrongdoers should be left to work out between
themselves any apportionment….
It is urged that plaintiff now has changed the theory of his case in claiming a concert of action;
that he did not plead or prove such concert. From what has been said it is clear that there has been
no change in theory. The joint liability, as well as the lack of knowledge as to which defendant was
liable, was pleaded and the proof developed the case under either theory. We have seen that for the
reasons of policy discussed herein, the case is based upon the legal proposition that, under the
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circumstances here presented, each defendant is liable for the whole damage whether they are
deemed to be acting in concert or independently. The judgment is affirmed.
ã

1.

QUESTIONS
Shots Fired! The court tells us that “[o]ne shot struck plaintiff in his eye and another in
his upper lip.” Do we know whether these two injuries were from the same gun or
different guns? Would the answer affect the liability puzzle that Summers presents?

2.

Shifting Burdens: The Summers court’s theory, which comes to be known as alternative
causation or alternative liability, allows multiple defendants to be held jointly and
severally liable when: (1) each defendant acted in a nearly identically careless manner
toward the plaintiff; (2) one of the defendants caused the plaintiff’s injury; (3) the
plaintiff isn’t at fault; and (4) the plaintiff’s failure of proof isn’t due to their lack of
diligence. Does this remind you of another doctrine we’ve studied that also touches upon
issues of proof? What’s the difference here? What are the similarities?

3.

Hunting Party: How does the Summers rule effectively modify a plaintiff’s usual burden
of proof? Would the rule still have force if there were three shooters? Or five? Or ten?
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The following case discusses miscarriages.
SINDELL v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES
Supreme Court of California (1980)
Mosk, Justice:

ã

This case involves a complex problem both timely and
significant: may a plaintiff, injured as the result of a drug
administered to her mother during pregnancy, who
knows the type of drug involved but cannot identify the
manufacturer of the precise product, hold liable for her
injuries a maker of a drug produced from an identical
formula?
Plaintiff Judith Sindell brought an action against
eleven drug companies and Does 1 through 100, on behalf
of herself and other women similarly situated…. Between
1941 and 1971, defendants were engaged in the business
of manufacturing, promoting, and marketing diethylstilbesterol (DES), a drug which is a synthetic
compound of the female hormone estrogen. The drug was administered to plaintiff’s mother and
the mothers of the class she represents,1 for the purpose of preventing miscarriage. In 1947, the Food
and Drug Administration authorized the marketing of DES as a miscarriage preventative, but only
on an experimental basis, with a requirement that the drug contain a warning label to that effect.
DES may cause cancerous vaginal and cervical growths in the daughters exposed to it before
birth, because their mothers took the drug during pregnancy. The form of cancer from which these
daughters suffer is known as adenocarcinoma, and it manifests itself after a minimum latent period
of 10 or 12 years. It is a fast-spreading and deadly disease, and radical surgery is required to prevent
it from spreading. DES also causes adenosis, precancerous vaginal and cervical growths which may
spread to other areas of the body. The treatment for adenosis is cauterization, surgery, or
cryosurgery. Women who suffer from this condition must be monitored by biopsy or colposcopic
examination twice a year, a painful and expensive procedure. Thousands of women whose mothers
received DES during pregnancy are unaware of the effects of the drug.
In 1971, the Food and Drug Administration ordered defendants to cease marketing and
promoting DES for the purpose of preventing miscarriages, and to warn physicians and the public
that the drug should not be used by pregnant women because of the danger to their unborn children.
During the period defendants marketed DES, they knew or should have known that it was a
carcinogenic substance, that there was a grave danger after varying periods of latency it would cause
cancerous and precancerous growths in the daughters of the mothers who took it, and that it was
ineffective to prevent miscarriage. Nevertheless, defendants continued to advertise and market the
drug as a miscarriage preventative. They failed to test DES for efficacy and safety; the tests performed
by others, upon which they relied, indicated that it was not safe or effective. In violation of the
authorization of the Food and Drug Administration, defendants marketed DES on an unlimited
basis rather than as an experimental drug, and they failed to warn of its potential danger.
Because of defendants’ advertised assurances that DES was safe and effective to prevent
miscarriage, plaintiff was exposed to the drug prior to her birth. She became aware of the danger
from such exposure within one year of the time she filed her complaint. As a result of the DES
ingested by her mother, plaintiff developed a malignant bladder tumor which was removed by
surgery. She suffers from adenosis and must constantly be monitored by biopsy or colposcopy to
insure early warning of further malignancy.
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The plaintiff class alleged consists of “girls and women who are residents of California and who have been exposed to
DES before birth and who may or may not know that fact or the dangers” to which they were exposed. Defendants are also
sued as representatives of a class of drug manufacturers which sold DES after 1941.
1
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The first cause of action alleges that defendants were jointly and individually negligent in that
they manufactured, marketed and promoted DES as a safe and efficacious drug to prevent
miscarriage, without adequate testing or warning, and without monitoring or reporting its effects.
A separate cause of action alleges that defendants are jointly liable regardless of which particular
brand of DES was ingested by plaintiff’s mother because defendants collaborated in marketing,
promoting and testing the drug, relied upon each other’s tests, and adhered to an industry-wide safety
standard. DES was produced from a common and mutually agreed upon formula as a fungible drug
interchangeable with other brands of the same product; defendants knew or should have known that
it was customary for doctors to prescribe the drug by its generic rather than its brand name and that
pharmacists filled prescriptions from whatever brand of the drug happened to be in stock….
Each cause of action alleges that defendants are jointly liable because they acted in concert, on
the basis of express and implied agreements, and in reliance upon and ratification and exploitation
of each other’s testing and marketing methods.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages of $1 million and punitive damages of $10 million for
herself. For the members of her class, she prays for equitable relief in the form of an order that
defendants warn physicians and others of the danger of DES and the necessity of performing certain
tests to determine the presence of disease caused by the drug, and that they establish free clinics in
California to perform such tests.
Defendants demurred to the complaint. While the complaint did not expressly allege that
plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of the precise drug ingested by her mother, she stated
in her points and authorities in opposition to the demurrers filed by some of the defendants that she
was unable to make the identification, and the trial court sustained the demurrers of these
defendants without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiff did not and stated she could not
identify which defendant had manufactured the drug responsible for her injuries…. This appeal
involves only five of ten defendants named in the complaint.2…
This case is but one of a number filed throughout the country seeking to hold drug
manufacturers liable for injuries allegedly resulting from DES prescribed to the plaintiffs’ mothers
since 1947. According to a note in the Fordham Law Review, estimates of the number of women who
took the drug during pregnancy range from 1 ½ million to 3 million. Hundreds, perhaps thousands,
of the daughters of these women suffer from adenocarcinoma, and the incidence of vaginal adenosis
among them is 30 to 90 percent. Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
Fordham L. Rev. 963 (1978). Most of the cases are still pending. With two exceptions, those that
have been decided resulted in judgments in favor of the drug company defendants because of the
failure of the plaintiffs to identify the manufacturer of the DES prescribed to their mothers. The
same result was reached in a recent California case. The present action is another attempt to
overcome this obstacle to recovery.
We begin with the proposition that, as a general rule, the imposition of liability depends upon a
showing by the plaintiff that his or her injuries were caused by the act of the defendant or by an
instrumentality under the defendant’s control…. There are, however, exceptions to this rule.
Plaintiff’s complaint suggests several bases upon which defendants may be held liable for her injuries
even though she cannot demonstrate the name of the manufacturer which produced the DES
actually taken by her mother. The first of these theories, classically illustrated by Summers v. Tice,
199 P.2d 1 (1948), places the burden of proof of causation upon tortious defendants in certain
circumstances. The second basis of liability emerging from the complaint is that defendants acted in
concert to cause injury to plaintiff. There is a third and novel approach to the problem, sometimes
called the theory of “enterprise liability,” but which we prefer to designate by the more accurate term
of “industry-wide” liability, which might obviate the necessity for identifying the manufacturer of
the injury-causing drug. We shall conclude that these doctrines, as previously interpreted, may not
be applied to hold defendants liable under the allegations of this complaint. However, we shall

2

Abbott Laboratories, Eli Lilly and Company, E.R. Squibb and Sons, the Upjohn Company, and Rexall Drug Company
are respondents. The action was dismissed or the appeal abandoned on various grounds as to other defendants named in the
complaint; e.g., one defendant demonstrated it had not manufactured DES during the period plaintiff’s mother took the drug.
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propose and adopt a fourth basis for permitting the action to be tried, grounded upon an extension
of the Summers doctrine.
I
Plaintiff places primary reliance upon cases which hold that if a party cannot identify which of
two or more defendants caused an injury, the burden of proof may shift to the defendants to show
that they were not responsible for the harm. This principle is sometimes referred to as the
“alternative liability” theory.
The celebrated case of Summers v. Tice, a unanimous opinion of this court, best exemplifies the
rule. In Summers, the plaintiff was injured when two hunters negligently shot in his direction. It
could not be determined which of them had fired the shot that actually caused the injury to the
plaintiff’s eye, but both defendants were nevertheless held jointly and severally liable for the whole
of the damages. We reasoned that both were wrongdoers, both were negligent toward the plaintiff,
and that it would be unfair to require plaintiff to isolate the defendant responsible, because if the
one pointed out were to escape liability, the other might also, and the plaintiff-victim would be shorn
of any remedy. In these circumstances, we held, the burden of proof shifted to the defendants, “each
to absolve himself if he can.” We stated that under these or similar circumstances a defendant is
ordinarily in a “far better position” to offer evidence to determine whether he or another defendant
caused the injury.
In Summers, we relied upon Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). There, the plaintiff was
injured while he was unconscious during the course of surgery. He sought damages against several
doctors and a nurse who attended him while he was unconscious. We held that it would be
unreasonable to require him to identify the particular defendant who had performed the alleged
negligent act because he was unconscious at the time of the injury and the defendants exercised control
over the instrumentalities which caused the harm. Therefore, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
an inference of negligence arose that defendants were required to meet by explaining their conduct….
Defendants assert that these principles are inapplicable here. First, they insist that a predicate to
shifting the burden of proof under Summers-Ybarra is that the defendants must have greater access
to information regarding the cause of the injuries than the plaintiff, whereas in the present case the
reverse appears. [We disagree.]…
Because many years elapsed between the time the drug was taken and the manifestation of
plaintiff’s injuries she, and many other daughters of mothers who took DES, are unable to make
such identification. Certainly there can be no implication that plaintiff is at fault in failing to do so—
the event occurred while plaintiff was in utero, a generation ago.
On the other hand, it cannot be said with assurance that defendants have the means to make the
identification…. Nor…[is] the absence of evidence on this subject…due to the fault of
defendants…. [T]he difficulty or impossibility of identification results primarily from the passage
of time rather than from their allegedly negligent acts of failing to provide adequate warnings….
It is important to observe, however, that while defendants do not have means superior to plaintiff
to identify the maker of the precise drug taken by her mother, they may in some instances be able to
prove that they did not manufacture the injury-causing substance. In the present case, for example,
one of the original defendants was dismissed from the action upon proof that it did not manufacture
DES until after plaintiff was born.
Thus we conclude the fact defendants do not have greater access to information that might
establish the identity of the manufacturer of the DES which injured plaintiff does not per se prevent
application of the Summers rule.
Nevertheless, …[t]here is an important difference between the situation involved
in Summers and the present case. There, all the parties who were or could have been responsible for
the harm to the plaintiff were joined as defendants. Here, by contrast, there are approximately 200
drug companies which made DES, any of which might have manufactured the injury-producing
drug. Defendants maintain that, while in Summers there was a 50 percent chance that one of the two
defendants was responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, here since any one of 200 companies which
manufactured DES might have made the product that harmed plaintiff, there is no rational basis

CASES & CRITIQUE

175

upon which to infer that any defendant in this action caused plaintiff’s injuries, nor even a
reasonable possibility that they were responsible.
These arguments are persuasive if we measure the chance that any one of the defendants supplied
the injury-causing drug by the number of possible tortfeasors. In such a context, the possibility that
any of the five defendants supplied the DES to plaintiff’s mother is so remote that it would be unfair
to require each defendant to exonerate itself. There may be a substantial likelihood that none of the
five defendants joined in the action made the DES which caused the injury, and that the offending
producer not named would escape liability altogether. While we propose, infra, an adaptation of the
rule in Summers which will substantially overcome these difficulties, defendants appear to be correct
that the rule, as previously applied, cannot relieve plaintiff of the burden of proving the identity of
the manufacturer which made the drug causing her injuries.
II
The second principle upon which plaintiff relies is the so-called “concert of action” theory….
The elements of this doctrine are prescribed in section 876 of the Restatement Second of Torts…[:]
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant
to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so
to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
With respect to this doctrine, Prosser, Law of Torts § 46 (1971), states that “those who, in
pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it
by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt
his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary, and
all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding.”
Plaintiff…alleges that defendants’ wrongful conduct “is the result of planned and concerted
action, express and implied agreements, collaboration in, reliance upon, acquiescence in and
ratification, exploitation and adoption of each other’s testing, marketing methods, lack of warnings
and other acts or omissions” and that “acting individually and in concert, defendants promoted,
approved, authorized, acquiesced in, and reaped profits from sales” of DES. These allegations,
plaintiff claims, state a “tacit understanding” among defendants to commit a tortious act against her.
In our view, this litany of charges is insufficient to allege a cause of action under the rules stated
above. The gravamen of the charge of concert is that defendants failed to adequately test the drug or
to give sufficient warning of its dangers and that they relied upon the tests performed by one another
and took advantage of each others’ promotional and marketing techniques. These allegations do not
amount to a charge that there was a tacit understanding or a common plan among defendants to fail
to conduct adequate tests or give sufficient warnings, and that they substantially aided and
encouraged one another in these omissions….
III
A third theory upon which plaintiff relies is the concept of industry-wide liability, or according
to the terminology of the parties, “enterprise liability.” This theory was suggested in Hall v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In that case, plaintiffs were 13
children injured by the explosion of blasting caps in 12 separate incidents which occurred in 10
different states between 1955 and 1959. The defendants were six blasting cap manufacturers,
comprising virtually the entire blasting cap industry in the United States, and their trade association.
There were, however, a number of Canadian blasting cap manufacturers which could have supplied
the caps. The gravamen of the complaint was that the practice of the industry of omitting a warning
on individual blasting caps and of failing to take other safety measures created an unreasonable risk
of harm, resulting in the plaintiffs’ injuries. The complaint did not identify a particular manufacturer
of a cap which caused a particular injury….
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We decline to apply this theory in the present case. At least 200 manufacturers produced
DES; Hall, which involved 6 manufacturers representing the entire blasting cap industry in the
United States, cautioned against application of the doctrine espoused therein to a large number of
producers. Moreover, in Hall, the conclusion that the defendants jointly controlled the risk was
based upon allegations that they had delegated some functions relating to safety to a trade
association. There are no such allegations here, and we have concluded above that plaintiff has failed
to allege liability on a concert of action theory.
Equally important, the drug industry is closely regulated by the Food and Drug Administration,
which actively controls the testing and manufacture of drugs and the method by which they are
marketed, including the contents of warning labels. To a considerable degree, therefore, the
standards followed by drug manufacturers are suggested or compelled by the government.
Adherence to those standards cannot, of course, absolve a manufacturer of liability to which it would
otherwise be subject. But since the government plays such a pervasive role in formulating the criteria
for the testing and marketing of drugs, it would be unfair to impose upon a manufacturer liability
for injuries resulting from the use of a drug which it did not supply simply because it followed the
standards of the industry.
IV
If we were confined to the theories of Summers and Hall, we would be constrained to hold that
the judgment must be sustained. Should we require that plaintiff identify the manufacturer which
supplied the DES used by her mother or that all DES manufacturers be joined in the action, she
would effectively be precluded from any recovery. As defendants candidly admit, there is little
likelihood that all the manufacturers who made DES at the time in question are still in business or
that they are subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts. There are, however, forceful
arguments in favor of holding that plaintiff has a cause of action.
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create
fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to
those injured by such products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. Just as Justice
Traynor in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d
436 (1944), recognized that in an era of mass production and complex marketing methods the
traditional standard of negligence was insufficient to govern the obligations of manufacturer to
consumer, so should we acknowledge that some adaptation of the rules of causation and liability
may be appropriate in these recurring circumstances….
The most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that advanced
in Summers: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the
cost of the injury. Here, as in Summers, plaintiff is not at fault in failing to provide evidence of
causation, and although the absence of such evidence is not attributable to the defendants either,
their conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years played a significant
role in creating the unavailability of proof.
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury resulting
from the manufacture of a defective product. As was said by Justice Traynor in Escola, “the cost of
an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured,
and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among
the public as a cost of doing business.” The manufacturer is in the best position to discover and
guard against defects in its products and to warn of harmful effects; thus, holding it liable for defects
and failure to warn of harmful effects will provide an incentive to product safety. These
considerations are particularly significant where medication is involved, for the consumer is
virtually helpless to protect himself from serious, sometimes permanent, sometimes fatal, injuries
caused by deleterious drugs.
Where, as here, all defendants produced a drug from an identical formula and the manufacturer of
the DES which caused plaintiff’s injuries cannot be identified through no fault of plaintiff, a
modification of the rule of Summers is warranted. As we have seen, an undiluted Summers rationale is
inappropriate to shift the burden of proof of causation to defendants because if we measure the chance
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that any particular manufacturer supplied the injury-causing product by the number of producers of
DES, there is a possibility that none of the five defendants in this case produced the offending substance
and that the responsible manufacturer, not named in the action, will escape liability.
But we approach the issue of causation from a different perspective: we hold it to be reasonable in
the present context to measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which
allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of them for the purpose of
preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that purpose. Plaintiff
asserts in her briefs that Eli Lilly and Company and five or six other companies produced 90 percent
of the DES marketed. If at trial this is established to be the fact, then there is a corresponding
likelihood that this comparative handful of producers manufactured the DES which caused plaintiff’s
injuries, and only a 10 percent likelihood that the offending producer would escape liability.
If plaintiff joins in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES which her
mother might have taken, the injustice of shifting the burden of proof to defendants to demonstrate
that they could not have made the substance which injured plaintiff is significantly diminished.
While 75 to 80 percent of the market is suggested as the requirement by the Fordham Comment, we
hold only that a substantial percentage is required.
The presence in the action of a substantial share of the appropriate market also provides a ready
means to apportion damages among the defendants. Each defendant will be held liable for the
proportion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it
could not have made the product which caused plaintiff’s injuries. In the present case, as we have
seen, one DES manufacturer was dismissed from the action upon filing a declaration that it had not
manufactured DES until after plaintiff was born. Once plaintiff has met her burden of joining the
required defendants, they in turn may cross-complain against other DES manufacturers, not joined
in the action, which they can allege might have supplied the injury-causing product.
Under this approach, each manufacturer’s liability would approximate its responsibility for the
injuries caused by its own products. Some minor discrepancy in the correlation between market
share and liability is inevitable; therefore, a defendant may be held liable for a somewhat different
percentage of the damage than its share of the appropriate market would justify. It is probably
impossible, with the passage of time, to determine market share with mathematical exactitude. But
just as a jury cannot be expected to determine the precise relationship between fault and liability in
applying the doctrine of comparative fault or partial indemnity, the difficulty of apportioning
damages among the defendant producers in exact relation to their market share does not seriously
militate against the rule we adopt. As we said in Summers with regard to the liability of independent
tortfeasors, where a correct division of liability cannot be made “the trier of fact may make it the
best it can.”
We are not unmindful of the practical problems involved in defining the market and
determining market share,3 but these are largely matters of proof which properly cannot be
determined at the pleading stage of these proceedings. Defendants urge that it would be both unfair
and contrary to public policy to hold them liable for plaintiff’s injuries in the absence of proof that
one of them supplied the drug responsible for the damage. Most of their arguments, however, are
based upon the assumption that one manufacturer would be held responsible for the products of
another or for those of all other manufacturers if plaintiff ultimately prevails. But under the rule we
adopt, each manufacturer’s liability for an injury would be approximately equivalent to the damage
caused by the DES it manufactured. The judgments are reversed.
Richardson, Justice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In these consolidated cases the majority adopts a wholly new theory which
contains these ingredients: The plaintiffs were not alive at the time of the commission of the tortious
acts. They sue a generation later. They are permitted to receive substantial damages from multiple
defendants without any proof that any defendant caused or even probably caused plaintiffs’ injuries.
3

Defendants assert that there are no figures available to determine market share, that DES was provided for a number
of uses other than to prevent miscarriage and it would be difficult to ascertain what proportion of the drug was used as a
miscarriage preventative, and that the establishment of a time frame and area for market share would pose problems.
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Although the majority purports to change only the required burden of proof by shifting it from
plaintiffs to defendants, the effect of its holding is to guarantee that plaintiffs will prevail on the
causation issue because defendants are no more capable of disproving factual causation than
plaintiffs are of proving it. “Market share” liability thus represents a new high water mark in tort
law. The ramifications seem almost limitless…. In my view, the majority’s departure from
traditional tort doctrine is unwise….
The “market share” thesis may be paraphrased. Plaintiffs have been hurt by someone who made
DES. Because of the lapse of time no one can prove who made it. Perhaps it was not the named
defendants who made it, but they did make some. Although DES was apparently safe at the time it
was used, it was subsequently proven unsafe as to some daughters of some users. Plaintiffs have
suffered injury and defendants are wealthy. There should be a remedy. Strict products liability is
unavailable because the element of causation is lacking. Strike that requirement and label what
remains “alternative” liability, “industry-wide” liability, or “market share” liability, proving thereby
that if you hit the square peg hard and often enough the round holes will really become square,
although you may splinter the board in the process….
1.

QUESTIONS
Pheasants to Pharma: Why can’t the Sindell court rely on Summers and call it a day? In
terms of proving causation, how might Sindell provide a less radical rule than Summers?

2.

What’s Tort Law Up To? Does Sindell’s market-share liability serve the goals of tort law?
DRAG SUPERSTAR PROBLEM

Paul and Michelle are competing in America’s Next Drag Superstar, an annual drag race in the
residential neighborhood of Beverley Hills. As they hurtle toward the finish line, Michelle loses
control of her car and crashes into Carson, who’s walking his dog nearby. Ross, a friend of Paul’s
who attends all his races, watches in horror from the crowd.
(a) Who should Carson sue?
(b) What’s Carson’s best theory of liability as to each potential defendant?
UNION PUMP CO. v. ALLBRITTON
Supreme Court of Texas (1995)
Owen, Justice:

ã

The issue in this case is whether the condition, act, or
omission of which a personal injury plaintiff complains was,
as a matter of law, too remote to constitute legal causation.
Plaintiff brought suit alleging negligence…, and the trial
court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the
plaintiff raised issues of fact concerning [proximate cause].
Because we conclude that there was no legal causation as a
matter of law, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and render judgment that plaintiff take nothing.
On the night of September 4, 1989, a fire occurred at Texaco Chemical Company’s facility in Port
Arthur, Texas. A pump manufactured by Union Pump Company caught fire and ignited the
surrounding area. This particular pump had caught on fire twice before. Sue Allbritton, a trainee
employee of Texaco Chemical, had just finished her shift and was about to leave the plant when the
fire erupted. She and her supervisor Felipe Subia, Jr., were directed to and did assist in abating the fire.
Approximately two hours later, the fire was extinguished. However, there appeared to be a
problem with a nitrogen purge valve, and Subia was instructed to block in the valve. Viewing the
ã

Lady Dragonfly, Emergency Fire Crews (CC BY 2.0).
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facts in a light most favorable to Allbritton, there was some evidence that an emergency situation
existed at that point in time. Allbritton asked if she could accompany Subia and was allowed to do
so. To get to the nitrogen purge valve, Allbritton followed Subia over an aboveground pipe rack,
which was approximately two and one-half feet high, rather than going around it. It is undisputed
that this was not the safer route, but it was the shorter one. Upon reaching the valve, Subia and
Allbritton were notified that it was not necessary to block it off. Instead of returning by the route
around the pipe rack, Subia chose to walk across it, and Allbritton followed. Allbritton was injured
when she hopped or slipped off the pipe rack. There is evidence that the pipe rack was wet because
of the fire and that Allbritton and Subia were still wearing fireman’s hip boots and other firefighting
gear when the injury occurred. Subia admitted that he chose to walk over the pipe rack rather than
taking a safer alternative route because he had a “bad habit” of doing so.
Allbritton sued Union Pump, alleging…that the defective pump was a [proximate cause] of her
injuries. But for the pump fire, she asserts, she would never have walked over the pipe rack, which
was wet with water or firefighting foam…. The question before this Court is whether Union Pump
established as a matter of law that neither its conduct nor its product was a legal cause of Allbritton’s
injuries. Stated another way, was Union Pump correct in contending that there was no causative
link between the defective pump and Allbritton’s injuries as a matter of law?
Negligence requires a showing of proximate cause…. At some point in the causal chain, the
defendant’s conduct or product may be too remotely connected with the plaintiff’s injury to
constitute legal causation…. [D]efining the limits of legal causation eventually mandates weighing
of policy considerations. [Consider] Springall v. Fredericksburg Hospital & Clinic, 225 S.W.2d 232
(Tex. Ct.. App. 1949), in which the court of appeals observed:
The law does not hold one legally responsible for the remote results of his
wrongful acts and therefore a line must be drawn between immediate and remote
causes. The doctrine of “proximate cause” is employed to determine and fix this
line and “is the result of an effort by the courts to avoid, as far as possible the
metaphysical and philosophical niceties in the age-old discussion of causation,
and to lay down a rule of general application which will, as nearly as may be done
by a general rule, apply a practical test, the test of common experience, to human
conduct when determining legal rights and legal liability.
Drawing the line between where legal causation may exist and where, as a matter of law, it
cannot, has generated a considerable body of law. Our Court has considered where the limits of legal
causation should lie in the factually analogous case of Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.
1991). The threshold issue was whether causation was negated as a matter of law in an action where
negligence and product liability theories were asserted. Perez, an employee of the Texas Highway
Department, was driving a truck pulling a flashing arrow sign behind a highway sweeping operation
to warn traffic of the highway maintenance. The sign malfunctioned when wires connecting it to the
generator became loose, as they had the previous day. Perez got out of the truck to push the wire
connections back together, and an oncoming vehicle, whose driver was asleep, struck the sign, which
in turn struck Perez. Perez’s survivors brought suit against the manufacturer of the sign. In holding
that any defect in the sign was not the legal cause of Perez’s injuries, we found a comment to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 431, instructive on the issue of legal causation:
In order to be a legal cause of another’s harm, it is not enough that the harm would
not have occurred had the actor not been negligent. The negligence must also be
a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. The word “substantial”
is used to denote the fact that the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in
producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that
word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility,
rather than in the so-called “philosophic sense,” which includes every one of the
great number of events without which any happening would not have occurred.
As this Court explained in Lear Siegler, the connection between the defendant and the plaintiff’s
injuries simply may be too attenuated to constitute legal cause. Legal cause is not established if the
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defendant’s conduct or product does no more than furnish the condition that makes the plaintiff’s
injury possible….
This Court similarly considered the parameters of legal causation in Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d
117 (Tex. 1968). In Bell, two cars collided, and a trailer attached to one of them disengaged and
overturned into the opposite lane. A number of people gathered, and three of them were attempting
to move the trailer when they were struck by another vehicle. This Court held that the parties to the
first accident were not a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, reasoning:
All acts and omissions charged against respondents had run their course and were
complete. Their negligence did not actively contribute in any way to the injuries
involved in this suit. It simply created a condition which attracted the plaintiffs to
the scene, where they were injured by a third party….
Even if the pump fire were in some sense a “philosophic” or “but for” cause of Allbritton’s
injuries, the forces generated by the fire had come to rest when she fell off the pipe rack. The fire had
been extinguished, and Allbritton was walking away from the scene. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Allbritton, the pump fire did no more than create the condition that made
Allbritton’s injuries possible. We conclude that the circumstances surrounding her injuries are too
remotely connected with Union Pump’s conduct or pump to constitute a legal cause of her
injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals….
Cornyn, Justice, concurring:
I concur in the Court’s judgment, but for different reasons than those given in its opinion. I
would hold that although the defective pump was a cause-in-fact of Sue Allbritton’s injury, neither
Union Pump’s negligence nor the defective pump was a legal cause of her injury. Because the Court’s
opinion conflates foreseeability and other policy issues with its cause-in-fact analysis, I do not join
its opinion….
This case does not present a question of cause-in-fact. The pump defect clearly was a “but for”
cause of Allbritton’s injuries: assuming the truth of Allbritton’s allegations, as we must in this
summary judgment case, if the pump had not been defective, there would have been no fire, and
Allbritton would have gone home uninjured at the end of her shift….
But determining that the defect was the cause-in-fact of Allbritton’s injuries does not end the
inquiry. We must decide whether the pump defect meets the second prong of [proximate cause]. In
proximate cause, this other element is foreseeability, but it also incorporates policy driven decisions
such as when subsequent events will be treated as intervening causes. In this case, the injury to
Allbritton was not foreseeable. Allbritton’s injuries were the result of a needlessly dangerous
shortcut taken after the crisis had subsided.1 Holding Union Pump liable for Allbritton’s failure to
use proper care in exiting the area of the fire after the crisis has ended is akin to holding it liable for
an auto accident she suffered on the way home, even though the accident probably would not have
occurred had she left after her normal shift. Foreseeability allows us to cut off Union Pump’s liability
at some point; I would do so at the point the crisis had abated or at the point that Allbritton and
Subia departed from their usual, safe path….
Spector, Justice, dissenting:
…The record reflects that at the time Sue Allbritton’s injury occurred, the forces generated by
the fire in question had not come to rest. Rather, the emergency situation was continuing. The whole
area of the fire was covered in water and foam; in at least some places, the water was almost kneedeep. Allbritton was still wearing hip boots and other gear, as required to fight the fire. Viewing all
the evidence in the light most favorable to Allbritton, I agree with Justice Cornyn that the pump
defect was… a “but-for” cause…and was therefore a cause in fact [of Allbritton’s injury].
This case is markedly different from the two main cases on which the majority relies: Lear Siegler,
Inc. v. Perez and Bell v. Campbell. In each of those cases, a defendant’s negligence simply created a
1
My conclusion might be different had Allbritton taken the shortcut under emergency conditions because it is
foreseeable that workers might take extraordinary risks in trying to extinguish a dangerous fire.
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condition that attracted an individual to the scene, where a negligent third party inflicted an injury.
Here, in contrast, there was no negligent third party. To whatever extent Allbritton’s own negligence
may have contributed to her injury, a jury should be allowed to allocate comparative responsibility….
1.

QUESTIONS
One Step at a Time: Pause before getting to proximate cause. Was the defective pump
an actual cause of Allbritton’s injury?

2.

Commuting Conundrums: Do you think Union Pump should be liable for Allbritton’s
injury? What if she’d crashed her car while driving home and could show that she
wouldn’t have been injured had she not stayed late at work to deal with the defective
pump? What if the crash instead happened on her way to fight the fire?

3.

Cutting Corners: Justice Cornyn’s concurrence wants to focus on Allbritton’s decision
to take a shortcut. To which element does he think this fact is relevant? How does the
dissent differ on this score?
JOLLEY v. SUTTON LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL
House of Lords (2000)

Steyn, Lord:

ã

My Lords, On 8 April 1990, in the grounds of a
block of council flats owned and occupied by the
London Borough of Sutton, Justin Jolley, then a
schoolboy aged 14, sustained serious spinal injuries
in an accident. It arose when a small abandoned
cabin cruiser [a boat], which had been left lying in
the grounds of the block of flats, fell on Justin as he
lay underneath it while attempting to repair and
paint it. As a result he is now a paraplegic. He
claimed damages in tort from the council…. After
a seven day trial in 1998 Mr. Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., a Deputy High Court Judge, gave judgment for
Justin but reduced the damages by 25 per cent. by virtue of a finding of contributory negligence. The
judge awarded damages in the sum of £621,710…. The council appealed. The Court of Appeal
unanimously reversed the judge’s conclusions on the merits and entered judgment for the council….
The council own and occupy the common parts of a block of council flats known as Hayling
Court at North Cheam in Surrey. In 1987 a boat was brought on a trailer to the grounds of Hayling
Court. It was placed on a grassed area where children played. The boat was abandoned. It was
exposed to the elements and became derelict and rotten. It was neither covered nor fenced around.
The trailer was by the side of the boat. In December 1988 the council placed a sticker on the boat
which was in a form used for abandoned cars. It read “Danger do not touch this vehicle unless you
are the owner” and stated that it would be removed within seven days unless claimed by its owner.
Complaints about the boat were made to the council by residents of the block of flats. In the early
Summer of 1989 when he was 13 Justin and a friend, Karl Warnham, saw the boat when they were
walking past the flats. In February 1990 the two boys returned to the boat, planning to repair it and
take it to Cornwall to sail it. Justin was by then 14 years old. They swivelled the boat round, and
lifted the front end of the boat onto the trailer so as to be able to get under the boat to repair the hull.
The trailer supports made holes in the wooden structure of the boat. Accordingly, the boys pulled
the boat off the trailer. In order to repair the holes in the hull, Justin took a car jack and some wood
from his home and the boys jacked the front of the abandoned boat up some 2 ½ feet. In that position
the boys painted part of the boat, and attempted to repair holes with wood, nails and glue. On one
occasion one of the boys put his foot through the structure. Justin and Karl had worked on the boat
on about five occasions over some six weeks from February 1990 until the date of the accident. On
ã
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8 April 1990 Justin and Karl were underneath the jacked up boat working on it. After a while Justin
noticed that Karl had crawled out from under the boat. Justin remained. The boat seemed to rock
above him. He tried to get out from under the boat but before he could do so it came down onto
him and caused him to suffer a broken back and consequent paraplegia. The immediate cause of the
collapse was that the boat toppled off the jack and other material upon which it was propped. It was
not established that the derelict or rotten condition of the boat was causative of the collapse.
In a careful and detailed judgment the judge analysed the evidence and made detailed findings
of fact. He then quoted the relevant statutory provisions. Section 2(2) of the Occupiers’ Liability Act
1957 defines the “common duty of care” as: “a duty to take such care as in all the circumstances of
the case is reasonable to see that the visitor will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the
purposes for which he is invited or permitted by the occupier to be there.” Sub-section (3) provides:
“The circumstances relevant for the present purpose include the degree of care, and of want of care,
which would ordinarily be looked for in such a visitor, so that (for example) in proper cases…an
occupier must be prepared for children to be less careful than adults.”
The judge observed that it has long been established that children are or may be attracted to
meddle with objects on premises or property which constitute a danger when meddled with. He
stated in very general terms that the occupier is under a duty to protect a child from danger caused
by meddling with such an object by taking reasonable steps in the circumstances including, where
appropriate, removing the object altogether so as to avoid the prospect of injury….
The judge then recorded his conclusions:
Did the boat present a trap or allurement to the plaintiff and Karl and one which
presented a danger of physical injury to them? If so, was this state of affairs
reasonably foreseeable to the defendants such that they ought to have taken
measure in good time to protect boys such as the plaintiff from such danger? One
must keep well in mind that this case is concerned with boys aged 13 and 14. The
boat was on a grassed area outside a block of council flats in an area where there
were abandoned cars. I have no doubt that the presence of the boat was something
which one ought to anticipate would be an attraction to children of differing ages.
Younger children might simply play on it and in its rotting condition might suffer
injury, perhaps of a quite minor nature. Mr. Palmer stressed that these two boys
were not so much playing with the boat as working on it. I do not believe any such
distinction assists the defendants. Play can take the form of mimicking adult
behaviour. It was reasonably foreseeable that children including those of the age
of the plaintiff would meddle with the boat at risk of some physical injury. So far
as this type of accident was concerned, it is really only likely to occur if the child
was a young teenage boy with strength and ability to raise the boat and prop it up.
Abandoned cars were clearly treated by the defendants as a potential source of
danger and this abandoned boat must also have fallen into that category. Although
the warning DANGER contained on the stickers is not conclusive as to whether a
particular object presented a danger it is at least a pointer in that direction.
There was no reason in fact or in law preventing the defendants from
removing and disposing of the boat well before the accident (as actually occurred
after it). As owners and occupiers of the Hayling Court estate they were entitled
to remove and dispose of abandoned motor cars and an abandoned boat. Further
they had statutory powers as a local authority under section 6 of the Refuse
Disposal (Amenity) Act 1978 to remove and dispose of this abandoned boat. I find
that is what the defendants ought to have done, not merely because the boat was
an eyesore but because it was a trap or allurement to children.
The judge summed up his conclusion as follows:
I find that the type of accident and injury which occurred in this case was
reasonably foreseeable (albeit that it involved significant meddling with the boat
by two young teenage boys and that the injuries proved to be very severe) and that
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the actions of the plaintiff and/or Karl did not amount to a novus actus.
Accordingly, I find the defendants in breach of their duty to the plaintiff as
occupiers and (subject to the point on contributory negligence considered below)
liable to the plaintiff for the injury, loss and damage which he has sustained.
I have set out these findings of fact at length because the interpretation of the judge’s finding
became controversial during the hearing of the appeal in the House.
The leading judgment in the Court of Appeal was given by Lord Woolf M.R. He cited extensively
[The Wagon Mound cases]:
The judge attached importance to the presence of the boat as being both an
allurement and a trap. While this can be of significance in some cases it is only
part of the background to this case. There can be no dispute that, if this boat was
left in this position, children would be attracted by it and would play with it. This
was conceded. It was also a trap in the sense that it was not immediately apparent
that it was in a rotten condition, that is in a condition where it could prove
dangerous because a child could find that a plank or planks gave way. It was a
combination of these two features that made it the duty of the council to have the
boat removed. They failed to do this and in that respect they were negligent.
However, these features, the attractiveness of the boat to children and its
dangerous condition, were not established to be part of the causes of the accident.
The immediate cause of the accident was that the two boys jacked and propped
the boat up so that they could work underneath it and did so in a way that meant
that the boat was unstable and could and did fall on the plaintiff.
The question which has to be asked is: was this accident in the words of Lord
Pearce “of a different type and kind from anything that a defender could have
foreseen?” In answering this question it is necessary to have well in mind that the
council should have appreciated that it is difficult to anticipate what children will
do when playing with a boat of this sort. Boats, like cars, if they were left
“abandoned” in an area where children have access, will certainly attract children
to play with them. But what the plaintiff was engaged on was an activity very
different from normal play.
Even making full allowance for the unpredictability of children’s behaviour,
I am driven to conclude that it was not reasonably foreseeable that an accident
could occur as a result of the boys deciding to work under a propped up boat. Nor
could any reasonably similar accident have been foreseen. Ironically the state of
the boat was so poor that it made it less likely that it would be repairable or that
boys would embark on doing the necessary repairs. The photographs of the boat
and the evidence of Mr. Hall indicate that it was a fairly heavy structure. It would
be by no means easy for the boat to be moved or raised. In deciding whether the
accident was foreseeable it is important not only to consider the precise accident
which occurred but the class of accident….
…[T]he Court of Appeal never squarely addressed the question whether the judge’s critical
finding was open to him on the evidence. For my part the judge’s reasons for that finding are
convincing in the context of teenage boys attracted by an obviously abandoned boat. And I do not
regard what they did as so very different from normal play. The judge’s observation that play can
take the form of mimicking adult behaviour is a perceptive one. It is true, of course, that one is not
dealing with a challenge to an issue of primary fact. The issue whether an accident of the particular
type was reasonably foreseeable is technically a secondary fact but perhaps it is more illuminating to
call it an informed opinion by the judge in the light of all the circumstances of the case. In my view
it was an opinion which is justified by the particular circumstances of the case. Counsel has not
persuaded me that the judge’s view was wrong. And I would hold that the Court of Appeal was not
entitled to disturb the judge’s findings of fact….
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Very little needs to be said about the law. The decision in this case has turned on the detailed
findings of fact at first instance on the particular circumstances of this case. Two general
observations are, however, appropriate. First, in this corner of the law the results of decided cases
are inevitably very fact-sensitive. Both counsel nevertheless at times invited your Lordships to
compare the facts of the present case with the facts of other decided cases. That is a sterile exercise.
Precedent is a valuable stabilising influence in our legal system. But, comparing the facts of and
outcomes of cases in this branch of the law is a misuse of the only proper use of precedent, viz to
identify the relevant rule to apply to the facts as found.
Secondly, Lord Woolf M.R. made an observation casting doubt on part of Lord Reid’s speech
in Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837. The defendants left a manhole uncovered and protected
only by a tent and paraffin lamp. A child climbed down the hole. When he came out he kicked over
one of the lamps. It fell into the hole and caused an explosion. The child was burned. The Court of
Session held that there was no liability. The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of
Session. In the present case Lord Woolf cited the following parts of [that case]:
So we have (first) a duty owned by the workmen, (secondly) the fact that if they
had done as they ought to have done there would have been no accident, and
(thirdly) the fact that the injuries suffered by the appellant, though perhaps
different in degree, did not differ in kind from injuries which might have resulted
from an accident of a foreseeable nature. The ground on which this case has been
decided against the appellant is that the accident was of an unforeseeable type. Of
course, the pursuer has to prove that the defender’s fault caused the accident and
there could be a case where the intrusion of a new and unexpected factor could be
regarded as the cause of the accident rather than the fault of the defender. But that
is not this case. The cause of this accident was a known source of danger, the lamp,
but it behaved in an unpredictable way. This accident was caused by a known
source of danger, but caused in a way which could not have been foreseen and in
my judgment, that affords no defence.
Lord Woolf M.R. observed that he had difficulty in reconciling these remarks with the approach
in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388. It is true that in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) Viscount
Simonds at one stage observed:
“If, as admittedly it is, B’s liability (culpability) depends on the reasonable
foreseeability of the consequent damage, how is that to be determined except by
the foreseeability of the damage which in fact happened - the damage in suit?”
But this is to take one sentence in the judgment in The Wagon Mound (No. 1) out of context.
Viscount Simonds was in no way suggesting that the precise manner of which the injury occurred
nor its extent had to be foreseeable. And Lord Reid was saying no more. The speech of Lord Reid
in Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837 is in harmony with the other judgments. It is not in
conflict with The Wagon Mound (No. 1). The scope of the two modifiers—the precise manner in
which the injury came about and its extent—is not definitively answered by either The Wagon
Mound (No. 1) or Hughes v. Lord Advocate. It requires determination in the context of an intense
focus on the circumstances of each case.
My Lords, I would restore the wise decision of Mr. Geoffrey Brice, Q.C., the Deputy High Court
judge. I would allow the appeal. I would further remit the case to the Court of Appeal to enable it to
consider what course it should adopt on any application in regard to the determination of any issue
relating to quantum of damages.
Hoffmann, Lord:
My Lords,…It is…agreed that the plaintiff must show that the injury which he suffered fell
within the scope of the council’s duty and that in cases of physical injury, the scope of the duty is
determined by whether or not the injury fell within a description which could be said to have been
reasonably foreseeable. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 of course established the general
principle that reasonable foreseeability of physical injury to another generates a duty of care. The
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further proposition that reasonable foreseeability also governs the question of whether the injury
comes within the scope of that duty had to wait until The Wagon Mound (No. 1) for authoritative
recognition. Until then, there was a view that the determination of liability involved a two-stage
process. The existence of a duty depended upon whether injury of some kind was foreseeable. Once
such a duty had been established, the defendant was liable for any injury which had been “directly
caused” by an act in breach of that duty, whether such injury was reasonably foreseeable or not. But
the present law is that unless the injury is of a description which was reasonably foreseeable, it is
(according to taste) “outside the scope of the duty” or “too remote.”
It is also agreed that what must have been foreseen is not the precise injury which occurred but
injury of a given description. The foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus. And the
description is formulated by reference to the nature of the risk which ought to have been foreseen.
So, in Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837 the foreseeable risk was that a child would be injured
by falling in the hole or being burned by a lamp or by a combination of both. The House of Lords
decided that the injury which actually materialised fell within this description, notwithstanding that
it involved an unanticipated explosion of the lamp and consequent injuries of unexpected severity….
The short point in the present appeal is therefore whether the judge was right in saying in general
terms that the risk was that children would “meddle with the boat at the risk of some physical injury”
of whether the Court of Appeal were right in saying that the only foreseeable risk was of “children
who were drawn to the boat climbing upon it and being injured by the rotten planking giving way
beneath them.” Was the wider risk, which would include within its description the accident which
actually happened, reasonably foreseeable?…
[Counsel for the borough] says that apart from its rotten planking, the boat was simply a heavy
object like any other. It was no more likely to cause injury to the children than any other heavy object
they might be able to get hold of. He draws the analogy of a man who negligently leaves a loaded
gun where children play with it and one child injures another by dropping it on his toe. The injury
does not fall within the scope of the risk created by the fact that it is a gun rather than some other
heavy but innocuous object….
I think that in a case like this, analogies from other imaginary facts are seldom helpful. Likewise
analogies from real facts in other cases: I entirely agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Steyn
in deploring the citation of cases which do nothing to illuminate any principle but are said to
constitute analogous facts. In the present case, the rotten condition of the boat had a significance
beyond the particular danger it created. It proclaimed the boat and its trailer as abandoned, res nullius,
there for the taking, to make of them whatever use the rich fantasy life of children might suggest….
[I]t has been repeatedly said in cases about children that their ingenuity in finding unexpected
ways of doing mischief to themselves and others should never be underestimated. For these reasons,
I think that the judge’s broad description of the risk as being that children would “meddle with the
boat at the risk of some physical injury” was the correct one to adopt on the facts of this case. The
actual injury fell within that description and I would therefore allow the appeal….
1.

QUESTIONS
Philosophizing Foreseeability: What does the court mean when it says that
“foreseeability is not as to the particulars but the genus”?

2.

Kids Will Be Kids: What was the risk that the council ought to have foreseen? Was it
kids playing in the boat? Kids attempting to repair the boat so that they could take it to
Cornwall and fight pirates? Something else?

3.

Jolley Good Show: Imagine that the boys successfully repair the boat. En route to the
Cornish coast, they stop at a gas station to buy a pasty (not a typo… Google it) and see
that the wooden hull is crumbling. As they try to stop the boat from slipping off the
trailer, Justin severely hurts his hand. Did the council’s carelessness proximately cause
his injuries?
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DATE NIGHT(MARE) PROBLEM
A few lads were on hole 17 at the legendary Ocean Course at Kiawah Island. Derrick thought it
would be funny to hit his ball into the water, and naturally his friends egged him on and opened
their Snapchats to record. He swung hard and struck his ball perfectly. Destiny, who owns a house
on the water, was riding by on her hydrofoil surfboard, and Derrick’s ball struck their left eye.
Destiny was supposed to go out on a date that night. But their eye was swollen shut, so they
canceled their plans, threw on some shades and a hoodie, and went to the bar to drink away their
sorrows. On their drive home, they were going below the speed limit in their lane when they hit a
cyclist, Grady, who was dressed in all black and riding without bike lights or reflectors. After Destiny
hit Grady, they swerved and hit a light pole and whacked their right eye on the steering wheel.
Grady bruised his hip in the fall. After flicking off Destiny, he was hobbling toward the opposite
lane to retrieve his bike when something hit his head. Bryce, an 8-year-old boy, had his feet dangling
from the passenger window of a minivan driving in the other direction. The blow from Bryce’s feet
knocked Grady unconscious. The minivan pulled over. Then, in Kiawah fashion, the weather
changed suddenly. A lightning bolt struck a tree that promptly fell on Destiny’s car and the minivan.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

For which injuries might Derrick be held liable? Which injuries did he proximately cause?
How about Grady?
And Destiny?
Is anyone else on the hook for negligence?
TIKTOK CHALLENGE PROBLEM

Devi was on her daily commute, riding the New York subway home to Brooklyn from her office
in Manhattan. As she stepped off the train and onto the platform at her station, she saw a crowd of
teenagers skateboarding toward her to complete a new viral TikTok challenge, achieved by jumping
onto trains after the doors have started closing. The train doors closed, but another passenger on the
platform saw one teen hurtling toward the train and yelled, “Open the doors, open the doors! Hold
the train!” Though the driver’s view of the platform was partially blocked by a pillar, the train doors
suddenly burst opened and then began to close again slowly. The teen sped up, plowed into Devi,
and jumped over her body through the closing doors. The train pulled away. Devi, meanwhile, lay
in agony on the platform. She suffered a serious ankle injury and won’t be able to continue her
longtime hobby of marathon running, even after surgery to repair the damage. Footage of the whole
event went viral online, yet the TikTok teen was never identified. Devi sues New York City Transport
(NYCT), which operates the subway, for negligence.
(a) Did NYCT owe Devi a duty? If so, did it breach that duty?
(b) If so, was that breach an actual and proximate cause of Devi’s injuries? Imagine NYCT
argues that “the reopening and closing of the doors, if it were in fact a negligent act,
might be expected to cause injury to a passenger falling from the train or becoming
entangled in the doors, but it simply could not be expected that because the doors were
reopened the unidentified teen would run directly into the plaintiff.” Are you persuaded?
(c) Does it matter whether this accident was reasonably foreseeable to the driver? If so, how?
(d) Should we be concerned about the policy implications of imposing liability in a case like
this? NYCT makes the following argument: “The concepts of duty and proximate cause
rest upon considerations of sound public policy. If NYCT were to be exposed to liability
merely because train doors are opened, or not opened, in every instance where persons
are running to catch trains, operation of the transit system would be impossible, and
defendant would be cast as an insurer of its passengers.” Do you share this worry?
(e) Once you’ve read the next two cases and problem, return to Devi’s lawsuit. Was the
TikTok teen’s intervening conduct the superseding cause of Devi’s injuries? Even
assuming that the train driver was negligent, did his act merely furnish the conditions
for an unrelated and unforeseeable act that caused Devi’s injuries?
(f) If Devi also sues the passenger who yelled, might she have a better negligence claim?
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PALSGRAF v. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD CO.
Court of Appeals of the State of New York (1928)
Cardozo, Chief Judge:

ã

Plaintiff was standing on a platform of
defendant’s railroad after buying a ticket to
go to Rockaway Beach. A train stopped at the
station, bound for another place. Two men
ran forward to catch it. One of the men
reached the platform of the car without
mishap, though the train was already
moving. The other man, carrying a package,
jumped aboard the car, but seemed unsteady
as if about to fall. A guard on the car, who had
held the door open, reached forward to
help him in, and another guard on the platform pushed him from
behind. In this act, the package was dislodged, and fell upon the rails.
It was a package of small size, about fifteen inches long, and was
covered by a newspaper. In fact it contained fireworks, but there was
nothing in its appearance to give notice of its contents. The fireworks
when they fell exploded. The shock of the explosion threw down some
scales at the other end of the platform, many feet away. The scales
struck the plaintiff, causing injuries for which she sues.
The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation to
the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff,
standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at all. Nothing
in the situation gave notice that the falling package had in it the potency
of peril to persons thus removed. Negligence is not actionable unless it
involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a
right. Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do. Negligence
is the absence of care, according to the circumstances. The plaintiff as
she stood upon the platform of the station might claim to be protected
against intentional invasion of her bodily security. Such invasion is not
charged. She might claim to be protected against unintentional
invasion by conduct involving in the thought of reasonable men an
unreasonable hazard that such invasion would ensue. These, from the
point of view of the law, were the bounds of her immunity, with
perhaps some rare exceptions, survivals for the most part of ancient
forms of liability, where conduct is held to be at the peril of the actor. If
no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent
and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did
not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a wrong,
though apparently not one involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with
reference to some one else. In every instance, before negligence can be
predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a
duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which would
have averted or avoided the injury. The ideas of negligence and duty
are strictly correlative. The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty
to another.
A different conclusion will involve us, and swiftly too, in a maze of
contradictions. A guard stumbles over a package which has been left
ã
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upon a platform. It seems to be a bundle of newspapers. It turns out to be a can of dynamite. To the
eye of ordinary vigilance, the bundle is abandoned waste, which may be kicked or trod on with
impunity. Is a passenger at the other end of the platform protected by the law against the
unsuspected hazard concealed beneath the waste? If not, is the result to be any different, so far as
the distant passenger is concerned, when the guard stumbles over a valise which a truckman or a
porter has left upon the walk? The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all, has a cause of
action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be protected against invasion of his
bodily security is neither greater nor less because the act resulting in the invasion is a wrong to
another far removed. In this case, the rights that are said to have been violated, the interests said to
have been invaded, are not even of the same order. The man was not injured in his person nor even
put in danger. The purpose of the act, as well as its effect, was to make his person safe. If there was a
wrong to him at all, which may very well be doubted, it was a wrong to a property interest only, the
safety of his package. Out of this wrong to property, which threatened injury to nothing else, there
has passed, we are told, to the plaintiff by derivation or succession a right of action for the invasion
of an interest of another order, the right to bodily security. The diversity of interests emphasizes the
futility of the effort to build the plaintiff’s right upon the basis of a wrong to some one else. The gain
is one of emphasis, for a like result would follow if the interests were the same. Even then, the orbit
of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty. One who
jostles one’s neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights of others standing at the outer fringe
when the unintended contact casts a bomb upon the ground. The wrongdoer as to them is the man
who carries the bomb, not the one who explodes it without suspicion of the danger. Life will have to
be made over, and human nature transformed, before prevision so extravagant can be accepted as
the norm of conduct, the customary standard to which behavior must conform.
The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting meanings of such words as “wrong” and
“wrongful,” and shares their instability. What the plaintiff must show is “a wrong” to herself, i.e., a
violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong to some one else, nor conduct “wrongful” because
unsocial, but not “a wrong” to any one. We are told that one who drives at reckless speed through a
crowded city street is guilty of a negligent act and, therefore, of a wrongful one irrespective of the
consequences. Negligent the act is, and wrongful in the sense that it is unsocial, but wrongful and
unsocial in relation to other travelers, only because the eye of vigilance perceives the risk of damage.
If the same act were to be committed on a speedway or a race course, it would lose its wrongful
quality. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation;
it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. This does not mean, of course,
that one who launches a destructive force is always relieved of liability if the force, though known to
be destructive, pursues an unexpected path. It was not necessary that the defendant should have had
notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident
was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye. Some acts, such as shooting, are so imminently dangerous
to any one who may come within reach of the missile, however unexpectedly, as to impose a duty of
prevision not far from that of an insurer. Even today, and much oftener in earlier stages of the law,
one acts sometimes at one’s peril. Under this head, it may be, fall certain cases of what is known as
transferred intent, an act willfully dangerous to A resulting by misadventure in injury to B. These
cases aside, wrong is defined in terms of the natural or probable, at least when unintentional. The
range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at times, if varying
inferences are possible, a question for the jury. Here, by concession, there was nothing in the
situation to suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread
wreckage through the station. If the guard had thrown it down knowingly and willfully, he would
not have threatened the plaintiff’s safety, so far as appearances could warn him. His conduct would
not have involved, even then, an unreasonable probability of invasion of her bodily security. Liability
can be no greater where the act is inadvertent.
Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from things
related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all. Negligence is not a tort unless it
results in the commission of a wrong, and the commission of a wrong imports the violation of a
right, in this case, we are told, the right to be protected against interference with one’s bodily
security. But bodily security is protected, not against all forms of interference or aggression, but only
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against some. One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing without
more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not willful, he must show that the
act as to him had possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be protected
against the doing of it though the harm was unintended. Affront to personality is still the keynote of
the wrong. Confirmation of this view will be found in the history and development of the action on
the case. Negligence as a basis of civil liability was unknown to mediaeval law. For damage to the
person, the sole remedy was trespass, and trespass did not lie in the absence of aggression, and that
direct and personal. Liability for other damage, as where a servant without orders from the master
does or omits something to the damage of another, is a plant of later growth. When it emerged out
of the legal soil, it was thought of as a variant of trespass, an offshoot of the parent stock. This appears
in the form of action, which was known as trespass on the case. The victim does not sue derivatively,
or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the person of another. Thus to view
his cause of action is to ignore the fundamental difference between tort and crime. He sues for breach
of a duty owing to himself.
The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us. The question of
liability is always anterior to the question of the measure of the consequences that go with liability.
If there is no tort to be redressed, there is no occasion to consider what damage might be recovered
if there were a finding of a tort. We may assume, without deciding, that negligence, not at large or
in the abstract, but in relation to the plaintiff, would entail liability for any and all consequences,
however novel or extraordinary. There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn
according to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where conduct negligent in that it
threatens an insignificant invasion of an interest in property results in an unforseeable invasion of
an interest of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps other distinctions may be
necessary. We do not go into the question now. The consequences to be followed must first be rooted
in a wrong.
The judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Trial Term should be reversed, and the
complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts.
ã
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Andrews, Judge, dissenting:
Assisting a passenger to board a train, the defendant’s servant negligently knocked a package
from his arms. It fell between the platform and the cars. Of its contents the servant knew and could
know nothing. A violent explosion followed. The concussion broke some scales standing a
considerable distance away. In falling they injured the plaintiff, an intending passenger.
Upon these facts may she recover the damages she has suffered in an action brought against the
master? The result we shall reach depends upon our theory as to the nature of negligence. Is it a
relative concept—the breach of some duty owing to a particular person or to particular persons? Or
where there is an act which unreasonably threatens the safety of others, is the doer liable for all its
proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would generally be thought to
be outside the radius of danger? This is not a mere dispute as to words. We might not believe that
to the average mind the dropping of the bundle would seem to involve the probability of harm to
the plaintiff standing many feet away whatever might be the case as to the owner or to one so near
as to be likely to be struck by its fall. If, however, we adopt the second hypothesis we have to inquire
only as to the relation between cause and effect. We deal in terms of proximate cause, not of
negligence.
Negligence may be defined roughly as an act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect
the rights of others, or which unreasonably fails to protect oneself from the dangers resulting from
such acts. Here I confine myself to the first branch of the definition. Nor do I comment on the word
“unreasonable.” For present purposes it sufficiently describes that average of conduct that society
requires of its members….
But we are told [by one scholar] that there is no negligence unless there is in the particular case
a legal duty to take care, and this duty must be one which is owed to the plaintiff himself and not
merely to others. This, I think too narrow a conception. Where there is the unreasonable act, and
some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. That is
immaterial. Should we drive down Broadway at a reckless speed, we are negligent whether we strike
an approaching car or miss it by an inch. The act itself is wrongful. It is a wrong not only to those
who happen to be within the radius of danger but to all who might have been there—a wrong to the
public at large. Such is the language of the street. Such the language of the courts when speaking of
contributory negligence. Such again and again their language in speaking of the duty of some
defendant and discussing proximate cause in cases where such a discussion is wholly irrelevant on
any other theory. As was said by Mr. Justice Holmes many years ago, “the measure of the defendant’s
duty in determining whether a wrong has been committed is one thing, the measure of liability when
a wrong has been committed is another.” Spade v. Lynn Boston R.R. Co., 52 N.E. 747 (Mass. 1899).
Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to
protect A, B or C alone.
It may well be that there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract. “Proof of negligence in
the air, so to speak, will not do.” In an empty world negligence would not exist. It does involve a
relationship between man and his fellows. But not merely a relationship between man and those
whom he might reasonably expect his act would injure. Rather, a relationship between him and
those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a tendency to harm some one, it harms him a mile
away as surely as it does those on the scene. We now permit children to recover for the negligent
killing of the father. It was never prevented on the theory that no duty was owing to them. A husband
may be compensated for the loss of his wife’s services. To say that the wrongdoer was negligent as
to the husband as well as to the wife is merely an attempt to fit facts to theory. An insurance company
paying a fire loss recovers its payment of the negligent incendiary. We speak of subrogation—of
suing in the right of the insured. Behind the cloud of words is the fact they hide, that the act, wrongful
as to the insured, has also injured the company. Even if it be true that the fault of father, wife or
insured will prevent recovery, it is because we consider the original negligence not the proximate
cause of the injury.
In the well-known Polemis Case, 3 K.B. 560 (1921), Scrutton, L.J., said that the dropping of a
plank was negligent for it might injure “workman or cargo or ship.” Because of either possibility the
owner of the vessel was to be made good for his loss. The act being wrongful the doer was liable for
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its proximate results. Criticized and explained as this statement may have been, I think it states the
law as it should be and as it is.
The proposition is this. Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those
acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged
to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he
be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one
complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be
expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those
in fact injured may complain. We have never, I think, held otherwise. Indeed in the Di Caprio case
we said that a breach of a general ordinance defining the degree of care to be exercised in one’s
calling is evidence of negligence as to every one. We did not limit this statement to those who might
be expected to be exposed to danger. Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not
confined to those who might probably be hurt.
If this be so, we do not have a plaintiff suing by “derivation or succession.” Her action is original
and primary. Her claim is for a breach of duty to herself—not that she is subrogated to any right of
action of the owner of the parcel or of a passenger standing at the scene of the explosion.
The right to recover damages rests on additional considerations. The plaintiff’s rights must be
injured, and this injury must be caused by the negligence. We build a dam, but are negligent as to
its foundations. Breaking, it injures property down stream. We are not liable if all this happened
because of some reason other than the insecure foundation. But when injuries do result from our
unlawful act we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that they are unusual, unexpected,
unforeseen and unforeseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with
the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former.
These two words have never been given an inclusive definition. What is a cause in a legal sense,
still more what is a proximate cause, depend in each case upon many considerations, as does the
existence of negligence itself. Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help us. A boy throws
a stone into a pond. The ripples spread. The water level rises. The history of that pond is altered to
all eternity. It will be altered by other causes also. Yet it will be forever the resultant of all causes
combined. Each one will have an influence. How great only omniscience can say. You may speak of
a chain, or if you please, a net. An analogy is of little aid. Each cause brings about future events.
Without each the future would not be the same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But
that is not what we mean by the word. Nor on the other hand do we mean sole cause. There is no
such thing.
Should analogy be thought helpful, however, I prefer that of a stream. The spring, starting on its
journey, is joined by tributary after tributary. The river, reaching the ocean, comes from a hundred
sources. No man may say whence any drop of water is derived. Yet for a time distinction may be
possible. Into the clear creek, brown swamp water flows from the left. Later, from the right comes
water stained by its clay bed. The three may remain for a space, sharply divided. But at last, inevitably
no trace of separation remains. They are so commingled that all distinction is lost.
As we have said, we cannot trace the effect of an act to the end, if end there is. Again, however,
we may trace it part of the way. A murder at Sarajevo may be the necessary antecedent to an
assassination in London twenty years hence. An overturned lantern may burn all Chicago. We may
follow the fire from the shed to the last building. We rightly say the fire started by the lantern caused
its destruction.
A cause, but not the proximate cause. What we do mean by the word “proximate” is, that because
of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a
series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. Take our rule as to
fires. Sparks from my burning haystack set on fire my house and my neighbor’s. I may recover from
a negligent railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as directly harmed the one as the other. We
may regret that the line was drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said the
act of the railroad was not the proximate cause of our neighbor’s fire. Cause it surely was. The words
we used were simply indicative of our notions of public policy. Other courts think differently. But
somewhere they reach the point where they cannot say the stream comes from any one source.
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Take the illustration given in an unpublished manuscript by a distinguished and helpful writer
on the law of torts. A chauffeur negligently collides with another car which is filled with dynamite,
although he could not know it. An explosion follows. A, walking on the sidewalk nearby, is killed.
B, sitting in a window of a building opposite, is cut by flying glass. C, likewise sitting in a window a
block away, is similarly injured. And a further illustration. A nursemaid, ten blocks away, startled
by the noise, involuntarily drops a baby from her arms to the walk. We are told that C may not
recover while A may. As to B it is a question for court or jury. We will all agree that the baby might
not. Because, we are again told, the chauffeur had no reason to believe his conduct involved any risk
of injuring either C or the baby. As to them he was not negligent.
But the chauffeur, being negligent in risking the collision, his belief that the scope of the harm
he might do would be limited is immaterial. His act unreasonably jeopardized the safety of any one
who might be affected by it. C’s injury and that of the baby were directly traceable to the collision.
Without that, the injury would not have happened. C had the right to sit in his office, secure from
such dangers. The baby was entitled to use the sidewalk with reasonable safety.
The true theory is, it seems to me, that the injury to C, if in truth he is to be denied recovery, and
the injury to the baby is that their several injuries were not the proximate result of the negligence.
And here not what the chauffeur had reason to believe would be the result of his conduct, but what
the prudent would foresee, may have a bearing. May have some bearing, for the problem of
proximate cause is not to be solved by any one consideration.
It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment. There are
simply matters of which we may take account. We have in a somewhat different connection spoken
of “the stream of events.” We have asked whether that stream was deflected—whether it was forced
into new and unexpected channels. This is rather rhetoric than law. There is in truth little to guide
us other than common sense.
There are some hints that may help us. The proximate cause, involved as it may be with many
other causes, must be, at the least, something without which the event would not happen. The court
must ask itself whether there was a natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was
the one a substantial factor in producing the other? Was there a direct connection between them,
without too many intervening causes? Is the effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the cause
likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to produce the result? Or by the exercise of prudent
foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too remote from the cause, and here we consider
remoteness in time and space. Clearly we must so consider, for the greater the distance either in time
or space, the more surely do other causes intervene to affect the result. When a lantern is overturned
the firing of a shed is a fairly direct consequence. Many things contribute to the spread of the
conflagration—the force of the wind, the direction and width of streets, the character of intervening
structures, other factors. We draw an uncertain and wavering line, but draw it we must as best we
can. Once again, it is all a question of fair judgment, always keeping in mind the fact that we
endeavor to make a rule in each case that will be practical and in keeping with the general
understanding of mankind.
Here another question must be answered. In the case supposed it is said, and said correctly, that
the chauffeur is liable for the direct effect of the explosion although he had no reason to suppose it
would follow a collision. The fact that the injury occurred in a different manner than that which
might have been expected does not prevent the chauffeur’s negligence from being in law the cause
of the injury. But the natural results of a negligent act—the results which a prudent man would or
should foresee—do have a bearing upon the decision as to proximate cause. We have said so
repeatedly. What should be foreseen? No human foresight would suggest that a collision itself might
injure one a block away. On the contrary, given an explosion, such a possibility might be reasonably
expected. I think the direct connection, the foresight of which the courts speak, assumes prevision
of the explosion, for the immediate results of which, at least, the chauffeur is responsible.
It may be said this is unjust. Why? In fairness he should make good every injury flowing from
his negligence. Not because of tenderness toward him we say he need not answer for all that follows
his wrong. We look back to the catastrophe, the fire kindled by the spark, or the explosion. We trace
the consequences—not indefinitely, but to a certain point. And to aid us in fixing that point we ask
what might ordinarily be expected to follow the fire or the explosion.
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This last suggestion is the factor which must determine the case before us. The act upon which
defendant’s liability rests is knocking an apparently harmless package onto the platform. The act
was negligent. For its proximate consequences the defendant is liable. If its contents were broken, to
the owner; if it fell upon and crushed a passenger’s foot, then to him. If it exploded and injured one
in the immediate vicinity, to him also as to A in the illustration. Mrs. Palsgraf was standing some
distance away. How far cannot be told from the record—apparently twenty-five or thirty feet.
Perhaps less. Except for the explosion, she would not have been injured. We are told by the appellant
in his brief “it cannot be denied that the explosion was the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” So
it was a substantial factor in producing the result—there was here a natural and continuous
sequence—direct connection. The only intervening cause was that instead of blowing her to the
ground the concussion smashed the weighing machine which in turn fell upon her. There was no
remoteness in time, little in space. And surely, given such an explosion as here it needed no great
foresight to predict that the natural result would be to injure one on the platform at no greater
distance from its scene than was the plaintiff. Just how no one might be able to predict. Whether by
flying fragments, by broken glass, by wreckage of machines or structures no one could say. But injury
in some form was most probable.
Under these circumstances I cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s injuries were not
the proximate result of the negligence. That is all we have before us. The court refused to so charge.
No request was made to submit the matter to the jury as a question of fact, even would that have
been proper upon the record before us. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
1.

QUESTIONS
Aligning the Elements: Which element of negligence does Judge Cardozo (left) believe
is central to this case? Is he concerned about proximate cause? Or does he conclude that
something else is amiss with Mrs. Palsgraf’s claim? Does Judge Andrews (right) agree?

2.

Minimum Outcome Changer: If you could pick just two facts that were crucial to Judge
Cardozo’s decision, what would they be? Put differently, which two facts could you
change just a little to cure the deficiency he perceives with Mrs. Palsgraf’s claim?

3.

Proximity and Pragmatism: What does Judge Andrews mean when he talks about
“practical politics”? How does he think pragmatism should affect negligence liability?
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The following case discusses sexual assault.
FAST EDDIE’S v. HALL
Court of Appeals of Indiana (1997)
Baker, Judge:

ã

Appellant-defendant Fast Eddie’s…appeals the
trial court’s denial of its motions for summary
judgment on a complaint filed by the plaintiffappellee Judy Hall, as executor of the estate of Teresa
Hall (Estate). Teresa Hall died after one of Fast
Eddie’s patrons shot and killed her. On appeal, Fast
Eddie’s argues that it did not owe Hall a common law
duty to protect her from another patron’s unexpected
criminal acts of sexual assault and murder.
Additionally, Fast Eddie’s argues that its actions were not the proximate cause of Hall’s death….
[O]n the evening of June 4, 1993, Teresa Hall, Michael Lamb and John Schooley were patrons at
Fast Eddie’s. Schooley and Lamb arrived together around 7:00 p.m. and began to consume alcoholic
beverages. Sometime later in the evening, Hall arrived at the tavern and began to drink and socialize
with Schooley. At one point in the evening, after Schooley stepped outside the bar for moment,
Lamb began to make advances toward Hall. At about the same time, the on-duty manager, Rita
Stephens, noticed that Hall had become heavily intoxicated and was having difficulty sitting up on
her bar stool. As a result, Stephens asked Lamb to take Hall out of the tavern. Lamb did as Stephens
requested and escorted Hall to Schooley’s car and returned to the bar. Schooley then drove Hall to
his trailer in Terre Haute. After they arrived, Hall passed out in the passenger’s seat of Schooley’s
car. Schooley then went inside his trailer and passed out on the couch.
Shortly thereafter, Lamb purchased a six-pack of beer from the tavern and drove to his home.
After discovering that his wife was not there, he drove to Schooley’s trailer. As he approached the
trailer, he noticed Hall passed out in the passenger’s seat of Schooley’s car. Lamb removed Hall’s
body and placed her in his car. He then drove to the Riley Conservation Club where he shot Hall in
the abdomen and head, killing her. When Hall’s body was found, her blood alcohol was .23%, her
skirt was twisted over her hips and her breasts were partially exposed. Lamb later confessed to killing
Hall and pled guilty to her murder.
On September 30, 1994, Judy Hall, as administrator of the Estate of Teresa Hall, filed a complaint
against Fast Eddie’s alleging that it was negligent per se for violating Indiana’s Dram Shop Act, by
serving Lamb and Hall alcoholic beverages when they were visibly intoxicated. The Estate further
argued that Fast Eddie’s breached its common law duty of care to provide for Hall’s safety by failing
to protect her from Lamb’s criminal acts of sexual assault and murder.
In response, Fast Eddie’s filed a motion for summary judgment in which it argued that it did not
violate the Dram Shop Act because it did not serve Lamb or Hall any alcohol on the night of Hall’s
murder. It further argued that even if Lamb was served, he was not visibly intoxicated. Additionally,
Fast Eddie’s argued that it did not owe Hall a common law duty to protect her from Lamb’s
unforeseeable criminal acts of sexual assault and murder because they were not reasonably
foreseeable. The trial court, however, denied the motion.
Thereafter, on May 30, 1996, Fast Eddie’s filed a second motion for summary judgment in which
it argued that its alleged act of serving Lamb and Hall in violation of the Dram Shop Act was not the
proximate cause of Hall’s death. Specifically, it argued that sexual assault and murder were not the
natural and probable consequences of Lamb’s alleged intoxication. The trial court, again, denied
Fast Eddie’s motion. Thereafter, the trial court certified both of Fast Eddie’s motions for summary
judgment for interlocutory appeal…and this court accepted jurisdiction on February 7, 1997.
Fast Eddie’s contends that the trial court erroneously denied its motions for summary judgment.
Specifically, it argues that it did not have a common law duty to protect Hall from Lamb’s
ã

Tim Vrtiska, Dive Bar (CC BY-ND 2.0).

CASES & CRITIQUE

195

unforeseeable criminal acts of sexual assault and murder. Alternatively, it argues that it did not
gratuitously assume a common law duty to protect Hall from Lamb by asking Lamb to remove Hall
from the tavern. Finally, Fast Eddie’s argues that its alleged violation of Indiana’s Dram Shop Act
was not the proximate cause of Hall’s death….
I. Fast Eddie’s Common Law Duty
First we address Fast Eddie’s contention that it did not owe Hall a common law duty to protect
her from Lamb’s criminal acts of sexual assault and murder. In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a
claim for negligence, she must show that: (1) the defendant owed her a duty to exercise reasonable
care; (2) the defendant breached that duty by failing to conform its conduct to the requisite standard
of care; and (3) the plaintiff sustained injuries which were the proximate cause of the defendant’s
breach. However, absent a duty, there can be no negligence.
This court has previously held that a proprietor of a tavern owes its patrons a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect them from the foreseeable acts of other patrons. However, a proprietor of
a tavern is not required to protect its patrons from unexpected criminal acts unless particular facts
make it reasonably foreseeable that the criminal act will occur. These include the prior actions of the
assailant either on the day the act occurred or on a previous occasion. However, a criminal act is not
foreseeable merely because a patron was served beyond the point of intoxication….
[T]he Estate offered evidence that Fast Eddies was a “run down[,] kind of dirty” tavern with a
reputation for fighting, theft and accidents. It also submitted evidence that Lamb and Hall consumed
large amounts of alcohol on the night of Hall’s murder and that Hall became physically helpless due
to her intoxicated state. Additionally, the Estate submitted evidence that Lamb made advances
toward Hall shortly before Schooley took her home and that Rona Slater, a waitress at Fast Eddie’s,
had personal knowledge that Lamb’s “sexual drive increased” when he became intoxicated. Finally,
the Estate offered evidence that one or more of the bartenders on duty that evening had knowledge
that Lamb carried a gun.
Even accepting all of the Estate’s evidence as true, none of it demonstrates that Lamb’s sexual
assault and murder of Hall were foreseeable. First, it does not follow that because Lamb’s sexual
drive increased when he was intoxicated and that he showed an interest in Hall, he would
intentionally harm Hall absent some evidence which would show his propensity for sexual assault
or murder. It also does not follow that because Fast Eddie’s had a reputation for violence, that every
patron, including Lamb, is violent. Further, even if fighting had occurred at the tavern in the past,
the Estate offered no evidence that Lamb had been involved in any of the prior altercations. Finally,
Hall’s death was not foreseeable merely because Lamb carried a gun. Therefore, the evidence most
favorable to Hall supports Fast Eddie’s contention that it had no knowledge of Lamb’s propensity to
commit sexual assault or murder. As a result, Fast Eddie’s had no duty to protect Hall from Lamb’s
intentional criminal acts. See L.W. v. Western Golf Ass’n, 675 N.E.2d 760 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997) (foundation could not have reasonably foreseen that male scholarship recipient would rape
female recipient in foundation’s coed house where recipients were required to live, because it had
no knowledge that male recipient had propensity for violence or sexual assault).
II. Assumption of a Duty
…A duty of care may be created by gratuitous or voluntary assumption…. [T]he Estate contends
that the manager’s act of telling Lamb to take Hall out of the tavern, evidences Fast Eddie’s intent to
assume a duty to provide for Hall’s safety…. Here, Fast Eddie’s only action was to order Lamb to
take Hall out of the tavern. However, this act is not an affirmative step to provide for Hall’s safety.
Without some affirmative action on the part of a tavern owner or its employees to provide for its
patron’s safety, we refuse to impute a duty. Were we to do otherwise, we would, in essence, require
tavern owners to be the guarantors of each departing patron’s safety, which we refuse to do….
III. Proximate Cause of Hall’s Assault and Murder
Finally, Fast Eddie’s argues that the trial court erroneously denied its motion for summary
judgment because its alleged violation of the Dram Shop Act was not the proximate cause of Hall’s
sexual assault and death. According to the Dram Shop Act, a provider of alcoholic beverages is not
liable in a civil action unless:
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(1) the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage had actual knowledge that the
person to whom the alcoholic beverage was furnished was visibly intoxicated at
the time the alcoholic beverage was furnished; and,
(2) the intoxication of the person to whom the alcoholic beverage was furnished
was a proximate cause of the death, injury, or damage alleged in the complaint.
Thus, even though a proprietor may have a statutory duty to refrain from providing alcoholic
beverages to intoxicated persons, it will not be liable unless the alleged violation is the proximate
cause of a patron’s death or injury.
Proximate cause is the limitation which courts have placed on the actor’s responsibility for the
consequences of his act or failure to act. A party’s act is the proximate cause of an injury if it is the
natural and probable consequence of the act and should have been reasonably foreseen and
anticipated in light of the circumstances. However, a willful, malicious criminal act of a third party
is an intervening act which breaks the causal chain between the alleged negligence and the resulting
harm. Although proximate cause is generally a question of fact, it becomes a question of law where
only a single conclusion can be drawn from the facts.
Here, even assuming Fast Eddie’s breached its statutory duty under the Dram Shop Act, its
breach was not the proximate cause of Hall’s sexual assault and death. First, the chain of causation
in the instant case is extremely tenuous. Although Lamb initially escorted Hall out of the tavern, he
returned to the bar after Schooley drove Hall to his trailer. It was later in the evening, however, when
Lamb left the tavern, returned home to discover his wife’s absence, decided to proceed to Schooley’s
home, found Hall passed out in Schooley’s car and killed her. The tavern could not have reasonably
foreseen this series of events which culminated in Hall’s unfortunate death. Additionally, even if the
chain of causation were stronger, Lamb’s intentional criminal acts were the intervening cause of
Hall’s death which broke the causal chain between Fast Eddie’s negligence and Hall’s sexual assault
and death. Therefore, Fast Eddie’s alleged violation of the statute was not the proximate cause of
Hall’s sexual assault and death.
Finally, we reject the Estate’s contention that Lamb’s intoxication was the proximate cause of
Hall’s death. In support of its contention, the Estate submitted Lamb’s deposition testimony that his
intoxication caused him to shoot Hall. The Estate concludes that this evidence creates a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the proximate cause of Hall’s death. We disagree.
Unlike automobile accidents which occur as the result of alcoholic beverage consumption,
assault and murder are intentional acts of volition which are the result of an assailant’s deliberate
design. Here, Hall died because Lamb deliberately decided to kill her. This criminal intent would
have been present whether or not Lamb was intoxicated. Thus, despite Lamb’s contention, we find
as a matter of law that Hall’s death was the result of Lamb’s deliberate design and volitional act and
not his intoxication…. The trial court’s denial of summary judgment is reversed.
1.

QUESTIONS
Mussivand Revisited: In the earlier case of Mussivand v. David, could Dr. David have
argued that Dr. West’s intentional act (having sex with Dr. Mussivand) was an
intervening cause that “broke the causal chain” between David’s negligence and
Mussivand’s infection? Are these cases analogous or would you distinguish them?

2.

Baker Revisited: Notice the distinct points that Hall’s estate unsuccessfully makes in
arguing that Fast Eddie’s owed an affirmative duty to protect. Why do they fail? How is
what happened to Hall in Fast Eddie’s different from what happened to Baker in Taco Bell?

3.

On or Off the Hook: The Restatement (Third) of Torts rejects the doctrine of intervening
cause (sometimes called “superseding cause”), relying instead on rules of apportionment.
Under these rules, when a third party’s intervening act makes them substantially more
culpable than the defendant, the defendant will be liable for a smaller share of the
plaintiff’s damages. What distinguishes this regime from the rule applied in Fast Eddie’s?
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TARGET PRACTICE PROBLEM
Cameron and Xavier, both eighteen-year-old high-school seniors, are staying at Cameron’s
family cabin for the weekend. On Saturday night, the pair decided to dip into Cameron’s parents’
alcohol stash in the basement. After enjoying a few beers, they decide it would be fun to shoot their
empty cans off of the dock. Both Cameron and Xavier had been hunting with their families since
they were kids, and they often shot at cans for target practice while they were at the cabin. They
assembled their cans, got their rifles from the safe, and took turns shooting cans at the end of the
dock. They were having a great time until Cameron shot at her last can, and the bullet ricocheted off
of the boat beside the dock and then hit Xavier’s foot. In the chaos that followed, Cameron’s rifle
slid off the dock and into the lake. Luckily, Xavier survived with minimal long-term injuries, but his
family wants to sue Cameron for negligence to cover his hospital fees.
Two years later, a group of kids was swimming in the lake when nine-year-old Uri found the
long-abandoned rifle. Excited to show his dad what he’d found, Uri ran out of the water carrying
the rifle. He tripped and fell, and the gun went off. The bullet caught Uri’s dad in the leg, and he
suffered serious injuries that mean he’ll forever walk with a limp. Uri’s family discovers the gun
belonged to Cameron and wants to hold her liable for negligently leaving a loaded gun in the lake.
(a) Is Cameron liable for negligence in both cases? If not, what makes Xavier’s case different
from Uri’s dad’s case? Did Cameron play an equal role in causing both injuries?
(b) Should Cameron’s parents be worried about facing any liability?

E. Negligence Per Se
DALAL v. CITY OF NEW YORK
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division (1999)
Per Curiam:

ã

The instant action arises out of an automobile
accident that occurred at the intersection of Booth
Street and 66th Avenue in Queens. The action against
the defendant City of New York was discontinued
prior to trial. At trial, the plaintiff testified that he
stopped at the stop sign controlling traffic on 66th
Avenue, and looked both ways for a distance of about
one block, without seeing anything, before he
proceeded into the intersection. When he was about
halfway through the intersection, his vehicle was
struck on the driver’s side by a vehicle operated by Alicia Ramdhani-Mack (hereinafter the defendant).
The plaintiff further testified that he never saw the defendant’s car until impact. The defendant testified
that she was about 10 to 15 feet away from the intersection when she noticed the plaintiff’s vehicle,
which was about 14 feet behind the stop sign but moving, and that about 5 to 7 seconds elapsed from
the time that she observed the plaintiff’s vehicle until the collision. She stated that she attempted to
swerve out of the way, but could not avoid the collision. The defendant further testified that although
she was nearsighted and required prescription glasses, she was not wearing her glasses at the time of
the accident. She claimed she was still able to see while driving. There was no evidence that either driver
was speeding. The jury returned a verdict finding that only the plaintiff was negligent, and that his
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge that the defendant’s
violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(3) was negligence per se, and erred in refusing to allow
him to cross-examine the defendant on that issue. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(3) provides that
“no person shall operate any motor vehicle in violation of any restriction contained on his license”.

ã
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The defendant testified at her examination before trial that her New York State driver’s license
contained a restriction requiring her to wear corrective lenses while driving.
It is well established that an unexcused violation of a statutory standard of care, if unexplained,
constitutes negligence per se. The defendant’s reliance upon the principle that operating a motor
vehicle without a license is not negligence per se is misplaced. The absence or possession of a driver’s
license relates only to the authority for operating the vehicle and not to the manner
thereof. However, a restriction placed upon the license requiring the wearing of glasses when driving
relates directly to the actual operation of the vehicle. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 509(3) provides that
no one shall operate a vehicle in violation of any restriction contained on his or her license, and also
relates to the manner in which the vehicle is being operated. Thus, the statute sets up a standard of
care, the unexcused violation of which is negligence per se. The trial court erred, therefore, in
refusing the plaintiffs request to charge…. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a new trial.
1.

QUESTIONS
Lawbreaking and Lawmaking: What’s the significance of Ramdhani-Mack’s violation of
§ 509(3)? Which element of negligence does it affect? And what effect does it have? Does
it mean that Dalal wins his negligence claim?

2.

Brown-Eyed Girl: Would Dalal be entitled to an instruction on negligence per se if
Ramdhani-Mack had lied about her eye color when applying for her driver’s license?
Would it matter whether there was a provision of New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Law
that penalized people for putting false information on their applications?

3.

Negligence Por Que? Why does the doctrine of negligence per se exist? What values does
it serve? What benefits or drawbacks does it have?
BAYNE v. TODD SHIPYARDS CORP.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1977)

Brachtenbach, Justice:

ã

Plaintiff sued for personal injuries sustained
while unloading goods being delivered to
defendant’s premises. Plaintiff was not an employee
of the defendant, but rather of the trucking company
engaged in the delivery. While unloading those
goods, plaintiff fell from a loading platform. Plaintiff
contended that the defendant’s loading platform
lacked a guardrail required by a safety standard
regulation promulgated by the Department of Labor
and Industries, pursuant to statute. The trial court
refused to instruct that violation of that administrative regulation was negligence per se, but did
instruct that it was evidence of negligence…. [T]he Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for the
defendant…. We granted review limited to the sole issue whether violation of an administrative safety
regulation is negligence per se or only evidence of negligence. We reverse.
The statute in effect at the time of the injury imposed a duty upon the Director of Labor and
Industries to promulgate safety regulations to furnish workers a place of work which is as safe as is
reasonable and practicable under the circumstances, surroundings and conditions…. Pursuant to
this authority, the Director of Labor and Industries adopted WAC 296-25-515:
(1) All elevated walks, runways or platforms, except on loading or unloading sides
of platforms, if four feet or more from the floor level, shall be provided with a
standard railing on platforms. If height exceeds six feet, a toe-board shall be
provided, to prevent material from rolling or falling off.

ã
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We have long been committed to the principle that violation of an applicable statute or ordinance
is negligence per se. This is the majority rule. However, the courts are divided on the question whether
violation of an administrative regulation is evidence of negligence or negligence per se.
By our decision in Kness v. Truck Trailer Equip. Co., 501 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1972), we already have
aligned ourselves with those jurisdictions which hold that under appropriate circumstances
violation of an administrative order is negligence per se. In Kness a regulation had been adopted
limiting the hours of work for a minor. The regulation was based on a rather broad statute
authorizing the administrative establishment of standards of wages and conditions of labor for
women and minors. In holding violation of the regulation was negligence per se we said:
In deciding whether violation of a public law or regulation shall be considered in
determining liability, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965) properly
states the rules:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
This court has substantially adhered to these principles in a number of cases.
In this case we had a somewhat more specific statutory directive to adopt standards of safety to
make safe the place of work of workmen…. We perceive no reason why such a regulation should be
of any less force, effect or significance than a municipal ordinance….
Defendant contends that plaintiff was not within the protected class because he was not an
employee of the defendant. The statute requires a safe place of work for workmen. It does not limit
it to employees of the defendant employer. A worker who is lawfully on the premises in pursuit of
his own employment and at the invitation of the third party, defendant here, is entitled to the benefit
of the statute and the regulation. See Pierson v. Holly Sugar Corp., 237 P.2d 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951),
which so holds, stating that the regulation was a safeguard for the public generally which necessarily
included a workman making a delivery who was not an employee of the defendant. Extension of the
protection of the regulation to the public generally is not before us….
The judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered.
Hicks, Justice, dissenting:
I dissent. Administrative agencies have a penchant for spawning regulations without end. As a
Member of Congress, I served on a subcommittee that had occasion to evaluate regulations
promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). While these regulations were
generally most appropriate, they were unnecessary, impractical or picayunish (Mickey Mouse) often
enough to give me concern as to making violation of any one of them negligence per se in every
instance in a damage action.
The court is setting policy in this case and I have no quarrel with that. However, I am more
comfortable with the rule that violation of administrative regulations be submitted to the trier of
fact as evidence of negligence, as the trial court did in this case, rather than to be submitted as
negligence as a matter of law. In my view, when violations of regulations are submitted as evidence
of negligence, the trier of fact has a better opportunity to use common sense and reach a more nearly
just result between the parties.
Until this case, the state of the law in this jurisdiction did not compel the result the majority
reaches…. In the instant case, [the regulations] do no more than provide an administratively
approved standard of safety. By the fiat of this court, the violation of such administratively
promulgated standard now becomes negligence as a matter of law in every instance in a damage
action. I believe the better course to be to…submit the regulation to the trier of fact only as evidence
of an approved standard, as the trial court did in this case….
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1.

QUESTIONS
Who Cares? Todd Shipyards doesn’t dispute that it violated the regulation, so why is it
still arguing that negligence per se doesn’t apply? Even if it didn’t apply, could Bayne still
point to the regulatory violation in making his case?

2.

Steamboat Willie: Why does Justice Hicks bring up Mickey Mouse in his dissent? What
does it have to do with the doctrine of negligence per se?

3.

Hooky: Suppose Bayne’s daughter leaves school early and makes the rounds with him at
work. She falls from the loading platform. Negligence per se?
VICTOR v. HEDGES
California Court of Appeal (1999)

Dau, Justice:

ã

Plaintiff Stephani Victor appeals from the judgment
entered in favor of defendants Michael Hedges and
Thermtech, Inc. (collectively, “Hedges”), following the
grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and
from the denial of her motion for new trial. Michael
Hedges parked his auto on the sidewalk in front of his
apartment building. Plaintiff and Hedges were standing on
the sidewalk behind the car, when an inattentive motorist
drove over the curb and into plaintiff, seriously injuring
her. We are required to decide whether a statute
prohibiting the parking of a vehicle on a sidewalk may be employed to fix upon Hedges the
presumption of negligence in the circumstances of this case and whether reasonable people could
conclude that he subjected plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm. We hold the statute in question
was not designed to prevent the type of occurrence that resulted in plaintiffs injury, and plaintiff has
failed to raise a triable issue of fact that an ordinarily prudent person in Hedges’s place would have
foreseen an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. Accordingly, we affirm.
Plaintiff brought an action for damages alleging that…defendant Thermtech owned a certain
Ford Explorer and defendant Hedges was driving that vehicle with the owner’s consent, that
defendant Mark Williams was driving a Ford Aerostar van, and that defendants negligently operated
and controlled these vehicles so as to cause a collision with plaintiff, who was lawfully upon the
sidewalk in the City of Hermosa Beach.
The undisputed facts showed that at approximately 10:00 p.m. Hedges had parked his Ford
Explorer on the sidewalk in front of his apartment building, parallel to, and with the driver’s side
tires three to four feet from, the curb line of Hermosa Avenue in Hermosa Beach. Hedges did this
to show plaintiff his new compact disk player, which was located in the rear of the Explorer. Due to
construction, northbound traffic along Hermosa Avenue was routed into a single lane along the east
curb. There was some gravel on the road, and the surface was rough with bumps and potholes.
Immediately before the accident Williams was northbound on Hermosa Avenue, approaching the
intersection with First Street, in his Aerostar van. He looked down at the tape deck and, with his
right hand, fast forwarded a cassette for approximately two seconds. The steering wheel jostled about
an inch each way, Williams’s van drifted to the right, and the front and rear passenger side tires hit
the First Street curb, causing them to blow out; the van continued in its path. Hedges and plaintiff
were standing at the rear of the Explorer, with plaintiff nearer the curb and Hedges to her right,
when Williams’s van ran into plaintiff and the Explorer about 30 feet from the First Street curb….
Plaintiff’s claim against Hedges and Thermtech is based on theories of negligence per se and
common law negligence. Defendants argued in the court below that a necessary element of plaintiffs
case under either theory—proximate cause—could not be established…. [W]e will address the
negligence per se issue before coming to that of ordinary negligence. We do this, even though the
ã
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proximate cause argument (which is focused on foreseeability) made by the parties is common to
both, for the following reason: If Hedges is not to be presumed negligent, and we will conclude that
he is not, the ordinary negligence analysis may proceed uncontaminated by the infraction charge….
Plaintiff argues that Hedges must be presumed negligent because he violated Vehicle Code
section 22500, subdivision (f), which prohibits parking on a sidewalk.
Section 669, subdivision (a) of the Evidence Code provides: “The failure of a person to exercise
due care is presumed if: (1) He violated a statute (2) The violation proximately caused death or
injury to person or property; (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which
the statute was designed to prevent; and (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his
person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted.”
With respect to paragraphs (3) and (4), the Law Revision Commission Comments state: “Whether
the death or injury involved in an action resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the
statute was designed to prevent and whether the plaintiff was one of the class of persons for whose
protection the statute was adopted are questions of law.
At the time of the accident, section 22500 provided: “No person shall stop, park, or leave standing
any vehicle whether attended or unattended, except when necessary to avoid conflict with other
traffic or in compliance with the directions of a peace officer or official traffic control device, in any
of the following places:…(f) On a sidewalk, except electric carts when authorized by local ordinance,
as specified in Section 21114.5.” We are required to determine the nature of the occurrence that
section 22500, subdivision (f) was designed to prevent….
Section 22500 designates twelve categories of locations where stopping, standing or parking a
vehicle is prohibited. The Legislature specified certain of these with pedestrians obviously in mind.
“On a sidewalk,” which the Code defines as “that portion of a highway, other than the roadway, set
apart by curbs, barriers, markings or other delineation for pedestrian travel,” is one of these. Others
are: “on a crosswalk”; “between a safety zone and the adjacent right-hand curb”; “alongside curb
space authorized for the loading and unloading of passengers of a bus engaged as a common carrier
in local transportation”; and “in front of that portion of a curb that has been cut down, lowered, or
constructed to provide wheelchair accessibility to the sidewalk.” With the exception of “on a
sidewalk,” vehicles normally operate within each of these designated categories, and, for these, the
section’s prohibition appears designed both to prevent vehicular obstruction of pedestrian traffic
and to lessen the danger of vehicle-pedestrian collision. Thus pedestrians finding it necessary to walk
around a vehicle that is illegally parked, stopped or left standing may be put at increased risk of
injury from unsure footing, from another vehicle in the roadway, or from the sudden movement of
the vehicle that had been at rest. Hedges’s parked automobile did not obstruct plaintiffs way and
increase her risk of injury in this fashion.
Injury to a pedestrian on a sidewalk, resulting from contact with a vehicle that has been parked,
stopped or left standing there, can also occur when the vehicle is at rest or when it is again put in
motion. The Legislature’s 1998 amendment to subdivision (f) appears to reflect an awareness that a
vehicle at rest, even if partially on the sidewalk, can cause injury to a passing pedestrian. In this
situation, the pedestrian, insufficiently aware of the presence of the vehicle, walks into it, or a portion
of it, and is injured. That is not what occurred in the case at bar. Here, plaintiff was inspecting the
Explorer’s compact disk player when she was struck by another vehicle, which ran into her and the
Explorer.
We conclude that subdivision (f) of section 22500 was designed to prevent (1) vehicular
obstruction of pedestrian traffic on sidewalks, and (2) injury to pedestrians that might occur when
a pedestrian (a) walks around the obstructing vehicle and is injured by another hazard, (b) walks
into the obstructing vehicle, or (c) is struck when the vehicle, previously at rest on the sidewalk, is
put in motion. The section was not designed to prevent the type of occurrence that resulted in
plaintiffs injury in this case—being struck on the sidewalk by a vehicle other than the illegally parked
vehicle. Accordingly, the court correctly denied to plaintiff the presumption…that defendants failed
to exercise due care.
We turn now to the issue of ordinary negligence…. Negligence is conduct which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Only
those circumstances which the actor perceives or should perceive at the time of his or her action are
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to be considered in determining whether the actor should recognize the risks that are involved in
his or her conduct. The actor is required to give his surroundings the attention which the average
person in the community would give under like circumstances and such superior attention as the
actor himself or herself has….
Plaintiff contends the following undisputed facts are sufficient to defeat defendants’ summary
judgment motion: Hedges took plaintiff to the sidewalk in front of his apartment at about 10:00
p.m., to see the compact disk player in his car, and stood with plaintiff on the sidewalk within three
to four feet of the curb, knowing that the street was undergoing construction, such that traffic was
reduced to one lane and the surface of the road had some gravel upon it and was bumpy. In the halfblock south of his apartment building Hedges had observed between five and ten dirt mounds; the
mounds were six to eight feet in height and four to five feet on the other side of the traffic lane.
Hedges acknowledged that due to bumps and potholes in the street, sometimes his car would act a
little “squirrelly,” causing “momentary loss of control of the vehicle for a split second.”…
The cases relied upon by the parties are focused upon determining whether the defendant’s
conduct was the cause of the injury, and we believe that in the case at bar the proper focus lies
elsewhere. There is a clear distinction between the problem of foreseeability of intervening causes in
determining whether the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of an injury, and the problem
of foreseeability in determining whether the defendant was negligent at all. In the latter case the
problem is whether or not the defendant’s conduct was wrongful toward the plaintiff, while in the
former it is whether he should be relieved of responsibility for an admitted wrong because another’s
wrongful conduct also contributed to the injury. Where it is contended that the element of
foreseeability is determinative of proximate cause, the court should approach the problem as one of
determining the nature of the duty and the scope of the risk of the negligent conduct.
For Hedges to be liable for negligence, his conduct must have fallen below the standard
established by law for the protection of those in plaintiff’s situation against unreasonable risk of
harm. Plaintiff argues that Hedges should have foreseen the likelihood that another vehicle would
lose control and come onto the public sidewalk where he and plaintiff were standing, a few feet from
the curb. This, says the plaintiff, was negligence because it was near a road made hazardous by
construction activity, which Hedges knew about, and it was foreseeable that these conditions could
cause a car to lose control and run onto the curb.
In the circumstances of this case these facts do not raise a triable issue that Hedges’s conduct was
wrongful toward the plaintiff. Reasonable people would not conclude, from these facts, that Hedges’s
act of taking plaintiff to the sidewalk subjected her to an unreasonable risk of harm. Plaintiff relies
solely upon Hedges’s knowledge of the following road conditions to establish his negligence: the
street was undergoing construction; traffic was reduced to one lane; the road surface was bumpy
and had some gravel upon it; and there were dirt mounds four to five feet to the left of the traffic
lane. Plaintiffs expert declared that these and other factors—deficient size of lane of travel, according
to applicable manuals and specifications, inadequate delineation of the left side of the roadway, and
the asphalt overhang at the gutter—“biased” the Williams van to the right side of the road, and that
the van’s drift to the right could be predicted by traffic engineering human factors. But Hedges is
not shown to have had the special knowledge of an expert, and his conduct is not judged by that
standard. Thus, knowledge of the “bias” condition of the roadway, or of what could have been
predicted by using traffic engineering human factors, is superior knowledge that Hedges is not
chargeable with. There is no evidence in the record that Hedges was aware of any prior accident in
this area, and there is no evidence raising a triable issue of fact that an ordinarily prudent person
would have understood that he or she was subjecting plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm by
standing on the public sidewalk at this location….
We conclude that under the undisputed facts here there can be no reasonable difference of
opinion as to whether Hedges subjected plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm or as to the
foreseeability that a driver would become distracted and, due to road conditions that only qualified
experts would be able to detect, run up on the sidewalk in the stretch of road in front of Hedges’s
apartment. We conclude that defendants were entitled to summary judgment….
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QUESTIONS
Realizing Risks: Is Victor in the class of persons that § 22500 was meant to protect? If
so, why doesn’t negligence per se apply? Consider Judge Cardozo’s words in DeHaen v.
Rockwood Sprinkler Co. of Massachusetts, 179 N.E. 764 (N.Y. 1932): “The hazard out of
which the accident ensued must have been the particular hazard or class of hazards that
the statutory safeguard in the thought and purpose of the Legislature was intended to
correct.” Is this the idea that sinks Victor’s argument?

2.

Fast Eddie’s Revisited: Would the Dram Shop Act in Fast Eddie’s have supported an
instruction on negligence per se? How would you use Victor to make your argument?

3.

It’s Not All Downhill from Here: Following Victor’s accident, both of her legs were
amputated to save her life. Years later, she told an interviewer: “People say do you want
your legs back? Yes! I would love to go for a run, or dance, or stand up in the shower,
you know. But I wouldn’t take my legs back if that meant trading what I have and what
I’ve learned through all of this experience. I wouldn’t trade that for anything.” After
multiple surgeries and years of recovery, she decided to take an adaptive skiing lesson.
Now, as a five-time Paralympic medalist in alpine skiing, her story certainly didn’t end
with defeat in the California Court of Appeal.

F. Comparative Fault
UNITED STATES v. RELIABLE TRANSFER CO.
Supreme Court of the United States (1975)
Stewart, Justice:
[A tanker owned by Reliable Transfer Co.
got stranded on a sandbar. Reliable Transfer
sued the United States for failing to maintain
a flashing light that would have allowed the
tanker’s captain to avoid the sandbar. The
district court attributed 25% of the fault to the
U.S. Coast Guard for failure to keep a working
light there and 75% of the fault to the boat’s
captain. The district court stated:]
The fault of the vessel was more egregious than the fault of the Coast Guard….
Equipped with look-out, chart, searchlight, radio-telephone, and radar, [the
captain] made use of nothing except his own guesswork judgment. After turning
in a loop toward the north so as to pass [another ship], he should have made sure
of his position before setting his new…course. The fact that a northwest gale
blowing at 45 knots with eight to ten foot seas made it difficult to see, emphasizes
the need for caution rather than excusing a turn into the unknown.
The [district] court held, however, that the settled admiralty rule of divided damages required
each party to bear one-half of the damages to the vessel….
The precise origins of the divided damages rule are shrouded in the mists of history…. [I]n 1855
this Court adopted the rule of equal division of damages in The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58
U.S. 170 (1854). The rule was adopted because it was then the prevailing rule in England, because it
had become the majority rule in the lower federal courts, and because it seemed the most just and
equitable, and best tended to induce care and vigilance on both sides, in the navigation. There can
be no question that subsequent history and experience have conspicuously eroded the rule’s
foundations…. England has long since abandoned the rule and now follows the Brussels Collision
Liability Convention of 1910 that provides for the apportionment of damages on the basis of
“degree” of fault whenever it is possible to do so. Indeed, the United States is now virtually alone
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among the world’s major maritime nations in not adhering to the Convention with its rule of
proportional fault—a fact that encourages transoceanic forum shopping.
While the lower federal courts originally adhered to the divided damages rule, they have more
recently followed it only grudgingly, terming it “unfair,” “illogical,” “arbitrary,” “archaic and
frequently unjust.” Judge Learned Hand was a particularly stern critic of the rule. Dissenting
in National Bulk Carriers v. United States, 183 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1950), he wrote: “An equal division
of damages in this case would be plainly unjust; they ought to be divided in some such proportion
as five to one. And so they could be but for our obstinate cleaving to the ancient rule which has been
abrogated by nearly all civilized nations.” And Judge Hand had all but invited this Court to overturn
the rule when, in an earlier opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, he stated that
“we have no power to divest ourselves of this vestigial relic; we can only go so far as to close our eyes
to doubtful delinquencies.” Oriental Trading & Transport Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 173 F. 2d 108 (1949).
Some courts, even bolder, have simply ignored the rule…
The divided damages rule has been said to be justified by the difficulty of determining
comparative degrees of negligence when both parties are concededly guilty of contributing fault.
Although there is some force in this argument, it cannot justify an equal division of damages in every
case of collision based on mutual fault. When it is impossible fairly to allocate degrees of fault, the
division of damages equally between wrongdoing parties is an equitable solution. But the rule is
unnecessarily crude and inequitable in a case like this one where an allocation of disparate
proportional fault has been made. Potential problems of proof in some cases hardly require
adherence to an archaic and unfair rule in all cases. Every other major maritime nation has evidently
been able to apply a rule of comparative negligence without serious problems, and in our own
admiralty law a rule of comparative negligence has long been applied with no untoward difficulties
in personal injury actions.
The argument has also been made that the divided damages rule promotes out-of-court
settlements, because when it becomes apparent that both vessels are at fault, both parties can readily
agree to divide the damages—thus avoiding the expense and delay of prolonged litigation and the
concomitant burden on the courts. It would be far more difficult, it is argued, for the parties to agree
on who was more at fault and to apportion damages accordingly. But the argument is hardly
persuasive. For if the fault of the two parties is markedly disproportionate, it is in the interest of the
slightly negligent party to litigate the controversy in the hope that the major-minor fault rule may
eventually persuade a court to absolve it of all liability. And if, on the other hand, it appears after a
realistic assessment of the situation that the fault of both parties is roughly equal, then there is no
reason why a rule that apportions damages would be any less likely to induce a settlement than a
rule that always divides damages equally. Experience with comparative negligence in the personal
injury area teaches that a rule of fairness in court will produce fair out-of-court settlements. But even
if this argument were more persuasive than it is, it could hardly be accepted. For, at bottom, it asks
us to continue the operation of an archaic rule because its facile application out of court yields quick,
though inequitable, settlements, and relieves the courts of some litigation. Congestion in the courts
cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litigation simply to encourage speedy outof-court accommodations….
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage
in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties
proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be
allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure
the comparative degree of their fault….
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
The Demise of Divided Damages: What’s the most compelling argument in favor of
simply dividing damages? Was it right for the Supreme Court to jettison this rule?
Splitting the Baby: The Court says that the rule of comparative fault should give way to
divided damages “when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of
their fault.” In practice, when would that exception apply? Or, perhaps more cynically,
is it ever possible to fairly measure the parties’ comparative degrees of fault?
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Contributory Negligence: If the plaintiff bringing a lawsuit is also at fault for their
injuries due to their own negligence, why shouldn’t they be barred from recovering
anything at all? If you think that rule seems unfair, how can you explain its prevalence
in many states as recently as the 1990s? Indeed, the all-or-nothing regime of
contributory negligence remains the rule in several states and the District of Columbia.

HUNT v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
Court of Claims of Ohio (1997)
Strausbaugh, Judge:
ã

In her complaint, plaintiff, Lesa Hunt, alleges that
defendant, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction
(“ODRC”), negligently instructed and trained her to operate
a snowblower, and that she was not provided with
supervision while she was operating the snowblower.
Plaintiff alleges that as a result, she inserted her hand in the
chute in an attempt to unclog the snowblower, thereby
causing her bodily injury….
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was an inmate in the custody and control of defendant….
On January 23, 1995, plaintiff was operating a Gravely snowblower while working with the outside
yard crew. Carl Jenkins was the corrections officer in charge of the yard crew. Plaintiff and fellow
inmate, Claudia DeJesus, were assigned to clear the sidewalks of two streets with the snowblower.
While plaintiff was operating the snowblower, the chute became clogged with snow. Plaintiff put the
snowblower in neutral and turned the “Power Take Off” (“PTO”) switch to the “off” position. The
PTO switch shut down the blower. After visually inspecting the chute, plaintiff inserted her hand
inside the chute and began cleaning out the packed snow. As she was removing the snow, the
machine caught plaintiff’s gloved hand and started pulling it into the chute. Although her glove
remained caught in the chute, and plaintiff was able to pull her hand out, her right index, middle
and third fingers were partially severed.
Prior to her assignment on that day, plaintiff and DeJesus had been instructed by Officer Jenkins
on how to operate the snowblower. The training session lasted approximately ten minutes. This was
the first time that Officer Jenkins had trained anyone to operate the snowblower, in spite of the fact
that he had no prior experience operating the snowblower. Although Officer Jenkins did not read
the operator’s manual, he had been trained one week prior to the accident by Woody Meyers, head
of the maintenance department, who had instructed him that if the chute became clogged, to push
the PTO switch in, turn the power switch off with the key, and clean out the snow with water or
some device. Meyers cautioned against placing one’s hand down the chute.
The court finds that Officer Jenkins, in good faith, believed that he had instructed plaintiff on all
of the above. However, even if he did instruct plaintiff in this manner, there was insufficient
emphasis placed on the importance of the safety instructions. The court finds that plaintiff was
under the impression that she needed only to push the PTO switch into the “off’ position. Plaintiff
did not consider the snowblower a dangerous machine and did not realize that there were moving
parts that could still be spinning for a period of time after the snowblower was turned off. The court
finds that plaintiff was not made aware that the engine should also be shut off prior to cleaning out
packed snow and that she should never place her hand in the chute.
Plaintiff’s claim sets forth a single cognizable action, sounding in negligence…. In the special
relationship between the state and its prisoners, the state owes prisoners a duty of reasonable care
and protection from unreasonable risks of harm. Reasonable care is that which would be utilized by
an ordinarily prudent person under certain circumstances. An inmate laborer, such as plaintiff in
the case at bar, is not an employee of the state….
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The court finds that defendant owed plaintiff a duty to warn her of the potential risks associated
with the operation of the snowblower. The court further finds that plaintiff received inadequate
safety training concerning what actions to take in the event that the snowblower became clogged.
The operation of the machine was relatively new to both plaintiff and Officer Jenkins. Therefore,
plaintiff should have received more detailed and hands-on safety training with the snowblower. It is
not unreasonable to expect that a new user of such a machine may believe that the blades would
immediately shut off by putting the PTO switch in the “off’ position, without being specifically
warned also to turn the ignition switch to the “off’ position and wait for the blades to stop. The court
finds that defendant did not adequately instruct plaintiff on the proper operation of the snowblower,
and defendant is therefore negligent, since it breached its duty of reasonable care to protect plaintiff
from harm.
Although the court finds that defendant was negligent, Ohio’s comparative negligence
statute bars a plaintiff from recovery if his or her actions were a greater cause (more than fifty
percent) of his injuries than any acts of defendant. In this case, the court finds that although
plaintiff’s own negligence was not a greater causative factor, it constituted forty percent of the cause
of her injuries.
The court finds that plaintiff disregarded a potential hazard and failed to use common sense
when she inserted her hand in the chute of the snowblower. The court concludes that plaintiff has
proven that defendant breached its duty of reasonable care; however, the contributory negligence
attributable to plaintiff is forty percent. Judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff. A trial on the issue
of damages will be scheduled in the near future.
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
Round Numbers: The judge concludes that Hunt was 40% at fault for her own injuries.
Why 40%? Why not 30%? Or 57%? Where are these nice round numbers coming from?
Do the Math: The Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer applied a rule of “pure”
comparative fault—i.e., when more than one party is at fault, liability is “allocated among
the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault,” regardless of the
percentage share assigned to each party. How is Ohio’s rule of “modified” comparative
fault different? Had the judge concluded that Hunt was 50% at fault, how much would
she have received in damages? What if she was 51% at fault?
BOOZY BORIS PROBLEM

Boris drives home drunk from the pub and hits a traffic light. Dr. Jeremy successfully treats
Boris’s serious injuries and then puts him on oxygen because he’s struggling to breathe. Due to Dr.
Jeremy’s carelessness, however, Boris suffers brain damage when the oxygen is temporarily cut.
Should Boris’s fault in getting injured in the first place limit any damages he could recover? Or is
the reason for him needing emergency care irrelevant when the case is about Dr. Jeremy’s
carelessness in providing that care?
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8
Factors for Assigning Shares of Responsibility (2000)
Factors for assigning percentages of responsibility to each person
whose legal responsibility has been established include
(a) the nature of the person’s risk-creating conduct, including any
awareness or indifference with respect to the risks created by
the conduct and any intent with respect to the harm created by
the conduct; and
(b) the strength of the causal connection between the person’s risk-creating conduct and the harm.
ã

ã

Valberg Lárusson, Tomato Juice Crumb Cake (CC BY 2.0); Alexander Savin, Räyskälä Skydive (CC BY 2.0).

CASES & CRITIQUE

207

POST-WORKOUT PROBLEM
Mo is driving home from the gym after lifting heavy weights for several hours. As he turns onto
the highway, he suddenly feels some soreness in his bulging bicep. Only then does he remember that
he didn’t stretch properly after his workout. He parks his car on the highway shoulder and gets out
to give himself some room to move. His car isn’t blocking any traffic, but it’s very close to the edge
of the fast lane. Within minutes, Alex clips the side of Mo’s car with her motorbike, leading her to
fall and suffer horrendous injuries. Mo, who had just completed his first set of lunges, was unscathed.
Alex later admits that, after pulling an all-nighter playing videogames and then driving for two
hours, she had dozed off just before the collision. Alex sues Mo for negligence, producing evidence
that she suffered $1 million in compensable damages due to her injuries.
(a) What’s Alex likely to recover under systems of contributory negligence, pure
comparative fault, and modified comparative fault? First give the rule, then your opinion
of the likely result.
(b) After doing this exercise, does the rule of divided damages seem more or less attractive?

G. Assumption of the Risk
JONES v. DRESSEL
Supreme Court of Colorado (1981)
Erickson, Justice:
…In an action for damages by the plaintiff for
personal injuries sustained in an airplane crash, the
trial court granted the defendants’ motion for
partial summary judgment. Summary judgment
was based upon the execution of an exculpatory
agreement which the court held insulated the
defendants from liability for simple negligence
involving the crash of an airplane….
On November 17, 1973, the plaintiff, William
Michael Jones, who was then seventeen years old,
signed a contract with the defendant, Free Flight Sport Aviation, Inc. (Free Flight).1 The contract
allowed Jones to use Free Flight’s recreational skydiving facilities, which included use of an airplane
to ferry skydivers to the parachute jumping site. A covenant not to sue and a clause exempting Free
Flight from liability were included in the contract:
2A. EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY. The plaintiff exempts and releases the
Corporation, its, owners, officers, agents, servants, employees, and lessors from
any and all liability, claims, demands or actions or causes of action whatsoever
arising out of any damage, loss or injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property
while upon the premises or aircraft of the Corporation or while participating in
any of the activities contemplated by this Agreement, whether such loss, damage,
or injury results from the negligence of the Corporation, its officers, agents,
servants, employees, or lessors or from some other cause.

1
Even though Jones’ mother had ratified the terms of this contract on November 16, 1973, it should be noted that the
approval by a parent does not necessarily validate an infant child’s contract.
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The contract also contained an alternative provision which would have permitted Jones to use
Free Flight’s facilities at an increased cost, but without releasing Free Flight from liability for
negligence.2
On December 28, 1973, Jones attained the age of eighteen. Ten months later, on October 19,
1974, he suffered serious personal injuries in an airplane crash which occurred shortly after takeoff
from Littleton Airport. Free Flight furnished the airplane as part of its skydiving operation.
On November 21, 1975, nearly two years after attaining his majority, Jones filed suit against Free
Flight alleging negligence and willful and wanton misconduct as the cause of the airplane crash. The
defendants included the owners and operators of the airplane, the airport, and Free Flight. Based
upon the exculpatory agreement, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court.
Jones asserts three grounds for reversal of the summary judgment. First, he claims that he
disaffirmed the contract with Free Flight within a reasonable time after he attained his majority by
filing suit. Second, he asserts that the exculpatory agreement is void as a matter of public policy.
Third, he contends that inasmuch as an exculpatory agreement must be strictly construed against
the party seeking to avoid liability for negligence, the injuries which he sustained as a result of the
airplane crash were beyond the scope of the agreement….
Ratification
As a matter of public policy, the courts have protected minors from improvident and imprudent
contractual commitments by declaring that the contract of a minor is voidable at the election of the
minor after he attains his majority. A minor may disaffirm a contract made during his minority
within a reasonable time after attaining his majority or he may, after becoming of legal age, by acts
recognizing the contract, ratify it…. What act constitutes ratification or disaffirmance is ordinarily
a question of law to be determined by the trial court…. We conclude…that the trial court properly
determined that Jones ratified the contract, as a matter of law, by accepting the benefits of the
contract when he used Free Flight’s facilities on October 19, 1974….
The Contract
Jones’ assertion that his contract with Free Flight is void as a matter of public policy, raises two
issues: (A) whether the contract with Free Flight is an adhesion contract; and (B) the validity of the
exculpatory provisions of the contract….
An adhesion contract is a contract drafted unilaterally by a business enterprise and forced upon
an unwilling and often unknowing public for services that cannot readily be obtained elsewhere. An
adhesion contract is generally not bargained for, but is imposed on the public for a necessary service
on a take or leave it basis…. There must be a showing that the parties were greatly disparate in
bargaining power, that there was no opportunity for negotiation, or that the services could not be
obtained elsewhere….
We conclude that the record in the instant case supports the trial court’s determination that the
contract between Jones and Free Flight was not an adhesion contract as a matter of law. Jones
contends that this was an adhesion contract because he was not allowed to select the alternative
provision which would have allowed him to participate in the activities without releasing Free Flight
from liability for its negligence, and that a genuine issue as to his lack of choice precluded the entry
2
The record indicates that the alternative provision of the contract was crossed out when Jones signed the contract.
However, the record does not establish that Free Flight would have prohibited Jones from participating in skydiving activities
if the alternative provision had not been crossed out.

2B. ALTERNATE PROVISION. In consideration of the deletion of the provisions, 2A, 3, 4, and 5
herein regarding ASSUMPTION OF RISK, EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY, COVENANT NOT TO
SUE, INDEMNITY AGAINST THIRD PARTY CLAIMS, and CONTINUATION OF
OBLIGATIONS, the Participant has paid the additional sum of $50.00 upon execution of this
agreement, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the Corporation.
2C. It is understood that acceptance of this ALTERNATIVE PROVISION does not constitute a
contract of insurance, but only waives Corporation’s contractual defenses which would otherwise be
available.
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of summary judgment. We disagree…. [T]he fact that a contract is a printed form contract and
offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis does not alone cause it to be an adhesion contract. We also
agree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that nothing in the record establishes a disparity in
bargaining power, or that the services provided by Free Flight could not be obtained elsewhere.
Jones asserts that the exculpatory agreement is void as a matter of public policy. We disagree.
The defendants contend that Barker v. Colorado Region, 532 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974), is
dispositive of the issue of the validity of the exculpatory agreement. In Barker, the court of appeals
held that an exculpatory clause in a contract relating to recreational activities will be given effect
where the intention of the parties is expressed in sufficiently clear and unequivocal language and
does not fall within any of the categories where the public interest is directly involved.
Jones, however, claims that summary judgment should not have been granted…. First, he argues
that because exculpatory agreements must be strictly construed against the party seeking exemption,
the agreement here does not insulate the defendants from liability for negligence in connection with
a crash that occurred prior to the time that Jones made a parachute jump…. [Second], he contends
that Free Flight…cannot contract away its liability for negligence in the performance of a duty
imposed by law or where the public interest requires performance.
The determination of the sufficiency and validity of an exculpatory agreement is a question of
law for the court to determine…. An exculpatory agreement, which attempts to insulate a party from
liability from his own negligence, must be closely scrutinized, and in no event will such an agreement
provide a shield against a claim for willful and wanton negligence…. In determining whether an
exculpatory agreement is valid, there are four factors which a court must consider: (1) the existence
of a duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service performed; (3) whether the contract was fairly
entered into; and (4) whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous
language. Measured against the four factors which determine the validity of an exculpatory
agreement, we conclude that the trial court correctly held, as a matter of law, that the exculpatory
agreement was valid….
The duty to the public factor is not present in this case. In Tunkl v. Regents of University of
California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963), the California Supreme Court stated:
In placing particular contracts within or without the category of those affected with
a public interest, the courts have revealed a rough outline of that type of transaction
in which exculpatory provisions will be held invalid. Thus the attempted but
invalid exemption involves a transaction which exhibits some or all of the following
characteristics. [1.] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for
public regulation. [2.] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public. [3.] The party holds himself out as
willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least
for any member coming within certain established standards. [4.] As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party
invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against
any member of the public who seeks his services. [5.] In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay
additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. [6.] Finally, as
a result of the transaction, the person or property of the purchaser is placed under
the control of the seller, subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.
In light of the foregoing factors, we conclude that the contract between Jones and Free Flight
does not fall within the category of agreements affecting the public interest…. While it is not
necessary for a contract to embody all of the characteristics set forth in Tunkl to meet the test, we
conclude that an insufficient number of these characteristics are present in the instant case to
establish that the contract between Jones and Free Flight affected the public interest. The service
provided by Free Flight was not a matter of practical necessity for even some members of the public;
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because the service provided by Free Flight was not an essential service, it did not possess a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength over Jones; and the contract was not an adhesion contract.
Finally, …we note that there was no disagreement between the parties that the contract was fairly
entered into. Likewise, the agreement expressed the parties’ intention in clear and unambiguous
language; the contract used the word “negligence” and specifically included injuries sustained “while
upon the aircraft of the Corporation.”
We conclude that the exculpatory agreement was not void as a matter of public policy….
1.

QUESTIONS
Read the Fine Print: Looking at the terms of Free Flight’s liability waiver, was the
company’s alleged negligence in crashing the airplane covered? Would the waiver apply
if William had instead been hit by a carelessly driven Free Flight van while waiting for
his mother in the parking lot after skydiving? What if he got food poisoning after eating
bad sushi in Free Flight’s cafeteria before boarding the plane?

2.

Take It or Leave It: If similar exculpatory terms were found in every skydiving contract
in Colorado, would William have a stronger argument that Free Flight’s liability waiver
was a contract of adhesion? Would it have been a winning argument?

3.

Freefall Fanatics: If Coloradans were devoted skydivers, such that 93% of all residents
in the Centennial State did at least one jump before their twenty-first birthday, would
this case come out differently?
DALURY v. S-K-I, LTD.
Supreme Court of Vermont (1995)

Johnson, Justice:

ã

We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment for defendants S-K-I, Ltd. and Killington, Ltd. in
a case involving an injury to a skier at a resort operated by
defendants. We hold that the exculpatory agreements
which defendants require skiers to sign, releasing
defendants from all liability resulting from negligence, are
void as contrary to public policy.
While skiing at Killington Ski Area, plaintiff Robert
Dalury sustained serious injuries when he collided with a
metal pole that formed part of the control maze for a ski
lift line. Before the season started, Dalury had purchased a midweek season pass and signed a form
releasing the ski area from liability. The relevant portion reads:
RELEASE FROM LIABILITY AND CONDITIONS OF USE
1. I accept and understand that Alpine Skiing is a hazardous sport with many
dangers and risks and that injuries are a common and ordinary occurrence of the
sport. As a condition of being permitted to use the ski area premises, I freely accept
and voluntarily assume the risks of injury or property damage and release
Killington Ltd., its employees and agents from any and all liability for personal
injury or property damage resulting from negligence, conditions of the premises,
operations of the ski area, actions or omissions of employees or agents of the ski
area or from my participation in skiing at the area, accepting myself the full
responsibility for any and all such damage or injury of any kind which may result.
Plaintiff also signed a photo identification card that contained this same language.
Dalury and his wife filed a complaint against defendants, alleging negligent design, construction,
and replacement of the maze pole. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
ã
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release of liability barred the negligence action. The trial court, without specifically addressing
plaintiffs’ contention that the release was contrary to public policy, found that the language of the
release clearly absolved defendants of liability for their own negligence.
The trial court based its decision on Douglass v. Skiing Standards, Inc., 459 A.2d 97 (Vt. 1983), in
which we held that an exculpatory agreement was sufficient to bar a negligence action by a
professional freestyle skier who was injured in a skiing competition, and two subsequent decisions
of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont. See Estate of Geller v. Mount Snow
Ltd., No. 89-66 (D. Vt. May 21, 1991) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff recreational
skier signed release on back of ski pass); Barenthein v. Killington, Ltd., No. 86-33 (D. Vt. June 17,
1987) (summary judgment granted where plaintiff signed equipment rental agreement which
contained a release). The trial court did not view the distinction between professional and
recreational skiing as significant, and granted summary judgment on the ground that the release was
clear and unambiguous.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the release was ambiguous as to whose liability was waived
and that it is unenforceable as a matter of law because it violates public policy. We agree with
defendants that the release was quite clear in its terms. Because we hold the agreement is
unenforceable, we proceed to a discussion of the public policy that supports our holding.
This is a case of first impression in Vermont. While we have recognized the existence of a public
policy exception to the validity of exculpatory agreements, in most of our cases, enforceability has
turned on whether the language of the agreement was sufficiently clear to reflect the parties’ intent.
Even well-drafted exculpatory agreements, however, may be void because they violate public
policy. According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496B (1965), an exculpatory agreement
should be upheld if it is (1) freely and fairly made, (2) between parties who are in an equal bargaining
position, and (3) there is no social interest with which it interferes. The critical issue here concerns
the social interests that are affected.
Courts and commentators have struggled to develop a useful formula for analyzing the public
policy issue. The formula has been the subject of great debate during the whole course of the
common law, and it had proven impossible to articulate a precise definition because the social forces
that have led to such characterization are volatile and dynamic. The leading judicial formula for
determining whether an exculpatory agreement violates public policy was set forth by Justice
Tobriner of the California Supreme Court [in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963)]. An agreement is invalid if it exhibits some or all of the [the six Tunkl factors outlined above
in Jones v. Dressel.]…
Numerous courts have adopted and applied the Tunkl factors. See Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch.
Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968 (Wash. 1988) (release for school district’s interscholastic
athletics violated public policy); Kyriazis v. Univ. of W. Va., 450 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1994) (release
for state university-sponsored club rugby was invalid because “[w]hen a state university provides
recreational activities to its students, it fulfills its educational mission, and performs a public
service”). Other courts have incorporated the Tunkl factors into their decisions. The Colorado
Supreme Court [in Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981)] concluded, based on
the Tunkl factors, that no duty to the public was involved in air service for a parachute jump, because
that sort of service does not affect the public interest. Using a similar formula, the Wyoming
Supreme Court concluded that a ski resort’s sponsorship of an Ironman Decathlon competition did
not invoke the public interest. Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988).
On the other hand, the Virginia Supreme Court recently concluded, in the context of a “Teflon
Man Triathlon” competition, that a preinjury release from liability for negligence is void as against
public policy because it is simply wrong to put one party to a contract at the mercy of the other’s
negligence. The court stated: “To hold that it was competent for one party to put the other parties
to the contract at the mercy of its own misconduct can never be lawfully done where an enlightened
system of jurisprudence prevails. Public policy forbids it, and contracts against public policy are
void.” Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass’n, 418 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1992).
Having reviewed these various formulations of the public policy exception, we accept them as
relevant considerations, but not as rigid factors that, if met, preclude further analysis. Instead, we
recognize that no single formula will reach the relevant public policy issues in every factual context.
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Like the court in Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522 (Md. 1994), we conclude that ultimately the
“determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the
circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations.”
Defendants urge us to uphold the exculpatory agreement on the ground that ski resorts do not
provide an essential public service. They argue that they owe no duty to plaintiff to permit him to
use their private lands for skiing, and that the terms and conditions of entry ought to be left entirely
within their control. Because skiing, like other recreational sports, is not a necessity of life,
defendants contend that the sale of a lift ticket is a purely private matter, implicating no public
interest. See, e.g., Milligan, 754 P.2d at 1066 (“Generally, a private recreational business does not
qualify as a service demanding a special duty to the public, nor are its services of a special, highly
necessary or essential nature.”). We disagree.
Whether or not defendants provide an essential public service does not resolve the public policy
question in the recreational sports context. The defendants’ area is a facility open to the public. They
advertise and invite skiers and nonskiers of every level of skiing ability to their premises for the price
of a ticket. At oral argument, defendants conceded that thousands of people buy lift tickets every
day throughout the season. Thousands of people ride lifts, buy services, and ski the trails. Each ticket
sale may be, for some purposes, a purely private transaction. But when a substantial number of such
sales take place as a result of the seller’s general invitation to the public to utilize the facilities and
services in question, a legitimate public interest arises.
The major public policy implications are those underlying the law of premises liability. In
Vermont, a business owner has a duty of active care to make sure that its premises are in safe and
suitable condition for its customers. We have recognized this duty of care where the defendant’s
routine business practice creates a foreseeable hazard for its customers. The business invitee has a
right to assume that the premises, aside from obvious dangers, are reasonably safe for the purpose
for which he is upon them, and that proper precaution has been taken to make them so. We have
already held that a ski area owes its customers the same duty as any other business—to keep its
premises reasonably safe.
The policy rationale is to place responsibility for maintenance of the land on those who own or
control it, with the ultimate goal of keeping accidents to the minimum level possible. Defendants,
not recreational skiers, have the expertise and opportunity to foresee and control hazards, and to
guard against the negligence of their agents and employees. They alone can properly maintain and
inspect their premises, and train their employees in risk management. They alone can insure against
risks and effectively spread the cost of insurance among their thousands of customers. Skiers, on the
other hand, are not in a position to discover and correct risks of harm, and they cannot insure against
the ski area’s negligence.
If defendants were permitted to obtain broad waivers of their liability, an important incentive
for ski areas to manage risk would be removed with the public bearing the cost of the resulting
injuries. It is illogical, in these circumstances, to undermine the public policy underlying business
invitee law and allow skiers to bear risks they have no ability or right to control.
For these reasons, we disagree with the decisions of the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont, upholding exculpatory agreements similar to the one at issue here. We do not
accept the proposition that because ski resorts do not provide an essential public service, such
agreements do not affect the public interest. A recognition of the principles underlying the duty to
business invitees makes clear the inadequacy of relying upon the essential public service factor in
the analysis of public recreation cases. While interference with an essential public service surely
affects the public interest, those services do not represent the universe of activities that implicate
public concerns.
Moreover, reliance on the private nature of defendants’ property would be inconsistent with
societal expectations about privately owned facilities that are open to the general public. Indeed,
when a facility becomes a place of public accommodation, it renders a service which has become of
public interest in the manner of the innkeepers and common carriers of old. Defendants are not
completely unfettered, as they argue, in their ability to set the terms and conditions of admission.
Defendants’ facility may be privately owned, but that characteristic no longer overcomes a myriad
of legitimate public interests. Public accommodations laws that prohibit discrimination against
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potential users of the facility are just one example of limitations imposed by law that affect the terms
and conditions of entry….
1.

QUESTIONS
Sport the Difference: Why do Jones and Dalury come out differently? Is Colorado just filled
with rugged individualists and Vermont with fussy paternalists?

2.

Proceed at Your Own Risk: One possible difference is that skydiving arguably carries
greater risk of serious injuries on per-capita basis. But which way would that cut? Should
public policy make it easier or harder to waive liability for riskier activities?

3.

Where Ought the Obligation Be? Do you think Dalury comes out the same way if it
happened in Georgia, not Vermont? Why might we care about an activity’s popularity
in a particular state? In thinking this through, consider the possible relevance of Judge
Cardozo’s words in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916): “We
have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences
of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the
source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.”
SMOLLETT v. SKAYTING DEVELOPMENT CORP.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (1986)

Hunter, Judge:

ã

On February 15, 1981, Helene Smollett and
her husband attended a fundraiser at a skating
rink owned by Skayting Development
Corporation. Smollett, who was thirty-three
years old at that time, is an experienced skater.
Although she had not skated for the two years
before she went to the appellant’s rink, she had
skated over fifty times in her life.
When Smollett and her husband entered the
rink, they noticed that there were no guardrails.
They discussed this with the owner, Les Cooper,
who told them that this design was the practice
at many new rinks to further safety by avoiding
the use of guardrails which could become loose and collapse unexpectedly. Smollett did not take
skating lessons although they were offered to everyone at the fundraiser.
The skating area, which had a polyurethane surface, was raised three to five inches higher than
the surrounding floor, which was carpeted. Smollett skated for about ninety minutes, until 7:50 p.m.,
without mishap. The rink was not overcrowded, with fifty to one hundred people skating. There
were eight skateguards working that night and at least two were on the skating floor. Several signs
reading “skate at your own risk” were posted in the rink. The skaters included many children and
inexperienced skaters. At 7:50 p.m. Smollett’s husband wished to leave. She told him she would join
him after she took two last turns around the rink. On her last lap, Smollett skated behind a young
child who fell. To avoid the child and a skater on her left, she swerved to the right onto the carpeted
area. She fell and broke her left wrist. Her injury required surgery on the day of the accident and
again one year later.
Smollett and her husband filed this suit against the rink. As a defense, Skayting asserted that
Smollett had assumed the risk of injury. [At trial] the jury returned a verdict for Smollett but made
no award to her husband. Because the jury found Smollett 50% at fault, her award was reduced from
$50,000 to $25,000. The court denied Skayting’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or, in the alternative, for a new trial….
ã
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We hold that it was error to deny the skating rink’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because there was insufficient evidence to find that Smollett had not assumed the risk of
injury. The Virgin Islands has enacted a comparative negligence statute, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 1451,
and thereby removed the contributory negligence bar to recovery. Assumption of risk is still
available as a complete defense to a negligence claim but it has been limited by enactment of the
comparative negligence statute. Assumption of risk, to the extent it incorporates the concept of fault
on the part of the actor and, therefore, overlaps with contributory negligence, is no longer available
as a defense. However, assumption of risk can still be applied to non-negligent conduct which
constitutes waiver or consent but which involved no negligence. In such cases the absolute bar to
recovery remains.
The evidence in this case shows that Smollett fully understood the risk of harm to herself and
voluntarily chose to enter the area of risk. She, therefore, implicitly assumed the risk of injury.
Smollett admitted that she was aware that there were no guardrails, that the skating area was covered
with a smooth surface and was elevated, and that the area around the rink was carpeted. All of these
circumstances were clearly visible as was the fact that young and inexperienced skaters were at the
rink that day.
Smollett contends that she did not assume the risk because she was not aware of the dangerous
condition created by the combination of three circumstances at the rink: 1) lack of guardrails;
2) elevated skating area; 3) difference in coefficient of friction between the skating surface and the
surrounding carpeted area. We believe that Smollett was aware of the risk of falling when going from
the skating area to the surrounding carpeted area. To reach the rink she had to walk on the carpeted
area with her skates and, therefore, she had to be aware that the carpet slowed down the wheels on
the skates. She had skated many times before and knew that other skaters might fall down in her path.
We conclude that Smollett assumed the risk of injury. We will reverse the judgment of the district
court denying a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and direct the district court to enter judgment
for Skayting Development Corporation.
Mansmann, Judge, dissenting:
…I believe that the defendant has not demonstrated that the record lacks a minimum quantum
of evidence from which a jury could reasonably have afforded relief. Therefore, I would affirm the
judgment of the district court.
Assumption of the risk is an affirmative defense which has traditionally been considered an
absolute bar to recovery. Although the Virgin Islands has enacted a contributory negligence statute
which permits recovery on a pro rata basis where the plaintiff’s negligence does not exceed that of
the defendant, the assumption of the risk doctrine is nonetheless an available, although limited,
defense. As we noted in Keegan v. Anchor Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35 (3d Cir.1979), the assumption of
the risk doctrine “embraces two distinct concepts—one akin to waiver or consent, the other a species
of negligence.” To the extent that the assumption of risk doctrine involves a negligence theory, the
doctrine has been replaced by the Virgin Islands contributory negligence statute. To the extent that
the theory involves a consent or waiver principle, it remains a viable defense.
In Keegan, we explained that portion of the assumption of the risk theory which continues to
operate as an absolute bar to recovery.
Assumption of risk in its primary and strict sense involves voluntary exposure to
an obvious or known danger which negates liability. Under this concept recovery
is barred because the plaintiff is assumed to have relieved the defendant of any duty
to protect him.
The defendant, who asserts the assumption of the risk defense in its primary sense, has the
burden of demonstrating that no duty was owed plaintiff. Defendant can sustain its burden by
proving that plaintiff knew of the risk, appreciated its character, and voluntarily chose to accept it.
The defendant must also demonstrate that the plaintiff’s conduct in knowingly and voluntarily
confronting the risk was reasonable.
The defendant here claims that the jury’s failure to find assumption of the risk was against the
clear weight of the evidence…. The plaintiff admits that she was aware of the separate hazards which
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contributed to her injuries: the lack of guardrails, the elevation of the skating surface, and the
different textures of the carpeted surface and the polyurethaned skating floor. The plaintiff
maintains, however, that the defendant is relying impermissibly on the assumption of the risk
doctrine in its secondary sense—as a theory of negligence. The plaintiff also alleges that there is
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict….
While the evidence does indicate that the plaintiff knew of the separate hazards, there is no
evidence that the plaintiff knew of and appreciated how the various hazards could work in
combination. The majority speculates that the plaintiff must have known of the risk because she had
walked on the carpeted area with her skates and was aware, therefore, that the carpet slowed her rate
of speed. The majority’s speculation suggests only that the plaintiff was aware of the separate hazard
of the carpeted area. It does not address the issue of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the risk created by
the combined hazards….
In addition, there is evidence in the record which tends to counter a finding of waiver or consent.
The plaintiff and her husband did ask Les Cooper, owner of the defendant skating rink, about the
safety of the rink in the absence of guardrails. They were told that the no-guardrail design was used
for safety reasons. In light of this representation, I cannot say that all reasonable people would
conclude that the combined hazard was so obvious that the plaintiff assumed the risk and that the
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff….
In addition, there is evidence in the record which tends to counter a finding of waiver or consent.
The plaintiff and her husband did ask Les Cooper, owner of the defendant skating rink, about the
safety of the rink in the absence of guardrails. They were told that the no-guardrail design was used
for safety reasons. In light of this representation, I cannot say that all reasonable people would
conclude that the combined hazard was so obvious that the plaintiff assumed the risk and that the
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff.
Because there is room for doubt on the questions of the plaintiff’s knowledge and understanding
and the reasonableness of her conduct, we should not disturb the jury’s verdict. I would find that
the district court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the
assumption of the risk doctrine….
1.

QUESTIONS
The Stakes: What result flows the court’s conclusion that Smollett assumed the risk of
her injuries? How would that result be different from a determination that she was
comparatively at fault? Which regime favors defendants?

2.

Dead Heat: Is there anything about the Virgin Islands’ comparative-fault statute that
might explain why the jury initially split the damages so cleanly down the middle?

3.

Check Yo Self: By concluding that Smollett assumed the risk of her injuries, is the Third
Circuit saying that she wasn’t careless and partly at fault for the accident? Do you think
she was acting without reasonable care for her own safety?
AVILA v. CITRUS COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
Supreme Court of California (2006)

Werdegar, Justice:

ã

During an intercollegiate baseball game at a
community college, one of the home team’s
batters is hit by a pitch. In the next half-inning,
the home team’s pitcher allegedly retaliates with
an inside pitch and hits a visiting batter in the
head. The visiting batter is injured, he sues, and
the courts must umpire the dispute.

ã

Phoca2004, Bean Ball (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
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Jose Luis Avila, a Rio Hondo Community College (Rio Hondo) student, played baseball for the
Rio Hondo Roadrunners. On January 5, 2001, Rio Hondo was playing a preseason road game against
the Citrus Community College Owls (Citrus College). During the game, a Roadrunners pitcher hit
a Citrus College batter with a pitch; when Avila came to bat in the top of the next inning, the Citrus
College pitcher hit him in the head with a pitch, cracking his batting helmet. Avila alleges the pitch
was an intentional “beanball” thrown in retaliation for the previous hit batter or, at a minimum, was
thrown negligently.
Avila staggered, felt dizzy, and was in pain. The Rio Hondo manager told him to go to first base.
Avila did so, and when he complained to the Rio Hondo first base coach, he was told to stay in the
game. At second base, he still felt pain, numbness, and dizziness. A Citrus College player yelled to
the Rio Hondo dugout that the Roadrunners needed a pinch runner. Avila walked off the field and
went to the Rio Hondo bench. No one tended to his injuries. As a result, Avila suffered unspecified
serious personal injuries.
Avila sued both schools, his manager, the helmet manufacturer, and various other entities and
organizations. Only the claims against the Citrus Community College District (the District) are
before us. Avila alleged that the District was negligent in failing to summon or provide medical care
for him when he was obviously in need of it, failing to supervise and control the Citrus College
pitcher, failing to provide umpires or other supervisory personnel to control the game and prevent
retaliatory or reckless pitching, and failing to provide adequate equipment to safeguard him from
serious head injury. Avila also alleged that the District acted negligently by failing to take reasonable
steps to train and supervise its managers, trainers, employees, and agents in providing medical care
to injured players and by conducting an illegal preseason game in violation of community college
baseball rules designed to protect participants such as Avila.
The District demurred, contending it…owed no duty of care to Avila. The trial court sustained
the demurrer and dismissed the action against the District. A divided Court of Appeal reversed….
We granted the District’s petition for review to…address the extent of a college’s duty in these
circumstances….
To recover for negligence, Avila must demonstrate, inter alia, that the District breached a duty
of care it owed him. Generally, each person has a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
circumstances and is liable to those injured by the failure to do so….
The existence of duty is not an immutable fact of nature but only an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection. Thus, the existence and scope of a defendant’s duty is an issue of law, to be decided by a
court not a jury. When the injury is to a sporting participant, the considerations of policy and the
question of duty necessarily become intertwined with the question of assumption of risk.
The traditional version of the assumption of risk doctrine required proof that the plaintiff
voluntarily accepted a specific known and appreciated risk. The doctrine depended on the actual
subjective knowledge of the given plaintiff and, where the elements were met, was an absolute
defense to liability for injuries arising from the known risk.
California’s abandonment of the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative
negligence led to a reconceptualization of the assumption of risk…. [T]here are in fact two species of
assumption of risk: primary and secondary. Primary assumption of the risk arises when, as a matter
of law and policy, a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from particular harms.1 Applied in
the sporting context, it precludes liability for injuries arising from those risks deemed inherent in a
sport; as a matter of law, others have no legal duty to eliminate those risks or otherwise protect a
sports participant from them. Under this duty approach, a court need not ask what risks a particular
plaintiff subjectively knew of and chose to encounter, but instead must evaluate the fundamental
nature of the sport and the defendant’s role in or relationship to that sport in order to determine
whether the defendant owes a duty to protect a plaintiff from the particular risk of harm….

1

Secondary assumption of the risk arises when the defendant still owes a duty of care, but the plaintiff knowingly
encounters the risks attendant on the defendant’s breach of that duty. We deal here with an issue of primary, not secondary,
assumption of the risk.
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Here, the host school’s role is a mixed one: its players are coparticipants, its coaches and
managers have supervisorial authority over the conduct of the game, and other representatives of
the school are responsible for the condition of the playing facility. We have previously established
that coparticipants have a duty not to act recklessly, outside the bounds of the sport, and coaches
and instructors have a duty not to increase the risks inherent in sports participation; we also have
noted in dicta that those responsible for maintaining athletic facilities have a similar duty not to
increase the inherent risks, albeit in the context of businesses selling recreational opportunities. In
contrast, those with no relation to the sport have no such duty.
In interscholastic and intercollegiate competition, the host school is not a disinterested,
uninvolved party vis-a-vis the athletes it invites to compete on its grounds. Without a visiting team,
there can be no competition. Intercollegiate competition allows a school to, on the smallest scale,
offer its students the benefits of athletic participation and, on the largest scale, reap the economic
and marketing benefits that derive from maintenance of a major sports program. These benefits
justify removing a host school from the broad class of those with no connection to a sporting contest
and no duty to the participants. In light of those benefits, we hold that in interscholastic and
intercollegiate competition, the host school and its agents owe a duty to home and visiting players
alike to, at a minimum, not increase the risks inherent in the sport. Schools and universities are
already vicariously liable for breaches by the coaches they employ, who owe a duty to their own
athletes not to increase the risks of sports participation. No reason appears to conclude
intercollegiate athletics will be harmed by making visiting players, necessary coparticipants in any
game, additional beneficiaries of the limited duty not to increase the risks of participation. Thus, we
disagree with the Court of Appeal dissent, which argued that the District is little more than a passive
provider of facilities and therefore should have no obligation to visiting players.
We consider next whether Avila has alleged facts supporting breach of the duty not to enhance
the inherent risks of his sport. Though it numbers them differently, Avila’s complaint in essence
alleges four ways in which the District breached a duty to Avila by: (1) conducting the game at all;
(2) failing to control the Citrus College pitcher; (3) failing to provide umpires to supervise and
control the game; and (4) failing to provide medical care. The District’s demurrer was properly
sustained if, and only if, each of these alleged breaches, assumed to be true, falls outside any duty
owed by the District and within the inherent risks of the sport assumed by Avila.
With respect to the first of these, conducting the game, Avila cites unspecified “community
college baseball rules” prohibiting preseason games. But the only consequence of the District’s
hosting the game was that it exposed Avila, who chose to participate, to the ordinary inherent risks
of the sport of baseball. Nothing about the bare fact of the District’s hosting the game enhanced
those ordinary risks, so its doing so, whether or not in violation of the alleged rules, does not
constitute a breach of its duty not to enhance the ordinary risks of baseball. Nor did the District owe
any separate duty to Avila not to host the game.
The second alleged breach, the failure to supervise and control the Citrus College pitcher, is
barred by primary assumption of the risk. Being hit by a pitch is an inherent risk of baseball. The
dangers of being hit by a pitch, often thrown at speeds approaching 100 miles per hour, are apparent
and well known: being hit can result in serious injury or, on rare tragic occasions, death.2
Being intentionally hit is likewise an inherent risk of the sport, so accepted by custom that a pitch
intentionally thrown at a batter has its own terminology: “brushback,” “beanball,” “chin music.” In
turn, those pitchers notorious for throwing at hitters are “headhunters.” Pitchers intentionally throw
at batters to disrupt a batter’s timing or back him away from home plate, to retaliate after a teammate
has been hit, or to punish a batter for having hit a home run. Some of the most respected baseball
managers and pitchers have openly discussed the fundamental place throwing at batters has in their
sport. In George Will’s study of the game, Men at Work, one-time Oakland Athletics and current St.
Louis Cardinals manager Tony La Russa details the strategic importance of ordering selective
intentional throwing at opposing batters, principally to retaliate for one’s own players being hit. As
Los Angeles Dodgers Hall of Fame pitcher Don Drysdale and New York Giants All Star pitcher Sal
2
Most famously, in August 1920, Cleveland Indians shortstop Roy Chapman was hit by a pitch from the New York
Yankees’ Carl Mays. He died the next day. At least seven other batters in organized baseball have been killed by pitches.
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“The Barber” Maglie have explained, intentionally throwing at batters can also be an integral part of
pitching tactics, a tool to help get batters out by upsetting their frame of mind.3 Drysdale and Maglie
are not alone; past and future Hall of Famers, from Early Wynn and Bob Gibson to Pedro Martinez
and Roger Clemens, have relied on the actual or threatened willingness to throw at batters to aid
their pitching. Yankees Aced by Red Sox, L.A. Times (May 31, 2001) (relating Martinez’s assertion
that he would even throw at Babe Ruth).
While these examples relate principally to professional baseball, there is nothing legally
significant about the level of play in this case. The laws of physics that make a thrown baseball
dangerous and the strategic benefits that arise from disrupting a batter’s timing are only minimally
dependent on the skill level of the participants, and we see no reason to distinguish between
collegiate and professional baseball in applying primary assumption of the risk.
It is true that intentionally throwing at a batter is forbidden by the rules of baseball. But even
when a participant’s conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the violator to internal
sanctions prescribed by the sport itself, imposition of legal liability for such conduct might well alter
fundamentally the nature of the sport by deterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity
that falls close to, but on the permissible side of, a prescribed rule. It is one thing for an umpire to
punish a pitcher who hits a batter by ejecting him from the game, or for a league to suspend the
pitcher; it is quite another for tort law to chill any pitcher from throwing inside, i.e., close to the
batter’s body—a permissible and essential part of the sport—for fear of a suit over an errant pitch.
For better or worse, being intentionally thrown at is a fundamental part and inherent risk of the
sport of baseball.4 It is not the function of tort law to police such conduct….
[A]n athlete does not assume the risk of a coparticipant’s intentional or reckless conduct totally
outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. Here, even if the Citrus College
pitcher intentionally threw at Avila, his conduct did not fall outside the range of ordinary activity
involved in the sport. The District owed no duty to Avila to prevent the Citrus College pitcher from
hitting batters, even intentionally. Consequently, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk bars
any claim predicated on the allegation that the Citrus College pitcher negligently or intentionally
threw at Avila.
The dissent suggests primary assumption of the risk should not extend to an intentional tort
such as battery and that Avila should have been granted leave to amend to allege a proper battery
claim. Amendment would have been futile. Absence of consent is an element of battery. One who
enters into a sport, game or contest may be taken to consent to physical contacts consistent with the
understood rules of the game. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992) (“It may be accurate to
suggest that an individual who voluntarily engages in a potentially dangerous activity or sport
‘consents to’ or ‘agrees to assume’ the risks inherent in the activity”); Ritchie-Gamester v. City of
Berkley, 597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999) (“The act of stepping onto the field may be described as
‘consent to the inherent risks of the activity.’”) Thus, the boxer who steps into the ring consents to
his opponent’s jabs; the football player who steps onto the gridiron consents to his opponent’s hard
tackle; the hockey goalie who takes the ice consents to face his opponent’s slapshots; and, here, the
baseball player who steps to the plate consents to the possibility the opposing pitcher may throw
near or at him. The complaint establishes Avila voluntarily participated in the baseball game; as
such, his consent would bar any battery claim as a matter of law.
The third way in which Avila alleges the District breached its duty of care, by failing to provide
umpires, likewise did not increase the risks inherent in the game. Baseball may be played with
umpires, as between professionals at the World Series, or without, as between children in the sandlot.
Avila argues that providing umpires would have made the game safer, because an umpire might have
3

As Maglie explained the strategy: “You have to make the batter afraid of the ball or, anyway, aware that he can get hurt.
A good time is when the count is two balls and two strikes. He’s looking to swing. You knock him down then and he gets up
shaking. Now throw a curve to him and you have your out.” Maglie’s nickname is attributed to his propensity for shaving
batters’ chins with his pitches. Similarly for Drysdale: “The knockdown pitch upsets a hitter’s timing, like a change-up. It’s
not a weapon. It’s a tactic.”
4
The conclusion that being intentionally hit by a pitch is an inherent risk of baseball extends only to situations such as
that alleged here, where the hit batter is at the plate. Allegations that a pitcher intentionally hit a batter who was still in the
on deck circle, or elsewhere, would present an entirely different scenario.
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issued a warning and threatened ejections after the first batter was hit. Whatever the likelihood of this
happening and the difficulty of showing causation, the argument overlooks a key point. The District
owed a duty not to increase the risks inherent in the sport, not a duty to decrease the risks. While the
provision of umpires might—might—have reduced the risk of a retaliatory beanball, Avila has alleged
no facts supporting imposition of a duty on the District to reduce that risk.
Finally, Avila alleges that the District breached a duty to him by failing to provide medical care
after he was injured…. [H]e argues that because the District placed him in peril through the actions
of the Citrus College pitcher, it had a duty to ensure he received medical attention.
In some circumstances, the common law imposes a duty on those who injure others to mitigate
the resulting harm…. [A]n actor who knows or has reason to know that by his conduct, whether
tortious or innocent, he has caused such bodily harm to another as to make him helpless and in
danger of further harm is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent such further harm. In
Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802 (1953), we recognized and applied this
principle, holding in the context of a hit-and-run death that “one who negligently injures another
and renders him helpless is bound to use reasonable care to prevent any further harm which the
actor realizes or should realize threatens the injured person.”
Avila’s proposed extension of Brooks to this case encounters at least three main difficulties. First,
Avila has not alleged a basis on which to conclude the District caused his injury. Universities
ordinarily are not vicariously liable for the actions of their student-athletes during competition.
While Avila argues the District should be responsible for the Citrus College pitcher’s conduct if the
Citrus College coaches ordered or condoned a retaliatory pitch, the complaint notably lacks any
allegation they did so.
Second, even if Avila might have amended his complaint to add such an allegation, Brooks and
the common law duty it recognizes are confined to situations where the injured party is helpless.
The complaint establishes that Avila was able to make it to first and then second base under his own
power, and was able to alert his own first base coach to his condition. These allegations cast serious
doubt on whether Avila was sufficiently helpless so as to warrant imposing a [Brooks-type] duty on
the District.
Third, even if we were to impose a duty, the face of the complaint establishes that Avila’s own
Rio Hondo coaches and trainers were present. They, not Citrus College’s coaches, had exclusive
authority to determine whether Avila needed to be removed from the game for a pinch runner in
order to receive medical attention.5 Likewise, to the extent Avila argues a Citrus-College-provided
umpire could have insisted Avila receive medical treatment, there is no basis for concluding a home
team umpire would have been authorized to overrule the medical judgments of Rio Hondo’s
trainers. Thus, even if the District were responsible for causing Avila’s injury, at most it would have
had a duty to ensure that Avila’s coaches and trainers were aware he had been injured so they could
decide how best to attend to him. The complaint indicates Avila alerted his own first base coach to
how he was feeling, and when he arrived at second base, a Citrus College player, recognizing Avila
was injured, alerted the Rio Hondo bench, at which point Rio Hondo removed Avila from the game.
If the District had a duty, it satisfied that duty. In the possibly apocryphal words of New York
Yankees catcher Yogi Berra, “It ain’t over till it’s over,” but this means that for Avila’s complaint
against Citrus College, it’s over.
Kennard, Justice, concurring and dissenting:
…[T]he majority holds that a baseball pitcher owes no duty to refrain from intentionally
throwing a baseball at an opposing player’s head. This is a startling conclusion. It is contrary to the
official view in the sport that such conduct “should be—and is—condemned by everybody.” Official
Rules of Major League Baseball, rule 8.02(d).
Central to the majority’s holding is its reliance on the legal rule that there is no duty to avoid
risks “inherent” in a recreational sport…. Unlike good wine, this rule has not improved with age. I
have repeatedly voiced my disagreement with this court’s adoption of that rule, which is tearing at
5
Any departure from this rule would lead to chaos, as teams asserted a legal duty to remove their opponents’ “injured”
star players from competition in order to evaluate them and provide any necessary medical care.
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the fabric of tort law because it distorts the negligence concept of due care to encompass reckless
and intentional conduct. Moreover, because the question of what is “inherent” in a sport is
amorphous and fact-intensive, it is impossible for trial courts to discern, at an early stage in the
proceedings, which risks are inherent in a given sport. As explained below, this case illustrates that
the no-duty-for-sports rule is unworkable and unfair….
The first, third, and fourth of the legal theories alleged in Avila’s complaint can be disposed of
without resort to the no-duty-for-sports rule. Avila’s first theory of liability (that the District conducted
an illegal preseason game) fails because, as the majority explains, the District did not breach any duty
to Avila by conducting the game, irrespective of whether community college rules permitted it to be
played. Avila’s third theory (that the District failed to provide umpires) must be rejected because
baseball games are often played without umpires, and there is no reason to impose on community
colleges a duty to provide them. And Avila’s fourth theory (that the District failed to provide medical
care) fails because, as the majority points out, the District had no duty to provide medical care when
Avila’s team came equipped with its own trainers, who were present to treat his injuries.
Avila’s second theory of liability (that the District failed to supervise and control the Citrus
pitcher) presents a more difficult question. As the majority notes, colleges “ordinarily are not
vicariously liable for the actions of their student-athletes during competition.” Although Avila now
argues that the District would be liable if its coaches ordered or allowed a retaliatory pitch aimed at
Avila’s head, his complaint does not expressly allege that they did so. Thus, his failure to do so
justifies the trial court’s decision to sustain the District’s demurrer. But the trial court should have
given Avila at least one opportunity to amend his original complaint to include such an allegation.
The majority, however, upholds the trial court’s sustaining of the District’s demurrer without
leave to amend. Relying on the no-duty-for-sports rule, the majority, in essence, concludes that even
if the District’s coaches had ordered the Citrus pitcher to hit Avila in the head with a pitched ball,
the District is not liable for Avila’s injuries because the risk that a batter will be injured by a pitch
intentionally thrown at his head is “an inherent risk of the sport.” According to the majority, “[s]ome
of the most respected baseball managers and pitchers have openly discussed the fundamental place
[that] throwing at batters has in their sport.” The majority acknowledges that those comments were
made in the context of professional baseball. The majority then proceeds to hold that throwing at
batters is a risk as inherent in college baseball as it is in professional baseball. My concerns are
threefold.
First, the determination whether being hit by a pitched ball intentionally aimed at one’s head is
an inherent risk of baseball, whether professional or intercollegiate, is a question of fact to be
determined in the trial court…. Here, the trial court never heard, and thus never considered, the
comments from professional baseball managers and pitchers on which the majority relies; indeed,
not only did the District offer no evidence on this issue, but the District did not even argue that
Avila’s complaint was barred by the no-duty-for-sports rule. Undeterred, the majority has done its
own research and made its own factual findings on this issue, thus invading the province of the trial
court. I recognize that this court must take judicial notice of facts and propositions of generalized
knowledge that are so universally known that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. But
the majority’s assertion that intentionally throwing a ball at a batter’s head is inherent in
intercollegiate baseball is not a fact so “universally known” that it cannot reasonably be the subject
of dispute.
Had Avila been given the opportunity in the trial court, he might well have called expert
witnesses who could have refuted the majority’s factual determination that aiming at a batter’s head
is inherent in professional baseball. And he could have pointed to the official comments
accompanying Major League Baseball’s rule 8.02(d), which prohibits pitchers from trying to hit the
batter: “To pitch at a batter’s head is unsportsmanlike and highly dangerous. It should be—and is—
condemned by everybody. Umpires should act without hesitation in enforcement of this rule.”
Alternatively, Avila could have called expert witnesses to refute the majority’s finding, which is
unsupported by any citation of authority, that the conduct in question is as inherent in
intercollegiate baseball as it is in professional baseball. And he could have pointed out that, unlike
the rules of professional baseball, the rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association provide
that a pitcher who intentionally throws at a batter is not only ejected from the game in which the
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pitch was thrown, but is also suspended for the team’s next four games, and a pitcher who
intentionally throws at a batter on three occasions must be suspended for the remainder of the
season. (Nat. Collegiate Athletic Assn., NCAA Baseball Rules (Dec. 2005) rule 5, § 16(d).)
I turn to my second concern…. [T]he majority imposes on trial courts the obligation to decide—
in ruling on a demurrer—a question of fact: that is, whether a particular sports injury arises from an
activity inherent in the game. Questions of fact cannot be decided on demurrer, however; they must
be decided on summary judgment or at trial. Thus, the no-duty-for-sports rule is unworkable
because it forces trial courts to decide questions of fact at the demurrer stage when the only method
available to them is suitable only for deciding questions of law.
My third concern is that the majority’s application of the no-duty-for-sports rule to include
pitches intentionally thrown at a batter’s head is an ill-conceived expansion of that rule into
intentional torts. In Knight, the plaintiff alleged only that the defendant acted negligently, and the
plurality there justified the no-duty-for-sports rule with the comment that a baseball player should
not be held liable “for an injury resulting from a carelessly thrown ball or bat during a baseball game.”
Here, however, the majority applies that rule to hold that the trial court properly sustained the
District’s demurrer to Avila’s cause of action alleging an intentional tort, in which he alleged that the
pitch that hit him “was thrown in a deliberate retaliatory fashion, with reckless disregard for the
safety of plaintiff.” Even if I were to accept the majority’s misguided no-duty-for-sports rule, I would
apply it only to causes of action for negligence, not for intentional torts.
I would analyze Avila’s claim under the traditional doctrine of assumption of risk. Under that
doctrine, the pertinent inquiry is not what risk is inherent in a particular sport; rather, it is what risk
the plaintiff consciously and voluntarily assumed. That issue, as I explained earlier, is not one
involving a duty of care owed to another, to be resolved on demurrer; rather, it is an affirmative
defense, to be resolved on summary judgment or at trial.
Under traditional assumption-of-risk analysis, sports participants owe each other a duty to
refrain from unreasonably risky conduct that may cause harm. Intentionally hitting another person
in the head with a hard object thrown at a high speed is highly dangerous and is potentially tortious,
no matter whether the object is a ball thrown on a baseball field or is a rock thrown on a city street.
Thus, if the District here was complicit in a decision by the pitcher to hit Avila in the head with the
baseball, it may be held liable for Avila’s injuries if Avila did not assume the risk that the pitcher
would hit him in this manner. But, as I explained earlier, Avila has thus far not alleged that coaches
employed by the District either advised or condoned any such act. Thus, the trial court properly
sustained the District’s demurrer; but Avila should be given leave to amend his original complaint
to allege that the District was legally responsible for the pitcher’s decision to aim the baseball at
Avila’s head.
If Avila were to amend his complaint to allege the District’s complicity in the pitcher’s decision
to hit him in the head with the baseball, the District should be permitted to deny liability on the
ground that Avila assumed the risk of an intentional hit in the head during the game: that is, he
voluntarily accepted that risk with knowledge and appreciation of that risk. Whether Avila assumed
that risk is a question of fact that has no bearing on the District’s duty of care toward Avila….
1.

QUESTIONS
Assuming Risks: What’s the difference between primary and secondary assumption of
risk? And how do they both differ from the assumption of risk raised by Jones and
Dalury? Can multiple types of assumption of risk be relevant in a single case?

2.

Beanball: How can conduct both violate a sport’s rules and be an inherent risk of that
sport? And how do we decide if a risk is inherent? Does the level of play matter? What if
this had happened six years earlier, when Avila was playing in a Little League game?

3.

Karma’s a Pitch: Does it matter why the Roadrunners pitcher threw the beanball? What
if he threw it because his boyfriend recently cheated on him with Avila?

222

CHAPTER

TORT LAW

5:

STRICT LIABILITY

A. Ultrahazardous Activities
RYLANDS v. FLETCHER
House of Lords (1868)
Cairns, Lord Chancellor:
My Lords, in this case the Plaintiff…is the occupier of a mine and
works under a close of land. The Defendants are the owners of a mill
in his neighbourhood, and they proposed to make a reservoir for the
purpose of keeping and storing water to be used about their mill upon
another close of land, which, for the purposes of this case, may be taken
as being adjoining to the close of the Plaintiff, although, in point of fact,
some intervening land lay between the two. Underneath the close of
land of the Defendants on which they proposed to construct their
reservoir there were certain old and disused mining passages and
works. There were five vertical shafts, and some horizontal shafts
communicating with them. The vertical shafts had been filled up with
soil and rubbish, and it does not appear that any person was aware of the existence either of the
vertical shafts or of the horizontal works communicating with them. In the course of the working
by the Plaintiff of his mine, he had gradually worked through the seams of coal underneath the close,
and had come into contact with the old and disused works underneath the close of the Defendants.
In that state of things the reservoir of the Defendants was constructed. It was constructed by
them through the agency and inspection of an engineer and contractor. Personally, the Defendants
appear to have taken no part in the works, or to have been aware of any want of security connected
with them. As regards the engineer and the contractor, we must take it from the case that they did
not exercise, as far as they were concerned, that reasonable care and caution which they might have
exercised, taking notice, as they appear to have taken notice, of the vertical shafts filled up in the
manner which I have mentioned. However, my Lords, when the reservoir was constructed, and
filled, or partly filled, with water, the weight of the water bearing upon the disused and imperfectly
filled-up vertical shafts, broke through those shafts. The water passed down them and into the
horizontal workings, and from the horizontal workings under the close of the Defendants it passed
on into the workings under the close of the Plaintiff, and flooded his mine, causing considerable
damage, for which this action was brought.
The Court of Exchequer, when the special case stating the facts to which I have referred, was
argued, was of opinion that the Plaintiff had established no cause of action. The Court of Exchequer
Chamber, before which an appeal from this judgment was argued, was of a contrary opinion, and
the Judges there unanimously arrived at the conclusion that there was a cause of action, and that the
Plaintiff was entitled to damages.
My Lords, the principles on which this case must be determined appear to me to be extremely
simple. The Defendants, treating them as the owners or occupiers of the close on which the reservoir
was constructed, might lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the
ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may term the natural user of that
land, there had been any accumulation of water, either on the surface or underground, and if, by the
operation of the laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close occupied
by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not have complained that that result had taken place. If he had
desired to guard himself against it, it would have lain upon him to have done so, by leaving, or by
interposing, some barrier between his close and the close of the Defendants in order to have
prevented that operation of the laws of nature….
On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of their close, had desired to
use it for any purpose which I may term a non-natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the
close that which in its natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing water
either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the result of any work or operation
on or under the land—and if in consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection
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in the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into the close of the Plaintiff,
then it appears to me that that which the Defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril;
and, if in the course of their doing it, the evil arose to which I have referred, the evil, namely, of the
escape of the water and its passing away to the close of the Plaintiff and injuring the Plaintiff, then for
the consequence of that, in my opinion, the Defendants would be liable…. My Lords, these simple
principles, if they are well founded, as it appears to me they are, really dispose of this case.
The same result is arrived at on the principles referred to by Mr. Justice Blackburn in his
judgment, in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, where he states the opinion of that Court as to the
law in these words:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who, for his own purposes,
brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He
can excuse himself by shewing that the escape was owing to the Plaintiff’s default;
or, perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God;
but as nothing of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to inquire what excuse
would be sufficient. The general rule, as above stated, seems on principle just. The
person whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour,
or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir, or whose
cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made
unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali works, is
damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that
the neighbour who has brought something on his own property (which was not
naturally there), harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property,
but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, should be
obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining
it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have
accrued, and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there, so that no
mischief may accrue, or answer for the natural and anticipated consequence. And
upon authority this we think is established to be the law, whether the things so
brought be beasts, or water, or filth, or stenches.
My Lords, in that opinion, I must say I entirely concur. Therefore, I have to move your
Lordships that the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber be affirmed, and that the present
appeal be dismissed with costs.
Cranworth, Lord, concurring:
My Lords, I concur with my noble and learned friend in thinking that the rule of law was
correctly stated by Mr. Justice Blackburn in delivering the opinion of the Exchequer Chamber. If a
person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to
his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however
careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage. In
considering whether a Defendant is liable to a Plaintiff for damage which the Plaintiff may have
sustained, the question in general is not whether the Defendant has acted with due care and caution,
but whether his acts have occasioned the damage…. [T]he doctrine is founded on good sense. For
when one person, in managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is
obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer. He is bound….
1.

QUESTIONS
Pingaro Revisited: How is Rylands like Pingaro? How is it different?

2.

Leffler Revisited: How is Rylands like Leffler? How is it different?

3.

Menlove Revisited: Could Menlove have been decided on similar grounds to Rylands?
Are spontaneously combusting haystacks like leaky reservoirs?
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KLEIN v. PYRODYNE CORP.
Supreme Court of Washington (1991)
Guy, Justice:
The plaintiffs in this case are persons injured when
an aerial shell at a public fireworks exhibition went
astray and exploded near them. The defendant is the
pyrotechnic company hired to set up and discharge
the fireworks. The issue before this court is whether
pyrotechnicians are strictly liable for damages caused
by fireworks displays. We hold that they are.
Defendant Pyrodyne Corporation (Pyrodyne) is a
general contractor for aerial fireworks at public
fireworks displays. Pyrodyne contracted to procure
fireworks, to provide pyrotechnic operators, and to display the fireworks at the Western Washington
State Fairgrounds in Puyallup, Washington, on July 4, 1987. All operators of the fireworks display
were Pyrodyne employees acting within the scope of their employment duties.
As required by Washington statute, Pyrodyne purchased a $1 million insurance policy prior to
the fireworks show. The policy provided $1 million coverage for each occurrence of bodily injury or
property damage liability. Plaintiffs allege that Pyrodyne failed to carry out a number of the other
statutory and regulatory requirements in preparing for and setting off the fireworks. For example,
they allege that Pyrodyne failed to properly bury the mortar tubes prior to detonation, failed to
provide a diagram of the display and surrounding environment to the local government, failed to
provide crowd control monitors, and failed to keep the invitees at the mandated safe distance.
During the fireworks display, one of the 5-inch mortars was knocked into a horizontal position.
From this position an aerial shell inside was ignited and discharged. The shell flew 500 feet in a
trajectory parallel to the earth and exploded near the crowd of onlookers. Plaintiffs Danny and
Marion Klein were injured by the explosion. Mr. Klein’s clothing was set on fire, and he suffered
facial burns and serious injury to his eyes.
The parties provide conflicting explanations of the cause of the improper horizontal discharge
of the shell. Pyrodyne argues that the accident was caused by a 5-inch shell detonating in its
aboveground mortar tube without ever leaving the ground. Pyrodyne asserts that this detonation
caused another mortar tube to be knocked over, ignited, and shot off horizontally. In contrast, the
Kleins contend that the misdirected shell resulted because Pyrodyne’s employees improperly set up
the display. They further note that because all of the evidence exploded, there is no means of proving
the cause of the misfire.
The Kleins brought suit against Pyrodyne under [a theory of] strict liability…. The trial court
denied Pyrodyne’s summary judgment motion regarding the Kleins’ strict liability claim, holding
that Pyrodyne was strictly liable without fault and ordering summary judgment in favor of the Kleins
on the issue of liability…. Pyrodyne is appealing solely as to the trial court’s holding that strict
liability is the appropriate standard of liability for pyrotechnicians….
I. Fireworks Displays as Abnormally Dangerous Activities
The Kleins contend that strict liability is the appropriate standard to determine the culpability
of Pyrodyne because Pyrodyne was participating in an abnormally dangerous activity…. The
modern doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities derives from Fletcher v.
Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), in which the defendant’s reservoir flooded mine shafts on the
plaintiff’s adjoining land. Rylands v. Fletcher has come to stand for the rule that the defendant will
be liable when he damages another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the
place where it is maintained, in the light of the character of that place and its surroundings.
The basic principle of Rylands v. Fletcher has been accepted by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Section 519 of the Restatement provides that any party carrying on an “abnormally dangerous
activity” is strictly liable for ensuing damages. The test for what constitutes such an activity is stated
in section 520 of the Restatement. Both Restatement sections have been adopted by this court, and
determination of whether an activity is an “abnormally dangerous activity” is a question of law.
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Section 520 of the Restatement lists six factors that are to be considered in determining whether an
activity is “abnormally dangerous.” The factors are as follows:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
…[T]he comments to section 520 explain how these factors should be evaluated:
Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a particular case, and
ordinarily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it
is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.
Because of the interplay of these various factors, it is not possible to reduce
abnormally dangerous activities to any definition. The essential question is
whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because
of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability
for the harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable
care.
Examination of these factors persuades us that fireworks displays are abnormally dangerous
activities justifying the imposition of strict liability.
We find that the factors stated in clauses (a), (b), and (c) are all present in the case of fireworks
displays. Anytime a person ignites aerial shells or rockets with the intention of sending them aloft
to explode in the presence of large crowds of people, a high risk of serious personal injury or property
damage is created. That risk arises because of the possibility that a shell or rocket will malfunction
or be misdirected. Furthermore, no matter how much care pyrotechnicians exercise, they cannot
entirely eliminate the high risk inherent in setting off powerful explosives such as fireworks near
crowds.
The dangerousness of fireworks displays is evidenced by the elaborate scheme of administrative
regulations with which pyrotechnicians must comply. Pyrotechnicians must be licensed to conduct
public displays of special fireworks. To obtain such a license, the pyrotechnician must take and pass
a written examination administered by the director of fire protection, and must submit evidence of
qualifications and experience, including participation in the firing of at least six public displays as
an assistant, at least one of which shall have been in the current or preceding year. The
pyrotechnician’s application for a license must be investigated by the director of fire protection, who
must confirm that the applicant is competent and experienced. Licensed pyrotechnicians are
charged with ensuring that the display is set up in accordance with all rules and regulations.
Regulations also govern such matters as the way in which the fireworks at public displays are
constructed, stored, installed, and fired. The necessity for such regulations demonstrates the
dangerousness of fireworks displays.
Pyrodyne argues that if the regulations are complied with, then the high degree of risk otherwise
inherent in the displays can be eliminated. Although we recognize that the high risk can be reduced,
we do not agree that it can be eliminated. Setting off powerful fireworks near large crowds remains
a highly risky activity even when the safety precautions mandated by statutes and regulations are
followed. The Legislature appears to agree, for it has declared that in order to obtain a license to
conduct a public fireworks display, a pyrotechnician must first obtain a surety bond or a certificate
of insurance, the amount of which must be at least $1 million for each event.
The factors stated in clauses (a), (b), and (c) together, and sometimes one of them alone, express
what is commonly meant by saying an activity is ultrahazardous. As the Restatement explains,
however, “liability for abnormally dangerous activities is not a matter of these three factors alone,
and those stated in Clauses (d), (e), and (f) must still be taken into account.”
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The factor expressed in clause (d) concerns the extent to which the activity is not a matter “of
common usage.” The Restatement explains that “an activity is a matter of common usage if it is
customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community.” As
examples of activities that are not matters of common usage, the Restatement comments offer
driving a tank, blasting, the manufacture, storage, transportation, and use of high explosives, and
drilling for oil. The deciding characteristic is that few persons engage in these activities. Likewise,
relatively few persons conduct public fireworks displays. Therefore, presenting public fireworks
displays is not a matter of common usage.
Pyrodyne argues that the factor stated in clause (d) is not met because fireworks are a common
way to celebrate the Fourth of July. We reject this argument. Although fireworks are frequently and
regularly enjoyed by the public, few persons set off special fireworks displays. Indeed, the general
public is prohibited by statute from making public fireworks displays insofar as anyone wishing to
do so must first obtain a license.
The factor stated in clause (e) requires analysis of the appropriateness of the activity to the place
where it was carried on. In this case, the fireworks display was conducted at the Puyallup
Fairgrounds. Although some locations—such as over water—may be safer, the Puyallup
Fairgrounds is an appropriate place for a fireworks show because the audience can be seated at a
reasonable distance from the display. Therefore, the clause (e) factor is not present in this case.
The factor stated in clause (f) requires analysis of the extent to which the value of fireworks to
the community outweighs its dangerous attributes. We do not find that this factor is present here.
This country has a long-standing tradition of fireworks on the Fourth of July. That tradition suggests
that we as a society have decided that the value of fireworks on the day celebrating our national
independence and unity outweighs the risks of injuries and damage.
In sum, we find that setting off public fireworks displays satisfies four of the six conditions under
the Restatement test; that is, it is an activity that is not “of common usage” and that presents an
ineliminably high risk of serious bodily injury or property damage. We therefore hold that
conducting public fireworks displays is an abnormally dangerous activity justifying the imposition
of strict liability.
This conclusion is consistent with the results reached in cases involving damages caused by
detonating dynamite. This court has recognized that parties detonating dynamite are strictly liable
for the damages caused by such blasting. See Foster v. Preston Mill Co., 268 P.2d 645 (Wash.
1954). There are a number of similarities between fireworks and dynamite. Both activities involve
licensed experts intentionally igniting for profit explosives that have great potential for causing
damage. Moreover, after the explosion no evidence remains as to the original explosive. The notable
difference between fireworks and dynamite is that with fireworks the public is invited to watch the
display and with dynamite the public is generally prohibited from being near the blasting location.
Because detonating dynamite is subject to strict liability, and because of the similarities between
fireworks and dynamite, strict liability is also an appropriate standard for determining the standard
of liability for pyrotechnicians for any damages caused by their fireworks displays.
II. Public Policy and Strict Liability For Fireworks Displays
Policy considerations also support imposing strict liability on pyrotechnicians for damages
caused by their public fireworks displays, although such considerations are not alone sufficient to
justify that conclusion. Most basic is the question as to who should bear the loss when an innocent
person suffers injury through the nonculpable but abnormally dangerous activities of another. In
the case of public fireworks displays, fairness weighs in favor of requiring the pyrotechnicians who
present the displays to bear the loss rather than the unfortunate spectators who suffer the injuries.
In addition, the rule of strict liability rests not only upon the ultimate idea of rectifying a wrong and
putting the burden where it should belong as a matter of abstract justice, that is, upon the one of the
two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made the harm possible, but it also rests on problems
of proof: One of these common features is that the person harmed would encounter a difficult
problem of proof if some other standard of liability were applied. For example, the disasters caused
by those who engage in abnormally dangerous or extra-hazardous activities frequently destroy all
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evidence of what in fact occurred, other than that the activity was being carried on. Certainly this is
true with explosions of dynamite, large quantities of gasoline, or other explosives.
In the present case, all evidence was destroyed as to what caused the misfire of the shell that
injured the Kleins. Therefore, the problem of proof this case presents for the plaintiffs also supports
imposing strict liability on Pyrodyne.
III. Statutory Strict Liability for Fireworks
As well as holding Pyrodyne strictly liable on the basis that fireworks displays are abnormally
dangerous activities, we also hold that RCW 70.77.285 imposes statutory strict liability. The statute,
which mandates insurance coverage to pay for all damages resulting from fireworks displays,
establishes strict liability for any ensuing injuries.
An example of a statute which the appellate court has held to be a strict liability statute is RCW
16.08.040, which reads in part:
The owner of any dog which shall bite any person shall be liable for such damages
as may be suffered by the person bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of
such dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.
The court in Beeler v. Hickman, 750 P.2d 1282 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988), held that the language of
the statute clearly established strict liability for the owner of the dog. Although RCW 70.77.285 does
not establish strict liability in the same language as the dog bite statute, it nonetheless provides that
pyrotechnicians shall pay for all damages to persons or property resulting from fireworks displays.
RCW 70.77.285 has been amended twice since it was enacted in 1961. Neither amendment
changed the original disjunctive language mandating liability insurance coverage for “all damages
to persons or property or any negligence on the part of the applicant.” The statutory language clearly
indicates that the Legislature intended pyrotechnicians to carry insurance to cover any damages
incurred as a result of the fireworks display. The rule of construction applied to the disjunctive “or”
mandates that by use of “or,” a failure to comply with any requirement in the statute imposes
liability. Thus, by utilizing the disjunctive “or” the Legislature indicated that damages will be owed
for all injuries caused by the fireworks display, regardless of whether they resulted from the
pyrotechnician’s negligence.
Furthermore, no part of a statute should be deemed inoperative or superfluous unless it is the
result of obvious mistake or error. This requires that every word, clause, and sentence of a statute be
given effect, if possible. Pursuant to this requirement, both clauses of RCW 70.77.285 should be
given effect. Therefore, it is necessary to interpret the statute as mandating coverage of all damages
caused by fireworks displays, regardless of whether those damages were caused by negligence of the
pyrotechnicians.
IV. Possible Negligent Manufacture as an Intervening Force
Pyrodyne argues that even if there is strict liability for fireworks, its liability under the facts of
this case is cut off by the manufacturer’s negligence, the existence of which we assume for purposes
of evaluating the propriety of the trial court’s summary judgment. According to Pyrodyne, a shell
detonated without leaving the mortar box because it was negligently manufactured. This detonation,
Pyrodyne asserts, was what caused the misfire of the second shell, which in turn resulted in the
Kleins’ injuries. Pyrodyne reasons that the manufacturer’s negligence acted as an intervening or
outside force that cuts off Pyrodyne’s liability….
We note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes a position contrary to that advocated by
Pyrodyne. Section 522 of the Restatement provides that: “One carrying on an abnormally dangerous
activity is subject to strict liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the unexpectable
(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person.” The comment to section 522 explains
that “if the risk from an abnormally dangerous activity ripens into injury, it is immaterial that the
harm occurs through the unexpectable action of a human being.”
Thus, on the one hand, Pyrodyne urges us to adopt the view that any intervention by an outside
force beyond the defendant’s control is sufficient to relieve the defendant from strict liability for an
abnormally dangerous activity. On the other hand, section 522 provides that no negligent
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intervention by a third person will relieve the defendant from strict liability for abnormally
dangerous activities. We reject both positions….
We hold that intervening acts of third persons serve to relieve the defendant from strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities only if those acts were unforeseeable in relation to the
extraordinary risk created by the activity. The rationale for this rule is that it encourages those who
conduct abnormally dangerous activities to anticipate and take precautions against the possible
negligence of third persons. Where the third person’s negligence is beyond the actor’s control, this
rule…nonetheless imposes strict liability if the third person negligence was reasonably foreseeable.
Such a result allocates the economic burden of injuries arising from the foreseeable negligence of
third persons to the party best able to plan for it and to bear it—the actor carrying on the abnormally
dangerous activity.
In the present case, negligence on the part of the fireworks manufacturer is readily foreseeable
in relation to the extraordinary risk created by conducting a public fireworks display. Therefore,
even if such negligence may properly be regarded as an intervening cause, an issue we need not
decide, it cannot function to relieve Pyrodyne from liability. This is not to say, however, that in a
proper case a defendant in a strict liability action could not pursue a claim against a third party and
enforce a right of contribution to an extent proportionate to that party’s fault.
We hold that Pyrodyne Corporation is strictly liable for all damages suffered as a result of the
July 1987 fireworks display. Detonating fireworks displays constitutes an abnormally dangerous
activity warranting strict liability. Public policy also supports this conclusion. Furthermore, RCW
70.77.285 mandates the payment of all damages caused by fireworks displays, regardless of whether
those damages were due to the pyrotechnicians’ negligence. This establishes the standard of strict
liability for pyrotechnicians. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Dolliver, Justice, concurring:
I concur fully with the result reached by the majority. In my opinion the statute, RCW 70.77.285,
is decisive. While I harbor some belief the Legislature may not have intended the result reached by
the majority, legislative intent is irrelevant when the language of the statute is plain on its face.
I am not in agreement, however, with the analysis reached by the majority relative to the
application of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, which characterizes fireworks displays as
“abnormally dangerous.”…
I first note that no other jurisdiction has adopted a common law rule of strict liability for
fireworks displays. While this state regularly does things differently from its companion
jurisdictions and, indeed, its uniqueness is many times a source of justifiable pride, extreme care
should be exercised before embarking on a new doctrine foreign to this state as well as to all others….
The majority claims [Restatement § 520] factors (a), (b), (c), and (d) are present while factors (e)
and (f) are not present. I agree factors (e) and (f) do not apply for the reasons given by the majority.
I also agree factors (a) and (b) are present. Where I disagree with the majority is in whether factors
(c) and (d) are present. The majority says yes, I say no.
Fireworks, no less than motor vehicles, for example, are high risk instrumentalities. In reality, all
instrumentalities inevitably involve some degree of risk. Nothing in human life is risk free. The real
issue is whether the hazard can be reduced to acceptable limits. This analysis is particularly apt
where, as here, the likelihood of injury to significant numbers of persons is great unless the risk is
significantly reduced. Blasting at some remove from civilization is one thing; public, urban fireworks
displays are another matter.
It is apparent the Legislature, recognizing the dangers of public fireworks displays, attempted to
regulate comprehensively fireworks displays. There are strict and specific safety and licensing
provisions…. The Legislature has made the determination, through the legislative process, that in
fact the “high degree of risk” inherent in public fireworks displays can adequately be reduced by the
“reasonable care” required by the statute. This being so, I do not believe this court should use a
random case, as here, to tamper with this legislative judgment. Factor (c) has not been met.
In discussing factor (d), the majority states that since “few persons set off special fireworks
displays” they are not a matter of common usage. I believe the majority misconstrues factor (d). The
Restatement comment on clause (d) discusses activities carried on by only a few
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persons, e.g., blasting, the transportation of high explosives, the drilling of oil wells. What is
significant is that each of the activities used for illustrative purposes is not only an activity which is
not a matter of common usage, but it is also a solitary activity. In contrast to the large crowds which
attend public fireworks displays, the examples listed in comment d are not for spectators and are
done away from the public. The viewing of a public fireworks display is in fact, in the words of the
comment on clause (d), “customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in
the community.” None of the examples in the comment are in any way similar to public fireworks
displays. While it is true the setting up and setting off of the fireworks in public displays are done by
very few people, the more important “activity” is viewing the fireworks display. I would find factor
(d) is not met.
I also disagree with the majority’s treatment of the six factors as acting only in favor of strict
liability. Properly construed, each of the factors may also mitigate against strict liability…. The
majority concedes “the value of fireworks to the community outweighs its dangerous attributes.”
Properly construed, therefore, factor (f) is not merely a nullity in the strict liability analysis, but
should actually mitigate against the imposition of strict liability….
1.

QUESTIONS
Strict in Theory, Fatal in Fact? How do plaintiffs benefit by establishing strict liability?
How does it effectively eliminate an element of negligence? Do you think that Klein
could also have established negligence here? What effect might strict liability have on
out-of-court settlements? And will imposing strict liability likely encourage fireworks
companies to be more careful in the future?

2.

Condemnation or Cost Allocation? The justices look to § 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts to determine whether fireworks displays are abnormally dangerous
activities. On what points do they agree and disagree? In particular, how does factor (f)
have different implications for Justice Guy and Justice Dolliver? Do they have divergent
views on whether strict liability signals disapproval of ultrahazardous activities?

3.

Keep It Simple, Stupid: Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, an activity is
abnormally dangerous if it (1) creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical
harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and (2) isn’t a matter of
common usage. Does this create a meaningful difference from the earlier standard?
FOSTER v. PRESTON MILL CO.
Supreme Court of Washington (1954)

Hamley, Justice:

ã

Blasting operations conducted by Preston Mill
Company frightened [a] mother mink owned by B.W.
Foster, and caused the mink to kill their kittens.
Foster brought this action against the company to
recover damages…[and] judgment was rendered for
plaintiff in the sum of $1,953.68. The theory adopted
by the [trial] court was that, after defendant received
notice of the effect which its blasting operations were
having upon the mink, it was absolutely liable for all
damages of that nature thereafter sustained….
Respondent’s mink ranch is located in a rural area [on about]…seven and one-half acres on
which are located seven sheds for growing mink…. The period of each year during which mink
kittens are born, known as the whelping season, begins about May 1st. The kittens are born during
a period of about two and one-half weeks, and are left with their mothers until they are six weeks
old. During this period, the mothers are very excitable. If disturbed by noises, smoke, or dogs and
ã

Network for Animal Freedom, Mink I Bur (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
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cats, they run back and forth in their cages and frequently destroy their young. However, mink
become accustomed to disturbances of this kind, if continued over a period of time….
Appellant and several other companies have been engaged in logging in the adjacent area for
more than fifty years. Early in May, 1951, appellant began the construction of a road to gain access
to certain timber which it desired to cut. The road was located about two and one-quarter miles
southwest of the mink ranch, and about twenty-five hundred feet above the ranch, along the side of
what is known as Rattlesnake Ledge. It was necessary to use explosives to build the road. The
customary types of explosives were used, and the customary methods of blasting were followed….
The procedure used was to set off blasts twice a day—at noon and at the end of the work day.
Roy A. Peterson, the manager of the ranch in 1951, testified that the blasting resulted in “a
tremendous vibration, is all. Boxes would rattle on the cages.” The mother mink would then run
back and forth in their cages, and many of them would kill their kittens….
Before the 1951 whelping season had far progressed, the mink mothers, according to Peterson’s
estimate, had killed thirty-five or forty of their kittens. He then told the manager of appellant
company what had happened. He did not request that the blasting be stopped. After some
discussion, however, appellant’s manager indicated that the shots would be made as light as possible.
The amount of explosives used in a normal shot was then reduced [to lessen the vibration.]
Officials of appellant company testified that it would have been impractical to entirely cease
road-building during the several weeks required for the mink to whelp and wean their young. Such
a delay would have made it necessary to run the logging operation another season, with attendant
expense. It would also have disrupted the company’s log production schedule and consequently the
operation of its lumber mill.
In this action, respondent sought and recovered judgment only for such damages as were
claimed to have been sustained as a result of blasting operations conducted after appellant received
notice that its activity was causing loss of mink kittens.
The primary question [on appeal] is whether, on these facts, the judgment against appellant is
sustainable on the theory of absolute liability.
The modern doctrine of strict liability for dangerous substances and activities stems from Justice
Blackburn’s decision in Rylands v. Fletcher…. As applied to blasting operations, the doctrine has
quite uniformly been held to establish liability, irrespective of negligence, for property damage
sustained as a result of casting rocks or other debris on adjoining or neighboring premises.
There is a division of judicial opinion as to whether the doctrine of absolute liability should apply
where the damage from blasting is caused, not by the casting of rocks and debris, but by concussion,
vibration, or jarring. This court has adopted the view that the doctrine applies in such cases. Patrick
v. Smith, 134 Pac. 1076 (Wash. 1913). In the Patrick case, it was held that contractors who set off an
exceedingly large blast of powder, causing the earth for a considerable distance to shake violently,
were liable to an adjoining owner whose well was damaged and water supply lost, without regard to
their negligence in setting off the blast, although there was no physical invasion of the property….
However the authorities may be divided on the point just discussed, they appear to be agreed
that strict liability should be confined to consequences which lie within the extraordinary risk whose
existence calls for such responsibility. This limitation on the doctrine is indicated in the italicized
portion of the rule as set forth in Restatement of Torts:
Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable
to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to
be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost
care is exercised to prevent the harm.
This restriction which has been placed upon the application of the doctrine of absolute liability
is based upon considerations of policy. As Professor Prosser has said:
It is one thing to say that a dangerous enterprise must pay its way within
reasonable limits, and quite another to say that it must bear responsibility for
every extreme of harm that it may cause. The same practical necessity for the
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restriction of liability within some reasonable bounds, which arises in connection
with problems of “proximate cause” in negligence cases, demands here that some
limit be set. This limitation has been expressed by saying that the defendant’s duty
to insure safety extends only to certain consequences. More commonly, it is said
that the defendant’s conduct is not the “proximate cause” of the damage. But
ordinarily in such cases no question of causation is involved, and the limitation is
one of the policy underlying liability.
Applying this principle to the case before us, the question comes down to this: Is the risk that
any unusual vibration or noise may cause wild animals, which are being raised for commercial
purposes, to kill their young, one of the things which make the activity of blasting ultrahazardous?
We have found nothing in the decisional law which would support an affirmative answer to this
question. The decided cases, as well as common experience, indicate that the thing which makes
blasting ultrahazardous is the risk that property or persons may be damaged or injured by coming
into direct contact with flying debris, or by being directly affected by vibrations of the earth or
concussions of the air.
Where, as a result of blasting operations, a horse has become frightened and has trampled or
otherwise injured a person, recovery of damages has been upheld on the theory of negligence. Klein
v. Phelps Lbr. Co., 135 Pac. 226 (1913). But we have found no case where recovery of damages caused
by a frightened farm animal has been sustained on the ground of absolute liability….
The relatively moderate vibration and noise which appellant’s blasting produced at a distance of
two and a quarter miles was no more than a usual incident of the ordinary life of the community.
The trial court specifically found that the blasting did not unreasonably interfere with the enjoyment
of their property by nearby landowners, except in the case of respondent’s mink ranch. It is the
exceedingly nervous disposition of mink, rather than the normal risks inherent in blasting
operations, which therefore must, as a matter of sound policy, bear the responsibility for the loss
here sustained….
It is our conclusion that the risk of causing harm of the kind here experienced, as a result of the
relatively minor vibration, concussion, and noise from distant blasting, is not the kind of risk which
makes the activity of blasting ultrahazardous. The doctrine of absolute liability is therefore
inapplicable under the facts of this case, and respondent is not entitled to recover damages. The
judgment is reversed.
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
Jolley Revisited: How is Foster like Jolley? Does it also have parallels with Victor?
Hindsight: Would Foster have prevailed if the theory behind the claim had been
negligence, not strict liability?
PYROMANIA PROBLEM

John sells perfume for Christine De Orr. One day, on his way to make a delivery, he stops to buy
some tools at Ole’s Home Center. Leonard sneaks up to John’s truck in the parking lot, pops a
gasoline-soaked rag in the exhaust pipe, and sets the rag alight. After the truck explodes, fire burns
the hardware store to the ground. The store’s owner, Ole, wants to sue John on a theory of strict
liability. What’s John’s best rebuttal?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

John’s decision to leave his truck unattended wasn’t negligent.
Transporting the perfume wasn’t an actual cause of the fire that destroyed the store.
Leonard’s acts mean that Ole can’t establish proximate cause.
Delivering perfume isn’t an abnormally dangerous activity.
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CHAPTER

6:

DAMAGES

A. Compensatory Damages
KENTON v. HYATT HOTELS CORP.
Supreme Court of Missouri (1985)
Dowd, Judge:

ã

[Two skywalks above the Hyatt Regency Hotel
lobby in Kansas City, Missouri, collapsed onto the
crowded lobby floor. Many injured victims sued Hyatt
and agreed to a partial settlement, leaving only the issue
of damages for the jury. In exchange, the victims agreed
not to present evidence regarding the construction and
maintenance of the skywalks. They also agreed to a cap
on the total punitive damages. Plaintiff-respondent Kay
Kenton was one victim. She had completed two years of
law school at the time of the accident. The jury awarded
her $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Defendants
sought a new trial, arguing that the award was excessive.
The trial judge sustained a motion for a new trial unless
the plaintiff agreed to a $250,000 remittitur—a procedural tool by which the judge offers the plaintiff
the option of accepting a lower award instead of re-trying an entire case. Plaintiff accepted the
remittitur, and both sides appealed.]…
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, in all respects, except remittitur; we…reinstate the
verdict and enter judgment for plaintiff for the verdict sum of $4,000,000….
I
Appellants’ first point is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning events at the
hotel on July 17, 1981. They contend: “Such evidence was not relevant to any issue relating to
respondent’s damages, because appellants admitted that respondent’s injuries were caused by the
accident. Because the evidence was inflammatory and prejudicial to appellants the jury’s verdict was
based upon improper passion and prejudice and was greatly enhanced.”…
[A fire captain who responded to the collapse and a TV reporter who witnessed the disaster were
permitted to testify about the chaos and devastation of that day. The trial court also let some
videotape evidence from the scene into evidence, with certain gruesome parts edited out.]
Respondent’s sister, Ann Kenton, who was with her on the evening of the disaster, testified as to
her observations of that occurrence…. Ann described the sounds she heard coming from people in
and around the skywalks after the collapse: “…It was hysterical, hysteria. There were grown men
crying for help and there was nothing I could do for them. There were people crushed everywhere,
blood, and I looked in the area where she had been and there was rubble and bodies and I couldn’t
pick her out of the bodies. And the moans and screams.” Ann later found respondent slumped in a
chair to the west of the skywalks, and respondent was carried outside and placed on a gurney or a
stretcher.
Still photographs of the scene were admitted into evidence, some in color and some in black and
white. Ann Kenton identified Exhibit 4K as the area where respondent had been and described it
thus: “…There were people sticking halfway out from under the skywalk, from here up there were
grown men screaming for help, moaning and I walked through the blood, or there was blood
everywhere. And the rescue people were pulling out whoever was more alive than others, I suppose.”
None of the admitted photographs show any dead or injured persons….
Appellants argue that the testimony concerning the events of July 17, 1981, was neither probative
nor material to the issue of respondent’s compensation; it was an attempt to incite the jury with
evidence of how she was injured; and that the “slight probative value the testimony may have had
ã
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concerning the nature of Ms. Kenton’s injuries was outweighed completely by the gruesome and
highly inflammatory nature of the evidence.”…
Respondent says that…the evidence was not offered or received as bearing on appellants’
conduct which was not an issue, but was offered instead for the purpose of showing how respondent
was injured, both physically and mentally, as well as her location at the time her injuries were
sustained. Begley v. Adaber Realty & Investment Company, 358 S.W.2d 785 (Mo. 1962), held that
photographs of ductwork which fell upon plaintiff, taken after it had fallen and had been removed
to a parking lot, was admissible to show the type of construction, the presence or absence of straps,
and what type of object struck plaintiff. Respondent was similarly entitled to show the force, violence
and traumatic circumstances of this tragic occurrence as bearing upon the nature, extent and
duration of her injuries…. Even though photographs are gruesome and depict serious injuries they
need not be excluded if they satisfy the rules as to the admission of demonstrative evidence.
The evidence of respondent’s injuries is that she suffered a cervical fracture which produced an
initial paralysis of her body. In addition, Dr. Walter Menninger stated that she was subjected to the
most severe psychosocial stressor imaginable, Grade 7, and the traumatic event and the crippling
effects it produced caused a dramatic and profound psychic trauma which is continuing in nature.
Dr. Francisco Gomez, respondent’s treating psychiatrist, and Dr. Menninger classified her psychiatric
injury as post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic and severe. Dr. Menninger testified further that she
exhibited symptoms characteristic of a post-traumatic stress disorder: re-experiencing the trauma by
either recurrent recollections, recurrent dreams, or suddenly acting or feeling as if the event was
happening; and a numbing of responsiveness or reduced involvement with the external world
sometime afterward. Certainly, the jury was entitled to consider the evidence of the scene of the
collapse, the utter chaos that prevailed, and the effect upon respondent of being pinned beneath the
debris, amidst blood, dead and injured bodies, and the sheer terror of the voices around her, in
evaluating her physical and mental injuries for the purpose of fixing her compensation. The evidence
was relevant, material, and appropriate. Its probative value far outweighed any prejudicial effect it
might have had on the jury. There was no error in admitting the evidence….
II
[Appellants’ second argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to exclude the testimony of
two law school professors that respondent was unable to return to law school or to practice law.]…
Appellants conclude that because of these (claimed) errors the jury considered evidence
incompetent in itself and as foundation for economic projections of respondent’s future wage loss,
and the award was greatly and improperly enhanced by the use of this evidence.
[The professors testified to the rigors of law school, stating that law students spend 48 hours per
week to prepare for classes and that with Kenton’s medical condition, she could not function as a
law student. Another professor testified that respondent perhaps could return as a part-time student
but would be unlikely to find part-time employment after graduation. A lawyer who suffered
disabilities from polio testified for Hyatt, stating that, with accommodations, Kenton could finish
law school and practice law, but he did concede that her job opportunities would be narrowed by
her disabilities.]
The trial court properly determined that expert testimony was needed to inform the jury as to
the physical and mental rigors of a person attending law school and practicing law. Members of the
jury would not ordinarily have knowledge of that subject, and certainly the two professors, being
actively engaged in that field would have superior knowledge and expertise thereof by reason of their
education and experience…. In addition to stating their knowledge and experience in the practice
of law, and in teaching law school courses, both professors reviewed respondent’s academic records,
medical records, and reports which were in evidence without objection. [One of the professors who
testified] had also personally met and interviewed respondent. There was thus a sufficient factual
basis for them to give their opinions. They were not…giving medical opinions….
Appellants also say that the testimony of the two professors permitted respondent’s economist,
Dr. Ward, to base his opinion as to her projection of economic losses on incompetent evidence….
[We disagree.] The jury [properly] had the function of evaluating all the evidence of economic loss,
both appellants’ and respondent’s, and the weight to be given thereto….
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III
[Appellants’ third argument is] that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a remittitur of
$2,000,000. They contend that as a matter of law the jury’s verdict greatly exceeded the upper limits
of “fair and reasonable compensation,” the proper measure of damages, and that the verdict was, as
the trial court itself recognized, the erroneous product of a mistaken evaluation of highly incendiary
evidence and was improperly disproportionate to awards for comparable or more severe injuries.
Taking respondent’s evidence in the light most favorable to her, as this court must do, her loss
of income and the reasonably anticipated future loss of income because of the injuries sustained was
testified to…have been between $1,605,846 as a low, to a high of $2,164,642.
The evidence shows that, to the time of trial, respondent’s hospital, medical and therapy expenses
incurred amounted to at least $80,000; her future physical therapy and cost of an electronic device
(T.E.N.S.) was from $189,759 to $250,000; her homemaking assistance and care, $307,228 to
$614,457; her future medical and supplemental insurance, $100,679. This evidence places the low of
these items at $677,666, and the high at $1,045,136. The economic loss, present and future medical,
and therapy expenses thus shows a range of between $2,283,512 to $3,209,778.
Respondent’s age was 28 years at the time of trial. She has a life expectancy of 51.8 years. The
nature and extent of respondent’s injuries, is shown by the following evidence, all shown to have been
permanent. She suffered a broken neck with permanent spinal cord damage [with miraculous surgical
treatment, she avoided becoming a permanent quadriplegic]; she has spasticity and weakness in all
four limbs, inability to walk without crutches, and must wear a knee cage to prevent buckling of the
left knee; lack of endurance and easy fatigability; reduced vital capacity and impaired breathing
muscles; sensory loss of much of her body below her neck, including female parts. She will not enjoy
a normal sexual life or have children normally; she has impaired bladder and bowel function with
periods of incontinence. Her bladder condition causes her to retain urine which will eventually
produce renal or kidney damage; psychic and emotional trauma diagnosed as chronic and severe
post-traumatic stress syndrome, which will require continued psychiatric care; destruction of her
athletic lifestyle which will prevent her from ever again playing tennis, skiing, running, jogging,
playing softball, raquetball, hiking, backpacking and riding horses; and a commitment to 2 to 4 hours
a day to maintain her present limited muscle function. There was some evidence that respondent’s
cost of therapy and the T.E.N.S. unit would increase over her lifetime, and her income would also
increase should she be employed as a lawyer, these being the effects of inflation.
The jury was entitled to consider the intangibles of the evidence of respondent’s past and future
pain and suffering, the destruction of her previous lifestyle, along with the evidence of economic
loss. All of the matters going to the nature and extent of respondent’s injuries were primarily for the
jury’s consideration because it is in a far better position to appraise them for the assessment of
damages which would fairly and reasonably compensate her. In Fowler v. Park Corporation, 673
S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1984), the plaintiff suffered the loss of both legs above the knees. He was 19 years
old, with a life expectancy of 50 years. He had not successfully used prosthetic devices; he would
need constant care and medical attention, and had doubtful employability. He did not introduce
evidence of economic damage other than showing that he stood to lose one million dollars in
earnings based upon present wage levels, and the court said that he would obviously be incapable of
leading a normal social life. The jury awarded $6 million to Fowler for his damages, and this court
declined to interfere with the amount of the verdict.
Appellants cite Chrisler v. Holiday Valley, Inc., 580 S.W.2d 309 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979), wherein the
plaintiff, 17 years old, was rendered a quadriplegic by reason of a diving accident, and the jury
returned a verdict of $2.3 million, which was affirmed. That case does not aid appellants. There was
apparently no evidence of economic loss by the plaintiff, but importantly, the court said:
In most litigation, and particularly in personal injury actions, there is a large range
between the damage extremes of inadequacy and excessiveness. Within that range
a jury has virtually unfettered discretion to determine the damages incurred and
is under no obligation to, and is in fact prohibited from, specifying what amounts
have been attributed to each of the various elements of damage. Past and future
pain and suffering, embarrassment and humiliation, future care and medical
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treatment, loss of or reduction in employment opportunities and many other
factors, do not lend themselves to precise calculation.
There is no exact formula to determine whether a verdict is excessive; each case is considered on
its own facts. The ultimate test is what fairly and reasonably compensates plaintiff for the injuries
sustained. In making this determination consideration is given to the nature and extent of the
injuries, diminished earning capacity, economic conditions, plaintiff’s age, and a comparison of the
compensation awarded and permitted in cases of comparable injuries….
Turning to the merits of this case, we believe that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
a remittitur of $250,000 after a verdict of $4,000,000 under the circumstances of this case. This
amount represents a miniscule percentage (6.25%) of the total verdict which demonstrates judicial
hairsplitting and shows the extremes to which the remittitur practice has fallen. [Because of outcomes
like this,] remittitur shall no longer be employed in Missouri…. Accordingly, the verdict of the jury
is affirmed and the cause is remanded with directions to set aside the order of remittitur and to
reinstate the verdict and enter judgment for the plaintiff, Kay Kenton, in the sum of $4,000,000.00.
ã

1.

QUESTIONS
What’s Tort Law Up To? Why do we award compensatory damages? How does this
remedy serve the goals of tort law?

2.

Show Me the Money: What’s the difference between the economic and non-economic
losses discussed in Kenton? Is it that only the former are readily quantifiable?

3.

Career Planning: How granular should we be with our lost-income predictions? Should
it matter, for example, if Kenton had a high GPA, if Kansas City firms have many female
partners, or if she told her friends that she dreamed of becoming a public defender?

ã
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McMILLAN v. CITY OF NEW YORK
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (2008)
Weinstein, Judge:
James McMillan, the claimant, was rendered a quadriplegic in the crash
of a ferryboat operated negligently by the City of New York. He sued for
pain, suffering and cost of necessary medical care.
A critical factor in determining claimant’s damages is his estimated life
expectancy. In a trial before the court and an advisory jury, statistical
evidence was introduced suggesting that a spinal cord-injured “AfricanAmerican” was likely to survive for fewer years than persons of other
“races” with similar injuries. The parties characterized claimant as an
“African-American.”
The question posed is whether such “racially” based statistics and other compilations may be
relied upon to find a shorter life expectancy for a person characterized as an “African-American,”
than for one in the general American population of mixed “ethnic” and “racial” backgrounds. The
answer is “no.” “Racially” based life expectancy and related data may not be utilized to find a reduced
life expectancy for a claimant in computing damages based on predictions of life expectancy. As
indicated below, the unreliability of “race” as a predictor of life expectancy as well as normative
constitutional requirements of equal treatment and due process support this conclusion.
The court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law disregarded all “race”-based computations of
life expectancy and applied predictions for the general male population, and particularly those
suffering from quadriplegia. Properly rejected in predicting life expectancy were “racially” based
statistics.
I. Factual Unreliability of “Race”-Based Statistics
In the United States, there has been “racial mixing” among “Whites,” “Africans,” “Native
Americans,” and individuals of other “racial” and “ethnic” backgrounds for more than three and a
half centuries. See, e.g., Annette Gordon-Reed, The Hemingses of Monticello: An American Family
660 (2008) (Thomas Jefferson fathered children with his “mixed blood” slave Sally Hemings. “[T]he
choices the children of Sally Hemings and Thomas Jefferson made would separate their lines forever.
Three would live in the white world, and one would remain in the black world.”); Gregory Howard
Williams, Life on the Color Line: The True Story of a White Boy Who Discovered He Was Black (1996).
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (approving separation of “Whites” and “Blacks” on the
grounds of “social” inferiority) the plaintiff was apparently 7/8th “White” and 1/8th “Black.” See also
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (“racial” inferiority of “Blacks,” who could not be citizens).
Clear-eyed observers of the American scene scoff at the use of “blood” in characterizing “race.” See,
e.g., Mark Twain, Pudd’nhead Wilson (1894) (“White” and “Black” babies who looked “White” taken
home by wrong mothers and raised inadvertently in “wrong ‘racial’ categories”).
Statistical reliance on “race” leads to such questions as whether Plessy would have been
categorized today as “African-American” for life expectancy purposes. In a more recent example,
“racially” characterizing for statistical purposes in a negligence lawsuit the current Democrat Party
presidential candidate, born of a “White” American mother and an “African” citizen of Kenya,
would be considered absurd by most Americans. See Colm Tóibín, James Baldwin & Barack Obama,
N.Y. Rev., Oct. 23, 2008, at 18 (“When Obama was a child, he wrote, ‘my father…was black as pitch,
my mother white as milk.’”). Reliance on “race”-based statistics in estimating life expectancy of
individuals for purposes of calculating damages is not scientifically acceptable in our current
heterogeneous population. As indicated below, “race” is largely a social construct inappropriate in
assessing damages in a negligence suit.
A. “Race” as Biological Fiction
Franz Boas, the great Columbia University Anthropologist, pointed out that “[e]very
classification of mankind must be more or less artificial”; he exposed much of the false cant of
“racial” homogeneity when he declared that “no racial group is genetically ‘pure.’” Quoted in Keay
Davidson, Franz Boas in 3 American National Biography 83 (1999). See also The Shaping of
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American Anthropology, 1883–1911, A Franz Boas Reader 273 (George W. Stocking, Jr., ed., 1974)
(“if we base our inferences entirely on the results of anatomical study, it would seem that there is no
reason to believe that the bulk of the people constituting two distinct races might not be
approximately on the same level” as to mental ability); Scott L. Malcomson, One Drop of Blood: The
American Misadventure of Race 277 (2000) (“within the premodern written records of, globally
speaking, light-skinned people, references to white people as white people, as a race, are remarkably
scarce”); Orlando Patterson, Rituals of Blood: Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries
155–58, 165–66 (1998) (intermarriage); The Concept of Race xi (Ashley Montagu, ed., 1964) (“the
biological concept of race has become unacceptable to a growing number of biologists”); Douglas S.
Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid, Segregation and the Making of the Underclass 9
(1993) (“Our fundamental argument is that racial segregation—and its characteristic institutional
form, the black ghetto—are the key structural factors responsible for the perpetuation of black
poverty in the United States.”); James C. King, The Biology of Race 146 (2d ed.1981) (“estimates of
the proportion of genetic material from white ancestry in American blacks range all the way from a
few percent to more than 50 percent”).
An anthropologist who has written extensively on “race” and its evolution in American society notes:
“Despite legal and social attempts to prohibit intermarriage or intermating, some genetic mixture
still occurred. In response, the United States had to resort to a fiction to help preserve the
distinctiveness of the White/Black racial (and social) dichotomy. North Americans define as Black
anyone who has known African ancestors, a phenomenon known and introduced by historians over
half a century ago as the ‘one drop rule.’ There is mounting historical evidence that this modern
ideology of race took on a life of its own in the latter half of the 19th century…[a]s a paradigm for
portraying the social reality of permanent inequality as something that was natural.” Audrey
Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a Social Problem is Real, 60:1 Am.
Psychologist 16, 20 (2005) (referred to herein as an article by Professor Smedley). Professor Smedley
finds that “the ideology [of “race”] arose as a rationalization and justification for human slavery at a
time when Western European societies were embracing philosophies promoting individual and
human rights, liberty, democracy, justice, brotherhood, and equality.” She cites Robert Moore, a
sociologist from the University of Liverpool, who “observed that in the mid-1800s, a consensus
emerged that human cultural differences were of a permanent kind, expressing underlying natural
differences.” Professor Moore quotes Alexis de Tocqueville, who as an early observer of American
life was among the first to recognize this conception of “race,” writing that “the existence of innate
and immutable racial characteristics is to be regarded with skepticism and theories founded upon
such doctrine are mere rationalizations for slavery and other forms of racial oppression.”
Professor Smedley cautions against scientific investigations that focus on justifying the
differences between “racial” groups: “Racialized science, with its emphasis on identifying immutable
differences between racial groups, can be expected only to maintain and reinforce existing racial
inequality, in that its adherents indirectly argue that no degree of government intervention or social
change will alter the skills and abilities of different racial groups. The disproportionate
representation of some ‘racial’ groups (e.g., African Americans, American Indians) among lower
socioeconomic tiers can therefore be explained as an unavoidable byproduct of human evolution.
Yet reinforcing this widely held social stereotype of racial inferiority risks limiting individual human
potential, in that individuals’ abilities and opportunities would likely be assessed in relation to their
racial group.”
DNA technology finds little variation among “races” (humans are genetically 99.9% identical),
and it is difficult to pinpoint any “racial identity” of an individual through his or her genes.
International gene mapping projects have only revealed variations in strings of DNA that correlate
with geographic differences in phenotypes among humans around the world, the reality being that
the diversity of human biology has little in common with socially constructed “racial” categories.
While “race” may be a social construct, many policymakers and courts insist that it remains a
significant predictor of access to societal goods and resources. “Racial” and “ethnic” disparities in
quality of health care, for example, remain substantial across a broad range of medical services. But
those disparities are associated with socioeconomic differences and tend to diminish significantly
and, in a few cases, to disappear altogether when socioeconomic factors are controlled. By allowing
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the use of “race”-based life expectancy tables, which are based on historical data, courts are
essentially reinforcing the underlying social inequalities of our society rather than describing a
significant biological difference.
B. Unreliability of “Racial” Categories
In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Statistical Policy Directive
Number 15, “Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting.” The
directive established four “racial” categories (“American Indian or Alaskan Native,” “Asian or
Pacific Islander,” “Black,” and “White”) for federal legislative, programmatic and administrative
purposes. The OMB revised these standards in October of 1997, creating five groups instead of four
by splitting “Asian” and “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.” The 2000 census also added a
sixth “racial” set, “Some Other Race,” and allowed responders to choose more than one category.
The catch-all of “Some Other Race,” which was meant to “capture responses such as Mulatto, Creole,
and Mestizo,” also included a write-in option.
Despite the 2000 census’ more detailed self-categorization system, demographic studies that use
pre-2000 census data continue to define “race” by using the 1977 OMB directive. See, e.g.,
Christopher J.L. Murray et al., Eight Americas: Investigating Mortality Disparities across Races,
Counties, and Race-Counties in the United States, 3:9 PLoS Med. 1513 (2006); Martha Chamallas,
Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A
Constitutional Argument, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1994) (“The tables presented in [a practitioner’s
text for calculating lost earning capacity] are the P-60 Series (for 1977–90) from the Current
Population Reports published by the United States Bureau of the Census…. As was the case for most
government data collections for these periods, race is reduced to either black or white; there is no
separate breakdown for other racial/ethnic groups.”).
Life expectancy tables are based on historical data and thus largely rely on the OMB’s former
archaic “racial” analysis. This means that the tables frequently employed by courts in determining
tort damages fail to account for the nuanced reality of “racial” heritage in the United States today.
After hundreds of years of sexual mixings, there continues to be no socially sanctioned inbetween classification of “race” in America. Even researchers investigating the differences between
the life expectancies of “Black” and “White” Americans admit that the “presently available summary
measures such as age-adjusted mortality and estimated life expectancy are crude” and “may mask
special successes and/or problems for specific age categories/diseases or in specific local
populations.” Robert S. Levine et al., Black–White Inequalities in Mortality and Life Expectancy,
1933–1999: Implications for Healthy People 2010, 116 Pub. Health Rep. 474 (Sept.-Oct. 2001); see
also Murray, supra, at 1521 (“The most important limitation of the data used for our analysis is that
reported race in the census, used for population estimates, may be different from race in mortality
statistics, where race may be reported by the family, the certifying physician, or the funeral
director.”). Even if reliance on “race”-based statistical projections made factual sense in the United
States, available statistics do not appear to account for what might be called “blood ratios,” in view
of the American reality of long-term “racial” mixing.
C. Socio-Economic Status and “Race”
Putting aside the question of the fallacy of treating all “dark-skinned” Americans as completely
different from “light-skinned” Americans in predicting life expectancy, socio-economic factors have
a large role in influencing length of life. While many sociologists, epidemiologists, and other
researchers have noted “[t]he broad influence of race/ethnicity and socioeconomic position on
functional status, active life expectancy, and mortality,” Arline T. Geronimus et al., Inequality in Life
Expectancy, Functional Status, and Active Life Expectancy across Selected Black and White
Populations in the United States, 38:2 Demography 227, 227 (2001), the influence of socio-economic
factors is often masked by “race.” See Levine, supra, at 482 (“race itself may be largely a surrogate for
other factors, especially differences in environmental exposures”). Reliable studies have found that
“[t]he relationships between socioeconomic position or race/ethnicity and health may be modified
by geographic influence and community conditions that contextualize and structure these
relationships.” Geronimus, supra, at 227. As one group of researchers has cautioned, “while race-
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based mortality ratios and absolute risks are important, there are clear limitations to their use as
indicators of health,” including the appropriateness and reliability of the “racial” and “ethnic”
categories used in statistical analysis. Levine, supra, at 481–82.
The impact of socio-economic status (SES) on life expectancy has long been recognized. See
Joseph J. Sudano & David W. Baker, Explaining U.S. racial/ethnic disparities in health declines and
mortality in late middle age: The roles of socioeconomic status, health behaviors, and health insurance,
62 Soc. Sci. & Med. 909 (2006) (“Our results are also consistent with previous studies that have found
large ‘direct’ (or residual) effects of SES on health that were not explained by differences in health
behaviors.”). Aside from “baseline health,” the next “dominant explanation for the worse health
outcomes for blacks and Hispanics was SES.” Id. “In contrast, health insurance and health behaviors
explained little of the racial/ethnic differences in health outcomes.” Id.; see also Murray, supra, at
1522 (“Important research in the past few decades has illustrated the critical role of individual and
community-level socio-economic factors, be it in absolute or relative terms, in health outcomes”);
Lloyd B. Potter, Socioeconomic Determinants of White and Black Males’ Life Expectancy Differentials,
1980, 28:2 Demography 303 (1991) (“There is a long-standing consensus that a negative relationship
exists between socioeconomic conditions and the levels of mortality experienced by a population.”).
More detailed investigations into the life expectancy gap between “White” and “Black”
Americans have shown that life expectancy varies within “racial” groups by economic characteristics
and geography. See Geronimus, supra, at 244 (“Our analyses revealed heterogeneity in length and
quality of life within the black and the white populations with respect to their communities’
economic characteristics and, to some extent, the location of their residence.”). Given the significant
impact of socio-economic factors, it is natural for courts to be concerned with the use of life
expectancy tables that ignore important distinctions such as education, place of residency, and
employment, collapsing all members of a “racial” group into a single number. Gross statistical tables
do not answer the question: how does the life expectancy of well-off or middle-class “AfricanAmericans” compare to that of poor “African-Americans?”
In a national study of twenty-three local areas, researchers found that “African American
residents of advantaged urban areas have substantially higher life expectancies than their poor urban
counterparts; in some cases their life expectancies approach the white national average.” Geronimus,
supra, at 241. That study also found that “White residents of urban poor areas have mortality profiles
comparable to those of black residents of poor rural areas and blacks nationwide,” and “somewhat
worse than residents of relatively advantaged black urban areas.” In fact, “African-Americans”
residing “in the advantaged population of New York City fare as well as whites nationwide.” Id. at
In studies targeting cardiovascular diseases (CVD), researchers found that after controlling for
risk level, “there was no consistent pattern in CVD mortality differences for Black and White men
according to income level. As shown in other research, the higher overall CVD mortality rate among
Black men than among White men was largely explained by differences in zip code area incomes
and risk factor levels.” Avis J. Thomas et al., Race/Ethnicity, Income, Major Risk Factors, and
Cardiovascular Disease Mortality, 95:8 Am. J. Pub. Health 1417, 1421 (2005).
When determining tort damages based upon an injured individual’s future life span and potential
needs, consideration must be given to the fact that changing a person’s socio-economic status may
have an impact upon his or her life expectancy. While studies have found that expanding health
insurance alone would not greatly impact the life expectancy or morbidity of individuals, it may well
be that elevating a group of individuals from a lower socio-economic class to a higher one would
change their overall cause-of-death structure and enhance their health and lifespan. Major causes of
death in “African-American” populations include homicide, HIV, unintentional injuries, and other
factors associated with poverty and low socio-economic status. See generally Sam Harper et al., Trends
in the Black–White Life Expectancy Gap in the United States, 1983–2003, 297:11 J. Am. Med. Ass’n
1224 (2007); see also Potter, supra, at 304 (“Improvement of socioeconomic conditions is associated
with a change from a cause-of-death structure characterized by infectious and parasitic diseases
toward one characterized by degenerative disease…such a shift will lead to higher life expectancy.”).
The findings of the studies cited above reinforce the conclusion that despite a documented gap
in life expectancy between “Black” and “White” Americans, the simple characterization of
individuals as “Black” or “White” is not only misleading, it risks masking the complex interactions
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between a host of genetic and socio-economic factors. While some researchers have suggested that
higher socio-economic position may not impact “African-American” health as directly as other
populations (due to stress-related diseases potentially linked to structural racism), this is not reason
for courts to enforce the negative impacts of lower socio-economic status while ignoring the
diversity within populations.
D. Legal Decisions on “Race”
A 1905 decision by a federal court in New York relied on “race”-based statistics and “racial”
categories in reducing damages in an admiralty case. The Saginaw and The Hamilton, 139 F. 906
(S.D.N.Y. 1905); see Jennifer B. Wriggins, Damages in Tort Litigation: Thoughts on Race and
Remedies, 1865–2007, 27 Rev. Litig. 37 (2007). Two steamships collided, resulting in the deaths of
some passengers and crewmembers. See In re Clyde S.S. Co., 134 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1904). Wrongful
death actions were brought for six “Colored” and two “White” persons killed in the accident.
Rejecting the use of standard mortality tables to predict the life expectancies of all the deceased, the
court cited census data summarizing differences in “White” and “Colored” life expectancies in
justifying its reduction of awards. At that time census respondents did not have the option of
selecting more than one “race” to identify themselves. Professor Jennifer B. Wriggins found that “on
average [the Saginaw court] lowered the awards for the deaths of blacks ten percent more than the
awards for the deaths of whites and [the court] slashed three of the awards for blacks by forty percent
or more.” Wriggins, supra, at 56; see also Marc Galanter, Bhopals, Past and Present: The Changing
Legal Response to Mass Disaster, 10 Windsor Yearbook of Justice 151 (1990) (describing the Hawk’s
Nest Tunnel disaster in early 1930s West Virginia in which over 700 unprotected laborers were
victims of acute silicosis and settlements ranged from $30 for a single “Black” to $1600 for a “White”
Family); Monograph, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 7 (1995) (same).
It should be noted in assessing The Saginaw that the case was decided shortly after Plessy,
approving “racial” segregation of “African-Americans.” Plessy’s “racial” basis was entirely rejected
by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Saginaw has no precedential value.
1. Future Earnings
Courts are increasingly troubled by “race”- and gender-based figures for calculating loss of future
income. The district court in United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp.2d 1285 (D. Utah 2004), noted
that “surprisingly the reported cases have almost completely neglected the question” of whether to
use sex- and “race”-neutral statistics. After receiving an expert report (for restitution purposes) that
reduced the estimate of lost income based on the fact that a victim was “Native American,” that
court directed recalculation without regard to “race” or gender. Avoiding reaching any
constitutional questions, the court chose to “exercise its discretion in favor of victims of violent
crime and against the possible perpetuation of inappropriate stereotypes,” especially “where the
defendants have deprived their victims of the chance to excel in life beyond predicted statistical
averages.” The court ultimately utilized gender-and “race”-neutral figures in its findings.
One court refused to use “racial” statistics in calculating tort damages for loss of future income
when the plaintiff was half “Black” and half “White.” Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F.
Supp. 427 (D.D.C. 1991). The defendant argued that the wage earnings projections for “Black” men
were the appropriate figures for the plaintiff, whose mother was “White” and father was “Black.”
Apparently “race”-based life expectancy figures were not introduced in the case. The court held it
“inappropriate to incorporate current discrimination resulting in wage differences between the sexes
or races or the potential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for damages resulting
from lost wages.” It used “the average earnings of all persons.” See also Laura Greenberg,
Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 429, 447 (2001) (arguing that “race”-based economic statistics “reinforce the
status quo of racial disparities” and “propel[] race to the forefront of predictions about individual
achievement”; advocating use of “race”-neutral statistics).
Canadian courts have refused to use gender-specific wage calculations in determining damages.
See, e.g., Walker v. Ritchie, 119 A.C.W.S. (3d) (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. Jan. 3, 2003) (using statistical figures
which reflected the entire population).
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2. Work-Life Expectancy
In an action for damages by an injured seaman, the plaintiff presented statistics on work-life
expectancy modified to exclude “race” as a factor; the defendant challenged the increased work-life
expectancy that resulted. Theodile v. Delmar Systems, Inc., 2007 WL 2491808 at *8 (W.D. La. 2007).
The district court refused to upset the jury’s award in the “race”-neutral amount suggested by
plaintiff’s expert. Another district court rejected an expert calculation that reduced a female tort
victim’s estimated working life by 40% based on a historical statistic about the number of years
females average in the workforce. Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1987).
In administering the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Special Master Kenneth R.
Feinberg based estimations of remaining years of work-life on the victim’s age, using statistics for
the general population of active males in the United States for all claimants and ignoring “racial”
differences. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,238 (Mar.
13, 2002); see generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, What is Life Worth? (2005).
3. Life Expectancy
In the context of Title VII, the Supreme Court noted that while “actuarial studies could
unquestionably identify differences in life expectancy based on race or national origin, as well as
sex,” Congress has outlawed classifications based on “race,” national origin, and sex. City of Los
Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). Thus, “even a true generalization
about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization
does not apply.” Id. at 708; see also Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance:
What’s Fair?, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1646, 1659 & n. 86 (collecting state statutes forbidding “race”
classifications by insurers). “Racial” statistics present an especially strong argument for exclusion,
since, as already noted, the question of “race” is ambiguous, whereas gender is generally conceded.
II. Unconstitutionality of “Race” as a Criterion for Assessing Damages
A. Equal Protection
For half a century the Supreme Court has rejected on equal protection grounds “race”-based
discrimination. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007) (allocating students to particular schools based on “race” unconstitutional); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (redistricting based on “race” impermissible); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429 (1984) (consideration of “race” in child custody decision unconstitutional despite possibility
that societal “racial” biases might affect child); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (“race”-based
restrictions on marriage unconstitutional); Brown, supra (abolishing segregation in public schools);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (applying rationale of Brown to federal government); see also,
e.g., Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (2d ed. 2004); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts (1994);
Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law (1959); Jack B. Weinstein, Benjamin N. Cardozo
Lecture: The Role of Judges In A Government Of, By, and For the People (2007).
As Professor Martha Chamallas notes, “when experts rely on race or gender-based statistics to
calculate tort damages, we tend not to notice the discrimination and to accept it as natural and
unproblematic.” Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic
Loss, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1435, 1442 (2005). “Racial” classifications of individuals are “suspect
categories,” see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938), meaning that
state action in reliance on “race”-based statistics triggers strict scrutiny. Cf. Charleen Hsuan, Note
Medicaid Coverage for Race-Based Drugs, 41 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 443 (2008) (arguing that
strict scrutiny under equal protection would apply to state Medicaid agency decisions to deny offlabel coverage for FDA-approved “race”-based drugs). Judicial reliance on “racial” classifications
constitutes state action. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (permitting
peremptory jury challenges based on “race” is state action violating equal protection); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state action in judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants based on
“race”); see also Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data
in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, supra, at 106 (“By conceding the relevance of racebased or gender-based data through its admission into evidence…the judge necessarily leads the
jury to believe that gender and race are legally permissible factors and thus cannot be said to be
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neutral on the issue.”) Equal protection in this context demands that the claimant not be subjected
to a disadvantageous life expectancy estimate solely on the basis of a “racial” classification.
B. Due Process
There is a right—in effect a property right—to compensation in cases of negligently caused
damage to the person under state and federal law. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)
(“[a]rguably” a tort cause of action created by a State constitutes “a species of ‘property’ protected
by the Due Process Clause” and there is a federal “interest in protecting the individual citizen from
state action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational”); see also John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional
Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524
(2005) (constitutional right to a body of tort law for the purpose of redressing private wrongs);
Weinstein, Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: The Role of Judges In A Government Of, By, and For the
People, supra, at 495–506 (same).
By allowing use of “race”-based statistics at trial, a court would be creating arbitrary and
irrational state action. “The form and content of statistical evidence is shaped by the requirements
of the substantive law.” David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, Statistical Proof of Discrimination 10
(1980). Were the court to apply an ill-founded assumption, automatically burdening on “racial”
grounds a class of litigants who seek compensation, there would be a denial of due process. Cf.
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) (“federal guaranty of due process
extends to state action through its judicial branch of government”).
The legal system does not work fairly and with due process if one class of litigants is unduly
burdened in litigation through the application of inappropriate “race”-based statistics. Where, as in
the instant case, no attempt was made to justify the use of “racial” statistics by the City, the due
process rights of the defendant cannot be said to have been affected.
III. Application of Law to Facts
There is no factual basis for discriminating against this claimant by finding a reduced life
expectancy based upon “race.” That conclusion is particularly sound in the instant case where the
damages awarded are designed to extend claimant’s life by providing him with the best medical and
other care—more than the equivalent of what the average American quadriplegic could expect.
Constitutional normative doctrine also supports excluding “race”-based statistics. “Any decision
to use a group-based projection into the future as the basis for a damage remedy also involves
normative judgments about the relevant frame of reference and the rate of future change.” Wriggins,
supra, at 56. The American reality reflects that “people do not fall naturally into discrete racial
groupings” and “legal classifications of race tend to be unrefined and often reflect ignorance of
differences within a given category.” Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and GenderSpecific Economic Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, supra, at 113.
Reliance on “race”-based statistics in estimating life expectancy for purposes of calculating
damages in this case is rejected in computing life expectancy and damages.
1.

QUESTIONS
Kenton Revisited: Now that you’ve read McMillan, should it matter that Kenton was
planning to be a lawyer before she suffered her injuries? How might giving weight to her
career choice reinforce past discrimination and reproduce inequality in the future?

2.

Reality Check: If courts refuse to consider a tort victim’s gender, is it fair to the families
of men who are left unable to work due to their injuries? If, as is factually the case, men
in many professions earn more than women, is it right to leave families with less income
if disability means a working father or husband can no longer earn his usual paycheck?

3.

Protected Characteristics: Should race (and gender) always be off-limits in damages
calculations? What about when calculating life expectancy? And what about other
characteristics, like someone’s religion or sexual orientation? Finally, can we rely on
constitutional rules to be an equalizing force when so many tort claims are resolved
through settlement?
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B. Punitive Damages
NATIONAL BY-PRODUCTS, INC. v. SEARCY HOUSE MOVING CO.
Supreme Court of Arkansas (1987)
Dudley, Justice:

ã

The sole issue in this tort case is whether an award of
punitive damages should be upheld. We hold there was no
substantial evidence to support the award of punitive
damages, and reverse….
On July 11, 1985, Robert Foley was driving a large tractortrailer for appellant National By-Products, Inc. from
Batesville south on Highway 167. At the same time, appellee
Searcy House Moving Company was moving a house north
on the same highway. Appellee could not get the house
through a bridge which was just north of Bald Knob, and, while the house was being adjusted on the
house moving trailer, traffic was stopped and flagged around in the one lane of traffic still open.
Stacy McGee and Lorene Staggs were slowly starting to go through the open lane when appellant
Foley, speeding in an over-weight truck smashed into the rear of their car, knocking it eighty feet
forward, causing it to hit the house and trailer, and then to hit two bystanders. Appellant National’s
truck also struck the house and then crashed into another tractor-trailer rig. Lorene Staggs died
instantly and Stacy McGee died seven hours later. The estates of Lorene Staggs and Stacy McGee
filed wrongful death actions against Foley and appellant National By-Products, Inc. and appellee
moving company. Defendants Foley and National By-Products and defendant moving company
filed cross-complaints against each other, each asking compensatory and punitive damages from the
other. The cases were tried before a jury which returned compensatory damage awards of $3,000,000
to the estate of Stacy McGee, $1,400,000 to the estate of Lorene Staggs, and $15,000 to appellee
moving company. In addition, separate punitive damage awards of $100,000 were given to each
estate and to appellee moving company. The judgments in the wrongful death cases were satisfied
and appellee moving company agreed to a remittitur of its compensatory damage award from
$15,000 to $1,883.14, the stipulated amount of compensatory damages. Therefore, the only damage
award involved in this appeal is the $100,000 punitive damage award made in favor of appellee
moving company and against appellant National By-Products Company.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The argument is meritorious. An award of punitive damages is justified
only where the evidence indicates that the defendant acted wantonly in causing the injury or with
such a conscious indifference to the consequences that malice may be inferred. We have previously
defined wantonness and conscious indifference to the consequences. In Ellis v. Ferguson, 385 S.W.2d
154 (Ark. 1964), we said:
Wantonness is essentially an attitude of mind and imparts to an act of misconduct
a tortious character, such conduct as manifests a “disposition of perversity.” Such
a disposition or mental state is shown by a person, when, notwithstanding his
conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger and of
common probability of injury to others, he proceeds into the presence of danger,
with indifference to consequences and with absence of all care. It is not necessary
to prove that the defendant deliberately intended to injure the plaintiff. It is
enough if it is shown that, indifferent to consequences, the defendant intentionally
acted in such a way that the natural and probable consequence of his act was
injury to the plaintiff….
The terms “wilfulness, or conscious indifference to consequences from which malice may be
inferred,” as used in the decisions of this court, means such conduct in the face of discovered peril.
In other words, in order to superadd this element of damages by way of punishment, it must appear
ã
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that the negligent party knew, or had reason to believe, that his act of negligence was about to inflict
injury, and that he continued in his course with a conscious indifference to the consequences, from
which malice may be inferred.
In the case at bar there was proof of gross negligence, but gross negligence is not sufficient to
justify punitive damages. The facts, when viewed most favorably to appellee, reveal that Foley,
appellant’s driver, was late leaving Batesville and his truck weighed 80,480 pounds, which is 480
pounds over the legal limit. Foley had received six citations in the last year for driving an overweight
truck, and appellant had paid all of the citations. One of appellant’s employees testified that the
company had a disciplinary procedure for drivers who got an excessive number of overweight
tickets, and he testified that Foley had an excessive number of such tickets, but admitted that Foley
had not been cautioned or disciplined for driving an overweight truck. Appellee’s expert witness on
accident reconstruction testified that the 480 pounds excess weight on the 80,000 pound rig was a
contributing, but insignificant, factor in the accident.
Between Batesville and the place of the accident, Foley exceeded the 55 miles per hour speed
limit while going downhill. He got so close to one car that all the driver of the car could see in his
rearview mirror was the grill of Foley’s tractor. He got extremely close to another car while
“tailgating” downhill. Finally, he came around a curve at the crest of a small hill and had 804 feet of
clear visibility to the bridge structure where the accident occurred. The house, which was sitting on
the trailer, at the bridge, was 17 feet high, 28 feet wide, and 36 feet long, and because of its added
height, could be seen from about 900 feet away. Foley either did not apply his brakes, or he applied
them but they did not function properly.
Appellee’s witnesses said Foley was going 60 to 70 miles per hour and made no effort to stop
even though he went past a vehicle with a flashing warning light. They testified his brake lights did
not come on, the tires did not skid, there was no smoke from either the brakes or tires, and there
were no skid marks. However, appellee’s expert brake witness testified that Foley probably did apply
his brakes just before the accident, but the brakes were not working properly. While the expert did
not testify about standards in the industry, he did testify that the Ryder Truck Company checks
truck brakes every 8,000 miles. One of the appellant’s employees testified that the company policy
was to adjust the trailer brakes once a month, but the brakes on this trailer had not been adjusted
for three and one-half months, and the tractor brakes had not been opened for a complete inspection
for almost six months, although they were adjusted about 6 weeks before the accident. He further
testified that appellant conducted an internal inspection of the brakes every 50,000 miles as
recommended by the American Trucking Association and, in addition, the drivers conducted a daily
inspection. There was no evidence that appellant had any knowledge that the brakes were faulty.
As Foley sped downhill at 70 miles per hour, he ran into the rear of the decedent’s car and then
struck appellee’s rig and the house.
The foregoing facts do not show that appellant, either by its own policies or through the actions
of its agent Foley, intentionally acted in such a way that the natural and probable consequence was
to damage appellee’s property. Nor do the facts show that appellant knew that some act of negligence
was about to cause damage, but still continued to cause that damage. Accordingly, we reverse the
judgment for punitive damages.
When we reverse a judgment for punitive damages, we normally must also reverse the award for
compensatory damages because the issues are so interwoven that an error with respect to one requires
a retrial of the whole case. In this case, however, the parties have stipulated as to the amount of
compensatory damages, so we reverse on the punitive damages, but do not remand for new trial….
Hays, Justice, dissenting:
The majority’s opinion has examined the evidence supporting punitive damages more from the
appellant’s standpoint than the appellee’s. When viewed most favorably to the appellee, and with its
fullest probative force, I believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s refusal to
grant a motion for a directed verdict.
We no longer require actual malice as an essential constituent of punitive damages. It is enough
if the defendant acted recklessly or wantonly, or with a conscious indifference to the safety and
welfare of others using the highways. In Dalrymple v. Fields, 633 S.W.2d 362 (Ark 1982), we said:
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Before punitive damages may be allowed it must be shown that in the absence of
proof of malice or willfulness there was a wanton and conscious indifference for
the rights and safety of others on the part of the tortfeasor.
While excessive speed may, in many circumstances, be no more than ordinary negligence,
actions are not to be viewed in a vacuum, and what may be no more than negligence in one setting
can readily be seen as wantonness or conscious indifference in another context. Thus driving 85
m.p.h. on certain stretches of highway may be relatively safe, or it may be negligence, depending on
the traffic, weather, etc. But driving only 35 or 40 m.p.h. past a school at dismissal hour or close to
a playground crowded with children with an evident indifference to the known tendencies of
children could meet even restrictive concepts of wantonness. In Airco, Inc. v. Simmons First National
Bank, 638 S.W.2d 660 (Ark. 1982), we upheld a monumental award of punitive damages, not on
proof that Airco had any intent to injure, but because the injury was the natural and probable
consequence of Airco’s conduct. It seems a fair analogy to me to say that when one knowingly drives
an overloaded 18-wheeler, with defective brakes, on the highway at speeds of 70 m.p.h. by some
accounts, oblivious of warning signals and without slowing down and with no apparent effort at
stopping, approaching congestion on the highway, a collision is the natural and probable
consequence of such conduct. At least, reasonable minds could differ on the issue of conscious
indifference and that is enough.
In sum, the proof was that Robert Foley was several hours late leaving Batesville for Little Rock. His
truck, an 18-wheeler, was loaded beyond the lawful limit. His truck, by whatever standard one chooses,
was equipped with brakes that were not functioning properly. For some miles prior to the point of
impact Mr. Foley drove so fast and so close to preceding vehicles that two of those motorists were
alarmed by it and described his conduct at trial as speeding and “tailgating.” Rounding a curve bearing
into a straight, level stretch of highway some 900 feet from the appellee’s house-moving rig, Mr. Foley
proceeded at a high rate of speed (70 m.p.h. by one account) and with no discernable attempt to reduce
his speed (some witnesses testified that his speed actually increased as he neared the impact point),
past one vehicle with a warning light flashing, to strike the Staggs-McGee vehicle, knocking it a
considerable distance in the air, and resulting in the deaths of the two occupants, before striking
another vehicle and the house. Photographs of the scene attest to extraordinary force of the impact.
There was testimony that one of the brake shoes on the truck was not even touching the brake
drum, rendering it useless as a braking device. There was testimony that none of the four rear brakes
met Department of Transportation specifications. There was other material evidence from which an
inference could be drawn that the brakes on the truck were seriously deficient and that fact was
known by Foley and was in derogation of the policies of National By-Products, Inc. Lastly, there was
proof from which the jury could quite properly have inferred that National By-Products, Inc., in
addition to neglecting the safe operation of the truck involved, engaged in practices which promoted
the overloading of its trucks beyond the legal limit, by routinely paying weight fines rather than
demanding compliance by its drivers.
The proof, I believe, was such that a jury had a right under the law to exemplify the conduct of
both defendants by assessing punitive damages. The judgment should be affirmed.
1.

QUESTIONS
What’s Tort Law Up To? What are punitive damages supposed to accomplish? Do they
serve the goals of tort law? Shouldn’t we accomplish punishment through criminal law?

2.

Intentional Torts: National By-Products shows us that punitive damages are sometimes,
but not always, available in negligence claims. But what about intentional torts? Will a
plaintiff suing for battery or false imprisonment always be entitled to punitive damages?

3.

You Be the Judge: In Justice Dudley’s view, no reasonable jury could conclude that Foley
acted with conscious indifference to the imminent risk of injury to others posed by his
driving. Do you agree?
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MATHIAS v. ACCOR ECONOMY LODGING, INC.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (2003)
Posner, Judge:

ã

The plaintiffs brought this diversity suit governed by Illinois law
against affiliated entities (which the parties treat as a single entity, as shall
we) that own and operate the “Motel 6” chain of hotels and motels. One
of these hotels (now a “Red Roof Inn,” though still owned by the
defendant) is in downtown Chicago. The plaintiffs, a brother and sister,
were guests there and were bitten by bedbugs…. The plaintiffs claim that
in allowing guests to be attacked by bedbugs in a motel that charges
upwards of $100 a day for a room and would not like to be mistaken for
a flophouse, the defendant was guilty of “willful and wanton conduct”
and thus under Illinois law is liable for punitive as well as compensatory
damages. The jury agreed and awarded each plaintiff $186,000 in punitive
damages though only $5,000 in compensatory damages. The defendant
appeals, complaining primarily about the punitive-damages award….
The defendant argues that at worst it is guilty of simple negligence, and if this is right the
plaintiffs were not entitled by Illinois law to any award of punitive damages. It also complains that
the award was excessive—indeed that any award in excess of $20,000 to each plaintiff would deprive
the defendant of its property without due process of law. The first complaint has no possible merit,
as the evidence of gross negligence, indeed of recklessness in the strong sense of an unjustifiable
failure to avoid a known risk, was amply shown. In 1998, EcoLab, the extermination service that the
motel used, discovered bedbugs in several rooms in the motel and recommended that it be hired to
spray every room, for which it would charge the motel only $500; the motel refused. The next year,
bedbugs were again discovered in a room but EcoLab was asked to spray just that room. The motel
tried to negotiate a building sweep by EcoLab free of charge, but, not surprisingly, the negotiation
failed. By the spring of 2000, the motel’s manager started noticing that there were refunds being
given by my desk clerks and reports coming back from the guests that there were ticks in the rooms
and bugs in the rooms that were biting. She looked in some of the rooms and discovered bedbugs.
The defendant asks us to disregard her testimony as that of a disgruntled ex-employee, but of course
her credibility was for the jury, not the defendant, to determine.
Further incidents of guests being bitten by insects and demanding and receiving refunds led the
manager to recommend to her superior in the company that the motel be closed while every room
was sprayed, but this was refused. This superior, a district manager, was a management-level
employee of the defendant, and his knowledge of the risk and failure to take effective steps either to
eliminate it or to warn the motel’s guests are imputed to his employer for purposes of determining
whether the employer should be liable for punitive damages. The employer’s liability for
compensatory damages is of course automatic on the basis of the principle of respondeat superior,
since the district manager was acting within the scope of his employment.
The infestation continued and began to reach farcical proportions, as when a guest, after
complaining of having been bitten repeatedly by insects while asleep in his room in the hotel, was
moved to another room only to discover insects there; and within 18 minutes of being moved to a
third room he discovered insects in that room as well and had to be moved still again. (Odd that at
that point he didn’t flee the motel.) By July, the motel’s management was acknowledging to EcoLab
that there was a “major problem with bed bugs” and that all that was being done about it was
“chasing them from room to room.” Desk clerks were instructed to call the “bedbugs” “ticks,”
apparently on the theory that customers would be less alarmed, though in fact ticks are more
dangerous than bedbugs because they spread Lyme Disease and Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever.
Rooms that the motel had placed on “Do not rent, bugs in room” status nevertheless were rented.
It was in November that the plaintiffs checked into the motel. They were given Room 504, even
though the motel had classified the room as “DO NOT RENT UNTIL TREATED,” and it had not been
ã
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treated. Indeed, that night 190 of the hotel’s 191 rooms were occupied, even though a number of them
had been placed on the same don’t-rent status as Room 504. One of the defendant’s motions in limine
that the judge denied was to exclude evidence concerning all other rooms—a good example of the
frivolous character of the motions and of the defendant’s pertinacious defense of them on appeal.
Although bedbug bites are not as serious as the bites of some other insects, they are painful and
unsightly. Motel 6 could not have rented any rooms at the prices it charged had it informed guests
that the risk of being bitten by bedbugs was appreciable. Its failure either to warn guests or to take
effective measures to eliminate the bedbugs amounted to fraud and probably to battery as
well…. There was, in short, sufficient evidence of “willful and wanton conduct” within the meaning
that the Illinois courts assign to the term to permit an award of punitive damages in this case.
But in what amount? In arguing that $20,000 was the maximum amount of punitive damages
that a jury could constitutionally have awarded each plaintiff, the defendant points to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent statement that “few awards of punitive damages exceeding a single-digit
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). The Court went
on to suggest that “four times the amount of compensatory damages might be close to the line of
constitutional impropriety.” Hence the defendant’s proposed ceiling in this case of $20,000, four
times the compensatory damages awarded to each plaintiff. The ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages determined by the jury was, in contrast, 37.2 to 1.
The Supreme Court did not, however, lay down a 4-to-1 or single-digit-ratio rule—it said merely
that “there is a presumption against an award that has a 145-to-1 ratio”—and it would be
unreasonable to do so. We must consider why punitive damages are awarded and why the Court has
decided that due process requires that such awards be limited. The second question is easier to
answer than the first. The term “punitive damages” implies punishment, and a standard principle of
penal theory is that “the punishment should fit the crime” in the sense of being proportional to the
wrongfulness of the defendant’s action, though the principle is modified when the probability of
detection is very low (a familiar example is the heavy fines for littering) or the crime is potentially
lucrative (as in the case of trafficking in illegal drugs). Hence, with these qualifications, which in fact
will figure in our analysis of this case, punitive damages should be proportional to the wrongfulness
of the defendant’s actions.
Another penal precept is that a defendant should have reasonable notice of the sanction for
unlawful acts, so that he can make a rational determination of how to act; and so there have to be
reasonably clear standards for determining the amount of punitive damages for particular wrongs.
And a third precept, the core of the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice, and more broadly
of the principle of the rule of law, is that sanctions should be based on the wrong done rather than
on the status of the defendant; a person is punished for what he does, not for who he is, even if the
who is a huge corporation…
[O]ne function of punitive-damages awards is to relieve the pressures on an overloaded system
of criminal justice by providing a civil alternative to criminal prosecution of minor crimes. An
example is deliberately spitting in a person’s face, a criminal assault but because minor readily
deterrable by the levying of what amounts to a civil fine through a suit for damages for the tort of
battery. Compensatory damages would not do the trick in such a case, and this for three reasons:
because they are difficult to determine in the case of acts that inflict largely dignitary harms; because
in the spitting case they would be too slight to give the victim an incentive to sue, and he might
decide instead to respond with violence—and an age-old purpose of the law of torts is to provide a
substitute for violent retaliation against wrongful injury—and because to limit the plaintiff to
compensatory damages would enable the defendant to commit the offensive act with impunity
provided that he was willing to pay, and again there would be a danger that his act would incite a
breach of the peace by his victim.
When punitive damages are sought for billion-dollar oil spills and other huge economic injuries,
the considerations that we have just canvassed fade. As the Court emphasized in Campbell, the fact
that the plaintiffs in that case had been awarded very substantial compensatory damages—$1 million
for a dispute over insurance coverage—greatly reduced the need for giving them a huge award of
punitive damages ($145 million) as well in order to provide an effective remedy. Our case is closer to
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the spitting case. The defendant’s behavior was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight
and at the same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it was emotional. And the
defendant may well have profited from its misconduct because by concealing the infestation it was
able to keep renting rooms. Refunds were frequent but may have cost less than the cost of closing the
hotel for a thorough fumigation. The hotel’s attempt to pass off the bedbugs as ticks, which some
guests might ignorantly have thought less unhealthful, may have postponed the instituting of
litigation to rectify the hotel’s misconduct. The award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the
additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by escaping detection
and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is “caught” only half the time he commits torts, then when
he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.
Finally, if the total stakes in the case were capped at $50,000 (2 × [$5,000 + $20,000]), the
plaintiffs might well have had difficulty financing this lawsuit. It is here that the defendant’s
aggregate net worth of $1.6 billion becomes relevant. A defendant’s wealth is not a sufficient basis
for awarding punitive damages. That would be discriminatory and would violate the rule of law, as
we explained earlier, by making punishment depend on status rather than conduct. Where wealth
in the sense of resources enters is in enabling the defendant to mount an extremely aggressive
defense against suits such as this and by doing so to make litigating against it very costly, which in
turn may make it difficult for the plaintiffs to find a lawyer willing to handle their case, involving as
it does only modest stakes, for the usual 33-40 percent contingent fee.
In other words, the defendant is investing in developing a reputation intended to deter plaintiffs.
It is difficult otherwise to explain the great stubbornness with which it has defended this case,
making a host of frivolous evidentiary arguments despite the very modest stakes even when the
punitive damages awarded by the jury are included….
All things considered, we cannot say that the award of punitive damages was excessive, albeit the
precise number chosen by the jury was arbitrary. It is probably not a coincidence that $5,000 +
$186,000 = $191,000/191 = $1,000: i.e., $1,000 per room in the hotel. But as there are no punitivedamages guidelines, corresponding to the federal and state sentencing guidelines, it is inevitable that
the specific amount of punitive damages awarded whether by a judge or by a jury will be arbitrary.
(Which is perhaps why the plaintiffs’ lawyer did not suggest a number to the jury.) The judicial
function is to police a range, not a point.
But it would have been helpful had the parties presented evidence concerning the regulatory or
criminal penalties to which the defendant exposed itself by deliberately exposing its customers to a
substantial risk of being bitten by bedbugs. That is an inquiry recommended by the Supreme Court.
But we do not think its omission invalidates the award. We can take judicial notice that deliberate
exposure of hotel guests to the health risks created by insect infestations exposes the hotel’s owner
to sanctions under Illinois and Chicago law that in the aggregate are comparable in severity to the
punitive damage award in this case.
“A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of an individual by any
means, commits reckless conduct if he performs recklessly the acts which cause the harm or
endanger safety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-5(a).
This is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year’s imprisonment or a fine of $2,500, or both…. Of
course a corporation cannot be sent to prison, and $2,500 is obviously much less than the $186,000
awarded to each plaintiff in this case as punitive damages. But this is just the beginning. Other guests
of the hotel were endangered besides these two plaintiffs. And, what is much more important, a
Chicago hotel that permits unsanitary conditions to exist is subject to revocation of its license,
without which it cannot operate. We are sure that the defendant would prefer to pay the punitive
damages assessed in this case than to lose its license.
1.

QUESTIONS
Don’t Let the Bedbugs Bite: Judge Posner observes that Motel 6’s failure to eliminate
the bedbugs or warn guests about them probably constituted battery. Do you agree? Did
Motel 6 intend a harmful or offensive contact? How might the guests establish intent for
a battery claim?
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2.

Litigation Incentives: Judge Posner thinks punitive damages are warranted to address
two special types of wrongful conduct. What are they? Which is at issue here? Is it fair
to say that, in essence, both types seek to remedy the problem of “under-litigation”?

3.

Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? Judge Posner mentions the Supreme Court’s State
Farm decision, which explored constitutional limits on punitive damages. The Court
held that due process requires punitive damages to be reasonable and proportionate—a
standard that involves courts scrutinizing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct and comparing the punitive damages to both the plaintiff’s compensatory
damages and civil penalties in other comparable cases. Although the Court said that
awards “exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages”
would be constitutionally dubious, it stressed that higher ratios might be warranted “if
a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”
How does this tie into Judge Posner’s justification for punitive damages? And what
happens if multiple plaintiffs bring separate claims based on the same wrong? Imagine,
for example, that other Motel 6 guests sue after getting bitten. Should courts prevent
them from continually recovering punitive damages from Motel 6 based on the same
conduct? Finally, what can legislators do if they want to rein in punitive awards?

C. Vicarious & Joint Liability
TABER v. MAINE
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1995)
Calabresi, Judge:

ã

Twenty-six years ago, in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968), this court held
that the United States Government was vicariously liable
for damage to a drydock caused by a drunken sailor who
was returning to ship from a night’s liberty. In his
celebrated opinion, Judge Henry Friendly described the
basis of respondeat superior as the “deeply rooted
sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly
disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be
said to be characteristic of its activities.” Even though the sailor had become drunk while on liberty
and far off base, we noted that drinking on leave was so common a part of naval life that the sailor’s
drunken return to ship could fairly be deemed to be characteristic of the military enterprise and,
hence, that the government should be held liable for the damage that he caused.
In Bushey, we applied admiralty law. Today—in a case that again involves a seaman who had too
much to drink—we must apply the law of Guam. This, in turn, points us to California decisions for
guidance. As it happens, California has taken the lead in developing the modern law of respondeat
superior even before Bushey. And, so, rounding out the circle, we now reach the same conclusion as
did Judge Friendly, twenty-six years ago….
On the morning of April 13, 1985, Robert S. Maine, a Navy serviceman on active duty at the U.S.
Naval Ship Repair Facility on the island of Guam, went on liberty after having completed a grueling
24 hour duty shift. While on liberty he was free to leave the base as he pleased and travel up to 50
miles away. He could also be recalled for duty at any time.
Maine decided to have a good time. By noon, he was relaxing at an on-base beach party and
drinking beer with Navy friends. Later that afternoon, he purchased two six-packs of beer at the base
PX with his Navy comrade, Karin Conville, and returned with her to his barracks to drink several
more cans. At dinnertime, Maine accompanied friends to the enlisted men’s club, where he
consumed two cocktails with his meal. After dinner, he attended a barracks party in the room of a
superior officer, with several other superior officers present. There, Maine drank three or four more
ã
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beers and—when he left to return to his own barracks at about 11:00 p.m.—Conville and another
Navy comrade named Jean Buquet noticed that he seemed to be drunk. At around 11:30 p.m., Maine
had difficulty sleeping and decided to drive off base to get something to eat. Feeling tired, he aborted
his snack mission and tried to return to base. On the way back, he caused the accident that injured
Scott A. Taber.
Taber was an enlisted Seabee—a construction worker in the United States Navy—and was
stationed at Camp Covington, Guam. At 6:00 p.m. on Friday, April 12th, he too went on liberty.
Accordingly, he was free to go off base at any time, to travel anywhere within 50 miles of his base
and, unless he was recalled for duty, to do as he pleased until his liberty ended at 6:00 a.m. on the
following Monday.
Around 2:00 p.m. on Saturday April 13, Taber’s civilian friend, Estelita Stills, met Taber at his
base in her car. They planned to spend the weekend together at her house, which was located off the
base. Before going there, however, the two drove to her cousins’ home for dinner at the nearby U.S.
Naval Station. There, Taber enjoyed a meal and, as a friendly gesture in return, helped fix the
cousins’ car. Shortly before midnight, Stills and Taber left for Stills’s house and their weekend of rest
and recreation. As fate would have it, they never got there. While they were driving on the public
roadway toward Stills’s house, Maine crashed into them, injuring Taber severely.
Two years later, Taber started this action for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”)…. Naming both Maine and the United States Government as defendants, Taber
complained that he was injured as a result of Maine’s negligent driving and that, because Maine was
acting within the scope of his Naval employment when he caused the accident, the government was
liable on a theory of respondeat superior…. [The district court] granted summary judgment to the
government because “Maine’s drunk driving incident on April 13, 1985, was not in the line of duty
and therefore the United States is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”…
The action proceeded against Maine, however. After a bench trial in which Maine appeared pro
se, the district court found Maine liable for negligence and assessed Taber’s damages at $300,000. A
final judgment was entered and Taber appealed….
The FTCA allows civil actions against the government based on the negligent acts or omissions
of its employees, including those of members of the Armed Services who are acting “in the line of
duty.” The courts have uniformly equated the FTCA’s “line of duty” language with the phrase “scope
of employment,” as that concept is defined by the respondeat superior law of the jurisdiction in
which the accident occurred. Because the accident in this case happened in Guam, we must follow
Guam’s law of respondeat superior….
Where the law of Guam is unclear, the Ninth Circuit, serving as Guam’s highest appellate court,
has instructed courts to look to California law for guidance…. It seems clear to us that California
law (and by implication the law of Guam) would hold the government vicariously liable for Maine’s
actions. California was one of the first states in the nation to adopt an expansive reading of
the respondeat superior doctrine [that is now] evident in numerous California cases…. For example,
in Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975), a subcontractor was
held vicariously liable for an assault committed by two of its employees who had lounged around
drinking for several hours in what was, ironically, called the “dry house” (a rest area/locker room
located on the job site). On a Friday night after their work shift had ended, the employees, though
free to go home, stayed in the dry house and got drunk. Later they went outside and got in a fight
with the plaintiffs. In finding respondeat superior liability, the court stated that “the inquiry should
be whether the risk was one that may be fairly regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the
enterprise undertaken by the employer.” The court further noted that under California law,
where social or recreational pursuits on the employer’s premises after hours are
endorsed by the express or implied permission of the employer and are
‘conceivably’ of some benefit to the employer or, even in the absence of proof of
benefit, if such activities have become ‘a customary incident of the employment
relationship,’ an employee engaged in such pursuits after hours is still acting
within the scope of his employment.

CASES & CRITIQUE

251

In Rodgers, the subcontractor “customarily permitted employees to remain on the premises in
or about the dry house long after their work shift had ended” and it was also “customary, particularly
on Friday evenings, for employees to sit around the dry house after their work shift and talk and
drink beer, often joined by their supervisors.” Because it “was neither unusual nor unreasonable”
for the assailants to be on the job site drinking before the assault, and because such drinking in the
dry house “was a customary incident of the employment relationship,” the court ruled that their
related tortious actions fell within the scope of their employment. Not surprisingly, the court
in Rodgers relied heavily on our decision in Bushey.
Similarly, in Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc., 235 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987), Shasta’s foreman gave Childers and Abbott (both Shasta employees) the keys to his office at
the end of the day and told them to go have a beer. The two employees were later joined by a
customer, and the three of them drank both beer and hard liquor for several hours, getting quite
drunk. At around 10:00 p.m., Abbott suggested to Childers that they drive off to feed Abbott’s
horses. Abbott drove her truck off the road, killing herself and injuring Childers. In addressing
Childers’s claim against Shasta, the court made clear that the fact that Childers’s injuries occurred
away from the work site did not bar the employer’s vicarious liability for Abbott’s drunk driving.
The court said:
respondeat superior liability is properly applied where an employee undertakes
activities within his or her scope of employment that cause the employee to
become an instrumentality of danger to others even where the danger may
manifest itself at times and locations remote from the ordinary workplace….
The district court below tried to distinguish these authorities on the ground that the drinking
in Rodgers and Childers took place at the work site while Maine’s supposedly did not. We disagree.
The drinking in both Rodgers and Childers occurred at worksite rest areas (the “dry house” and the
business office, respectively)—not on the assembly line. Similarly, although Maine did not drink
while working at the Naval Ship Repair Facility, he drank at an on-base beach party, at the enlisted
men’s club, and in the barracks—all of which were located on his base. These places were as much
on-site rest areas as the ones involved in both Rodgers and Childers.
The government understandably seeks to rely on an older conception of respondeat
superior. This view of the doctrine required a close link between the acts of the “agent” and “profit”
accruing to the master before vicarious liability attaches to the latter. But today this position is in
hasty retreat, if not rout. Thus Rodgers and Childers held that the employer-benefit requirement is
met whenever broad potential effects on morale and customer relations exist, or where the employer
has implicitly permitted or endorsed the recreational practices that led to the harm….
Of course drinking by servicemembers can be viewed as important to military morale, just as
drinking was apparently instrumental to good employee morale and customer relations
in Rodgers and Childers. Hence, “employer-benefit” can be adduced in all these cases. But in the end,
“employer-benefit” is significant only because it is one way of showing that the harm that drinking
causes can properly be considered a cost of the employer’s enterprise.
California courts have said that the doctrine of respondeat superior is concerned with the
allocation of the cost of industrial injury. The issue is simply whether the employee’s conduct is not
so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other
costs of the employer’s business. Thus, our focus must be on the relationship between the
servicemember’s behavior and the costs of the military enterprise.
Here, it is undisputed that drinking on base during off-duty hours was a commonplace, if not an
officially condoned activity. It certainly was a customary incident of Maine’s employment
relationship with the Navy, as that element is described in Rodgers. And in the context of the military
mission, an occasional drunken servicemember who leaves government premises and causes
damage is a completely foreseeable event, in the sense that it is a reasonably obvious risk of the
general enterprise. As such, we do not think that it would be either “unfair” or the slightest bit
unreasonable to impose that cost on the government. To the contrary, given the pervasive control
that the military exercises over its personnel while they are on a base, it is totally in keeping with the
doctrine of respondeat superior to allocate the costs of base operations to the government.
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See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga. L.
Rev. 851 (1981) (discussing respondeat superior as an incentive for employers to exert their control
over employees to induce careful conduct). And this is so quite apart from whether or not the
military benefits from the boost in morale achieved through fairly lenient on-base drinking policies.1
As the leading Torts treatise has put it, “the integrating principle” of respondeat superior is “that
the employer should be liable for those faults that may be fairly regarded as risks of his business,
whether they are committed in furthering it or not.” Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar
S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 26.8 (1986). Judge Friendly made the same point most elegantly
in Bushey. “The proclivity of seamen to find solicitude by copious resort to the bottle,” he wrote,
“has been noted in opinions too numerous to warrant citation. Once all this is granted, it is
immaterial that the coastguardsman’s precise action was not to be foreseen.” After all, the
government “cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be
characteristic of its activities.” We believe the law of Guam reaches the same conclusion.
Accordingly, we hold that the government is vicariously liable for Maine’s conduct….
ã

1.

QUESTIONS
Let the Master Answer: Did anyone in the Navy pressure Maine to get drunk and go
hunting for snacks while on liberty? Did his actions benefit the Navy? Why is the Navy
on the hook for his actions?

2.

Semper Fortis… et Ebrius! Judge Calabresi ties an employer’s liability to conduct that’s
“characteristic” of the employer’s enterprise. Is getting drunk characteristic of the Navy’s
activities? Would the Navy be liable if Maine had been boozing in a bar in Hagåtña?

3.

Role Reversal: Imagine that Taber had instead driven carelessly and crashed into Maine.
Would the Navy be liable under a theory of respondeat superior? How about if Maine
had punched Taber in a bar fight?

1
We make no pronouncement on drunkenness in general. Our point here is simply that drinking on base during offduty hours was a customary incident of Maine’s employment relationship with the Navy. This “on-base” drinking included
an on-base beach party, cocktails at the enlisted personnel club, and drinking at a barracks party in the room of a superior
officer, all on the day of the off-base accident. It is these on-base activities that bring this case within the ambit
of Rodgers and Childers, and therefore impose respondeat superior liability on the government. We find instructive the
example offered by Judge Friendly, albeit in an admiralty context in Bushey, indicating that employer liability would not be
imposed for an off-base tort resulting from drinking at an off-base bar. Like Judge Friendly, we would not deem such an
activity incident to the employment relationship.
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RAVO v. ROGATNICK
Court of Appeals of the State of New York (1987)
Alexander, Judge:
In this medical malpractice action, defendant, Dr.
Irwin L. Harris, appeals from an order of the Appellate
Division unanimously affirming an amended judgment of
Supreme Court, entered on a jury verdict, finding him
jointly and severally liable with Dr. Sol Rogatnick for
injuries negligently inflicted upon plaintiff, Josephine
Ravo, and resulting in brain damage that has rendered her
severely and permanently [disabled]. The issue presented
is whether joint and several liability was properly imposed
upon defendant under the circumstances of this case
where, notwithstanding that the defendants neither acted in concert nor concurrently, a single
indivisible injury—brain damage—was negligently inflicted. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Uncontroverted expert medical evidence established that plaintiff, Josephine Ravo, who at the
time of trial was 14 years of age, was severely and permanently [disabled] as a result of brain damage
she suffered at birth. The evidence demonstrated that the child was born an unusually large baby
whose mother suffered from gestational diabetes which contributed to difficulties during delivery.
The evidence further established that Dr. Rogatnick, the obstetrician who had charge of the ante
partum care of Josephine’s mother and who delivered Josephine, failed to ascertain pertinent medical
information about the mother, incorrectly estimated the size of the infant, and employed improper
surgical procedures during the delivery. It was shown that Dr. Harris, the pediatrician under whose
care Josephine came following birth, misdiagnosed and improperly treated the infant’s condition
after birth. Based upon this evidence, the jury concluded that Dr. Rogatnick committed eight separate
acts of medical malpractice, and Dr. Harris committed three separate acts of medical malpractice.
Although Dr. Rogatnick’s negligence contributed to Josephine’s brain damage, the medical
testimony demonstrated that Dr. Harris’s negligence was also a substantial contributing cause of the
injury. No testimony was adduced, however, from which the jury could delineate which aspects of
the injury were caused by the respective negligence of the individual doctors. Indeed, plaintiff’s
expert, Dr. Charash…concluded that neither he nor anybody else could say with certainty which of
the factors caused the brain damage. Similarly, Dr. Perrotta, testifying on behalf of plaintiff, opined
that she could not tell whether [Dr. Harris’s carelessness] contributed “10 percent, 20 percent, or
anything like that” to the injury. Nor, as the Appellate Division found, did Dr. Harris adduce any
evidence that could support a jury finding that he caused an identifiable percentage of the infant
plaintiff’s brain damage. Indeed, Dr. Harris’s entire defense appears to have been that he was not
responsible for the plaintiff’s injury to any degree.
The trial court instructed the jury [on comparative fault and joint and severable liability.]…
[T]he jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the total amount of $2,750,000 attributing 80% of the
“fault” to Dr. Rogatnick and 20% of the “fault” to Dr. Harris.
In a post-verdict motion, Dr. Harris sought an order directing entry of judgment limiting the
plaintiff’s recovery against him to $450,000 (20% of the $2,250,000 base recovery—the court having
setoff $500,000 received by plaintiff in settlement of claims against other defendants) based upon
his contention that his liability was not joint and several, but rather was independent and successive.
This motion was denied. [The Appellate Division affirmed.]
When two or more tort-feasors act concurrently or in concert to produce a single injury, they
may be held jointly and severally liable. This is so because such concerted wrongdoers are considered
“joint tort-feasors” and in legal contemplation, there is a joint enterprise and a mutual agency, such
that the act of one is the act of all and liability for all that is done is visited upon each. On the other
hand, where multiple tort-feasors neither act in concert nor contribute concurrently to the same
wrong, they are not joint tort-feasors; rather, their wrongs are independent and successive. Under
successive and independent liability, of course, the initial tort-feasor may well be liable to the
plaintiff for the entire damage proximately resulting from his own wrongful acts, including
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aggravation of injuries by a successive tort-feasor. The successive tort-feasor, however, is liable only
for the separate injury or the aggravation his conduct has caused.
It is sometimes the case that tort-feasors who neither act in concert nor concurrently may
nevertheless be considered jointly and severally liable. This may occur in the instance of certain
injuries which, because of their nature, are incapable of any reasonable or practicable division or
allocation among multiple tort-feasors. We had occasion to consider such a circumstance in Slater
v. Mersereau, 64 N.Y. 138 (N.Y. 1876), where premises belonging to the plaintiff were damaged by
rainwater as a result of the negligent workmanship by a general contractor and a subcontractor. We
held that where two parties by their separate and independent acts of negligence, cause a single,
inseparable injury, each party is responsible for the entire injury:
Although they acted independently of each other, they did act at the same time in
causing the damages, each contributing towards it, and although the act of each,
alone and of itself, might not have caused the entire injury, under the
circumstances presented, there is no good reason why each should not be liable
for the damages caused by the different acts of all. The water with which each of
the parties were instrumental in injuring the plaintiffs was one mass and
inseparable, and no distinction can be made between the different sources from
whence it flowed, so that it can be claimed that each caused a separate and distinct
injury for which each one is separately responsible. The contractor and
subcontractors were separately negligent, and although such negligence was not
concurrent, yet the negligence of both these parties contributed to produce the
damages caused at one and the same time.
Our affirmance in Hawkes v. Goll, 24 N.E.2d 484 (N.Y. 1939), demonstrates that simultaneous
conduct is not necessary to a finding of joint and several liability when there is an indivisible injury.
In that case, the decedent was struck by the vehicle driven by the defendant Farrell and was thrown
across the roadway, where very shortly thereafter he was again struck, this time by the vehicle driven
by the defendant Goll, and dragged some 40 to 50 feet along the highway. He was taken to the
hospital where he expired within the hour. The Appellate Division stated:
As the result of his injuries the plaintiff’s intestate died within an hour. There
could be no evidence upon which the jury could base a finding of the nature of the
injuries inflicted by the first car as distinguished from those inflicted by the second
car. The case was submitted to the jury upon the theory that if both defendants
were negligent they were jointly and severally liable. While the wrongful acts of
the two defendants were not precisely concurrent in point of time, the defendants
may nevertheless be joint tort feasors where, as here, their several acts of neglect
concurred in producing the injury….
Similarly, here the jury was unable to determine from the evidence adduced at trial the degree to
which the defendants’ separate acts of negligence contributed to the brain damage sustained by
Josephine at birth. Certainly, a subsequent tort-feasor is not to be held jointly and severally liable for
the acts of the initial tort-feasor with whom he is not acting in concert in every case where it is
difficult, because of the nature of the injury, to separate the harm done by each tort-feasor from the
others. Here, however, the evidence established that plaintiff’s brain damage was a single indivisible
injury, and defendant failed to submit any evidence upon which the jury could base an
apportionment of damage.
Harris argues, however, that since the jury ascribed only 20% of the fault to him, this was in reality
an apportionment of damage, demonstrating that the injury was divisible. This argument must fail.
Clearly, the court’s instruction, and the interrogatory submitted in amplification thereof, called upon
the jury to determine the respective responsibility in negligence of the defendants so as to establish a
basis for an apportionment between them, by way of contribution, for the total damages awarded to
plaintiff. In that respect, the jury’s apportionment of fault is unrelated to the nature of defendants’
liability (i.e., whether it was joint and several or independent and successive)….
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Here, the jury determined that the defendants breached duties owed to Josephine Ravo, and that
these breaches contributed to her brain injury. The jury’s apportionment of fault, however, does not
alter the joint and several liability of defendants for the single indivisible injury. Rather, that aspect
of the jury’s determination of culpability merely defines the amount of contribution defendants may
claim from each other, and does not impinge upon plaintiff’s right to collect the entire judgment
award from either defendant….
The right to seek equitable apportionment based on relative culpability is not one intended for
the benefit of the injured claimant. It is a right affecting the distributive responsibilities of tortfeasors inter sese. It is elementary that injured claimants may still choose which joint tort-feasors to
include as defendants in an action and, regardless of the concurrent negligence of others, recover
the whole of their damages from any of the particular tort-feasors sued. This being so, in light of the
evidence establishing the indivisibility of the brain injury and the contributing negligence of Dr.
Harris, and of the manner in which the case was tried and submitted to the jury, we conclude that
joint and several liability was properly imposed…. Order affirmed, with costs.
1.

2.

QUESTIONS
Hunt Revisited: When the jury attributed 80% of the fault to Dr. Rogatnick and 20% of
the fault to Dr. Harris, was it effectively dividing their relative causal contributions to
Ravo’s injury? Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 8,
what role does causation play in apportionment for purposes of comparative fault? Is
causation the whole ballgame?
Causation Conundrums: What’s the difference between a single indivisible injury and
an independent and successive wrong? What liability consequences flow from each?
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23
Contribution (2000)

(a) When two or more persons are or may be liable
for the same harm and one of them discharges
the liability of another by…discharge of
judgment, the person discharging the liability is
entitled to recover contribution from the other,
unless the other previously had a valid
settlement and release from the plaintiff.
(b) A person entitled to recover contribution may
recover no more than the amount paid to the
plaintiff in excess of the person’s comparative
share of responsibility.
ã

1.

2.

ã

QUESTIONS
Apportionment and Contribution: The jury found that Dr. Harris was 20% at fault for
Ravo’s injury. May Ravo recover the entire $2.25 million judgment from Dr. Harris? Is
there anything he can do to limit his financial exposure under § 23 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts? What if Dr. Rogatnick is insolvent or has fled to an unknown location?
Are the underlying rules here fair to defendants?
Posecai Revisited: Should the jury in Posecai have been allowed to assign some
percentage of fault to the mugger? Does your answer depend on whether the mugger
can be identified and made a party to Shirley Posecai’s lawsuit? When the plaintiff suffers
a single indivisible injury caused by multiple tortfeasors, how should the rules of
comparative fault, apportionment, and contribution deal with so-called “phantom
tortfeasors” to whom defendants attempt to shift some blame?

Alex Griffioen, Pointing the Finger (CC BY 2.0).
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CHAPTER

7:

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
DICKENS v. PURYEAR
Supreme Court of North Carolina (1981)
Exum, Justice:

ã

Plaintiff’s complaint is cast as a claim for intentional infliction of
mental distress. It was filed more than one year but less than three years
after the incidents complained of occurred…. Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment were allowed on the ground that plaintiff’s claim
was for assault and battery; therefore it was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations applicable to assault and battery…. We hold
that…plaintiff’s claim is not altogether barred by the one-year statute
because plaintiff’s factual showing indicates plaintiff may be able to
prove a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress—a claim
which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations….
For a time preceding the incidents in question plaintiff Dickens, a
thirty-one year old man, shared sex, alcohol and marijuana with
defendants’ daughter, a seventeen year old high school student. On 2
April 1975 defendants, husband and wife, lured plaintiff into rural Johnston County, North Carolina.
Upon plaintiff’s arrival defendant Earl Puryear, after identifying himself, called out to defendant Ann
Puryear who emerged from beside a nearby building and, crying, stated that she “didn’t want to see
that SOB.” Ann Puryear then left the scene. Thereafter Earl Puryear pointed a pistol between
plaintiff’s eyes and shouted “Ya’ll come on out.” Four men wearing ski masks and armed with
nightsticks then approached from behind plaintiff and beat him into semi-consciousness. They
handcuffed plaintiff to a piece of farm machinery and resumed striking him with nightsticks.
Defendant Earl Puryear, while brandishing a knife and cutting plaintiff’s hair, threatened plaintiff
with castration. During four or five interruptions of the beatings defendant Earl Puryear and the
others, within plaintiff’s hearing, discussed and took votes on whether plaintiff should be killed or
castrated. Finally, after some two hours and the conclusion of a final conference, the beatings ceased.
Defendant Earl Puryear told plaintiff to go home, pull his telephone off the wall, pack his clothes, and
leave the state of North Carolina; otherwise he would be killed. Plaintiff was then set free.
Plaintiff filed his complaint on 31 March 1978. It alleges that defendants on the occasion just
described intentionally inflicted mental distress upon him. He further alleges that as a result of
defendants’ acts plaintiff has suffered “severe and permanent mental and emotional distress, and
physical injury to his nerves and nervous system.” He alleges that he is unable to sleep, afraid to go out
in the dark, afraid to meet strangers, afraid he may be killed, suffering from chronic diarrhea and a
gum disorder, unable effectively to perform his job, and that he has lost $1,000 per month income….
Defendants contend, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that this is an action grounded in assault
and battery. Although plaintiff pleads the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the complaint’s factual allegations and the factual showing at the hearing
on summary judgment support only a claim for assault and battery. The claim was, therefore, barred
by the one-year period of limitations applicable to assault and battery. Plaintiff, on the other hand,
argues that the factual showing on the motion supports a claim for intentional infliction of mental
distress—a claim which is governed by the three-year period of limitations.1 At least, plaintiff argues,

ã

Joaquin Villaverde, Injury (CC BY-NC-SA 2.0).
Although defendants argue that even the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is governed by the one-year
statute of limitations, we are satisfied that it is not. The one-year statute, G.S. 1-54(3), applies to “libel, slander, assault, battery,
or false imprisonment.” As we go to some length in the opinion to demonstrate, the tort of intentional infliction of mental
distress is none of these things…. No statute of limitations addresses the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress by
name. It must, therefore, be governed by the more general three-year statute of limitations, G.S. 1-52(5), which applies to
“any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract and not hereafter enumerated.”…
1
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his factual showing is such that it cannot be said as a matter of law that he will be unable to prove
such a claim at trial….
The interest protected by the action for battery is freedom from intentional and unpermitted
contact with one’s person; the interest protected by the action for assault is freedom from
apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with one’s person. The apprehension created must
be one of an immediate harmful or offensive contact, as distinguished from contact in the future….
A mere threat, unaccompanied by an offer or attempt to show violence, is not an assault…. This
is true even though the mental discomfort caused by a threat of serious future harm on the part of
one who has the apparent intention and ability to carry out his threat may be far more emotionally
disturbing than many of the attempts to inflict minor bodily contacts which are actionable as assaults.
Any remedy for words which are abusive or insulting, or which create emotional distress by threats
for the future, is to be found [through other torts.]… Threats for the future are simply not present
breaches of the peace, and so never have fallen within the narrow boundaries of assault. Thus threats
for the future are actionable, if at all, not as assaults but as intentional inflictions of mental distress.
The tort of intentional infliction of mental distress is recognized in North Carolina. Liability
arises under this tort when a defendant’s conduct exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent
society and the conduct causes mental distress of a very serious kind. In Stanback v. Stanback, 254
S.E.2d 611 (N.C. 1979), plaintiff alleged that defendant breached a separation agreement between
the parties. She further alleged…that defendant’s conduct in breaching the contract was “wilful,
malicious, calculated, deliberate and purposeful” and that she has suffered great mental anguish and
anxiety as a result of defendant’s conduct in breaching the agreement and that defendant acted
recklessly and irresponsibly and with full knowledge of the consequences which would result….
[T]hese allegations were sufficient to state a claim for what has become essentially the tort of
intentional infliction of serious emotional distress….
The tort alluded to in Stanback is defined in the Restatement § 46 as follows:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm….
There is, however, troublesome dictum in Stanback that plaintiff, to recover for this tort, “must
show some physical injury resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by defendant’s alleged
conduct” and that the harm she suffered was a “foreseeable result.” Plaintiff in Stanback did not
allege that she had suffered any physical injury as a result of defendant’s conduct. We noted
in Stanback, however, that “physical injury” had been given a broad interpretation in some of our
earlier cases, e.g., Kimberly v. Howland, 55 S.E. 778 (N.C. 1906), where the Court said,
The nerves are as much a part of the physical system as the limbs, and in some
persons are very delicately adjusted, and when “out of tune” cause excruciating
agony. We think the general principles of the law of torts support a right of action
for physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or otherwise, none
the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system
instead of lacerated limbs.
We held in Stanback that plaintiff’s “allegation that she suffered great mental anguish and
anxiety is sufficient to permit her to go to trial upon the question of whether the great mental anguish
and anxiety (which she alleges) has caused physical injury.” We held, further, that plaintiff’s
allegation that defendant acted with full knowledge of the consequences of his actions sufficiently
indicated that the harm she suffered was a foreseeable result of his conduct…. [W]e are satisfied that
the dictum in Stanback was not necessary to the holding and in some respects actually conflicts with
the holding. We now disapprove it.
If “physical injury” means something more than emotional distress or damage to the nervous
system, it is simply not an element of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress…. In Wilson
v. Wilkins, 25 S.W.2d 428 (Ark. 1930), defendants came to the home of the plaintiff at night and
accused him of stealing hogs. They told him that if he did not leave their community within 10 days
they “would put a rope around his neck.” Defendants’ threats caused the plaintiff to remove his
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family from the area. Plaintiff testified that he was afraid they would kill him if he did not leave and
that he suffered great mental agony and humiliation because he had been accused of something of
which he was not guilty. In sustaining a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff, the Arkansas Supreme
Court rejected defendants’ contention that plaintiff was required to show some physical injury
before he could recover. The Court said:
The defendants rely upon the rule that in actions for negligence there can be no
mental suffering where there has been no physical injury. The rule is well settled
in this state, but it has no application to willful and wanton wrongs and those
committed with the intention of causing mental distress and injured feelings.
Mental suffering forms the proper element of damages in actions for willful and
wanton wrongs and those committed with the intention of causing mental
distress.
Similarly, the question of foreseeability does not arise in the tort of intentional infliction of
mental distress. This tort imports an act which is done with the intention of causing emotional
distress or with reckless indifference to the likelihood that emotional distress may result. A
defendant is liable for this tort when he desires to inflict severe emotional distress or knows that
such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct or where he acts
recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will
follow and the mental distress does in fact result. The authorities seem to agree that if the tort is
wilful and not merely negligent, the wrong-doer is liable for such physical injuries as may
proximately result, whether he could have foreseen them or not….
Stanback, in effect, was the first formal recognition by this Court of the relatively recent tort of
intentional infliction of mental distress. This tort, under the authorities already cited, consists of:
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe
emotional distress to another. The tort may also exist where defendant’s actions indicate a reckless
indifference to the likelihood that they will cause severe emotional distress. Recovery may be had
for the emotional distress so caused and for any other bodily harm which proximately results from
the distress itself….
The question [raised by defendants’ motion for summary judgment], then, is whether the
evidentiary showing demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiff’s only claim, if any, is for assault
and battery. If plaintiff, as a matter of law, has no claim for intentional infliction of mental distress
but has a claim, if at all, only for assault and battery, then plaintiff cannot surmount the affirmative
defense of the one-year statute of limitations and defendants are entitled to summary judgment….
Although plaintiff labels his claim one for intentional infliction of mental distress, …the nature
of the action is not determined by what either party calls it. The nature of the action is determined
by the issues arising on the pleading and by the relief sought, and by the facts which, at trial, are
proved or which, on motion for summary judgment, are forecast by the evidentiary showing.
Here much of the factual showing at the hearing related to assaults and batteries committed by
defendants against plaintiff. The physical beatings and the cutting of plaintiff’s hair constituted
batteries. The threats of castration and death, being threats which created apprehension of
immediate harmful or offensive contact, were assaults. Plaintiff’s recovery for injuries, mental or
physical, caused by these actions would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
The evidentiary showing on the summary judgment motion does, however, indicate that
defendant Earl Puryear threatened plaintiff with death in the future unless plaintiff went home,
pulled his telephone off the wall, packed his clothes, and left the state. The Court of Appeals
characterized this threat as being “an immediate threat of harmful and offensive contact. It was a
present threat of harm to plaintiff.” The Court of Appeals thus concluded that this threat was also
an assault barred by the one-year statute of limitations. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’
characterization of this threat. The threat was not one of imminent, or immediate, harm. It was a
threat for the future apparently intended to and which allegedly did inflict serious mental distress;
therefore it is actionable, if at all, as an intentional infliction of mental distress.
The threat, of course, cannot be considered separately from the entire episode of which it was
only a part. The assaults and batteries, construing the record in the light most favorable to the
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plaintiff, were apparently designed to give added impetus to the ultimate conditional threat of future
harm. Although plaintiff’s recovery for injury, mental or physical, directly caused by the assaults and
batteries is barred by the statute of limitations, these assaults and batteries may be considered in
determining the outrageous character of the ultimate threat and the extent of plaintiff’s mental or
emotional distress caused by it.2
Having concluded, therefore, that the factual showing on the motions for summary judgment was
sufficient to indicate that plaintiff may be able to prove at trial a claim for intentional infliction of mental
distress, we hold that summary judgment for defendants based upon the one-year statute of limitations
was error and we remand the matter for further proceedings against defendant Earl Puryear….
1.

QUESTIONS
Spousal Support: The court focuses on whether Earl Puryear may be liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. But could his wife, Ann Puryear, be liable
under any theory? And could she also be liable for assault and battery if those claims
weren’t barred by the statute of limitations?

2.

Slicing and Dicing: Take a close look at footnote 2. What exactly will it require of the
jury on remand? Do you think such delicate parsing is possible?

3.

Time Is of the Essence: Is there a reason to give plaintiffs an extra two years to bring
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress? Or is it merely legislative oversight?

The following case involves racism and includes redacted racist slurs.
LITTLEFIELD v. McGUFFEY
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (1992)
Wood, Judge:
Susanne Littlefield sued Malcolm McGuffey, also
known as Wally Mack among other persona, claiming he
denied her rental housing because her boyfriend, the father
of her daughter, was not of the same race as she. She sought
relief under the Equal Opportunity in Housing provision
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act as
amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.
In addition she claimed he committed numerous,
outrageous acts of harassment…[and] raised a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois
common law. The jury found Mr. McGuffey liable and
awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages.
McGuffey thereupon moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a
new trial. [The district court] denied both motions[,] entered judgment on the verdict, awarded
attorney’s fees…, and imposed Rule–11 sanctions on Mr. McGuffey’s attorneys for offering a motion
which was based on “inadequate legal inquiry and which was being used to harass, delay or increase
the costs of litigation.” Defendant McGuffey appeals…. For the reasons stated below we affirm.
On September 14, 1988, Ms. Littlefield, who was then 23 years old, met Malcolm McGuffey at
one of his apartment buildings. After viewing the advertised apartment she completed a rental
application form and gave him a $280 check as a security deposit, leaving the name of the payee
2
We note in this regard plaintiff’s statement in his deposition that “it is not entirely the future threat which caused me
all of my emotional upset and disturbance that I have complained about. It was the ordeal from beginning to end.” If plaintiff
is able to prove a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress it will then be the difficult, but necessary, task of the trier
of fact to ascertain the damages flowing from the conditional threat of future harm. Although the assaults and batteries serve
to color and give impetus to the future threat and its impact on plaintiff’s emotional condition, plaintiff may not recover
damages flowing directly from the assaults and batteries themselves.
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blank at McGuffey’s request. Later, McGuffey filled in the name of the payee with the fictitious
“Santa Maria Realty,” claiming at trial to have chosen that name because it had been close to
Columbus Day. He endorsed the check first as “Santa Maria Realty” then as “Osvaldo Kennardo,”
another persona of his. At their meeting McGuffey and Ms. Littlefield had agreed she, her younger
sister Sandra, and her daughter Shaunte would occupy the two-bedroom apartment and that
McGuffey would purchase and install a carpet with Ms. Littlefield paying the cost of installation.
McGuffey gave Ms. Littlefield a key to the apartment, and between then and September 27 she,
members of her family, and friends cleaned and painted the apartment and moved various
belongings into it.
On September 27, 1988, Bruce Collins, accompanied by Shaunte, the two-year old daughter of
Collins and Littlefield, took a check to McGuffey to pay for the carpet installation. When McGuffey
realized Mr. Collins was not the same race as Ms. Littlefield but was the father of her daughter, he
became quite agitated and exclaimed “the old man” had rented the apartment to someone else. At
trial McGuffey admitted he sometimes referred to himself as “the old man.”
After Collins left, McGuffey called Ms. Littlefield at work and told her she could not rent the
apartment because “the boss” (another of McGuffey’s persona) had rented it to someone else. He
also told her he had changed the locks and had put her belongings out on the porch. This was but
the first of many phone calls McGuffey made to Ms. Littlefield. That evening he called her at home,
identified himself as Walley Luther, and, mimicking a stereotypical black manner of speaking, told
her he wanted to move in with her and “six black guys, quit work and take welfare and drugs with
her, and swap wives with Bruce.” He called her at least two more times that night and several other
times that week with similar, degrading messages.
Ms. Littlefield was not the only recipient of McGuffey’s harassing, insulting and racist phone
calls. Her sister, Kathleen Gutierrez, was called many times over the next week or so. McGuffey told
her he was a member of the Ku Klux Klan and regularly asked how her sister, Susanne, “could have
gone to bed with a n****r and how she could have a n****r baby.” On one occasion McGuffey
attempted to lure Ms. Gutierrez outside on the pretext that she had to move her car because the
church lot where it was parked was being caulked.
The phone calls did not suffice. In early November McGuffey tracked down Ms. Littlefield’s new
residence and left a note, written on a napkin taped to her door, threatening the life of Bruce Collins
and repeating racist slurs. When she arrived home that evening, Ms. Littlefield found her sister,
Sandra, hiding behind the door, clutching a broom.
Ms. Littlefield and her witnesses…testified to all these events and more. Additionally, Ms.
Littlefield testified to numerous episodes of severe emotional distress. She became hysterical upon
receiving McGuffey’s call at work, went to the restroom, and cried; the rest of the day she suffered
from stomach upset and diarrhea. She experienced numerous episodes of disquiet and fright, being
particularly fretful because she feared for her daughter’s safety. Ms. Littlefield also testified that when
she came home at night with Shaunte, she would run from her car to her apartment, clutching her
daughter in one arm, with her keys in one hand and a can of mace in the other.
McGuffey denied Ms. Littlefield’s allegations, claiming he had not refused her rental housing on
the basis of race and that he had not harassed her. He asserted, instead, he had learned from various
businesses and prior landlords that she was a poor credit risk and had a history as an undesirable
tenant. He presented no witnesses, however, that confirmed having given him the negative rentalhistory or credit information. On the other hand, Ms. Littlefield presented witnesses from credit
departments of various businesses McGuffey claimed to have contacted. They generally testified the
credit information McGuffey claimed to have acquired would not be given out and that, anyway,
Ms. Littlefield’s credit history was respectable. The testimony of Brice Fawcett, Ms. Littlefield’s
former landlord, was notably damaging for the defendant. He contradicted everything McGuffey
claimed to have been told by him; he stated Ms. Littlefield had been a good tenant; and he testified
McGuffey did not interview him until October 1, four days after McGuffey evicted Ms. Littlefield.
As the district court observed, “Mr. McGuffey’s story therefore depended almost entirely on his own
credibility, and he was, to put it mildly, a witness with credibility problems.”
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…Mr. McGuffey raises [three] issues: [1] whether the district court erred in admitting or refusing
to admit certain items of evidence…, [2] whether there was sufficient evidence to support the
damage awards, and [3] whether the award of attorney’s fees was excessive….
Admission of Evidence
McGuffey…asserts it was error for the district court to admit Ms. Littlefield’s testimony about
episodes of fear and anxiety not accompanied by medically significant, physical manifestations. This
claim of error fails because in Illinois physical manifestation of emotional distress is not an element
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Under Illinois common law the tort comprises three elements. First, the conduct involved must
be truly extreme and outrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that his conduct inflict severe
emotional distress, or know that there is at least a high probability that his conduct will cause severe
emotional distress. Third, the conduct must in fact cause severe emotional distress. These are the
only elements enunciated by the court. Medically significant, physical manifestation of emotional
distress in not among them….
Jury Instructions
…A court of review should proceed cautiously when asked to set aside a jury’s verdict and order
a new trial, bound to consume substantial judicial resources, on the ground that the instructions
contained erroneous or confusing passages…. McGuffey finds fault with Plaintiff’s Instruction No.
21 regarding her state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. He raises numerous
allegations, the essence of which is that there was insufficient evidence of past, present, or future
damages to justify giving the challenged instruction…. There is sufficient evidence in the record to
support giving the challenged instruction. A perusal of the facts recited above shows Ms. Littlefield
presented evidence of her having suffered severe emotional distress. Additionally, there was some
evidence of that distress continuing through the time of trial. Thus, the district court was not without
justification for giving the instruction with respect to past, present, and future damages….
Sufficient Evidence
…McGuffey’s next two claims of error are that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
verdict awarding, on the one hand, $50,000 in compensatory damages and, on the other, $100,000
in punitive damages. A damage award will not be vacated for excessiveness unless it is monstrously
excessive or there is no rational connection between the evidence on damages and the verdict….
McGuffey claims the compensatory-damage award must be reduced, if not reversed, because
the plaintiff “presented no evidence of out-of-pocket loss” and no evidence of economic damage,
but only “intangible elements of emotional distress.” He further claims the amount of the award was
the result of the jury’s being carried away by passion and prejudice, due in large part to Ms.
Littlefield’s testimony about her emotional feelings.
But it is precisely the testimony about her emotional feelings and response to his terror tactics
which supports the award for the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and racial
discrimination. For example, Ms. Littlefield testified that after Mr. McGuffey called her at work to
tell her she could not move into the apartment, she became scared, went to the washroom, cried for
a half hour, and left work for the day without explaining to her boss why because she was too
embarrassed. She also testified that in late October or early November 1988, after moving into an
apartment with her daughter and sister, a terrifying note was discovered taped to her door. The note
read: “By THE Time you read this message Kiss your N***r [sic] friend goodbye Bitch > he’s dead!!!”
Plaintiff’s Exhibit A. Plaintiff’s handwriting expert testified the note had been written by McGuffey,
but the defendant’s expert was equivocal. All death threats are heinous and would support a finding
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. This one all the more because it employs the most
venomous and loathsome of racist epithets.
In addition, Ms. Littlefield testified she purchased cleaning, repair, and painting supplies, that she,
members of her family, and friends cleaned and painted the apartment she was never allowed to
occupy, and that she moved numerous personal items into it. This testimony belies McGuffey’s
appellate argument that Ms. Littlefield suffered no out-of-pocket loss. Lastly, the jury’s award is not
out of line with other, similar awards…. We, therefore, affirm the jury’s compensatory-damage award.
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McGuffey’s other complaint is about the amount of the punitive-damage award…. [W]e, like
the district court, conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s punitive-damage
award…. Initially, McGuffey rejected Ms. Littlefield as a tenant because of the race of her boyfriend
and their daughter. McGuffey’s subsequent acts of harassment and intimidation were entirely
gratuitous and did not begin until after his initial act of racial discrimination. These later acts, as
Judge Williams noted, included the following: (a) he immediately removed her belongings from the
apartment, exposing them to theft and vandalism and her to public ridicule and humiliation; (b) he
made numerous, blatantly racist, harassing phone calls to Ms. Littlefield; (c) he made similar racist,
harassing phone calls to members of Ms. Littlefield’s family who did not live with her; (d) he went
to her sister’s home and physically intimidated her; and (e) there is, of course, the death threat to
Bruce Collins posted on Ms. Littlefield’s door. Not only is the evidence sufficient to support the
award of punitive damages, it also supports the award of compensatory damages for the federal and
state law claims. We, therefore, affirm the jury’s punitive-damage award….
Attorney’s Fees
In his final claim of error McGuffey asserts the fees awarded Ms. Littlefield’s attorneys should
be reduced to reflect what he claims are the reasonable hours spent on the litigation…. A district
court’s rulings on attorney’s fees will rarely be reversed on appeal, and then only for abuse of
discretion…. McGuffey, nonetheless, asks us to reduce the fee awarded from approximately
$140,000 to nearly $50,000 by scrutinizing and excising some 473 individual time-charges, the
largest of which is for 9.5 hours and the smallest of which is for 0.1 hours. This we shall not do…..
McGuffey also argues the amount of the fees awarded is disproportionately large compared to
the damages awarded: approximately $140,000 versus $150,000. The size of a damage award,
however, is not the gauge of a plaintiff’s victory. Rather, value is gauged more broadly…. Ms.
Littlefield prevailed on her federal law claims, receiving both compensatory and punitive damages.
The latter certainly will punish McGuffey and, one hopes, deter him from further violations. The
award is also likely to deter others. Therefore, we find the attorney’s fees awarded are not
unreasonable, and the award stands….
1.

QUESTIONS
Proving Distress: What proof did Littlefield offer about her emotional distress? How
did McGuffey challenge her on this issue? In general, how should plaintiffs have to
substantiate their distress? What would you expect or want to see as a judge or juror?

2.

Extreme and Outrageous: Would McGuffey’s racist refusal to rent the apartment—
without his campaign of intimidation—suffice on its own to establish liability for
intentional infliction of emotional distress? What if his only act was to leave the racist
and threatening napkin note on Littlefield’s door?

3.

Racist Speech: Richard Delgado’s powerful 1982 article, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, examines how law often fails to
protect people from racial insults. After documenting the severe and extensive harm that
racism imposes on society, Delgado advocates for an independent tort to counter racial
slurs. Do you think such a tort should exist? What counterarguments might you expect
to this kind of proposal? Is a standalone tort necessary if victims of racist speech can
bring claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
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The following case discusses sexual assault.
JONES v. CLINTON
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas (1998)
Webber Wright, Judge:
The plaintiff in this lawsuit, Paula Corbin Jones, seeks
civil damages from William Jefferson Clinton, President of
the United States, and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas
State Police Officer, for alleged actions beginning with an
incident in a hotel suite in Little Rock, Arkansas. This case
was previously before the Supreme Court of the United
States to resolve the issue of Presidential immunity but was
remanded to this Court following the Supreme Court’s
determination that there is no constitutional impediment
to allowing plaintiff’s case to proceed while the President is
in office…. The matter is now before the Court on motion of both the President and Ferguson for
summary judgment…. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the President’s and
Ferguson’s motions for summary judgment should both be and hereby are granted.
This lawsuit is based on an incident that is said to have taken place on the afternoon of May 8,
1991, in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. President Clinton was Governor of
the State of Arkansas at the time, and plaintiff was a State employee with the Arkansas Industrial
Development Commission (“AIDC”)…. Ferguson was an Arkansas State Police officer assigned to
the Governor’s security detail.
According to the record, then-Governor Clinton was at the Excelsior Hotel on the day in
question delivering a speech at an official conference being sponsored by the AIDC. Plaintiff states
that she and another AIDC employee, Pamela Blackard, were working at a registration desk for the
AIDC when a man approached the desk and informed her and Blackard that he was Trooper Danny
Ferguson, the Governor’s bodyguard. She states that Ferguson made small talk with her and
Blackard and that they asked him if he had a gun as he was in street clothes and they “wanted to
know.” Ferguson acknowledged that he did and, after being asked to show the gun to them, left the
registration desk to return to the Governor. The conversation between plaintiff, Blackard, and
Ferguson lasted approximately five minutes and consisted of light, friendly banter; there was
nothing intimidating, threatening, or coercive about it.
Upon leaving the registration desk, Ferguson apparently had a conversation with the Governor
about the possibility of meeting with plaintiff, during which Ferguson states the Governor remarked
that plaintiff had “that come-hither look,” i.e. “a sort of sexually suggestive appearance from the look
or dress.”1 He states that “some time later” the Governor asked him to “get him a room, that he was
expecting a call from the White House and had several phone calls that he needed to make,” and
asked him to go to the car and get his briefcase containing the phone messages. Ferguson states that
upon obtaining the room, the Governor told him that if plaintiff wanted to meet him, she could
“come up.”
Plaintiff states that Ferguson later reappeared at the registration desk, delivered a piece of paper
to her with a four-digit number written on it, and said that the Governor would like to meet with
her in this suite number. She states that she, Blackard, and Ferguson talked about what the Governor
could want and that Ferguson stated, among other things, “We do this all the time.” Thinking that
it was an honor to be asked to meet the Governor and that it might lead to an enhanced employment
opportunity, plaintiff states that she agreed to the meeting and that Ferguson escorted her to the
floor of the hotel upon which the Governor’s suite was located.

1

Ferguson states that plaintiff informed him that she would like to meet the Governor, remarking that she thought the
Governor “was good-looking and had sexy hair,” while plaintiff states that Ferguson asked her if she would like to meet the
Governor and that she was “excited” about the possibility.
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Plaintiff states that upon arriving at the suite and announcing herself, the Governor shook her
hand, invited her in, and closed the door. She states that a few minutes of small talk ensued, which
included the Governor asking her about her job and him mentioning that Dave Harrington,
plaintiff’s ultimate superior within the AIDC and a Clinton appointee, was his “good friend.”
Plaintiff states that the Governor then “unexpectedly reached over to her, took her hand, and pulled
her toward him, so that their bodies were close to each other.” She states she removed her hand from
his and retreated several feet, but that the Governor approached her again and, while saying, “I love
the way your hair flows down your back” and “I love your curves,” put his hand on her leg, started
sliding it toward her pelvic area, and bent down to attempt to kiss her on the neck, all without her
consent. Plaintiff states that she exclaimed, “What are you doing?,” told the Governor that she was
“not that kind of girl,” and “escaped” from the Governor’s reach “by walking away from him.” She
states she was extremely upset and confused and, not knowing what to do, attempted to distract the
Governor by chatting about his wife. Plaintiff states that she sat down at the end of the sofa nearest
the door, but that the Governor approached the sofa where she had taken a seat and, as he sat down,
“lowered his trousers and underwear, exposed his penis (which was erect) and told her to ‘kiss it.’”2
She states that she was “horrified” by this and that she “jumped up from the couch” and told the
Governor that she had to go, saying something to the effect that she had to get back to the
registration desk. Plaintiff states that the Governor, “while fondling his penis,” said, “Well, I don’t
want to make you do anything you don’t want to do,” and then pulled up his pants and said, “If you
get in trouble for leaving work, have Dave call me immediately and I’ll take care of it.” She states
that as she left the room (the door of which was not locked), the Governor “detained” her
momentarily, “looked sternly” at her, and said, “You are smart. Let’s keep this between ourselves.”
Plaintiff states that the Governor’s advances to her were unwelcome, that she never said or did
anything to suggest to the Governor that she was willing to have sex with him, and that during the
time they were together in the hotel suite, she resisted his advances although she was “stunned by
them and intimidated by who he was.” She states that when the Governor referred to Dave
Harrington, she “understood that he was telling her that he had control over Mr. Harrington and
over her job, and that he was willing to use that power.” She states that from that point on, she was
“very fearful” that her refusal to submit to the Governor’s advances could damage her career and
even jeopardize her employment.
Plaintiff states that when she left the hotel suite, she was in shock and upset but tried to maintain
her composure. She states she saw Ferguson waiting outside the suite but that he did not escort her
back to the registration desk and nothing was said between them. Ferguson states that five or ten
minutes after plaintiff exited the suite he joined the Governor for their return to the Governor’s
Mansion and that the Governor, who was working on some papers that he had spread out on the
desk, said, “She came up here, and nothing happened.”
Plaintiff states she returned to the registration desk and told Blackard some of what had
happened. Blackard states that plaintiff was shaking and embarrassed. Following the Conference,
plaintiff states she went to the workplace of a friend, Debra Ballentine, and told her of the incident
as well. Ballentine states that plaintiff was upset and crying. Later that same day, plaintiff states she
told her sister, Charlotte Corbin Brown, what had happened and, within the next two days, also told
her other sister, Lydia Corbin Cathey, of the incident. Brown’s observations of plaintiff’s demeanor
apparently are not included in the record. Cathey, however, states that plaintiff was “bawling” and
“squalling,” and that she appeared scared, embarrassed, and ashamed.
Ballentine states that she encouraged plaintiff to report the incident to her boss or to the police, but
that plaintiff declined, pointing out that her boss was friends with the Governor and that the police
were the ones who took her to the hotel suite. Ballentine further states that plaintiff stated she did not
want her fiance to know of the incident and that she “just wanted this thing to go away.” Plaintiff States
that what the Governor and Ferguson had said and done made her “afraid” to file charges.
Plaintiff continued to work at AIDC following the alleged incident in the hotel suite. One of her
duties was to deliver documents to and from the Office of the Governor, as well as other offices
2
Plaintiff states in her amended complaint that the Governor “asked” her to “kiss it” rather than telling her to do so. She
states in her deposition that the Governor’s specific words to her were, “Would you kiss it for me?”
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around the Arkansas State Capitol. She states that in June 1991, while performing these duties for
the AIDC, she encountered Ferguson who told her that Mrs. Clinton was out of town often and that
the Governor wanted her phone number and wanted to see her. Plaintiff states she refused to provide
her phone number to Ferguson. She states that Ferguson also asked her how her fiance, Steve, was
doing, even though she had never told Ferguson or the Governor his name, and that this
“frightened” her. Plaintiff states that she again encountered Ferguson following her return to work
from maternity leave and that he said he had “told Bill how good looking you are since you’ve had
the baby.” She also states that she was “accosted” by the Governor in the Rotunda of the Arkansas
State Capitol when he “draped his arm over her, pulled her close to him and held her tightly to his
body,” and said to his bodyguard, “Don’t we make a beautiful couple: Beauty and the Beast?” Plaintiff
additionally states that on an unspecified date, she was waiting in the Governor’s outer office on a
delivery run when the Governor entered the office, patted her on the shoulder, and in a “friendly
fashion” said, “How are you doing, Paula?”…
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment with AIDC on February 20, 1993, in order to
move to California with her husband…. She states that in January 1994, while visiting family and
friends in Arkansas, she was informed of an article in The American Spectator magazine that she
claims referred to her alleged encounter with the Governor at the Excelsior Hotel and incorrectly
suggested that she had engaged in sexual relations with the Governor. Plaintiff states that she also
encountered Ferguson in a restaurant during this same time and that he indicated he was the source
for the article and that he knew she had refused the Governor’s alleged advances because, he said,
“Clinton told me you wouldn’t do anything anyway, Paula.”
On February 11, 1994, at an event attended by the media, plaintiff states that she publicly asked
President Clinton to acknowledge the incident mentioned in the article in The American Spectator,
to state that she had rejected his advances, and to apologize to her, but that the President responded
to her request for an apology by having his press spokespersons deliver a statement on his behalf
that the incident never happened and that he never met plaintiff. Thereafter, on May 6, 1994,
plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff’s amended complaint…asserts a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress or outrage against Governor Clinton, based primarily on the alleged incident at
the hotel but also encompassing subsequent alleged acts.
The President [argues that]…plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or
outrage fails because (a) by plaintiff’s own testimony, the conduct at issue does not constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage under Arkansas law,[3] and (b) plaintiff did not
as a result of the alleged conduct suffer emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could
endure it….
To establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that
emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the plaintiff’s emotional distress was so severe in nature that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
The President argues that the alleged conduct of which plaintiff complains was brief and isolated;
did not result in any physical harm or objective symptoms of the requisite severe distress; did not result
in distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; and he had no knowledge
of any special condition of plaintiff that would render her particularly susceptible to distress. He argues
that plaintiff has failed to identify the kind of clear cut proof that Arkansas courts require for a claim
of outrage and that he is therefore entitled to summary judgment. The Court agrees.
One is subject to liability for the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress if
he or she wilfully or wantonly causes severe emotional distress to another by extreme and outrageous
conduct…. [B]y extreme and outrageous conduct, we mean conduct that is so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. Whether conduct is “extreme and
3
Under Arkansas law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the tort of outrage are essentially the
same causes of action and are governed by the same standards.
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outrageous” is determined by looking at the conduct at issue; the period of time over which the
conduct took place; the relation between plaintiff and defendant; and defendant’s knowledge that
plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental
peculiarity. The tort is clearly not intended to provide legal redress for every slight insult or indignity
that one must endure. The Arkansas courts take a strict approach and give a narrow view to claims
of outrage, and merely describing conduct as outrageous does not make it so.
Plaintiff seems to base her claim of outrage on her erroneous belief that the allegations she has
presented are sufficient to constitute criminal sexual assault. She states that “Mr. Clinton’s
outrageous conduct includes offensive language, an offensive proposition, offensive touching
(constituting sexual assault under both federal and state definitions), and actual exposure of an
intimate private body part,” and that “there are few more outrageous acts than a criminal sexual
assault followed by unwanted exposure, coupled with a demand for oral sex by the most powerful
man in the state against a very young, low-level employee.”
While the Court will certainly agree that plaintiff’s allegations describe offensive conduct, the
Court, as previously noted, has found that the Governor’s alleged conduct does not constitute sexual
assault. Rather, the conduct as alleged by plaintiff describes a mere sexual proposition or encounter,
albeit an odious one, that was relatively brief in duration, did not involve any coercion or threats of
reprisal, and was abandoned as soon as plaintiff made clear that the advance was not welcome. The
Court is not aware of any authority holding that such a sexual encounter or proposition of the type
alleged in this case, without more, gives rise to a claim of outrage. Cf. Croom v. Younts, 913 S.W.2d
283 (Ark. 1996) (use of wine and medication by a vastly older relative to foist sex on a minor cousin
went “beyond a mere sexual encounter” and offended all sense of decency).
Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive nature of the Governor’s alleged conduct, plaintiff
admits that she never missed a day of work following the alleged incident, she continued to work at
AIDC another nineteen months (leaving only because of her husband’s job transfer), she continued
to go on a daily basis to the Governor’s Office to deliver items and never asked to be relieved of that
duty, she never filed a formal complaint or told her supervisors of the incident while at AIDC, she
never consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist, or incurred medical bills as a result of the alleged
incident, and she acknowledges that her two subsequent contacts with the Governor involved
comments made “in a light vein” and nonsexual contact that was done in a “friendly fashion.”
Further, despite earlier claiming that she suffered marital discord and humiliation, plaintiff stated
in her deposition that she was not claiming damages to her marriage as a result of the Governor’s
alleged conduct, and she acknowledged the request to drop her claim of injury to reputation by
stating, “I didn’t really care if it was dropped or not personally.” Plaintiff’s actions and statements in
this case do not portray someone who experienced emotional distress so severe in nature that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Cf. Hamaker v. Ivy, 51 F.3d 108 (8th Cir. 1995)
(no claim of outrage where plaintiff, who had a speech impediment and an I.Q. of between 75 and
100, was “red-faced and angry,” had an “increased heart rate and blood pressure,” and had trouble
sleeping four days after incident involving “rather nasty” practical joke).
Nevertheless, plaintiff submits a declaration from a purported expert with a Ph.D. in education
and counseling, Patrick J. Carnes, who, after a 3.5 hour meeting with plaintiff and her husband a
mere four days prior to the filing of President Clinton’s motion for summary judgment, opines that
her alleged encounter with Governor Clinton in 1991, “and the ensuing events,” have caused
plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress and “consequent sexual aversion.” The Court does not
credit this declaration.
In Angle v. Alexander, 945 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1997), the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that
absent physical harm, courts look for more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the
mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious. In that case, the plaintiffs offered their own testimony
that they had experienced emotional distress, thoughts of death, fear, anger, and worry, but little
else. In concluding that there was no evidence of extreme emotional distress required to prevail on
an outrage claim, the Court found it significant that none had seen a physician or mental health
professional for these concerns. The Court did not allow the fact that one plaintiff “on the advice of
her attorney, spoke to a psychologist” to overcome her failure of proof on this point….
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[T]he opinions stated [in the Carnes’ declaration] are vague and conclusory and, as in Angle, do
not suffice to overcome plaintiff’s failure of proof on her claim of outrage. Cf. Crenshaw v. GeorgiaPacific Corp., 915 F. Supp. 93 (W.D. Ark. 1995) (affidavit prepared after opposing motion for
summary judgment filed detailing symptoms of weight loss, lack of sleep, headache, worry, and
nausea, failed to present sufficient evidence of emotional distress).
In sum, plaintiff’s allegations fall far short of the rigorous standards for establishing a claim of
outrage under Arkansas law and the Court therefore grants the President’s motion for summary
judgment on this claim….
1.

QUESTIONS
Fojtik Revisited: Could Paula Jones have sued President Clinton for false imprisonment?
What about assault? Would she have been more successful with those claims?

2.

Mens Rea: If you were Paula Jones’s lawyer, which facts would you highlight to establish
that President Clinton intended to cause your client emotional distress? If you were
President Clinton’s lawyer, which facts would you use in your defense? How might both
parties address the question of whether President Clinton was at least reckless?

3.

#MeToo: Do you think this case would have come out differently if it had been litigated
after the #MeToo movement?
HUSTLER MAGAZINE, INC. v. FALWELL
Supreme Court of the United States (1988)

Rehnquist, Chief Justice:

ã

Petitioner Hustler Magazine, Inc., is a magazine of
nationwide circulation. Respondent Jerry Falwell, a
nationally known minister who has been active as a
commentator on politics and public affairs, sued
petitioner and its publisher, petitioner Larry Flynt, to
recover damages for invasion of privacy, libel, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District
Court directed a verdict against respondent on the
privacy claim, and submitted the other two claims to a
jury. The jury found for petitioners on the defamation
claim, but found for respondent on the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and awarded
damages. We now consider whether this award is
consistent with the [First Amendment].
The inside front cover of the November 1983 issue
of Hustler Magazine featured a “parody” of an
advertisement for Campari Liqueur that contained the
name and picture of respondent and was entitled “Jerry
Falwell talks about his first time.” This parody was
modeled after actual Campari ads that included
interviews with various celebrities about their “first times.” Although it was apparent by the end of
each interview that this meant the first time they sampled Campari, the ads clearly played on the
sexual double entendre of the general subject of “first times.” Copying the form and layout of these
Campari ads, Hustler’s editors chose respondent as the featured celebrity and drafted an alleged
“interview” with him in which he states that his “first time” was during a drunken incestuous
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse. The Hustler parody portrays respondent and his
mother as drunk and immoral, and suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only when
he is drunk. In small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, “ad parody —
ã

Jerry Falwell Talks About His First Time, HUSTLER (Nov. 1983).
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not to be taken seriously.” The magazine’s table of contents also lists the ad as “Fiction; Ad and
Personality Parody.”…
The jury…found against respondent on the libel claim, specifically finding that the ad parody
could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in
which he participated.” The jury ruled for respondent on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, however, and stated that he should be awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages,
as well as $50,000 each in punitive damages from petitioners….
This case presents us with a novel question involving First Amendment limitations upon a State’s
authority to protect its citizens from the intentional infliction of emotional distress. We must decide
whether a public figure may recover damages for emotional harm caused by the publication of an
ad parody offensive to him, and doubtless gross and repugnant in the eyes of most. Respondent
would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is
sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended
to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as
stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the
free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. The freedom to speak
one’s mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole. We have therefore
been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from
governmentally imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a “false” idea.
As Justice Holmes wrote, “when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to produce
speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those public figures who are intimately
involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in
areas of concern to society at large. Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly in Baumgartner v. United
States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944), when he said that “one of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the
right to criticize public men and measures.” Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned
or moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to “vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)….
Of course, this does not mean that any speech about a public figure is immune from sanction in
the form of damages. Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, we have consistently ruled that a public
figure may hold a speaker liable for the damage to reputation caused by publication of a defamatory
falsehood, but only if the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. False statements of fact are particularly valueless; they
interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an
individual’s reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or
effective. But even though falsehoods have little value in and of themselves, they are nevertheless
inevitable in free debate, and a rule that would impose strict liability on a publisher for false factual
assertions would have an undoubted “chilling” effect on speech relating to public figures that does
have constitutional value. Freedoms of expression require “breathing space.” This breathing space
is provided by a constitutional rule that allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only
when they can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the
requisite level of culpability.
Respondent argues, however, that a different standard should apply in this case because here the
State seeks to prevent not reputational damage, but the severe emotional distress suffered by the
person who is the subject of an offensive publication. In respondent’s view, and in the view of
the Court of Appeals, so long as the utterance was intended to inflict emotional distress, was
outrageous, and did in fact inflict serious emotional distress, it is of no constitutional import whether
the statement was a fact or an opinion, or whether it was true or false. It is the intent to cause injury
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that is the gravamen of the tort, and the State’s interest in preventing emotional harm simply
outweighs whatever interest a speaker may have in speech of this type.
Generally speaking the law does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which
should receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have
chosen to make it civilly culpable where the conduct in question is sufficiently “outrageous.” But in
the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than admirable
are protected by the First Amendment. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), we held that
even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression was protected by the
First Amendment: “Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk
that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred,
utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of
truth.” Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes of tort liability in
other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a result in the area of public
debate about public figures.
Were we to hold otherwise, there can be little doubt that political cartoonists and satirists would
be subjected to damages awards without any showing that their work falsely defamed its subject.
Webster’s defines a caricature as “the deliberately distorted picturing or imitating of a person,
literary style, etc. by exaggerating features or mannerisms for satirical effect.” The appeal of the
political cartoon or caricature is often based on exploitation of unfortunate physical traits or
politically embarrassing events—an exploitation often calculated to injure the feelings of the subject
of the portrayal. The art of the cartoonist is often not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and onesided. One cartoonist expressed the nature of the art in these words: “The political cartoon is a
weapon of attack, of scorn and ridicule and satire; it is least effective when it tries to pat some
politician on the back. It is usually as welcome as a bee sting and is always controversial in some
quarters.” Long, The Political Cartoon: Journalism’s Strongest Weapon, The Quill (Nov. 1962).
Several famous examples of this type of intentionally injurious speech were drawn by Thomas
Nast, probably the greatest American cartoonist to date, who was associated for many years during
the post-Civil War era with Harper’s Weekly. In the pages of that publication Nast conducted a
graphic vendetta against William M. “Boss” Tweed and his corrupt associates in New York City’s
“Tweed Ring.” It has been described by one historian of the subject as “a sustained attack which in
its passion and effectiveness stands alone in the history of American graphic art.” M. Keller, The Art
and Politics of Thomas Nast (1968). Another writer explains that the success of the Nast cartoon was
achieved “because of the emotional impact of its presentation. It continuously goes beyond the
bounds of good taste and conventional manners.” C. Press, The Political Cartoon (1981).
Despite their sometimes caustic nature, from the early cartoon portraying George Washington
as an ass down to the present day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent
role in public and political debate…. Lincoln’s tall, gangling posture, Teddy Roosevelt’s glasses and
teeth, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s jutting jaw and cigarette holder have been memorialized by
political cartoons with an effect that could not have been obtained by the photographer or the
portrait artist. From the viewpoint of history it is clear that our political discourse would have been
considerably poorer without them.
Respondent contends, however, that the caricature in question here was so “outrageous” as to
distinguish it from more traditional political cartoons. There is no doubt that the caricature of
respondent and his mother published in Hustler is at best a distant cousin of the political cartoons
described above, and a rather poor relation at that. If it were possible by laying down a principled
standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm.
But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite sure that the pejorative description
“outrageous” does not supply one. “Outrageousness” in the area of political and social discourse has
an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. An
“outrageousness” standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be
awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (“Speech does not lose its protected
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character…simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into action.”). And, as we stated
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978):
The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for
suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that
consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a
central tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral
in the marketplace of ideas….
Admittedly, these oft-repeated First Amendment principles, like other principles, are subject to
limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation, that speech that is “vulgar, offensive, and
shocking” is “not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances.” In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), we held that a State could lawfully punish an
individual for the use of insulting “‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” These limitations are but recognition of
the observation…that this Court has long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance. But the sort of expression involved in this case does not seem to us to be governed by
any exception to the general First Amendment principles stated above.
We conclude that public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without
showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with
“actual malice,” i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was true. This is not merely a blind application of the New York Times standard, it
reflects our considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate “breathing
space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.
Here it is clear that respondent Falwell is a “public figure” for purposes of First Amendment
law.1 The jury found against respondent on his libel claim when it decided that the Hustler ad parody
could not “reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about [Falwell] or actual events in
which he participated.” The Court of Appeals interpreted the jury’s finding to be that the ad parody
“was not reasonably believable,” and in accordance with our custom we accept this finding.
Respondent is thus relegated to his claim for damages awarded by the jury for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress by “outrageous” conduct. But for reasons heretofore stated this claim
cannot, consistently with the First Amendment, form a basis for the award of damages when the
conduct in question is the publication of a caricature such as the ad parody involved here. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed.
White, Justice, concurring:
As I see it, the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has little to do with this case, for here
the jury found that the ad contained no assertion of fact. But I agree with the Court that the judgment
below, which penalized the publication of the parody, cannot be squared with the First Amendment.
1.

2.

1

QUESTIONS
Kitchen-Sink Complaints: Intentional infliction of emotional distress is sometimes
patronizingly pitched as a “gap-filler” claim when other veteran torts might not do the
trick. Why couldn’t Falwell confidently rely on defamation or public disclosure of private
facts? How does parodic or satirical speech pose challenges for both of those torts?
Freeing Our Speech: Chief Justice Rehnquist tells us that “freedom to speak one’s mind
is not only an aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is
essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.” In this
single sentence, he condenses three dominant justifications for free speech. How is each
justification arguably served in this case by immunizing Hustler Magazine for

Neither party disputes this conclusion. Respondent is the host of a nationally syndicated television show and was the
founder and president of a political organization formerly known as the Moral Majority. He is also the founder of Liberty
University in Lynchburg, Virginia, and is the author of several books and publications.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress? And what standard does the Court establish
to ensure this constitutional respect in future cases? Does it seem like an appropriate
standard for the tort interest at issue?
3.

Actually Malicious: Is there any doubt that Larry Flynt, in publishing the ad parody,
acted intentionally or recklessly to inflict emotional distress on Falwell? Consider this
colloquy between Falwell’s lawyer and Flynt: “Q. Did you want to upset Reverend
Falwell? A. Yes…. Q. Do you recognize that in having published what you did in this ad,
you were attempting to convey to the people who read it that Reverend Falwell was just
as you characterized him, a liar? A. He’s a glutton. Q. How about a liar? A. Yeah. He’s a
liar, too. Q. How about a hypocrite? A. Yeah. Q. That’s what you wanted to convey?
A. Yeah. Q. And didn’t it occur to you that if it wasn’t true, you were attacking a man in
his profession? A. Yes. Q. Did you appreciate, at the time that you wrote ‘okay’ or
approved this publication, that for Reverend Falwell to function in his livelihood, and in
his commitment and career, he has to have an integrity that people believe in? A. Yeah.
Q. And wasn’t one of your objectives to destroy that integrity, or harm it, if you could?
A. To assassinate it.” Setting aside Flynt’s intentions, do you believe that Falwell actually
suffered severe distress? Testifying about his reaction to seeing the ad, Falwell said: “I
think I have never been as angry as I was at that moment…. I somehow felt that in all of
my life I had never believed that human beings could do something like this. I really felt
like weeping. I am not a deeply emotional person; I don’t show it. I think I felt like
weeping.” Even Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that the ad was “doubtless gross and
repugnant in the eyes of most.” With facts like these, is free speech a good enough reason
to deprive a person of tort remedies?
The following case includes discussion of sexual assault and homophobic slurs.
SNYDER v. PHELPS
Supreme Court of the United States (2011)

Roberts, Chief Justice:

ã

…Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in
Topeka, Kansas, in 1955. The church’s congregation believes that
God hates and punishes the United States for its tolerance of
homosexuality, particularly in America’s military. The church
frequently communicates its views by picketing, often at military
funerals. In the more than 20 years that the members of Westboro
Baptist have publicized their message, they have picketed nearly
600 funerals….
[The church picketed the funeral of Marine Lance Corporal
Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq. The picketers were
within a few hundred feet of the funeral procession, but they did
not yell profanity, use violence, or violate police instructions.
Instead, for about thirty minutes before the funeral, they sang
hymns, recited Bible verses, and displayed signs featuring various
offensive messages. Matthew’s father could see the tops of the signs as he drove to the funeral, but
he did not see what was written on them until he watched a news broadcast later that night.]1

ã

Westboro Baptist Church © 1955-2021.
A few weeks after the funeral, one of the picketers posted a message on Westboro’s Web site discussing the picketing
and containing religiously oriented denunciations of the Snyders, interspersed among lengthy Bible quotations. Snyder
discovered the posting, referred to by the parties as the “epic,” during an Internet search for his son’s name. The epic is not
properly before us and does not factor in our analysis. Although the epic was submitted to the jury and discussed in the courts
below, Snyder never mentioned it in his petition for certiorari…. Snyder devoted only one paragraph in the argument section
1
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Snyder [Matthew’s father] filed suit against Phelps, Phelps’s daughters, and the Westboro Baptist
Church [for state-law tort claims, including] defamation, publicity given to private life, [and]
intentional infliction of emotional distress…. The District Court awarded Westboro summary
judgment on Snyder’s claims for defamation and publicity given to private life, concluding that
Snyder could not prove the necessary elements of those torts. A trial was held on the remaining
claims. At trial, Snyder described the severity of his emotional injuries. He testified that he is unable
to separate the thought of his dead son from his thoughts of Westboro’s picketing, and that he often
becomes tearful, angry, and physically ill when he thinks about it. Expert witnesses testified that
Snyder’s emotional anguish had resulted in severe depression and had exacerbated pre-existing
health conditions. A jury found for Snyder on the intentional infliction of emotional distress
[claim]…and held Westboro liable for $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in
punitive damages. Westboro filed several post-trial motions, including a motion contending that
the jury verdict was grossly excessive and a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law on all claims
on First Amendment grounds. The District Court remitted the punitive damages award to $2.1
million, but left the jury verdict otherwise intact….
To succeed on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Maryland, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. The Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment—“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech”—can serve as
a defense in state tort suits, including suits for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Whether
the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on
whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the
case. Speech on matters of public concern is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection. The
First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). That is because speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence
of self-government. Accordingly, speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy
of First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.
Not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance, however, and where matters of purely
private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous. That is
because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional
concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest: There is no threat to the free and robust
debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas; and
the threat of liability does not pose the risk of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of
public import.
We noted a short time ago, in considering whether public employee speech addressed a matter
of public concern, that “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined.” San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam). Although that remains true today, we have articulated some
guiding principles, principles that accord broad protection to speech to ensure that courts
themselves do not become inadvertent censors.
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public. The
arguably inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question whether
it deals with a matter of public concern.
Our opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), on the
other hand, provides an example of speech of only private concern. In that case we held, as a general
matter, that information about a particular individual’s credit report “concerns no public issue.” The
content of the report, we explained, “was speech solely in the individual interest of the speaker and
its specific business audience.” That was confirmed by the fact that the particular report was sent to
only five subscribers to the reporting service, who were bound not to disseminate it further. To cite
of his opening merits brief to the epic. Given the foregoing and the fact that an Internet posting may raise distinct issues in
this context, we decline to consider the epic in deciding this case.
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another example, we concluded in San Diego v. Roe that, in the context of a government employer
regulating the speech of its employees, videos of an employee engaging in sexually explicit acts did
not address a public concern; the videos did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the
employing agency’s functioning or operation.
Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires us to examine the content,
form, and context of that speech, as revealed by the whole record. As in other First Amendment
cases, the court is obligated to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to
make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.
In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all
the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.
The “content” of Westboro’s signs plainly relates to broad issues of interest to society at large,
rather than matters of “purely private concern.” The placards read “God Hates the USA/Thank God
for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,” “Fag Troops,”
“Semper Fi Fags,” “God Hates Fags,” “Maryland Taliban,” “Fags Doom Nations,” “Not Blessed
Just Cursed,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “You’re Going
to Hell,” and “God Hates You.” While these messages may fall short of refined social or political
commentary, the issues they highlight—the political and moral conduct of the United States and its
citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and scandals involving the Catholic
clergy—are matters of public import. The signs certainly convey Westboro’s position on those
issues, in a manner designed, unlike the private speech in Dun & Bradstreet, to reach as broad a
public audience as possible. And even if a few of the signs—such as “You’re Going to Hell” and “God
Hates You”—were viewed as containing messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders
specifically, that would not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro’s
demonstration spoke to broader public issues….
Apart from the content of Westboro’s signs, Snyder contends that the “context” of the speech—
its connection with his son's funeral—makes the speech a matter of private rather than public
concern. The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a funeral, however, cannot by itself
transform the nature of Westboro’s speech. Westboro’s signs, displayed on public land next to a
public street, reflect the fact that the church finds much to condemn in modern society. Its speech
is fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, and the funeral setting
does not alter that conclusion.
Snyder argues that the church members in fact mounted a personal attack on Snyder and his
family, and then attempted to “immunize their conduct by claiming that they were actually
protesting the United States’ tolerance of homosexuality or the supposed evils of the Catholic
Church.” We are not concerned in this case that Westboro’s speech on public matters was in any
way contrived to insulate speech on a private matter from liability. Westboro had been actively
engaged in speaking on the subjects addressed in its picketing long before it became aware of
Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that Westboro’s picketing did not represent its
honestly believed views on public issues. There was no pre-existing relationship or conflict between
Westboro and Snyder that might suggest Westboro’s speech on public matters was intended to mask
an attack on Snyder over a private matter.
Snyder goes on to argue that Westboro’s speech should be afforded less than full First
Amendment protection “not only because of the words” but also because the church members
exploited the funeral “as a platform to bring their message to a broader audience.” There is no doubt
that Westboro chose to stage its picketing at…Matthew Snyder’s funeral to increase publicity for its
views and because of the relation between [the funeral] and its views—in the case of the military
funeral, because Westboro believes that God is killing American soldiers as punishment for the
Nation’s sinful policies.
Westboro’s choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the
expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthew’s father. The
record makes clear that the applicable legal term—“emotional distress”—fails to capture fully the
anguish Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable grief. But Westboro
conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public
street. Such space occupies a special position in terms of First Amendment protection. We have
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repeatedly referred to public streets as the archetype of a traditional public forum, noting that “time
out of mind public streets and sidewalks have been used for public assembly and debate.” Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
That said, even protected speech is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.
Westboro’s choice of where and when to conduct its picketing is not beyond the Government’s
regulatory reach—it is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions…. Maryland now
has a law imposing restrictions on funeral picketing, as do 43 other States and the Federal
Government. To the extent these laws are content neutral, they raise very different questions from
the tort verdict at issue in this case. Maryland’s law, however, was not in effect at the time of the
events at issue here, so we have no occasion to consider how it might apply to facts such as those
before us, or whether it or other similar regulations are constitutional….
Simply put, the church members had the right to be where they were…. The protest was not
unruly; there was no shouting, profanity, or violence. The record confirms that any distress
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed,
rather than any interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot
where Westboro stood, holding signs that said “God Bless America” and “God Loves You,” would
not have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.
Given that Westboro’s speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is
entitled to special protection under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt. If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Indeed, the point of all speech protection is to
shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.
The jury here was instructed that it could hold Westboro liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on a finding that Westboro’s picketing was “outrageous.”
“Outrageousness,” however, is a highly malleable standard with an inherent subjectiveness about it
which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on
the basis of their dislike of a particular expression. In a case such as this, a jury is unlikely to be
neutral with respect to the content of the speech, posing a real danger of becoming an instrument
for the suppression of vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant expression. Such a risk is
unacceptable; in public debate we must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to
provide adequate “breathing space” to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. What
Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it, is entitled to special
protection under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome by a jury finding
that the picketing was outrageous.
For all these reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for intentional
infliction of emotional distress must be set aside….
Westboro believes that America is morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about
Westboro. Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public discourse
may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of public import on public property, in a peaceful
manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local officials. The speech was indeed planned to
coincide with Matthew Snyder's funeral, but did not itself disrupt that funeral, and Westboro’s choice
to conduct its picketing at that time and place did not alter the nature of its speech.
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—
as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing
the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro
from tort liability for its picketing in this case….
Breyer, Justice, concurring:
…While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the picketing addressed matters of public
concern, I do not believe that our First Amendment analysis can stop at that point…. [S]uppose that
A were physically to assault B, knowing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide A with
an opportunity to transmit to the public his views on a matter of public concern. The constitutionally
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protected nature of the end would not shield A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means. And in some
circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected.
The dissent recognizes that the means used here consist of speech. But it points out that the
speech, like an assault, seriously harmed a private individual…. The dissent requires us to ask
whether our holding unreasonably limits liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress—
to the point where A (in order to draw attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a
verbal assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing the most intimate details of B’s private
life, while knowing that the revelation will cause B severe emotional harm. Does our decision leave
the State powerless to protect the individual against invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even in the
most horrendous of such circumstances?
As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does not hold or imply that the State is always powerless
to provide private individuals with necessary protection….
Alito, Justice, dissenting:
Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal
assault that occurred in this case.
Petitioner Albert Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance
Corporal Matthew Snyder, was killed in Iraq. Mr. Snyder wanted what is surely the right of any
parent who experiences such an incalculable loss: to bury his son in peace. But respondents,
members of the Westboro Baptist Church, deprived him of that elementary right. They first issued
a press release and thus turned Matthew’s funeral into a tumultuous media event. They then
appeared at the church, approached as closely as they could without trespassing, and launched a
malevolent verbal attack on Matthew and his family at a time of acute emotional vulnerability. As a
result, Albert Snyder suffered severe and lasting emotional injury. The Court now holds that the
First Amendment protected respondents’ right to brutalize Mr. Snyder. I cannot agree.
Respondents and other members of their church have strong opinions on certain moral,
religious, and political issues, and the First Amendment ensures that they have almost limitless
opportunities to express their views. They may write and distribute books, articles, and other texts;
they may create and disseminate video and audio recordings; they may circulate petitions; they may
speak to individuals and groups in public forums and in any private venue that wishes to
accommodate them; they may picket peacefully in countless locations; they may appear on television
and speak on the radio; they may post messages on the Internet and send out e-mails. And they may
express their views in terms that are “uninhibited,” “vehement,” and “caustic.”
It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on private
persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that make no
contribution to public debate. To protect against such injury, most if not all jurisdictions permit
recovery in tort for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (or IIED).
This is a very narrow tort with requirements that are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy….
Although the elements of the IIED tort are difficult to meet, respondents long ago abandoned any
effort to show that those tough standards were not satisfied here…. They did not dispute that Mr.
Snyder suffered wounds that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves. Nor did they
dispute that their speech was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Instead, they maintained that the First Amendment gave them a license to engage in
such conduct. They are wrong…. When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack
like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery….2 In order to
have a society in which public issues can be openly and vigorously debated, it is not necessary to
allow the brutalization of innocent victims like petitioner. I therefore respectfully dissent.

2
The Court refuses to consider the epic because it was not discussed in Snyder’s petition for certiorari. The epic, however,
is not a distinct claim but a piece of evidence that the jury considered in imposing liability for the claims now before this
Court. The protest and the epic are parts of a single course of conduct that the jury found to constitute intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The Court’s strange insistence that the epic “is not properly before us,” means that the Court has not
actually made an independent examination of the whole record….
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1.

QUESTIONS
Sullivan and Sidis Revisited: Given the facts we’re given here, do you see why the district
court rejected Snyder’s claims for defamation and public disclosure of private facts?
Would the same result be due if Matthew Snyder (or his estate) had brought the claims?

2.

Brooker Revisited: Justice Alito calls Westboro’s conduct a “verbal assault.” Is this purely
rhetorical? What’s the minimum change you could make to the facts that would provide
Snyder with a viable assault claim?

3.

The Epic: The Court tells us that deciding whether speech is of public or private concern
requires examining the “content, form, and context” of that speech. In an intriguing
exchange buried in the footnotes, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito spar over the
relevance of the “epic” posted on Westboro’s website. This epic, titled “The Burden of
Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew A. Snyder. The Visit of Westboro Baptist Church to Help
the Inhabitants of Maryland Connect the Dots!,” addressed the Snyders directly: “God
blessed you, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder, with a resource and his name was Matthew. He was
an arrow in your quiver! In thanks to God for the comfort the child could bring you, you
had a DUTY to prepare that child to serve the LORD his GOD—PERIOD! You did JUST
THE OPPOSITE—you raised him for the devil…. Albert and Julie RIPPED that body
apart and taught Matthew to defy his Creator, to divorce, and to commit adultery. They
taught him how to support the largest pedophile machine in the history of the entire
world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity. Every dime they gave the Roman Catholic
monster they condemned their own souls…. Then after all that they sent him to fight
for the United States of Sodom, a filthy country that is in lock step with his evil, wicked,
and sinful manner of life, putting him in the cross hairs of a God that is so mad He has
smoke coming from his nostrils and fire from his mouth! How dumb was that?” Imagine
that the Snyders had sued based solely on Westboro’s publication of the epic, not their
funeral protest. Would their actions satisfy the elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress? Did the epic constitute speech of public or private concern? What
other facts might you want to know? Would it matter, for example, that Westboro posted
the epic on its publicly accessible website instead of its invitation-only Facebook group?
Do the all-caps portions help or hurt the Snyders? And does the binary public–private
standard make any sense now that the internet allows us freely to publish lengthy prose
to the world—prose that might blend “private” commentary about little-known people
with “public” discourse on weighty political issues?

B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The following case discusses suicide and sexual assault.
BEUL v. ASSE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (2000)
Posner, Judge:

ã

In this diversity suit for negligence, governed (so far as
the substantive issues are concerned) by Wisconsin law, the
jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff Kristin Beul’s
damages were $1,100,000 and that she was 41 percent
responsible for them; in accordance with the verdict,
judgment was entered against defendant ASSE
International for $649,000 (59 percent of $1.1 million)….

ã

Russell Street, Foreign Exchange (CC BY-SA 2.0).
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The defendant is a nonprofit corporation that operates international student exchange
programs. For a fee of $2,000 it placed Kristin, a 16-year-old German girl who wanted to spend a
year in the United States, with the Bruce family of Fort Atkinson, Wisconsin. The family, which
consisted of Richard Bruce, age 40, his wife, and their 13-year-old daughter, had been selected by
Marianne Breber, the defendant’s Area Representative in the part of the state that includes Fort
Atkinson. Breber is described in the briefs as a “volunteer,” not an employee; the only payment she
receives from ASSE is reimbursement of her expenses. Nothing in the appeal, however, turns either
on her “volunteer” status or on ASSE’s nonprofit status. Charities are not immune from tort liability
in Wisconsin, and ASSE does not deny that if Breber was negligent it is liable for her negligence
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, even though she was not an employee of ASSE. The
doctrine is nowadays usually described as making an employer liable for the torts of his employees
committed within the scope of their employment, but strictly speaking the liability is that of a
“master” for the torts of his “servant” and it extends to situations in which the servant is not an
employee, provided that he is acting in a similar role, albeit as a volunteer.
There is also no argument that the contract between ASSE and Kristin’s parents is the exclusive
source of ASSE’s legal duties to Kristin. Negligence in the performance of a contract that foreseeably
results in personal injury, including as here emotional distress, is actionable under tort law… [T]ort
law is a field largely shaped by the special considerations involved in personal-injury cases, as
contract law is not. Tort doctrines are, therefore, prima facie more suitable for the governance of
such cases than contract doctrines are even when victim and injurer are linked by contract.
As the sponsor of a foreign exchange student, ASSE was subject to regulations of the United
States Information Agency that require sponsors to train their agents, “monitor the progress and
welfare of the exchange visit,” and require a “regular schedule of personal contact with the student
and host family.” These [federal] regulations are intended for the protection of the visitor, and the
jury was therefore properly instructed, under standard tort principles not challenged by ASSE, that
it could consider the violation of them as evidence of negligence. There is no argument that the
regulations create a private federal right of suit that would allow the plaintiffs to sue ASSE under the
federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts (and we have found no case suggesting there is
such a right), or that Wisconsin is legally obligated to use the regulations to define the duty of care
of a sponsor sued under state tort law…. But the district court was entitled to conclude that a state
court would look to the regulations for evidence of the sponsor’s duty of care. Courts in tort cases
commonly take their cues from statutes or regulations intended to protect the safety of the class to
which the tort plaintiff belongs.
ASSE is also a member of a private association of sponsors of foreign exchange students, the
Council on Standards for International Educational Travel, which requires members to “maintain
thorough, accurate, and continual communication with host families and school authorities.” A jury
could reasonably consider the Council’s statement as additional evidence of the standard of care
applicable to sponsors and it could also accept the plaintiff’s argument that due care required Breber
to try to develop rapport with Kristin so that Kristin would trust and confide in her and so that
Breber could pick up any signals of something amiss that Kristin might be embarrassed to mention
unless pressed.
Kristin Beul arrived in Wisconsin from Germany on September 7, 1995, and was met at the
airport by Richard Bruce and his daughter. Marianne Breber did not go to the airport to meet
Kristin. In fact, apart from a brief orientation meeting at a shopping mall in September with Kristin
and one other foreign exchange student, at which Breber gave Kristin her phone number, she didn’t
meet with Kristin until January 21 of the following year—under unusual circumstances, as we’ll see.
She did call the Bruce home a few times during this period and spoke briefly with Kristin once or
twice, but she made no effort to make sure that Kristin was alone when they spoke. She would ask
in these calls how Kristin was doing and Kristin would reply that everything was fine. Breber did not
talk to Mrs. Bruce, who would have told her that she was concerned that her husband seemed to be
developing an inappropriate relationship with Kristin.
Kristin had led a sheltered life in Germany. She had had no sexual experiences at all and in fact
had had only two dates in her life. On November 17, 1995, Richard Bruce, who weighed almost 300
pounds and who was alone at home at the time except for Kristin, came into the loft area in which
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she slept and raped her. This was the start of a protracted sexual relationship. In the months that
followed, Bruce frequently would call the high school that Kristin was attending and report her ill.
Then, with Mrs. Bruce off at work and the Bruce’s daughter at school, Bruce would have sex with
Kristin. By February 22, Kristin had been absent 27 days from school. Bruce brandished a gun and
told Kristin that he would kill himself if she told anyone what they were doing together.
Curiously, in January Bruce and Kristin called Marianne Breber and told her that Mrs. Bruce
appeared to be jealous of the time that her husband was spending with Kristin. Bruce invited Breber
to dinner on January 21. Breber did not meet privately with either Kristin or Mrs. Bruce on that
occasion, and she observed nothing untoward. In February, however, Mrs. Bruce told Breber that
she and her husband were getting divorced, and Breber forthwith found another host family to take
in Kristin. Kristin didn’t want to leave the Bruce home, but on February 22 Breber came with a
sheriff’s deputy to remove Kristin. The deputy asked Kristin in the presence of Richard Bruce and
his daughter whether there was any inappropriate sexual activity between Richard and Kristin, and
Kristin answered “no.” The same day Breber, upon calling Kristin’s school to tell them that Kristin
would be out for a few days in connection with her change of residence, learned for the first time of
Kristin’s many absences.
Kristin lived with Breber for a few days between host families, but Breber didn’t use the occasion
to inquire about any possible sexual relationship between Kristin and Bruce. Breber told the new
host family that Kristin was not to contact Bruce for a month, but she did not tell Bruce not to have
any contact with Kristin. They continued to correspond and talk on the phone. Kristin had decided
that she was in love with Bruce and considered herself engaged to him.
In April, Mrs. Bruce discovered some of Kristin’s love letters and alerted the authorities. A
sheriff’s deputy interviewed Bruce. The next day Bruce, who had committed a misdemeanor by
having sex with a 16 year old, killed himself, leaving a note expressing fear of jail. It is undisputed
that the events culminating in Bruce’s suicide inflicted serious psychological harm on Kristin; the
jury’s assessment of her damages is not claimed to be excessive.
The defendant argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively to a new
trial because of trial error. The first argument divides into three: there was insufficient proof of a
causal relationship between the defendant’s negligence in failing to keep closer tabs on Kristin Beul
and her sexual involvement with Bruce culminating in his suicide; Bruce’s criminal activity was the
sole, or superseding, cause of her harm; and the harm was too “remote” in a legal sense from the
defendant’s lack of due care to support liability.
Since Kristin was determined to conceal her relationship with Bruce, the defendant argues, no
amount of care by Breber would have warded off the harm that befell Kristin; she would have
stonewalled, however pertinacious Breber had been in her questioning. This is conceivable, and if
true would let ASSE off the hook; if there was no causal relation between the defendant’s negligence
and the plaintiff’s harm, there was no tort.
But it is improbable, and the jury was certainly not required to buy the argument. Suppose Breber
had inquired from the school how Kristin was doing—a natural question to ask about a foreigner
plunged into an American high school. She would have learned of the numerous absences, would
(if minimally alert) have inquired about them from Kristin, and would have learned that Kristin had
been “ill” and that Richard Bruce had been home and taken care of her. At that point the secret
would have started to unravel.
As for the argument that Bruce’s misconduct was so egregious as to let ASSE off the hook, it is
true that the doctrine of “superseding cause” can excuse a negligent defendant. Suicide by a sane
person, unless clearly foreseeable by the tortfeasor, for example a psychiatrist treating a depressed
person, is a traditional example of the operation of the doctrine. So if Bruce’s boss had refused him
a raise and Bruce had responded by killing himself, the boss even if somehow negligent in failing to
give him the raise would not be considered the legal cause of the death. Or if through the carelessness
of the driver a truck spilled a toxic substance and a passerby scraped it up and poisoned his motherin-law with it, the driver would not be liable to the mother-in-law’s estate; the son-in-law’s criminal
act would be deemed a superseding cause.
Animating the doctrine is the idea that it is unreasonable to make a person liable for such
improbable consequences of negligent activity as could hardly figure in his deciding how careful he
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should be. The doctrine is not applied, therefore, when the duty of care claimed to have been violated
is precisely a duty to protect against ordinarily unforeseeable conduct, as in our earlier example of a
psychiatrist treating depression. The existence of the duty presupposes a probable, therefore a
foreseeable, consequence of its breach. (All that “foreseeable” means in tort law is probable ex ante,
that is, before the injury that is the basis of the tort suit.) Thus a hospital that fails to maintain a
careful watch over patients known to be suicidal is not excused by the doctrine of superseding cause
from liability for a suicide, any more than a zoo can escape liability for allowing a tiger to escape and
maul people on the ground that the tiger is the superseding cause of the mauling.
So Kristin’s high school would not have been liable for the consequences of Bruce’s sexual
activity with Kristin even if the school should have reported her frequent absences to Breber; the
criminal activities with their bizarre suicide sequel were not foreseeable by the school. But part of
ASSE’s duty and Breber’s function was to protect foreign girls and boys from sexual hanky-panky
initiated by members of host families. Especially when a teenage girl is brought to live with strangers
in a foreign country, the risk of inappropriate sexual activity is not so slight that the organization
charged by the girl’s parents with the safety of their daughter can be excused as a matter of law from
making a responsible effort to minimize the risk. Sexual abuse by stepfathers is not uncommon, and
the husband in a host family has an analogous relationship to a teenage visitor living with the family.
It is true (we turn now to the issue of remoteness) that when through the negligence of an alarm
company, to which ASSE in its role as protector of foreign students from the sexual attentions of
members of host families might perhaps be analogized, a fire or burglary is not averted or controlled
in time, the company is generally not liable for the consequences; the consequences are deemed too
remote. There are two related considerations. One is that so many factors outside the alarm
company’s control determine the likelihood and consequences (whether in property loss or personal
injury) of a failure of its alarm to summon prompt aid on a particular occasion that the company is
bound to lack the information that it needs to determine what level of care to take to prevent a failure
of its system. This basis of the doctrine is the same as that of the doctrine of superseding cause. A
harm is not foreseeable in the contemplation of the law if the injurer lacked the information he
needed to determine whether he must use special care to avert the harm. The second point is that
the alarm company is not the primary accident avoider but merely a backup, and the principal
responsibility for avoiding disaster lies with the victim. The points are related because both involve
the difficulty a backup or secondary protector against disaster has in figuring out the consequence
of a lapse on its part. Neither point supports ASSE, which was standing in the shoes of the parents
of a young girl living in a stranger’s home far from her homeland and could reasonably be expected
to exercise the kind of care that the parents themselves would exercise if they could to protect their
16-year-old daughter from the sexual pitfalls that lie about a girl of that age in those circumstances.
ASSE assumed a primary role in the protection of the girl….
The defendant…complains about the following instruction to the jury: “You’re instructed that
the law of Wisconsin does not allow a child under the age of 18 to consent to an act of intercourse.”
This was a reference to the state’s statutory rape law, but it was not elaborated further. The jury was
instructed to consider the instructions as a whole and another instruction was that it was to consider
Kristin’s comparative fault. The jury assessed that fault at 41 percent, so obviously it did not think
the age-of-consent instruction prevented it from considering Kristin’s responsibility for the harm
that befell her as a consequence of her sexual relationship with Bruce.
But should the jury have been told what the age of consent is in Wisconsin and, if so, was the
information conveyed to the jury in the right way? The answer to the first question is yes. The age
of consent fixed by a state represents a legislative judgment about the maturity of girls in matters of
sex. Eighteen is a pretty high age of consent by today’s standards and of course the law was not fixed
by reference to German girls; but it is nonetheless a reminder that teenage children are not
considered fully responsible in sexual matters, and this was something relevant to the jury’s
consideration of Kristin’s share of responsibility for the disaster. The criminal law is frequently used
to set a standard of care for civil tort cases—…and that was essentially the use made of it here. It
would have been error to instruct the jury that because Kristin was below the age of consent her
comparative fault must be reckoned at zero. That would have given too much force to the criminal
statute in this civil case, for the statute cannot be considered a legislative judgment that minors are
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utterly incapable of avoiding becoming ensnared in sexual relationships. A comparative-fault rule,
moreover, requires gradations of victim responsibility that are alien to the normal criminal
prohibition. Victim fault is not a defense, either partial or complete, to criminal liability. It is not a
defense to a charge of rape that, for example, the victim was dressed provocatively, or drunk, or
otherwise careless in the circumstances in which the rape occurred.
It would have been better, though, if the jury had been told how it should take the age of consent
into account in their deliberations. It should have been told that in deciding how much responsibility
to assign to Kristin for the events that gave rise to the harm for which she was suing, it could consider
that the state had made a judgment that girls below the age of 18 should be protected by the criminal
law from sexual activity even if they agree to it. As it was, the jury was left to tease out the relation
between the age-of-consent instruction and the comparative-fault instruction for itself. But we
cannot think that it was other than a harmless error. Indeed, we are surprised that the jury assigned
so large a responsibility to this young foreign girl virtually abandoned by the agency that was
standing in for her parents. The jury verdict was rather favorable to the defendant than otherwise….
1.

QUESTIONS
Fast Eddie’s Revisited: Why does Judge Posner think that Kristin’s school wouldn’t also
be liable for negligence? Is it a matter of duty or causation, or both?

2.

Causation Complexities: How are both components of the causation element satisfied
here? Do causation concerns explain why Kristin’s claim primarily rests on the
emotional injury she suffered in 1996, rather than any bodily injury she might have
experienced from the sexual assault in 1995?

3.

Victimization and Victim Blaming: Judge Posner remarks that it’s “not a defense to a
charge of rape that, for example, the victim was dressed provocatively, or drunk, or
otherwise careless in the circumstances in which the rape occurred.” Though he’s
discussing criminal liability in that particular sentence, what might he be implying about
how these facts could be relevant in determining tort liability? Do you agree? Judge
Posner also repeatedly mentions that Kristin was a “foreign” girl. Is that relevant?
WAUBE v. WARRINGTON
Supreme Court of Wisconsin (1935)

Wickhem, Justice:

ã

[While Susie Waube looked out of her window and
watched her daughter Dolores cross the road, she witnessed
defendant Amber Warrington negligently run over Dolores,
killing the child. According to the complaint, Susie was
already frail at the time of the accident and died two weeks
later, in part because of her anguish. Plaintiff, Susie’s husband,
brought a survival action against Amber Warrington, Amber’s
husband who owned the car, and the car’s insurer. The action
proceeded on the theory that Susie would have been able to
recover compensation for her anguish via a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the Court of the
Appeals reversed. We now reverse and remand.]…
[T]he question presented is whether the mother of a child who, although not put in peril or fear
of physical impact, sustains the shock of witnessing the negligent killing of her child, may recover
for physical injuries caused by such fright or shock.
The problem must be approached at the outset from the view-point of the duty of defendant and
the right of plaintiff, and not from the view-point of proximate cause. The right of the mother to
ã

Aphrodite, Despair (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0).
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recover must be based, first, upon the establishment of a duty on the part of defendant so to conduct
herself with respect to the child as not to subject the mother to an unreasonable risk of shock or
fright, and, second, upon the recognition of a legally protected right or interest on the part of the
mother to be free from shock or fright occasioned by the peril of her child. It is not enough to find
a breach of duty to the child, follow the consequences of such breach as far as the law of proximate
cause will permit them to go, and then sustain a recovery for the mother if a physical injury to her
by reason of shock or fright is held not too remote.
Upon this point we adopt and follow the doctrine of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E.
99 (N.Y. 1928)…:
Negligence is not actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected
interest, the violation of a right…. The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong
personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to
another…. The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong at all, has a cause of
action, not derivative, but original and primary. His claim to be protected against
invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor less because the act resulting
in the invasion is a wrong to another far removed….
The right of a plaintiff to recover damages for nervous shock caused by negligence without actual
impact has had an interesting history. In Victoria Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222
(1888), it was held that plaintiff was not entitled to recover such damages…. This became the
prevailing doctrine in this country. This doctrine, however, was repudiated in a number of
jurisdictions, including Wisconsin, in situations where fright without impact produced physical
injuries…. [Courts in Wisconsin and elsewhere have now held] that in order to give rise to a right
of action grounded on negligent conduct, the emotional distress or shock must be occasioned by
fear of personal injury to the person sustaining the shock, and not fear of injury to his property or
to the person of another.
Thus it may be said that the doctrine most favorable to plaintiff is not sufficiently broad to entitle
him to recover. The question presented is whether there should be an extension of the rule to cases
where defendant’s conduct involves merely an unreasonable risk of causing harm to the child or
spouse of the person sustaining injuries through fright or shock….
The only case squarely dealing with this problem is Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141 (1925).
[There, the defendant’s employee parked the defendant’s truck at the top of a hill without taking
reasonable care to ensure it would not roll away. It did roll and ran over the plaintiff’s daughter while
she was walking to school. The plaintiff was nearby but not endangered herself. She soon learned
that a young girl had been run over and, upon arriving at the hospital, discovered it was her
daughter. The court determined that plaintiff “sustained a severe shock and consequent physical
injuries from which she died.”]… Viewing the matter from the standpoint of proximate cause rather
than duty, the court held that…defendant ought to have anticipated that if the unattended truck ran
down this narrow street it might terrify some woman to such an extent, through fear of some
immediate bodily injury to herself, that she would receive a mental shock with resultant physical
injuries, and that defendant ought also to have anticipated that such a shock might result from the
peril to the child of such a woman.
While the majority, mistakenly, as it seems to us, approach this problem from the standpoint of
proximate cause, the dissenting opinion of Sargant, L.J., approaches it from the standpoint of duty.
The dissenting opinion concedes that since it was defendant’s duty to exercise due care in the
management of his vehicle so as to avoid physical injury to those on or near the highway, this duty
cannot be limited to physical injuries caused by actual physical impact. The dissenting opinion,
however, states that…“it would be a considerable and unwarranted extension of the duty of owners
of vehicles towards others in or near the highway, if it were held to include an obligation not to do
anything to render them liable to harm through nervous shock caused by the sight or apprehension
of damage to third persons.” The dissenting opinion concludes that there is no sound reason for
erecting an exception in favor of the mother of a child, and points out that once the defendant’s duty
is held to extend to those outside the field of physical peril, a doctrine is stated to which no rational
boundaries can be erected….

282

TORT LAW

Fundamentally, defendant’s duty was to use ordinary care to avoid physical injury to those who
would be put in physical peril, as that term is commonly understood, by conduct on his part falling
short of that standard. It is one thing to say that as to those who are put in peril of physical impact,
impact is immaterial if physical injury is caused by shock arising from the peril. It is the foundation
of cases holding to this liberal ruling, that the person affrighted or sustaining shock was actually put
in peril of physical impact, and under these conditions it was considered immaterial that the physical
impact did not materialize. It is quite another thing to say that those who are out of the field of
physical danger through impact shall have a legally protected right to be free from emotional distress
occasioned by the peril of others, when that distress results in physical impairment. The answer to
this question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is it clear that it can be entirely disposed of by a
consideration of what the defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated as a consequence of his
wrong. The answer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain
how far defendant’s duty and plaintiff’s right may justly and expediently be extended. It is our
conclusion that they can neither justly nor expediently be extended to any recovery for physical
injuries sustained by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of
witnessing another’s danger. Such consequences are so unusual and extraordinary, viewed after the
event, that a user of the highway may be said not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of them
by the careless management of his vehicle. Furthermore, the liability imposed by such a doctrine is
wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor, would put an unreasonable
burden upon users of the highway, open the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point.
It was recognized by the court in the Hambrook Case that had the mother there merely been told
of the injury to her child, instead of having been virtually a witness to the transaction, there would
have been no liability. The court thus selected at least one arbitrary boundary for the
extension…. [I]f the mother may recover, why not a child whose shock was occasioned by the peril
of the mother? It is not necessary to multiply these illustrations. They can be made as numerous as
the varying degrees of human relationship, and they shade into each other in such a way as to leave
no definite or clear-cut stopping place for the suggested doctrine, short of a recovery for every person
who has sustained physical injuries as a result of shock or emotional distress by reason of seeing or
hearing of the peril or injury of another. No court has gone this far, and we think no court should
go this far. It is our view that fairness and justice, as well as expediency, require the defendant’s duty
to be defined as heretofore stated…. Human wrong-doing is seldom limited in its injurious effects
to the immediate actors in a particular event. More frequently than not, a chain of results is set up
that visits evil consequences far and wide. While from the standpoint of good morals and good
citizenship the wrong-doer may be said to violate a duty to those who suffer from the wrong, the law
finds it necessary, for reasons heretofore considered, to attach practical and just limits to the legal
consequences of the wrongful act….
The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint do not bring the interest of Susie Waube within the field
of legally protected rights…. Order reversed, and cause remanded with directions to sustain the
demurrer.
1.
2.

QUESTIONS
Palsgraf Revisited: Why does the court draw from Palsgraf? What’s its relevance here?
The Buck Stops Here: Despite acknowledging previous expansions of negligence
liability in similar cases, the court offers multiple reasons to explain its refusal to “bring
the interest of Susie Waube within the field of legally protected rights.” What are those
reasons? Are you persuaded?

DILLON v. LEGG
Supreme Court of California (1968)
Tobriner, Justice:

ã

That the courts should allow recovery to a mother who
suffers emotional trauma and physical injury from
witnessing the infliction of death or injury to her child for
which the tortfeasor is liable in negligence would appear
to be a compelling proposition. As Prosser points out, “All
ordinary human feelings are in favor of her action against
the negligent defendant. If a duty to her requires that she
herself be in some recognizable danger, then it has
properly been said that when a child is endangered, it is
not beyond contemplation that its mother will be
somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.”
Nevertheless, past American decisions have barred the
mother’s recovery. Refusing the mother the right to take
her case to the jury, these courts ground their position on an alleged absence of a required “duty” of
due care of the tortfeasor to the mother. Duty, in turn, they state, must express public policy; the
imposition of duty here would work disaster because it would invite fraudulent claims and it would
involve the courts in the hopeless task of defining the extent of the tortfeasor's liability…. We have
concluded that feared dangers excuses the frustration of the natural justice upon which the mother’s
claim rests….
[P]laintiff’s first cause of action alleged that…defendant’s negligent operation of his vehicle
caused it to “collide with the deceased Erin Lee Dillon resulting in injuries to decedent which
proximately resulted in her death.” Plaintiff, as the mother of the decedent, brought an action for
compensation for the loss. Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleged that she, Margery M. Dillon,
“was in close proximity to the collision and personally witnessed said collision.” She further alleged
that “because of the negligence of defendants…plaintiff sustained great emotional disturbance and
shock and injury to her nervous system” which caused her great physical and mental pain and
suffering…. [Plaintiff’s third cause of action asserted a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress on behalf of Erin’s sister Cheryl, who was alleged to have been standing nearby when Erin
was hit.]…
[Defendant] moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that “No cause of action is stated
in that allegation that plaintiff sustained emotional distress, fright or shock induced by apprehension
of negligently caused danger or injury or the witnessing of negligently caused injury to a third
person. Even where a child, sister or spouse is the object of the plaintiff’s apprehension no cause of
action is stated, unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, fright or
shock as a result of fear for his own safety.” The court granted a judgment on the pleadings against
the mother’s count, the second cause of action, and denied it as to the sister’s count, the third cause
of action…. The trial court apparently sustained the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the
second cause…because [Mrs. Dillon] was not within the zone of danger and denied that motion as
to the third cause involving Cheryl because of the possibility that she was within such zone of danger
or feared for her own safety. Thus we have before us a case that dramatically illustrates the difference
in result flowing from the alleged requirement that a plaintiff cannot recover for emotional trauma
in witnessing the death of a child or sister unless she also feared for her own safety because she was
actually within the zone of physical impact….
The case thus illustrates the fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery in the one situation and
grant it in the other…. [W]e can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which she suffered upon
apprehension of the child’s death and yet deny it to the mother merely because of a happenstance
that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident. The instant case exposes the hopeless
artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule….
ã
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We turn then to an analysis of the concept of duty, which, as we have stated, has furnished the
ground for the rejection of such claims as the instant one. Normally the simple facts of plaintiff’s
complaint would establish a cause of action: the complaint alleges that defendant drove his car
(1) negligently, as a (2) proximate result of which plaintiff suffered (3) physical injury. Proof of these
facts to a jury leads to recovery in damages; indeed, such a showing represents a classic example of
the type of accident with which the law of negligence has been designed to deal.
The assertion that liability must nevertheless be denied because defendant bears no “duty” to
plaintiff begs the essential question—whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendant’s conduct. Duty is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid
to analysis in itself. But it should be recognized that “duty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an
expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection….
We have noted that this negation of duty [in cases similar to this one] emanates from the twin
fears that courts will be flooded with an onslaught of (1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable claims. We
shall point out why we think neither fear justified.
1. This court in the past has rejected the argument that we must deny recovery upon a legitimate
claim because other fraudulent ones may be urged.
The denial of “duty” in the instant situation rests upon the prime hypothesis that allowance of
such an action would lead to successful assertion of fraudulent claims. The rationale apparently
assumes that juries, confronted by irreconcilable expert medical testimony, will be unable to
distinguish the deceitful from the bona fide. The argument concludes that only a per se rule denying
the entire class of claims that potentially raises this administrative problem can avoid this danger.
In the first instance, the argument proceeds from a doubtful factual assumption. Whatever the
possibilities of fraudulent claims of physical injury by disinterested spectators of an accident, a
question not in issue in this case, we certainly cannot doubt that a mother who sees her child killed
will suffer physical injury from shock…. In the second instance, and more fundamentally, the
possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases does not justify a
wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that potentiality arises. The contention that
the rule permitting the maintenance of the action would be impractical to administer is but an
argument that the courts are incapable of performing their appointed tasks, a premise which has
frequently been rejected…. The possibility that some fraud will escape detection does not justify an
abdication of the judicial responsibility to award damages for sound claims….
Indeed, we doubt that the problem of the fraudulent claim is substantially more pronounced in
the case of a mother claiming physical injury resulting from seeing her child killed than in other
areas of tort law in which the right to recover damages is well established in California. For
example, a plaintiff claiming that fear for his own safety resulted in physical injury makes out a well
recognized case for recovery.1 Moreover, damages are allowed for “mental suffering,” a type of
injury, on the whole, less amenable to objective proof than the physical injury involved here; the
mental injury can be in aggravation of, or “parasitic to,” an established tort. In fact, fear for another,
even in the absence of resulting physical injury, can be part of these parasitic damages. And
emotional distress, if inflicted intentionally, constitutes an independent tort. The danger of
plaintiffs’ fraudulent collection of damages for nonexistent injury is at least as great in these
examples as in the instant case.
In sum, the application of tort law can never be a matter of mathematical precision. In terms of
characterizing conduct as tortious and matching a money award to the injury suffered as well as in
fixing the extent of injury, the process cannot be perfect…. [D]efendants have [long] argued that

1
…[I]t is incongruous and somewhat revolting to sanction recovery for the mother if she suffers shock from fear for her
own safety and to deny it for shock from the witnessed death of her own daughter. To the layman such a ruling must appear
incomprehensible; for the courts to rely upon self-contradictory legalistic abstractions to justify it is indefensible. We concur
with Judge Magruder’s observation in 49 Harvard Law Review 1033: “Once accepting the view that a plaintiff threatened with
an injurious impact may recover for bodily harm resulting from shock without impact, it is easy to agree with Atkin, L.J.,
Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K.B. 141 (1925), that to hinge recovery on the speculative issue whether the parent was shocked
through fear for herself or for her children ‘would be discreditable to any system of jurisprudence.’”
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plaintiffs’ claims of injury from emotional trauma might well be fraudulent. Yet we cannot let the
difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.
2. The alleged inability to fix definitions for recovery on the different facts of future cases does not
justify the denial of recovery on the specific facts of the instant case; in any event, proper guidelines can
indicate the extent of liability for such future cases.
In order to limit the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow every negligent
act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the
time were reasonably foreseeable. In the absence of overriding policy considerations foreseeability
of risk is of primary importance in establishing the element of duty. As a classic opinion states: “The
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.” Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Defendant owes a duty, in the sense of a potential liability for damages, only
with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous,
and hence negligent, in the first instance….2
Since the chief element in determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to
plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because it
is inherently intertwined with foreseeability such duty or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated
only upon a case-by-case basis. We cannot now predetermine defendant’s obligation in every
situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every
circumstance of the future. We can, however, define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of
such an issue as the instant one.
We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff suffered a shock which resulted in
physical injury and we confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a case, whether
defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether
defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the
following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one
who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted
with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a
distant relationship.
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant’s foreseeability:
obviously defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her
child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so. Similarly, the degree of
foreseeability of the third person’s injury is far greater in the case of his contemporaneous
observance of the accident than that in which he subsequently learns of it. The defendant is more
likely to foresee that shock to the nearby, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to
anticipate that someone distant from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional
reaction. All these elements, of course, shade into each other; the fixing of obligation, intimately tied
into the facts, depends upon each case.
In light of these factors the court will determine whether the accident and harm was reasonably
foreseeable. Such reasonable foreseeability does not turn on whether the particular plaintiff as an
individual would have in actuality foreseen the exact accident and loss; it contemplates that courts,
on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide what the ordinary man under
such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts thus mark out the areas of liability,
excluding the remote and unexpected.
In the instant case, the presence of all the above factors indicates that plaintiff has alleged a
sufficient prima facie case. Surely the negligent driver who causes the death of a young child may
2
The concept of the zone of danger cannot properly be restricted to the area of those exposed to physical injury; it must
encompass the area of those exposed to emotional injury. The courts, today, hold that no distinction can be drawn between
physical injury and emotional injury flowing from the physical injury; indeed, in the light of modern medical knowledge, any
such distinction would be indefensible. As a result, in awarding recovery for emotional shock upon witnessing another’s
injury or death, we cannot draw a line between the plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of physical impact and the plaintiff
who is in the zone of danger of emotional impact. The recovery of the one, within the guidelines set forth infra, is as much
compelled as that of the other.
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reasonably expect that the mother will not be far distant and will upon witnessing the accident suffer
emotional trauma. As Dean Prosser has stated: “when a child is endangered, it is not beyond
contemplation that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious shock.”
We are not now called upon to decide whether, in the absence or reduced weight of some of the
above factors, we would conclude that the accident and injury were not reasonably foreseeable and
that therefore defendant owed no duty of due care to plaintiff. In future cases the courts will draw
lines of demarcation upon facts more subtle than the compelling ones alleged in the complaint
before us….
We do not believe that the fear that we cannot successfully adjudicate future cases of this sort,
pursuant to the suggested guidelines, should bar recovery in an otherwise meritorious cause….
[T]he history of the [negligent infliction of emotional distress] cases does not show the development
of a logical rule but rather a series of changes and abandonments. Upon the argument in each
situation that the courts draw a Maginot Line to withstand an onslaught of false claims, the cases
have assumed a variety of postures. At first they insisted that there be no recovery for emotional
trauma at all. Retreating from this position, they gave relief for such trauma only if physical impact
occurred. They then abandoned the requirement for physical impact but insisted that the victim fear
for her own safety, holding that a mother could recover for fear for her children’s safety if she
simultaneously entertained a personal fear for herself. They stated that the mother need only be in
the “zone of danger.” The final anomaly would be the instant case in which the sister, who observed
the accident, would be granted recovery because she was in the “zone of danger,” but the mother,
not far distant, would be barred from recovery. The successive abandonment of these positions
exposes the weakness of artificial abstractions which bar recovery contrary to the general rules. As
the commentators have suggested, the problem should be solved by the application of the principles
of tort, not by the creation of exceptions to them….
[F]or some artificial reason [ordinary principles of negligence] liability [are] alleged to be
unworkable in the most egregious case of them all: the mother’s emotional trauma at the witnessed
death of her child. If we stop at this point, however, we must necessarily question and reject not
merely recovery here, but the viability of the judicial process for ascertaining liability for tortious
conduct itself…. To deny recovery would be to chain this state to an outmoded rule of the 19th
century which can claim no current credence. No good reason compels our captivity to an
indefensible orthodoxy. The judgment is reversed.
Burke, Justice, dissenting:
…Every one of the arguments advanced in today’s opinion was considered by this court and
rejected, expressly or by fair implication, in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513
(Cal. 1963)…. [T]he majority’s “guidelines” are simply a restatement of those suggested earlier by
Professor Prosser [and] have already been discussed and expressly rejected by this court in Amaya.
Upon analysis, their seeming certainty evaporates into arbitrariness, and inexplicable distinctions
appear. As we asked in Amaya: What if the plaintiff was honestly mistaken in believing the third
person to be in danger or to be seriously injured? What if the third person had assumed the risk
involved? How “close” must the relationship be between the plaintiff and the third person? I.e., what
if the third person was the plaintiff’s beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiance, or lifelong friend,
more dear to the plaintiff than her immediate family? Next, how “near” must the plaintiff have been
to the scene of the accident, and how “soon” must shock have been felt? Indeed, what is the magic
in the plaintiff’s being actually present? Is the shock any less real if the mother does not know of the
accident until her injured child is brought into her home? On the other hand, is it any less real if the
mother is physically present at the scene but is nevertheless unaware of the danger or injury to her
child until after the accident has occurred? No answers to these questions are to be found in today’s
majority opinion. Our trial courts, however, will not so easily escape the burden of distinguishing
between litigants on the basis of such artificial and unpredictable distinctions….
[N]o fallacy or incongruity appears in the rule permitting recovery to one within the physical
zone of danger for trauma suffered from fear of impact, but denying it to a person outside that zone.
The impact feared must be to oneself, and it must be an objective fear—not merely that of an
excessively imaginative or timid plaintiff…. [T]o permit recovery by every person who might
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adversely feel some lingering effect of the defendant’s conduct would throw us into “the fantastic
realm of infinite liability.” Yet the majority opinion in the present case simply omits to either
mention or discuss the injustice to California defendants flowing from such a disproportionate
extension of their liability—an injustice which plainly constituted a “prime hypothesis” for rejection
of the liability sought to be imposed by the plaintiffs in Waube and in Amaya….
1.

QUESTIONS
California versus Wisconsin: In what ways is Dillon a departure from Waube?

2.

Fantastical Negligence: Are you convinced by the majority’s arguments for permitting
Margery Dillon’s claim to proceed? Are Justice Burke’s rebuttals in dissent persuasive?
Are we now in the “the fantastic realm of infinite liability”?

3.

Highway to the Danger Zone: Was there any logic to the narrower zone-of-danger rule?
Is Margery’s sister Cheryl basing her negligence claim on a meaningfully different theory
of emotional distress than Margery?
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APPENDIX : ADDITIONAL MATERIALS
A. Writing for Exams
By Jean Mangan, Courtney Hogan, and Thomas Kadri*
There are different strategies that you will use when writing an essay for an exam in law school
or for the bar. Many law school exams consist of short answers, essays on directed topics, and “issuespotters.” In law school, issue-spotters are exams featuring a long hypothetical—usually referred to
as a fact pattern—in which there are several potential claims, defenses, and/or other scenarios to be
analyzed under the rules you have learned in the course. When you are responding to an issuespotter question, your goal is to demonstrate to the reader (usually your professor) that you both
know the legal rules and understand how to apply them to a given set of facts. Depending on the
particular fact pattern and prompt, you might also need to tell the reader every possible way a
situation could resolve, often by applying the same rule and showing how your conclusion might
change depending on how you interpret different facts. This ability to explore the legal issues in
depth demonstrates your mastery of the rules and their nuances. Remember, your law professors
assume you can regurgitate the rules, but they really want to see that you know how to apply the
rules.
First, pay careful attention to the “call of the question” or prompt—what the professor has asked
you to explain about the fact pattern. Many questions will not have a “right” answer as to whether a
certain claim will succeed or fail, so the best practice is typically to explain both sides of the argument
then commit to what you believe to be the stronger conclusion (e.g.: “The judge is likely to grant the
motion for summary judgment in this case.”), unless instructions indicate otherwise or additional
facts are necessary to make a reasonable conclusion. To maximize the points you earn, show the
professor the steps you took to reach your conclusions by using the traditional IRAC structure for
issue-spotter answers. Exams are designed for you to demonstrate to your professor that you can
both find and articulate the legal Issue; identify the relevant Rule(s); conduct the appropriate
Analysis or application, including the consideration of counterarguments; and clearly state the
Conclusion. Put another way, for each section of your exam answer, you want to tell the professor
what that particular section discusses; what past sources of law tell us about this issue; explain how
this rule applies to the scenario and why the rule leads to a certain outcome; and then summarize
for the reader the purpose of the section by restating your conclusion.
The primary benefits to sticking to an IRAC format are that (1) you present your thoughts in a
logical sequence; (2) you are more likely to include all the components needed to show your thought
process; and (3) your professor will be able to read your answers easily. All three of these benefits
combine to create yet another benefit: you enhance your credibility with the reader.
When you begin reading an issue-spotter question, I suggest going ahead and writing
I
R
A
C
down the page. As you come across an issue, write it next to the I. You will repeat IRAC down
the page for each issue you have.
In Torts, an “issue” is a possible legal question—whether claim or defense—raised by a fact
pattern and prompt. Although many fact patterns are quite long, every word has been carefully
selected and warrants your full attention. To borrow another professor’s metaphor, think of issuespotting as a pinball game: the fact pattern is riddled with issues, and you gain more points for each
issue you find and discuss. To ensure you catch as many issues as possible, read the fact pattern
carefully and multiple times, marking up the page as much as possible. Analyze every word and keep
* This essay was originally prepared by Jean Mangan, Courtney Hogan, and me for publication in JEAN MANGAN ET
AL., LEGAL WRITING MANUAL (2021), https://alg.manifoldapp.org/projects/legal-writing-manual.
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an eye out for important relationships between parties, as well as specific indications of the parties’
thoughts or actions that could suggest their mindset or explain their conduct. Do not add facts to
the problem or make broad assumptions about facts given. If more facts are necessary, explain their
necessity in your analysis. In short, active reading is your best friend in a law school exam.
For example, say you encounter the following prompt on your Torts exam:
Early one Sunday morning, Arthur went over to Henry’s house to ask to borrow
some eggs. When Arthur knocked on the door, Henry threw open the door, striking
Arthur in the face and giving him a bloody nose. Henry sticks his head out, sees
Arthur with blood streaming down his face, and laughs. Arthur screams, “I’m going
to go after you for everything you’ve got!” Henry slams the door in his face. Can
Arthur sue Henry for his bloody nose?
I - Can A sue H for bloody nose under a theory of battery?
R - Battery occurs when a defendant (1) acts (2) intending to cause contact that is
(3) harmful or offensive; and (4) harmful or offensive contact results. The contact
does not have to be directly from a part of the defendant’s body; it is enough that
the defendant intentionally uses an object to cause a harmful or offensive contact
with the plaintiff such that the contact can be attributed to the defendant.
A - Here, we know that Henry caused a harmful contact to Arthur by swinging
the door open and striking Arthur in the face and injuring his nose, which means
that three elements of a battery claim are satisfied. What remains to be determined
is whether Henry intended for the door to strike Arthur in the nose. On the one
hand, the fact that Henry stuck his head out and laughed afterwards might suggest
that Henry meant to strike Arthur with the door; in that case, Henry would be
liable for battery. On the other hand, if Henry did not mean to strike Arthur and
was actually laughing about something else, then Henry would not have had the
intent to strike Arthur, and Henry could not be found liable for battery.
C - Henry’s liability for battery will depend on whether Arthur can prove Henry
intended to open the door in a way that would strike Arthur.
(You could then use the same format to explore whether Arthur can sue Henry under a theory
of negligence.)
Notice how stating the issue helps you recall the appropriate rules. Once you have stated the rule,
you then go through and connect a fact from the prompt to each piece of the rule. Where an
important fact is unknown or ambiguous, like whether Henry had the requisite intent, that tells you
to show how the facts could be interpreted to allow for either outcome. Then, you bring it all together
by answering the question posed in I with the likely conclusion or the specific fact or portion of the
rule that the outcome turns on.
As you are studying for your exams, practice putting your answers to practice problems in the
IRAC format when you write out your responses. You should always try to answer the problems on
your own before you read the sample answer! Having to recall the information and put it in your
own words will help make the material stick in your long-term memory, which is better both for
your exam-taking and for learning the material thoroughly.
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B. Sample Exam
Please write clearly, concisely, and unpretentiously. Answer the questions. Part of good
lawyering, and good exam-writing, is identifying the key resources you need to tackle a given
problem, so don’t discuss irrelevant points of law that won’t support your answer. Still, do consider
points that are reasonably relevant and deserving of analysis, even if you think the argument
wouldn’t succeed, and explain why such an argument would fail. The less colorable the point, the
less attention you should give it. If you know case names that are on point, you may cite them, but I
care much more that you make the right points than that you cite controlling authority for them.
The exam has two parts. Part One has one question and Part Two has one question. You must
answer both questions. Please start your answer for each part on a new page with the titles “Part
One” and “Part Two.” There are word limits noted at the beginning of each part. The word limits
aren’t the same, so pay careful attention to them. If your answer to either part exceeds the word
limit, I’ll stop grading your answer well before that limit. If you write more than 600 words in Part
One, for instance, I’ll grade only the first 400 words of your answer in that part. So, please don’t
exceed the word limit, and remember that the word limits are maximums, not minimums. A good
answer might not approach the limit.
You have three hours to work on the exam. Although you have three hours, you’ll notice that
the times I’ve recommended for each part amount to only two hours. This leaves you one hour for
reading, outlining, and editing. Ultimately, it’s up to you to decide how you allocate your time, but
you should know that the recommended times are proportional to the weight I’ll assign each part
when grading. As the recommended times suggest, the parts aren’t weighted evenly.
Now, take a deep breath and give it your best shot. Good luck!
Part One (30 minutes, 600 words)
A wise law professor once said: “Tort law sometimes endorses and entrenches social norms,
while sometimes it undermines and challenges them.” Pick one topic of tort law that we’ve studied—
a particular tort, element, defense, doctrine, or concept—and discuss how that topic might relate to
the professor’s words.
Part Two (90 minutes, 2400 words)
Tensions were running high in the town of Athenia. After a bitterly contested race in November
in which no candidate won a majority of votes, the two leading candidates for county coroner were
gearing up for a January run-off election. Each candidate secured the endorsement of their party’s
presidential nominee, Ronald Grump and Moe Widen, who quickly joined the campaign trail to
build support. At huge rallies held in the town’s colossal football stadium, the candidates and their
endorsers urged their supporters to make their own yard signs and display them proudly on their
front lawns—the bigger and more sensationalist the sign, the better. “This race could be won or lost
based on those signs,” said one local commentator.
Maria Perez and Monica Cruz lived on the same street in the Athenian neighborhood of Two
Points. Their political views couldn’t be more polarized, with each convinced that their preferred
candidate for coroner was the only person who could save this country from decay. Perez and Cruz
began enthusiastically making yard signs. Perez, an electrician, fitted her sign with lightbulbs that
flashed her candidate’s name for all her neighbors to see. Cruz, a party-planner, was no less creative,
decorating her sign with patriotic symbols to catch everyone’s eye.
When Perez’s candidate fell behind in the polls, she concluded that her lightbulb sign wasn’t
enough. One night, she snuck over to the edge of Cruz’s property and, making sure not to step on
Cruz’s lawn, used a long stick to yank the patriotic sign onto the street. She then burned the sign
before posting a photo of the ashes on Twitter along with the hashtag #CrematetheCoroner.
Unfortunately for Perez, Cruz spotted this act of partisan passion (even in the darkness, Perez had
something of a glow to her). When Cruz saw Perez leaving for work the next morning, she walked
across Perez’s driveway and smashed every light bulb on the illuminated sign with a baseball bat.
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Undeterred, Perez and Cruz spent the weekend making new signs. Perez made a metal sign in
the shape of a nectarine, while Cruz went old school with a cardboard sign featuring her candidate’s
name. But the two neighbors went one step further this time. Perez wired her metal sign to deliver
a sharp electric shock to anyone or anything that touched it. Cruz put her own vocation to good use,
attaching some string to her cardboard sign to detonate a glitter bomb if the sign were pulled out of
the ground.
Sure enough, the booby traps came in handy. On election week, with pollsters confidently
claiming that the candidates were neck and neck, Perez and Cruz made a last-ditch effort to clinch
the contest for their side. When Perez walked onto Cruz’s front lawn and grabbed the cardboard
sign, the glitter bomb exploded, showering her from head to toe in sparkly bits of plastic. She
coughed, spluttered, and sneezed, gasping for air as the glitter did its work.
Perez returned home utterly distraught, but she didn’t have to wait long for revenge. Later that
day, Cruz decided to steal the metal sign. As she tugged it, she suffered an electric shock that stung
her hand so sharply that she immediately let go and ran home. Unbeknownst to anyone, Cruz had
an undiagnosed heart condition, and she suffered a heart attack later that day while sitting on her
porch. Peering out of her window, Perez saw Cruz fall to the ground and clutch her chest, but she
was too busy scrubbing the glitter off her face to care. It was hours before Cruz was found.
Perez is outraged. Election day is around the corner, yet she’s still finding glitter in her hair and
clothing despite her repeated efforts to bathe and do laundry. She wants to sue. What claims could
she bring and why? What counterarguments would you expect? And, briefly, who do you think will
prevail and why?
Cruz remains in hospital. The doctors think she’ll eventually recover, but it looks like she might
not make it out of hospital in time to attend any election-night parties. What claims could she bring
and why? What counterarguments would you expect? And, briefly, who do you think will prevail
and why?
<< END OF EXAM >>
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C. Sample Syllabus
To see the “liquid” syllabus accompanying this casebook, including online materials not included
here, please visit www.thomaskadri.com/torts. Instructors using this casebook might roughly divide the
material up as follows (based on a 4-credit class meeting three times a week):
Week 1: Battery
Week 2: Assault; Consent
Week 3: Defense of People & Property; False Imprisonment; Trespass to Land
Week 4: Conversion; Trespass to Chattels; Consent; Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Week 5: Defamation; Injury; Duty (Unqualified Duties)
Week 6: Duty (Qualified Duties)
Week 7: Breach (Reasonable Person)
Week 8: Breach (Custom & Cost/Benefit)
Week 9: Breach (Res Ipsa Loquitor); Cause (Actual Causation)
Week 10: Cause (Proximate Causation)
Week 11: Negligence Per Se; Comparative Fault; Assumption of Risk (Express)
Week 12: Assumption of Risk (Implied); Ultrahazardous Activities; Compensatory Damages
Week 13: Punitive Damages; Vicarious & Joint Liability; IIED
Week 14: IIED; NIED; Tort Alternatives
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